In re M.R.
{¶1} Juvenile-appellant M.R. appeals from his designation as a juvenile offender registrant on three constitutional grounds. First, appellant characterizes the provision in
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶2} After conducting a trial, the Jefferson County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, found appellant delinquent for committing the offense of rape. See
{¶3} On June 6, 2013, appellant filed a brief in the juvenile court arguing that a classification would be unconstitutional on the three grounds aforementioned, and the state opposed those arguments. On August 2, 2013, the juvenile court found
{¶4} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he raises the three constitutional arguments that he presented prior to the classification hearing. He does not contest the factual bases for classification into tier II.
JUVENILE CLASSIFICATION AS “PUNITIVE”
{¶5} As a preliminary matter, we note that various arguments set forth by appellant are based upon the initial position that S.B. 10 as applied to juveniles is classified as a punitive rather than a remedial scheme. The state does not contest appellant‘s initial characterization of the classification system as punitive.
{¶6} The prior classification laws had been considered remedial rather than punitive. See State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 29; State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 418, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). After the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act in S.B. 10, the Supreme Court addressed whether the changes made to Chapter 2950 classifications could be applied retroactively to those who committed their crimes prior to the amendments but who were sentenced after the amendments, i.e. whether the classification scheme is now a punitive rather than a remedial law. State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
{¶7} The Williams Court found that the S.B. 10 аmendments were punitive based upon certain changes: automatic classification and registration, no evidentiary hearing, no trial court discretion as to tier, the inability to challenge the classification, the increase from ten years to twenty-five years (adult tier II) registration, and registration was required more often. Id. at ¶ 17-21 (stating that no one change compelled the decision). Williams dealt only with adult classification, and some of the concerns expressed are not involved in the juvenile classification at issue.
{¶8} Still, the Court broadly pronounced, “S.B. No. 10, as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.” Id. at syllabus, ¶ 21. And, after reviewing the Ferguson dissent‘s rationale, the Williams Court announced: “Following the enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been removed:
{¶9} The Court then summarily reversed and remanded multiple juvenile cases for application of its 2011 Williams case. In re Cases Held for the Decision in In re D.J.S., 130 Ohio St.3d 253, 2011-Ohio-5349, 957 N.E.2d 288; In re D.J.S., 130 Ohio St.3d 257, 2011-Ohio-5342, 957 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 1. And, the Court later applied Williams to a juvenile in a case concluding that the earliest application of the S.B. 10 amendments in order to avoid retroactive application is the January 2008 effective date rather than the June 2007 enactment date. In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 6, 12. Thus, even though the adult classification scheme contains major differences from the juvenile classification scheme, the Supreme Court has concluded that the new classifications are punitive as applied to juveniles as well. See also In re Lilley, 8th Dist. No. 98905, 2013-Ohio-3616, ¶ 11-12; In re C.W., 4th Dist. No. 11CA918, 2013-Ohio-2483, ¶ 7.
{¶10} Finally, we add that the Supreme Court has concluded that the automatic tier III lifetime registration and community notification for a public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant (PRQJOR) (with no chance оf reclassification for 25 years) is not just punitive, but is cruel and unusual punishment. In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 86. The effect of this holding is discussed further in assignment of error number three. From here, we proceed under the overriding principle that the S.B. 10 amendments are punitive as applied to juveniles. This leads to appellant‘s first assignment of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
{¶11} Appellant sets forth three assignments of error, the first of which provides:
{¶12} “Revised Code Section 2152.83(A) violates double jeopardy by allowing the juvenile court to impose multiple punishments for the same offense.”
{¶13} Pursuant to the statutory division contested by appellant here, a court that adjudicates a 16 or 17 year old sexually oriented offender “shall issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child‘s release from the secure facility an order that classifies the child a juvenile offender registrant * * *.” (Emphasis added).
{¶14} Appellant begins by stating that juveniles are protected by double jeopardy principles. See In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258, ¶ 23 (cannot impose sentence after probation completed), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (cannot transfer juvenile to adult court for second trial after adjudicatory hearing). As the Ohio Supreme Court considers S.B. 10 punitive, appellant moves to the portion of the double jeopardy clause that prohibits multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings, noting that the federal and state double jeopardy clauses are coextensive. See State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7 (the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that in Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive). Appellant concludes that since the classification is considered punitive, the deferred classification hearing is now an unconstitutional successive proceeding that imposes more criminal punishment, citing the Supreme Court‘s Raber case in support.
