In re S.G., 71 Cal.App.5th 654

Background

Mother and Father had a long, acrimonious custody history with recurring, largely unsubstantiated mutual allegations of abuse and about a dozen family-court restraining-order filings over ~2010–2020.
In November 2019 Mother obtained a family-court temporary restraining order and sought a permanent order after an October 2019 incident (Father allegedly banged on windows/doors while children present); DCFS filed a dependency petition before the permanent-restraining-order hearing.
The juvenile court heard jurisdiction, disposition, and Mother’s renewed section 213.5 restraining-order request in September 2020; it denied a permanent order protecting Mother (finding insufficient evidence Mother was at risk), granted a mutual 100-yard stay-away order, found the children were described by W&I Code § 300(c), and found Mother acted in bad faith and coached the children.
Mother appealed only the denial of the permanent restraining order; while the appeal was pending the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction (May 5, 2021) in an unappealed exit order.
The Court of Appeal (majority) held (1) the appeal was not moot because an appellate reversal and remittitur could revest limited jurisdiction in the juvenile court to issue the protective order, and (2) on the merits the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion — evidence did not compel a finding Mother needed the permanent order and any legal‑standard error was not prejudicial. A dissent would have dismissed the appeal as moot.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mother)	Defendant's Argument (Father)	Held
Mootness — can appeal proceed after unappealed termination of juvenile jurisdiction?	Appeal is not moot because if reversible error is found the appellate court can remand and remittitur will revest the juvenile court with limited jurisdiction to issue the requested order, which would provide immediate, effective relief.	Appeal is moot under the “general rule” that an unappealed exit order terminating juvenile jurisdiction typically precludes effective appellate relief; remand would be meaningless.	Not moot. Court held mootness depends on whether effective relief can be granted; remittitur can revest limited jurisdiction so appeal is justiciable here.
Power to revest juvenile court upon remand / scope of remittitur	Remittitur with directions may reinvest the juvenile court with the limited authority necessary to correct reversible error (e.g., to issue a §213.5 order).	Some authorities suggest a remand is pointless when juvenile jurisdiction has been terminated and not appealed.	The court rejected the categorical rule: remittitur may grant the lower court the limited power to follow appellate directions; prior cases stating an absolute bar were limited to their facts.
Sufficiency of evidence to grant §213.5 restraining order	Evidence (children’s statements, Mother’s account, Father’s past DV arrests) compelled issuance of a permanent protective order.	Evidence was conflicting, children were likely coached, and many prior referrals were unfounded; evidence did not compel a finding of present risk to Mother.	Affirmed. Substantial‑evidence/failure‑of‑proof review: the evidence did not compel a finding in Mother’s favor and the juvenile court’s credibility determinations stand.
Alleged incorrect legal standard applied by juvenile court	Court mistakenly required showing of threats/physical violence or reasonable apprehension thereof; §213.5 allows relief for disturbing the peace or jeopardy to safety without prior physical violence.	Even if the court misstated the standard, Mother cannot show it is reasonably probable she would have obtained a different result under the correct standard.	No reversible error. Either the court did not misapply the law, or any error was harmless because the record does not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Key Cases Cited

In re C.C., 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 (2009) (discusses mootness and case‑by‑case inquiry after termination of juvenile jurisdiction)
In re Michelle M., 8 Cal.App.4th 326 (1992) (held appeal moot where unappealed exit order controlled custody/visitation; court reads it narrowly)
In re Kristin B., 187 Cal.App.3d 596 (1986) (mootness must be decided case‑by‑case; effective relief controls)
In re Anna S., 180 Cal.App.4th 1489 (2010) (remittitur defines scope of lower‑court jurisdiction on remand)
In re Francisco W., 139 Cal.App.4th 695 (2006) (appellate remittitur can revest jurisdiction to implement directions)
In re N.S., 245 Cal.App.4th 53 (2016) (mootness inquiry focuses on appellate court’s ability to grant effective relief)
In re B.S., 172 Cal.App.4th 183 (2009) (§213.5 does not require prior physical violence; protection may issue where peace or safety is jeopardized)
In re Bruno M., 28 Cal.App.5th 990 (2018) (defines “disturbing the peace” under juvenile restraining‑order statute)
In re I.W., 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 (2009) (where appeal turns on failure of proof, reversal requires that the evidence compel a finding for appellant)
In re Cassandra B., 125 Cal.App.4th 199 (2004) (juvenile court must search for prior restraining orders and consider them when deciding §213.5 requests)
Lisa M. v. Superior Court (In re Lisa M.), 177 Cal.App.3d 915 (1986) (discussed in Michelle M.; facts where reversing earlier order could not affect final unappealed exit order)
Rashad D. v. Superior Court (In re Rashad D.), 63 Cal.App.5th 156 (2021) (applies Michelle M. reasoning to appeals affecting custody when exit order supplies final custody terms)
Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 557 (1970) (standard on disturbing trial court discretion and reversal for miscarriage of justice)