THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. THOMPKINS ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 95-450
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted February 20, 1996—Decided May 8, 1996
75 Ohio St.3d 558 | 1996-Ohio-264
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Nos. 14851 et al.
{¶ 1} This appeal involves thirty-three cases which were consolidated by the Second District Court of Appeals. In each case, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas refused to impose a mandatory driver‘s license suspension for an individual convicted of a drug offense. Based upon its decision in State v. DeVoise (Dec. 30, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 14701, unreported, the appellate court reversed each case. The matter is now before this court upon an allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Lynn G. Koeller, Montgomery County Public Defender, Anthony R. Cicero and Charles L. Grove, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellants.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, Deputy Chief Counsel, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, state of Ohio.
{¶ 2} At issue is the validity of
{¶ 3} We begin our discussion with the premise that all statutes are presumed constitutional. The party challenging the statutes bears the burden of proving otherwise. Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166; Univ. Hts. v. O‘Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 22 O.O.3d 372, 375, 429 N.E.2d 148, 152. Further, the legislation being questioned will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Arnold at 38-39, 616 N.E.2d at 166.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to its police powers, the General Assembly has the authority to enact laws defining criminal conduct and to prescribe its punishment. We recognize that this authority is not unfettered and that almost every exercise of the police power will necessarily interfere with the enjoyment of liberty or the acquisition or possession of property, or involve an injury to a person. See Benjamin v. Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 110, 4 O.O.2d 113, 117, 146 N.E.2d 854, 860. Nevertheless, laws passed by virtue of the police power will be upheld if they bear a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained, namely, the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, and are not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or unreasonable. Cincinnati v. Correll (1943), 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 26 O.O. 116, 118, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414. The federal test is similar. To determine whether such statutes are constitutional under federal scrutiny, we must decide if there is a rational relationship between the statute and its purpose. Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 354, 639 N.E.2d 31, 34 citing Martinez v. California (1980), 444 U.S. 277, 283, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 488.
{¶ 6} The state and amicus curiae set forth several legislative goals for the enactments of the laws at issue. These goals include the desire to keep the highways clear of people who have demonstrated a willingness to abandon their physical and mental acuity to drugs, the desire to inhibit the ability to buy, sell, transport or use
{¶ 7} We find a mandatory license suspension is rationally related to these goals. The mandatory suspension serves as an effective means to protect other drivers and passengers on the roads and to deter future drug use and punish offenders. It is immaterial that an automobile may not have been used in the commission of the crime. The General Assembly has chosen appropriate means to meet its goals. The laws at issue do not violate the due process of law guarantees of the Ohio or United States Constitutions.
{¶ 8} Appellants also challenge the statutes at issue on equal protection grounds under both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The standard for determining if a statute violates equal protection is “essentially the same under state and federal law.” Fabrey, supra, at 353, 639 N.E.2d at 33. “Under a traditional equal protection analysis, class distinctions in legislation are permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Departures from traditional equal protection principles are permitted only when burdens upon suspect classifications or abridgments of fundamental rights are involved.” State ex rel. Vana v. Maple Hts. City Council (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 561 N.E.2d 909, 911, citing Clements v. Fashing (1982), 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843-2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508, 516. Under rational-basis scrutiny, legislative distinctions are invalid only if they bear no relation to the state‘s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. Fabrey at 353, 639 N.E.2d at 33.
{¶ 9} Appellants argue that the classification created here includes all drug offenders, regardless of whether a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offense. They contend that this class is subject to discrimination solely on the basis of the type of offense and they believe it is not rational to discriminate against this class for purposes of deterring the use of motor vehicles in drug crimes or simply deterring drug crimes.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 12} Finally, we note that by our decision today, we join other courts across this nation which have considered similar constitutional challenges to similar suspension statutes and have found such statutes constitutional. See, e.g., People v. Zinn (Colo.1993), 843 P.2d 1351; Plowman v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp. (1993), 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124; Quiller v. Bowman (1993), 262 Ga. 769, 425 S.E.2d 641; Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1992), 413 Mass. 265, 596 N.E.2d 340; and State v. Wolfe (App.1995), 193 Wis.2d 641, 537 N.W.2d 435, 1995 WL 228329 (unpublished opinion).
Judgments affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, SUNDERMANN, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN, JR., J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, J.
Notes
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, the court may revoke, and if it does not revoke the license, shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years, the driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of this section that is a felony of the first degree and shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to any other violation of this section ***.”
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the driver‘s license or commercial driver‘s license of any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of this section.”
“In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this section, the court shall suspend for not less than six months nor more than five years the driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license of any person who is convicted of or has pleaded guilty to a violation of this section. ***”