{¶15} In Raber, the defendant was indicted for sexual battery (F2) but pled guilty to sexual imposition (M3). At sentencing, the parties disputed whether the sexually oriented offense involved consensual conduct based upon a statutory provision that one need not be classified if the offense involved “consensual sexual сonduct or consensual sexual contact” with a victim over 18 years old who is not under the custodial authority of the perpetrator. The trial court asked the state to demonstrate the lack of consent, but according to the Ohio Supreme Court, the state failed to do so. State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 3. The parties agreed to brief the sexually oriented offender issue, but did not do so. A week later, the trial court entered judgment sentencing the defendant to sixty days in jail (thirty suspended) and two years of community control, without ordering him to register as a sexually oriented offender.
{¶16} Ten months thereafter, the court scheduled a classification hearing, which eventually proceeded (before another judge). The defendant‘s former girlfriend testified that she consented to vaginal but not anal sex. The court found that the defendant wаs a tier I sex offender, and at another hearing held one month later, the court provided the defendant with notice of his duties. The court then entered judgment on the classification, which ended up being more than 14 months after the final judgment of conviction and sentence.
{¶17} The Supreme Court invalidated the classification due to principles surrounding the finality of final judgments and double jeopardy. First, the Court also stated that the trial court lacked authority to modify its final judgment, noting that there is nothing in the record showing that at the time the court sentenced the defendant, it erred in failing to classify him and finding there was no clerical error or issue that would result in a void sentence. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶18} The Court then pointed to their recent Williams decision that: ”
{¶19} After reiterating the punitive nature of S.B. 10, the Court addressed the pertinent double jeopardy protection: “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). “If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.” Id., quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987).
{¶20} The Court thus concluded the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality when the court sentenced him and double jeopardy principles prohibited the trial court from reopening his case, conducting a separate trial to determine whether the sexual activity at issue here wаs consensual, and then classifying the defendant as a sex offender. Id. at ¶ 26. In sum, the trial court lacked authority to reopen the case to reconsider the final judgment it had entered, and the protections against double jeopardy barred it from classifying the defendant as a sex offender more than a year after it imposed sentence. Id. at ¶ 27.
{¶21} Appellant concludes that classifying him as a juvenile offender registrant at any time other than his disposition likewise violates double jeopardy and thus
{¶22} Raber is not a case on point. The statute applicable to the adult in Raber provided that the court shall provide notice of the registration requirement at sentencing. See Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 250 at ¶ 16, citing
{¶23} Appellant‘s original brief does not raise the portion of Raber dealing with principles concerning modification of a final judgment. His reply brief, however, raises issues with entering a further sentence on a final order. Therein, he cites In re Sekulich, 65 Ohio St.2d 13, 15, 417 N.E.2d 1014 (1981), where a juvenile court‘s dispositional order fined a child $50 and transferred the case to another county‘s juvenile court for further disposition. The Supreme Court held that the first county entered a final appealable dispositional order, noting that the transfer statute does not allow transfer after disposition has been made. We note that a reply brief is not the place to raise a new argument.
{¶24} In any event, Sekulich did not deal with sexual offender classification or an еxpress statute allowing a post-disposition or a continued-disposition proceeding to occur. Statutorily, a classification can be made after disposition where the juvenile is sent to a secure facility. Thus, unlike in Raber or Sekulich, the juvenile court does in fact have authority to hold the later hearing and impose the contested item, here a classification into a tier. Such statute also establishes that the pertinent portion of the double jeopardy clause is not violated here.
{¶25} That is, as aforementioned, “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.” Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 at ¶ 24, citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. This protection prohibits the punishment only “[if a defendant has a legitimate expеctation of finality * * *.” Id., quoting Fogel, 829 F.2d at 87.
{¶26} For instance, a defendant has no legitimate expectation of finality regarding a sentence that is subject to direct review. See State v. Holdcroft , 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 1 N.E.2d 382, 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 16, citing State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-3835, 893 N.E.2d 818. The Ohio Supreme Court pointed out in Holdcroft how the United States Supreme Court charges a defendant with knowledge of a statute allowing the state to appeal from a certain sentence and thus he has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has run. Id., citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980).
{¶27} In addressing whether an increase of a sentence on review constitutes multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the DiFrancesco Court explained that one may try to argue that “the defendant perceives the length of his sentence as finally determined when he begins to serve it, and that the trial judge should be prohibited from thereafter increasing the sentence * * *.” DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139. However, the Court concluded: “that argument has no force where, as in the dangerous special offender statute, Congress has specifically provided that the sentence is subject to appeal. Under such circumstances, there can be no expectation of finality in the original sentence.” Id. (also emphasizing that the punishment authorized by Congress was “clear and specific” and noting that the statute represents “a considered legislative attempt to attack a specific problem“).
