THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID ALAN LARA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S155481
Supreme Court of California
Mar. 8, 2010
48 Cal. 4th 216
Lauretta Marie Oravitz-Komlos, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Seth K. Schalit, Dorian Jung and Brent Wilner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Dolores A. Carr, District Attorney (Santa Clara), Dana Overstreet and Paul Colin, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
CORRIGAN, J.---Defendant David Alan Lara was tried for false imprisonment of a child, found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), and committed to a state hospital. A petition to extend his commitment was filed so late that he did not have adequate time to prepare for trial before his term ended. There was no good cause for the late filing. His motion to dismiss the petition on due process grounds was denied, and he was recommitted.
We hold: (1) The statutory deadline for filing an extension petition is directory, not mandatory, so long as the petition is filed before the expiration of the current commitment. (2) Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of this petition. (3) Upon motion, he would have been entitled, under due process, to release pending trial, subject to possible proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act).1 (4) Defendant is not now eligible for release, however, because the court retained jurisdiction to try him and he received a fair trial.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility, unless sanity has been fully restored.2 If the court orders such a commitment, it is required to set a maximum term,3 defined as the longest prison term that could have been imposed on the defendant.4
In this case, the trial court found that defendant had falsely imprisoned a child at knifepoint (
The medical director gave timely notice to the district attorney that defendant‘s commitment should be extended. However, the district attorney took no action until September 21, filing a petition for extension less than a month before defendant‘s scheduled release date. On September 29, defense counsel orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the statutory 90-day filing deadline. “[T]o preserve the record,” counsel asked for a trial date before October 15, but expressed concern that she could not be prepared by that time. “I have tried to reach Mr. Lara, and I have not even been able to speak to him.” The prosecutor opposed the motion, but offered no explanation for the delay. The court took the matter under submission. On
At an October 12, 2004, hearing, defense counsel explained why she could not prepare for trial by October 15. Although she had received the extension petition on September 29, she was unable to contact defendant at the hospital until October 1, and could not meet with him until October 7. The return on her subpoena duces tecum for defendant‘s records was set for October 15. She had to review the records before deciding whether to seek an independent psychiatric evaluation. The prosecutor conceded that the delay in filing the extension petition was not excused by good cause,6 and did not argue that the defense could reasonably be ready for trial before defendant‘s term expired. The trial court denied the dismissal motion, but made no finding whether defense counsel had adequate time to prepare for trial before defendant‘s scheduled release date.
On October 18, defendant filed for writs of habeas corpus, mandate and/or prohibition in the Court of Appeal. The petitions were denied on December 6,7 and this court denied review on February 16, 2005.8
On May 13, 2005, almost seven months after defendant‘s original commitment ended, a jury found that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. The trial court extended his commitment for two years, running from the date his term originally was to expire.
On July 17, 2007, the Court of Appeal reversed, directing that the trial court grant defendant‘s motion to dismiss because he had been denied due process.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the extension petition on due process grounds. Had he so moved, he would have been entitled to release pending trial on the petition, subject to possible LPS Act proceedings. However, no relief is
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Statutory Deadlines Are Directory
Defendant contends that the statutory deadlines were mandatory, and because they were not met, the court lost jurisdiction to try the case. This argument fails.
People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] (Williams) is one of many cases that have grappled with the question of whether a failure to meet a statutory deadline deprives a court of jurisdiction. It explained that the concept of jurisdiction can be used in somewhat differing ways.
“When courts use the phrase ‘lack of jurisdiction,’ they are usually referring to one of two different concepts, although, as one court has observed, the distinction between them is ‘hazy.’ (People v. Mendez (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1773, 1781 [286 Cal.Rptr. 216].)” (Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 447.) A lack of jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense results in “‘an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.’ (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942].)” On the other hand, a court may have jurisdiction in the strict sense but nevertheless lack “‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ (Ibid.) When a court fails to conduct itself in the manner
The distinction is important because the remedies are different. “[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond a court‘s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void” ab initio. (Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 447.) “Therefore, a claim based on a lack of . . . fundamental jurisdiction[] may be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].)” ‘In contrast, an act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time. [Citations.]’ (People v. Ruiz[ (1990)] 217 Cal.App.3d [574], 584 [265 Cal.Rptr. 886]; In re Andres G. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476, 482 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 285].)” (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660-661 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020].)
