Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hosp.Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hosp.
I.
Wokocha sued the Hospital in October 2012, alleging he was mishandled by an occupational therapist during a postoperative stay at the Hospital in January 2009. The Hospital‘s negligence, Wokocha alleged, caused spinal shock and bleeding, which in turn caused Wokocha‘s deterioration into quadriplegia. The suit proceeded to trial. In February 2013, the jury returned a special verdict finding that the Hospital was negligent in the care of Wokocha but that this negligence was not a substantial factor causing Wokocha‘s quadriplegia. (All dates in the following two paragraphs are in the year 2013.)
Shortly after the verdict, Wokocha died, and the court substituted Kabran as plaintiff. On March 1, Kabran filed a notice of intent to move for a new trial, alleging newly discovered material evidence as a ground for the motion. On March 6, the parties stipulated to a 20-day extension under
The series of events that gave rise to the issue before us began when Kabran, in filing the memorandum and supporting affidavits on April 2, failed to pay the requisite filing fee. On April 4, the clerk of court canceled the original April 2 time stamp and did not process the submissions. Before the time stamp was canceled, however, Kabran obtained via an ex parte hearing on April 3 an order setting a new trial motion hearing for April 12 with a deadline for the Hospital‘s opposition papers of April 10. Kabran‘s memorandum was stamped as received, with filing fees, on April 5; the Gross and Grice affidavits were filed on April 9. In opposition, the Hospital submitted numerous evidentiary objections to the content of the affidavits and argued that the allegedly new evidence was cumulative, could have been discovered through reasonable diligence before trial, and would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The Hospital did not object to the admission of the memorandum or supporting affidavits on the ground that they were untimely filed. On April 12, the trial court granted Kabran‘s motion for a new trial on the grounds that “[t]here is a probability that this new evidence [the autopsy findings] may render a different result in a new trial” and that the evidence “could not, with reasonable diligence, [have] been discovered and produced at trial.” The order quoted Grice‘s affidavit in support of this conclusion.
The Hospital appealed. In addition to disputing the new trial order on its merits, the Hospital argued for the first time that the Grice and Gross affidavits were not timely filed under
II.
“A motion for a new trial is ‘a new statutory proceeding, collateral to the original proceeding’ and constitutes a new action brought to set aside the judgment.” (Spruce v. Wellman (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 158, 161.) Both the “right to move for a new trial” and the court‘s jurisdiction to hear it are creatures of statute. (Wagner v. Singleton (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 69, 72; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 19, p. 601 [“there is no inherent power in the trial court to grant a new trial”].) A trial court gains jurisdiction to hear such a motion only after a party files a timely notice of intent and judgment has been entered. (Tabor v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 505, 508 [court had no jurisdiction to hear new trial motion filed before court signed and filed findings of fact and conclusion of law, and parties cannot overcome this jurisdictional defect by stipulation or waiver].) Thus, a “trial court does not have the jurisdiction to make an order granting a new trial on its own motion.” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 151.) Nor is it “within the power of the litigants to invest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion for a
Because the trial court‘s jurisdiction to hear a new trial motion is contingent upon the moving party‘s timely filing of notice, this court and the Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that failure to adhere to the statutory provisions described above will make a subsequently granted new trial order reversible on appeal. “[I]t has uniformly been held that an order granting a new trial is in excess of jurisdiction and void if, for example, it is made . . . on a ground not prescribed by statute (Laumann v. Conner (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 631; cf. Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166), or upon a notice of intention that is filed prematurely (Fong Chuck v. Chin Po Foon (1947) 29 Cal.2d 552; see also Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 458–462) or too late (Smith v. Ibos (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 551) or is not served on an adverse party (Cox v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 26, 31), or if the court purports to grant the motion after expiration of the statutory time for ruling (Hinrichs v. Maloney (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 544).” (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 118.)
In particular, the trial court loses jurisdiction to hear a new trial motion if no notice of intent is filed within 15 days of the mailing or service of notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days of the entry of the judgment. (
By contrast, the Courts of Appeal have consistently held that the 10-day deadline for the filing of affidavits is not jurisdictional. A court may retroactively
Here, the Hospital failed to challenge an affidavit filed after the 30-day aggregate period had expired. Did the trial court have power to grant a new trial on the basis of that affidavit, or is such a new trial order void for lack of jurisdiction? In Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 30-day aggregate period is not jurisdictional, at least under the “narrow and peculiar circumstances” presented by that case. (Id. at pp. 21–22.) By contrast, several decisions have held that a trial court must disregard affidavits filed after
In Erikson, the Court of Appeal squarely addressed this question and held that the 30-day deadline for filing affidavits is jurisdictional. Plaintiff Erikson had been awarded significant damages in a medical malpractice suit, and defendant Weiner moved for a new trial due to juror misconduct. Weiner filed four affidavits in succession: one on October 24, the final day of an extension granted by the trial court; two on November 8; and a supplemental affidavit at the hearing on November 14. Three of the four affidavits were by the same juror. (Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667–1668.) Over Erikson‘s objection, the trial court accepted a declaration filed after the 30-day aggregate period had ended. (Id. at p. 1669.) The trial court denied Weiner‘s motion for a new trial. On appeal, the court held that it would not consider the belatedly filed affidavit in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion. (Id. at p. 1671.)
Treating the terms “mandatory” and “jurisdictional” as synonyms, Erikson concluded that the aggregate 30-day period for filing affidavits is mandatory. (Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1671.) The court focused on
III.