{¶28} Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld a statute which allows a judge to add any forgotten post-release control after sentence (and before release from the sentence) based upon the principle that the defendant has foreknowledge from the statute that such altered punishment can occur. State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 33 (this citation is to the holding regarding prospective application of the statute; the other holding in Singleton, that the statute cannot be applied retroactively, was affected by subsequent decision but is not pertinent here), citing Fogel, 829 F.2d at 87 (“A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased.“).
{¶29} In sum, the juvenile court has statutory authority to enter a classification upon release from the secure facility rather than at disposition. The juvenile being sentenced to a secure facility has statutory notice that classification will not occur at initial disposition but will be deferred until release. Because the statute cleаrly provides for a deferred classification until the time of release from the secure facility, the juvenile had no “legitimate expectation of finality” with regards to classification at the time of the disposition order committing him to a secure facility and thus there is no double jeopardy violation. This assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
{¶30} Appellant‘s second assignment of error contends:
{¶31} “The Jefferson County Juvenile Court erred when it classified M.R. as a juvenile offender registrant because M.R.‘s status as a mandatory registrant under
{¶32} Where a child aged 16 or 17 commits a sexually oriented offense, the juvenile court must classify the child as a juvenile offender registrant. See
{¶33} Appellant states that these classifications based upon age violate the equal protection clause contending that there is no rational basis for the disparate treatment of juveniles whom he believes are similarly situated. He urges that differential treatment is not supported by empirical evidence. Appellant cites to some studies that he reviewed in his memorandum to the trial court on this issue, dealing with the negative impact of registration on juveniles, the importance of treatment in decreasing recidivism risk for juveniles, and the lack of studies proving that juvenile
{¶34} The juvenile court‘s entry overruling the equal protection argument found that differences based upon the age of a juvenile are self-evident and that nothing was presented in the case which would overcome the statute‘s presumption of constitutionality. At his classification hearing, appellant presented the testimony of a psychologist who testified in accordance with the studies he cited but did not make statements regarding the classification among juveniles. The juvenile court pointed out that even if the court had discretion concerning whether to classify appellant (as it does for a 14 or 15 year old), the court still would have chosen to classify him. (Tr. 32).
{¶35} An equal protection analysis progresses the same under both the Ohio and the United States Constitutions. State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 664 N.E.2d 926 (1996). Where the challenger does not raise a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the test provides that class distinctions among individuals are permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Id. Notably, similarly situated persons must be treated alike, unless a rational basis justifies treating them differently; the test “does not require things which are different in fact * * * to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-4414, 936 N.E.2d 919, ¶ 38 (thus a comparison of only similarly situated individuals is imperative). See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (equal protection directs that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike).
{¶36} Under the rational basis level of scrutiny, legislative classifications can be invalidated only if they bear no relation to the state‘s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d at 561. As we consider any conceivable justification, the state has no actual litigation burden in facing a challenge to the rationality of a statutory classification. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 76, at ¶
{¶37} This rational basis test is not stringent and is even considered “relatively relaxed” as “the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Classifications are thus presumed to be valid. Id. Perfect classifications are not necessary let alone possible, and a law is not violative of equal protection rights merely because the classifications are imperfect. Id. at 314, 316. Consequently, there is “substantial deferenсe to the predictive judgment” of the legislature. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 531.
{¶38} The Eleventh District has addressed an argument by a 15 year old that the juvenile registration classifications based upon age violate his equal protection rights as a line is drawn so that 13 year olds are not subject to registration. In re B.D., 11th Dist. No. 2011-P-0078, 2012-Ohio-4463. The court first suggested that the juvenile failed to show that a 14 or 15 year old is similarly situated to a 13 year old. Id. at ¶ 31. The B.D. court continued that even if proximity in age suggests a similar situation: the legislature made a policy decision to exclude 13 year olds from the classification scheme; this is a uniquely legislative function; the line drawn is presumed constitutional; and the legislature‘s decision was not unreasonable. Id. at ¶ 31-21.