Whether the failure to follow a statute makes subsequent action void or merely voidable “‘has been characterized as a question of whether the statute should be accorded “mandatory” or “directory” effect. If the failure is determined to have an invalidating effect, the statute is said to be mandatory; if the failure is determined not to invalidate subsequent action, the statute is said to be directory.’ (People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 958 [140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382] . . . .)” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 923 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 483, 182 P.3d 1027] (City of Santa Monica)).10
Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question of interpretation for the courts. (City of Santa Monica, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 924.) “Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed directory.” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.) Here, the Legislature made its intent quite clear.
The
As the court noted in In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 577 [175 Cal.Rptr. 443] (Johns): “Throughout
With regard to defendant‘s reliance on the use of the word “shall,” it should not be assumed that every statute that uses that term is mandatory. (Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 625 [200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846]; Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 910–911, fn. 6 [136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606].) “Neither the word ‘may,’ nor the word ‘shall,’ is dispositive.” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 102.) The context of the language, as well as other indicia of legislative intent, must be considered. (DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523, 853 P.2d 978].) The preceding analysis demonstrates that the Legislature‘s clear intent was to use the term “section” to refer to the entirety of
Yet another factor supports our conclusion as to legislative intent. The Legislature‘s failure to include a penalty or consequence for noncompliance with the statutory procedure also indicates that the requirement is directory rather than mandatory. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79] (Correctional Peace Officers); Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 [158 Cal.Rptr. 662, 599 P.2d 1365] (Edwards).)
Defendant‘s reliance on Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, is misplaced. In Allen, the district attorney filed a petition to extend the commitment of a mentally disordered offender (MDO) after the defendant‘s previous commitment had ended. (Id. at p. 95.)
A “root requirement” of due process is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant liberty or property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event. (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379 [28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780]; see In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 937 [141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286].)
Here, without good cause, the petition to extend defendant‘s NGI commitment was filed so late he did not have adequate time to prepare for trial before his term ended. (See, ante, at p. 223.) Therefore, as we explain in part II.C., post, due process would have required that he be released pending trial, subject to LPS Act proceedings. An established line of California cases supports this analysis. We note at the outset, however, that these cases incorrectly identify the remedy for such due process denials. Insofar as they conclude that the extension orders should have been dismissed, they are disapproved.20 We discuss the fashioning of a remedy in greater detail in part II.C., post.
In People v. Hill (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1055 [185 Cal.Rptr. 64] (Hill), an NGI extension petition was filed 10 days before the maximum commitment date. The public defender was appointed only five court days before the existing commitment was to expire. Counsel had not yet met the defendant, his medical reports were unavailable, and independent experts had yet to be appointed. Undeterred by these realities, the trial court inquired why counsel could not proceed immediately and complete the trial before the current commitment ended. It did, however, grant a two-day continuance. Two days later counsel again argued that she could not possibly be prepared for trial in the next three days. The trial court expressed displeasure, noting that any number of lawyers had been able to begin trial on the very day of their appointment. Trial was ultimately held more than a year after the defendant‘s commitment had expired. (Id. at pp. 1057-1059.)
The Court of Appeal observed that the statutory time limits served the clear legislative objective to allow the defense “not less than 60 days to prepare for
Similarly, in People v. Hawkins (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 984 [189 Cal.Rptr. 126], an NGI extension petition was filed 45 days beyond the 90-day cutoff date, and counsel was not appointed until two days before trial was required by statute to begin. (Id. at pp. 986-988.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‘s dismissal of the petition as a denial of due process. (Id. at p. 988.)
In Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 245, the maximum NGI commitment date was November 8, 1981. The extension petition was not filed until October 14, and trial was set for November 2. A defense motion for dismissal made on the trial date was denied. (Id. at pp. 246-247.) Reversing the order extending the commitment, the Court of Appeal applied the due process analysis set out in Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 577. “‘Except where there has been an extended delay prejudice will not be presumed from delay. Where prejudice is not presumed, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show circumstances of actual prejudice.’ (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 581; see Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 505 [149 Cal.Rptr. 597, 585 P.2d 219]; Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 440–441 [121 Cal.Rptr. 457, 535 P.2d 321].)” (Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 248.)