“ ‘When courts use the phrase “lack of jurisdiction,” they are usually referring to one of two different concepts, although . . . the distinction between them is “hazy.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224 (Lara).) A lack of fundamental jurisdiction is “ ‘ “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. [Citation.] . . .” [¶] . . . [F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Rather, an act beyond a court‘s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is null and void’ ab initio. [Citation.] ‘Therefore, a claim based on a lack of . . . fundamental jurisdiction[] may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 224–225, italics added.) Likewise, “a
“Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.” (People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286–287.) We have described courts that violate procedural requirements, order relief that is unauthorized by statute or common law, or otherwise “fail to conduct [themselves] in the manner prescribed” by law as acting “in excess of jurisdiction.” (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 224–225.) Because a court that acts in excess of jurisdiction still has “jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 (Abelleira)), any such act is “valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time” (People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 574, 584). In contrast to errors concerning a court‘s fundamental jurisdiction, “[e]rrors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly . . . and are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final . . . . ” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661.)
In interpreting statutory requirements, courts have also used the terms “mandatory” and “directory.” Whether a requirement is mandatory or directory is determined largely by its effect: “If the failure to comply with a particular procedural step does not invalidate the action ultimately taken . . . the procedural requirement is referred to as ‘directory.’ If, on the other hand, it is concluded that noncompliance does invalidate subsequent action, the requirement is deemed
Erikson understood “mandatory” as a synonym for “jurisdictional.” (Erikson, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1671.) This court also has suggested on occasion that the “mandatory” and “jurisdictional” labels refer to the same concept. (See Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410; California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1148 (Correctional Peace Officers).) Where the statutory provision at issue governs a decisionmaking entity‘s exercise of authority — like that of an administrative agency — a “mandatory” statute may be “jurisdictional” in the sense that the entity lacks the power to take the action at issue if it does not comply with the statute. (See Edwards, at p. 410 [hearing deadlines for board of permit appeals]; Gray, supra, 58 Cal.4th 901 [30-day warning period before issuing citations using a newly
But a party‘s failure to comply with a mandatory requirement “does not necessarily mean a court loses fundamental jurisdiction resulting in ‘an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.’ ” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 101, fn. 5, quoting Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288.) It is a “misuse of the term ‘jurisdictional’ . . . to treat it as synonymous with ‘mandatory’ ” as a general matter. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 4, p. 578.) “There are many time provisions, e.g., in procedural rules, that are not directory but mandatory; these are binding, and parties must comply with them to avoid a default or other penalty. But failure to comply does not render the proceeding void” in a fundamental sense. (Ibid.; see Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1990) 52 Cal.3d 266, 274–275; City of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 551, fn. 2 (Santa Clara) [Courts of Appeal “erred in reasoning that the limitation, because mandatory, was necessarily jurisdictional.”].) The high court has similarly recognized, as a matter of federal law, that “mandatory” rules should not always “be given the jurisdictional brand.” (Henderson v. Shinseki (2011) 562 U.S. 428, 435; see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (2006) 546 U.S. 500, 510; Eberhart v. United States (2005) 546 U.S. 12, 17–18; see also Bowles v. Russell (2007) 551 U.S. 205, 216–217 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).)
For example, a statute of limitations may be “mandatory in the sense that the court may not excuse a late complaint on grounds of mistake, neglect, or the like,” but “it is not ‘jurisdictional.’ ” (Santa Clara, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 551, fn. 2.) A properly raised objection to an untimely complaint may require that the court dismiss it, and the court‘s failure to dismiss is reversible on appeal. But a party cannot raise the untimeliness for the first time on appeal or in a collateral
In sum, jurisdictional rules are mandatory, but mandatory rules are not necessarily jurisdictional. Noncompliance with a mandatory rule can result in invalidation of the action so long as the noncompliance is properly raised; a party can forfeit its challenge to the noncompliance by failing to object. Noncompliance with a jurisdictional rule cannot be excused or forfeited; a party may assert such noncompliance for the first time on appeal or in a collateral attack as a ground for invalidating the action. In addition, a court may decide on its own motion that it lacks authority over the action because of noncompliance with a jurisdictional rule. (See Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 302–303.)
The question here is whether
IV.
There are two presumptions, one general and one specific, against concluding that a trial court has no power to consider affidavits filed outside the 30-day aggregate period specified in
These presumptions are rebuttable. We find time limits to have jurisdictional significance where the Legislature clearly so intends. “Courts have . . . adopted various tests to determine the Legislature‘s ‘probable intent’ ” in such
In construing
Further, unlike
The fact that the deadlines of
The statutory scheme here provides that submission of affidavits must come within the 60-day jurisdictional period set forth by
The most significant changes initially proposed were eliminated before the passage of
“Invariably, ‘courts look to the procedure‘s purpose or function’ ” in assessing whether “ ‘noncompliance has an invalidating effect.’ ” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 924.) The Hospital argues that the purpose of
The Hospital could have objected to the allegedly untimely affidavits at the April 3, 2013 ex parte hearing or in the opposition it filed on April 10, 2013. But the Hospital did not register any such objection on the record. The Hospital argues that because the clerk did not cancel the affidavits’ time stamp until April 4, it “could not have possibly known that Plaintiff‘s papers were not timely filed” at the time of the April 3 ex parte hearing. But the Hospital had been timely and personally served with the affidavits on April 2 and thus could not have been prejudiced by their inclusion at the ex parte hearing. In any event, the Hospital
Because
In light of
We hold that the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction to consider Kabran‘s allegedly untimely filed affidavits in support of her motion for a new trial. The Hospital, having failed to object to the affidavits’ timeliness in the trial court, may not challenge the trial court‘s reliance on those affidavits for the first time on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
LIU, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.