{¶39} The Third District has discussed the legislative concern for sex offender recidivism and public safety and concluded that the legislature rationally сoncluded that the lower the age of the offender, the reduced likelihood of recidivism, thereby granting the juvenile court discretion in determining whether a sex offender classification is needed when the offender is younger. In re J.M., 3d Dist. No. 16-12-01, 2012-Ohio-4109, ¶ 32. See also In re Forbess, 3d Dist. No. 02-09-20, 2010-Ohio-2826, ¶ 56 (overruling assignment of error that
{¶40} The Fourth District has also concluded that juvenile offender age classifications do not violate equal protection principles because the lines drawn are rationally related to legitimate government interest in protecting the public. In re C.P., 4th Dist. No. 09CA41, 2010-Ohio-1484, ¶ 25. That сase was reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds involving the mandatory, automatic classification for public registry qualified juveniles, under cruel and unusual punishment and due process, without a ruling on the equal protection holdings made below. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1445, 967 N.E.2d 729.
{¶41} Here, appellant, who was 16 at the time of the offense, raises both the line at age 14 and the line at age 16. First, it is not difficult to rationally conclude that children who are 13 and under are not similarly situated to a 16 or 17 year old. A better case for similarly situated juveniles could be made for a 16 year old versus a 15 year old, which appellant also asserts. Even if juveniles of those ages are similarly situated, the drawing of the lines here has some rational basis to a legitimate interest.
{¶42} Appellant essentially states there is no scientific evidence that a 16 yеar old is more likely to reoffend than a 14 or 15 year old. However, this validly enacted statute is presumed constitutional, and the state need not present such evidence. See Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 76, at ¶ 34. Rather, the court is to evaluate whether the line drawn bears any conceivable rational relation to the state‘s legitimate goals. See Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d at 561
{¶43} The state cites many laws that draw age-based lines for juveniles based upon legislative decisions. See, e.g.,
{¶44} The purpose of sex offender registration is ultimately to protect the public. See
{¶45} As appellant‘s studies suggest, juvenile sex offenders are more responsive to treatment than adult sex offenders. And, this is reflected in the deferred classification until release after treatment in the secure facility, the review at final disposition, and the ability to seek declassification three years later and again thereafter. It is not irrational for legislators to conclude that the farther a juvenile is from adulthood, the more responsive he will be to treatment. From this, the legislature could reason that the lower the age of the offender, the reduced likelihood of recidivism and thus the decreased need for tracking.
{¶46} We rule that there is some rational, conceivable reason for drawing a line so that 14 and 15 year old sex offenders will only be subject to discretionary classification rather than the mandatory classification (into a discretionary tier) that 16 and 17 years old are subject to. Accord In re Forbess, 3d DIst. No. 02-09-20 at ¶ 56; In re J.M., 3d Dist. No. 16-12-01 at ¶ 32 (not equal protection violation to make juvenile court‘s decision to classify discretionary or mandatory depending on juvenile‘s age at the time of the offense). See also In re B.D., 11th Dist. No. 2011-P-0078 (rational basis for drawing line at 14 for beginning classifications). This assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
{¶47} Appellant‘s final assignment of error provides:
{¶48} “The Jefferson County Juvenile Court erred when it classified M.R. as a tier II juvenile offender registrant because the imposition of any classificаtion period that extends beyond the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court violates a youth‘s right to due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.”
{¶49} Juvenile offenders must register every year for 10 years in tier I, every six months for 20 years in tier II, and every 90 days for life in tier III.
{¶50} Moreover, in providing that dispositional orders are temporary and continue for the period designated in the order until terminated or modified by the court or the child reaches age 21,
{¶51} Finally, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction to “conduct the hearings, and to make the determinations, adjudications, and orders authorized
{¶52} Appellant states that the requirement that the classifications extend past age 21, which is the maximum time he could be incarcerated, violates principles of due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He emphasizes that the purpose of the juvenile system is supposed to be guidance and rehabilitation rather than punishment, pointing out that the registration scheme is now considered punitive. He relies on the principles from the Supreme Court‘s In re C.P. case to support his due prоcess and cruel and unusual punishment arguments here.
{¶53} In that case, a juvenile appealed his designation as a tier III juvenile offender registrant and public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant (PRQJOR) for whom there was automatic classification into tier III with lifelong registration (albeit subject to review after 25 years) and community notification as required by
{¶54} In this context, the review concerned whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the crime considering the nature of the offender. Id. at ¶ 25-27. In analyzing
{¶55} The In re C.P. Court pointed out that the automatic community notification requirement is no longer necessary in order for states to be considered compliant with the requirements of federal sex offender law, evidencing a national shift in consensus on that topic. Id. at ¶ 34-37. The Court looked at culpability and pointed out that juveniles are less culpable than adults and “their bad acts are less likely to reveal an unredeemable corruptness.” Id. at ¶ 39-40.