The Dougherty court went on to consider the question of prejudice. As the result of the late filing, the defense had only 20 days, rather than 60, to prepare before the commitment term expired. “At the outset of trial, counsel informed the court that there had been insufficient time to secure the appointment of medical experts (
In Dougherty, the medical director‘s negligence resulted in a late submission of his extension recommendation. (Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 249.) The Dougherty court weighed that reason against the resulting prejudice. “As the Supreme Court stated in Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, ‘[t]he ultimate inquiry in determining a claim based upon due process is whether the defendant will be denied a fair trial. . . . Thus, although delay may have been caused only by the negligence of the government, the prejudice suffered by a defendant may be sufficient when balanced against the reasons for the delay to constitute a denial of due process.’ (22 Cal.3d at p. 507.) While here, unlike Scherling, the effect of the delay was not to deprive appellant of his right to speedy trial, but rather to force him to trial in less than the minimum time provided by statute to prepare a defense, the due process analysis is the same. (See In re Newbern, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 791; People v. Hawkins, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 987; People v. Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060.) Because the justification for the delay is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the order extending appellant‘s commitment was entered in violation of his right to due process.” (Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 249.)
These principles have recently been applied in People v. Tatum (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 41 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 718] (Tatum). Tatum had been committed as an MDO with a maximum commitment date of March 12, 2007.21 The district attorney did not file an extension petition until February 7. (Tatum, at p. 48.) As of March 2, 10 days before the commitment was to end, the defense had not received the hospital records. The court set trial for the last day of Tatum‘s current commitment. On that date, defense counsel told the court she still had received no hospital records and could not adequately represent the defendant. She argued that any further unauthorized confinement would deprive Tatum of due process. (Id. at pp. 49-51.) The court dismissed the petition and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 46-47.)
The late filing of an extension petition potentially gives rise to two types of prejudice: (1) inability to prepare for trial in the remaining time; or (2) involuntary commitment beyond the release date. (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) When a petition is filed just before the release date, “the offender is often forced to choose between these two types of prejudice. Either the offender must curtail otherwise necessary trial preparation to ensure a ‘preexpiration trial’ (Zachary v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1036 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 532]) or agree to a continuance of the trial date beyond the release date, thus suffering unauthorized postrelease confinement. [W]henever the state‘s unexcused late filing of an MDO petition forces an offender to ‘choose’ between these two types of prejudice, some prejudice is necessarily established.” (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.)
The degree of prejudice will depend on a variety of factors, including how late the filing is, the amount of time reasonably required to prepare for trial and mount a defense, and whether action by the court or defense counsel contributed to the delay. (See Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61-62.) It should be noted that both the NGI and MDO recommitment statutes provide for a defense waiver of the 30-day time limit for beginning trial (
The Attorney General argues that defendant suffered no prejudice. As we shall explain, the cases on which he relies do not assist him, but they do show how different factual scenarios may yield differing results. First, however, it is useful to distinguish between the two senses in which the term “prejudice”
In Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 577, an NGI extension petition was filed 17 days late. (Id. at p. 579.) Had trial begun the full 30 days before the commitment expired,23 the defense would not have had the full 60 days for preparation.24 Instead, the trial began beyond the 30-day limit. It was completed before the commitment expired, and the commitment was extended. In reviewing Johns‘s due process claim, the Court of Appeal noted that prejudice would not be presumed because the filing delay was not lengthy. (Johns, at p. 581.) Thus, the defendant bore the burden to establish actual prejudice. He failed to do so. He was given the full 60 days to prepare, and did not cite any prejudice attributable to his trial beginning less than 30 days before his original commitment ended. (Ibid.) Johns is distinguishable from our case. Here, the showing of prejudice is substantially stronger. Because a showing of prejudice was made, inquiry into the reasons for the delay was required. There was no showing of good cause. (See, ante, at p. 223.) Finally, unlike Johns, defendant here was subjected to nearly seven months of additional confinement after his release date, but before the adjudication to which he was entitled. (See, ante, at p. 223.)
Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 117, is also distinguishable. It involved an MDO extension. The medical director‘s 180-day evaluation letter25 was not sent to the district attorney until 50 days before Fernandez‘s scheduled release date. (Fernandez, at p. 127.) The prosecutor promptly filed an extension petition, but the trial court found, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the medical director‘s delay was unsupported by good cause. (Id. at pp. 127-128.) Fernandez had only 29 days to prepare for trial (id. at p. 132),
Fernandez was held for 12 days beyond his release date before his trial was completed and the recommitment order issued. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim that this delay constituted a denial of due process. The record revealed the trial date was extended beyond Fernandez‘s scheduled release date because his own counsel requested continuances and not because of the prosecutor‘s failure to comply with any statutory deadlines. (Fernandez, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) Once the prosecutor received the medical director‘s letter, he issued expedited subpoenas to assist the defense in obtaining necessary documents. The original trial date was set before the commitment expired and the prosecutor was ready to begin on that date. The defense reported that the district attorney had made every effort to resolve the case expeditiously. (Id. at p. 134.) “Ultimately, the trial on the merits was concluded in one day. Except for the continuance requested by defense counsel, the trial would have been completed before defendant‘s release date. Although the trial court was within its discretion to grant the continuance requested by defense counsel, defendant may not now claim prejudice from this same delay requested on his behalf. To allow otherwise would allow defendants to request numerous continuances for good cause, pushing the trial past the release date, and then claim prejudice from the continued trial.” (Id. at p. 133.) In making its evaluation, the trial court properly considered the timing of the medical director‘s letter, diligent efforts made by the prosecution in filing the petition and in assisting the defense to acquire discovery, reasonable preparation time for both parties, the continuances requested by the defense and the circumstances attendant to those requests, and the ultimate date of the proceedings. Thus, Fernandez does not assist the Attorney General. It stands for the proposition that the complained-of prejudice must be attributable to the People‘s failure, not to legitimate requests made by the defense. Here it was the prosecution‘s tardiness that necessitated the delay.
In Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 436, the district attorney filed an MDO extension petition only 18 days before Williams‘s scheduled release date, and Williams was not brought before the court until two days before that date. Trial began two days after the release date and took two days to complete. (Id. at pp. 445-446.) Williams was represented by counsel, who did not object when the trial date was set. (Id. at pp. 440, 461-462.) Having
Again our case is distinguishable. Here, the defense repeatedly objected to the setting of the trial date, made its case for the demonstration of prejudice, and even sought writ review. (See, ante, at pp. 222-223.)
C. Remedy
As we have explained, a failure to comply with
As we explained in Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, if an extension petition is not filed before the current commitment ends, the defendant is no longer
If prosecutorial delay causes prejudice to the defendant that does not deprive the defendant of a reasonable time to prepare for trial, the court must consider whether and what remedial action is required. First, the court must balance the explanation for the delay against the prejudice resulting from it. (Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 60-61; Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 249.) If the justification for the delay outweighs its prejudicial effect, the defendant may remain confined, pending trial, beyond the scheduled release date. If, however, good cause is not shown, or the good cause shown does not outweigh the prejudice suffered, the court must fashion a remedy.
A defendant released from commitment under the NGI or MDO statutes may, however, be subject to confinement under the LPS Act. A defendant who falls under the provisions of the LPS Act is held in a therapeutic setting and is entitled to the more stringent timeframes and procedural protections the LPS Act provides. This approach comports with the intent of the Legislature, honors due process, and ensures both that the defendant will be treated and the public protected. (See Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 105-107; Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 66; Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060.)
In the future, those in defendant‘s circumstances will be entitled to release at the end of their then current terms, subject to possible LPS Act proceedings, pending trial on their extension petitions.26 However, no relief is appropriate in this case. The court retained jurisdiction to try the petition. The trial, while untimely, was ultimately fair. Therefore, violation of the statutory timelines does not warrant reversal.27
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
David Alan Lara was the subject of a petition to extend his commitment under
Defendant argues that the violation of these time limits deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed on the petition to extend his commitment. Yet, as
The violation of the 90-day and 30-day time limits was harmless because defendant was not prejudiced. This is not a case in which a defendant was forced to go to trial in shortened time without an adequate opportunity to prepare. (Cf. People v. Dougherty, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 245, 247-248 [191 Cal.Rptr. 668] [prejudice was demonstrated where the petition was filed 66 days late without good cause, the defendant was forced to go to trial with only 20 days of preparation, and counsel informed the court there had been insufficient time for the defense to secure medical experts who could testify
Defendant does complain that he remained in custody, beyond the expiration of his original commitment, pending trial on the petition to extend his commitment. I agree with the majority opinion that this was error, in that defendant would have been entitled to his release upon expiration of his original commitment since there was no good cause for the delay in the trial, defendant did not waive time, and no other statute authorized his continued confinement.1 I would go further and suggest that defendant may well have had a civil remedy for unlawful confinement if he had asked for (and been denied) his release during that period. However, this type of injury in itself does not mean that defendant suffered prejudice for purposes of this proceeding. Prejudice, under our state Constitution, means a miscarriage of justice that rendered the proceeding or its outcome unfair or unreliable. (People v. Watson (1946) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Defendant nowhere alleges that his continued confinement under a program of treatment interfered with his ability to prepare his defense or otherwise undermined the reliability of the verdict. Hence, he suffered no prejudice.