{¶56} The Court then looked at the severity of the punishment and stated that registration and notification requirements for life, with the possibility of having them lifted only after 25 years, are “especially harsh punishments for a juvenile,” adding that the length of the punishment is extraordinary for a juvenile and is imposed at an age at which the offender‘s character is not yet fixed. Id. at ¶ 44-45. The Court noted the stigmatization and the hampering of the juvenile‘s education, relationships, and employment. Id. at ¶ 45 (noting that a juvenile who remains under the authority of the juvenile court and has thus been adjudged redeemable will have his entire life evaluated through the prism of his juvenile adjudication).
{¶57} The Court next reviewed the penological justifications and concluded that lifetime registration and notification requirements run contrary to the system‘s goals of rehabilitating the offender and aiding his mental and physical development, stating: “Notification and rеgistration anchor the juvenile offender to his crime.” Id. at ¶ 47. It was difficult to say how much public safety is affected in individual cases, because the PRQJOR statutory scheme gives the juvenile judge no role in determining how dangerous a juvenile might be or what level of registration or notification would be adequate to preserve the safety of the public. Id. at ¶ 48.
{¶58} The Court found the PRQJOR penalties meet the statutory objective of accountability but the depth and duration of accountability that
{¶59} In re C.P. also evaluated whether it was cruel and unusual punishment under the Ohio Constitution, stating that lack of proportionality is a key factor and then evaluating whether the punishment is so greatly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the community‘s sense of justice. Id. at ¶ 60. It was emphasized that under
{¶60} The Supreme Court also found that the punishment of lifetime exposure for a wrong committed in childhood runs counter to the private nature of our juvenile court system and the core principle of confidentiality “is trampled by any requirement of public notification.” Id. at ¶ 62-68 (and reiterating the stigma concerns involving in notification). It was concluded that the “public punishments required by
{¶61} The Court then proceeded to invalidate
{¶62} The Court criticized
{¶63} The Ohio Supreme Court made some strong statements in that case. However, it was a case about automatic lifetime tier III classification with community notification for certain juveniles. Notably, appellant does not argue that classification itself is cruel and unusual punishment or violative of due process, but rather, he argues that continued application of the registration requirements beyond age 21 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates due process.
{¶64} We cannot conclude that the mere fact that registration may be required past age 21 would make a scheme cruel and unusual or shocking to a sense of justice under the analysis set forth In re C.P. There is mandatory classification for 16 and 17 years olds such as appellant; however, there is no automatic tier placement based upon the offense as the juvenile court has discretion on the choice of tier after the juvenile has been provided with an evidentiary heаring and after the juvenile has had an opportunity to seek treatment. (And, in the case at bar, the juvenile court
{¶65} Moreover, the tier placement can be appealed by the juvenile. In addition, the juvenile court can decrease the tier classification upon the juvenile‘s completion of the disposition.
{¶66} The state notes that the First District has overruled an argument that due process is violated by requiring registration past age 21. In re Raheem L., 1st Dist. No. C-100608, 2013-Ohio-2423, appeal not allowed by 136 Ohio St.3d 1560, 2013-Ohio-4861, 996 N.E.2d 987 and 137 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2014-Ohio-176, 2 N.E.3d 271 (reconsideration denied). See also In re N.Z., 11th Dist. No. 2012–L–100, 2014-Ohio-157, ¶ 1, 36-47 (overruling juvenile‘s argument that classification is unconstitutional in violation of due process clause because the required registration period extends beyond his 21st birthday). The state also points out that after invalidating
{¶67} In its exhaustive analysis, the In re C.P. Court made a mere passing reference to the fact that registration extends beyond typical juvenile jurisdiction, and their comment mainly related to how very far past age 21 a lifetime classification
{¶68} In sum, there is no community notification involved here, and the juvenile judge has a role in determining how dangerous the juvenile might be or what level of registration would be adequate to preserve the safety of the public. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513 at ¶ 48. Considering that the judge has initial discretion in choosing a tier for a 16 or 17 year old, who can prеsent evidence at a hearing in support of a lower tier, and considering that the classification can be reduced at final disposition and can be eliminated three years after final disposition, the mere fact that the classification can extend beyond age 21 is not cruel and unusual, nor does it shock the conscience or raise concerns with fundamental fairness. See id. at ¶ 61 (distinguishing automatic lifetime tier III from punishments for other juvenile offenders, whose cases are reevaluated when their juvenile disposition ends and at regularly scheduled intervals thereafter).1 This assignment of error is overruled.
{¶69} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.