Having disposed of defendant‘s statutory claim, I turn now to his constitutional claim that the violation of the time limits deprived him of due process. Generally, a due process claim arising from delays caused by the prosecution is analyzed by balancing the reasons for the delay against the prejudice caused to the accused. (United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 790 [52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct. 2044]; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, 105 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557].)
The majority opinion purports to adopt this well-settled framework: it accepts the district attorney‘s concession that the delay was not supported by
No one disputes that being forced to go to trial without adequate preparation would be a denial of due process. However, no such deprivation occurred here, inasmuch as defendant was granted over seven months to prepare for trial and defendant does not claim he was unprepared
Being involuntarily held in confinement without any statutory authorization may be a denial of due process but, without more, is not an injury that can be remedied in this proceeding, inasmuch as defendant has made no showing that his continued confinement affected the fairness of the proceeding or undermined confidence in its outcome. (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [33 L.Ed. 2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767–768 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice---just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594–596 [165 L.Ed.2d 56, 126 S.Ct. 2159] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend. may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim‘s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a criminal proceeding, since the interest it protects is unrelated to the actual seizure of the evidence]) or a breach of the defendant‘s attorney-client and work product privileges by a state actor other than the prosecution team (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 768 [220 P.3d 820] [intrusion by jail personnel on the defendant‘s legal papers may support a civil cause of action but does not entitle the victim to a reversal of his criminal conviction, where there is no indication any confidential information was conveyed to the prosecution team]). A defendant suffering confinement under those circumstances may be entitled to civil damages, but such confinement could not invalidate a trial conducted under fair procedures and resulting in an outcome that is reliable and unaffected by the error.
With this framework in mind, it is apparent that many of the cases on which the majority purports to rely are flawed, and this has in turn led the majority down a flawed analytical path. In hopes of clarifying the law for courts and practitioners in the future, I discuss these cases briefly.
The fundamental error shared by these cases is their assumption that when the People, without good cause, fail to comply with the time limits under
Consider People v. Hill, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 1055, which (contrary to the majority opinion) was decided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, and which was decided prior to the 1984 amendment to
In People v. Hawkins, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 984, the same Court of Appeal division that decided Hill affirmed the dismissal of a petition to extend the defendant‘s commitment where, without good cause, the petition was filed only 45 days before (and counsel was appointed only two days before) expiration of the original commitment. The Court of Appeal once again posited a forced choice between trial without adequate preparation or continued confinement beyond the maximum term. (Id. at pp. 987–988.) It thus failed to consider whether Hawkins could have been released pending trial or
Even worse, the majority opinion contends that People v. Tatum, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 41, which involved a commitment under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act) (
Unfortunately, the majority opinion all but ensures confusion among those charged with implementing the law when it perpetuates Tatum‘s mistaken understanding of “prejudice” and asserts further that “[t]he degree of prejudice will depend on a variety of factors, including how late the filing is, the amount of time reasonably required to prepare for trial and mount a defense, and whether action by the court or defense counsel contributed to the delay.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 232.) Given that a defendant faced with an unjustifiable delay may seek release once the prior commitment has expired, one must wonder why the degree of prejudice would depend on how late the filing is or the time needed to mount a defense. As long as the delay in the trial is not so extended as to raise a presumption of prejudice (see Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 812 [51 Cal.Rptr. 921, 415 P.2d 809]; In re Johns, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 581) and, as stated above, the defendant is granted adequate time to prepare, a late filing would not in itself establish either a due process violation or prejudice. And, given that a court need not even consider whether a delay was justified if there was no prejudice (Scherling v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 506-507), I cannot fathom how an analysis of the court‘s or defense counsel‘s contributions to the delay could affect the degree of prejudice.