IN THE MATTER OF: C.W. ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT CHILD.
Case No. 11CA918
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY
RELEASED 6/12/13
[Cite as In re C.W., 2013-Ohio-2483.]
Harsha, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Timоthy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Ohio State Assistant Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor, and Michele L. Harris, Adams County Assistant Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio, for Appellee.
Harsha, J.
{1} Following our remand, C.W. appeals the juvenile court‘s judgment classifying him as a Tier I juvenile sex offender under Senate Bill 10. C.W. argues that the court could not apply Senate Bill 10 to determine his classification when that law was not in effect at the time he committed his offense. Because courts may not аpply Senate Bill 10 to individuals who committed sexually-oriented offenses before the bill‘s effective date, the juvenile court‘s classification of C.W. as a Tier I juvenile sex offender is unconstitutional and, thus, void. And because C.W. has reached his 21st birthday, the juvenile court no longer possesses jurisdiction to re-classify him using the law in effect at the time C.W. committed the offenses. Accordingly, we sustain C.W.‘s assignment of error and reverse the trial court‘s judgment.
I. FACTS
{2} In June of 2005, the juvenile court adjudicated 14 year old C.W. a delinquent child for committing two counts of rape,
{3} On remand, the juvenile court classified C.W. as a tier I juvenile sex offender registrant under Senate Bill 10. C.W. appealed the court‘s judgment, and we stayed the matter pending two decisions from the Ohio Supreme Court: In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, and State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
{4} On February 16, 2012, C.W. attained 21 years of age.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{5} C.W. raises one assignment of error:
“The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 to C.W. violates the retroactivity clause of
III. ANALYSIS
{6} In his sole assignment of error, C.W. asserts that the juvenile court‘s retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 violates his state constitutional rights. He asserts the court cannot apply Senate Bill 10 to his classification hearing when that law was not in effect at the time he committed the offenses. C.W. further asserts the juvenile court no longer hаs jurisdiction to re-classify him upon remand because he has attained 21 years of age prior to being properly classified. The state agrees the court should not have applied Senate Bill 10 but disagrees with C.W.‘s assertion that the juvenile court no longеr has jurisdiction to re-classify him. The state contends because the court held the initial and subsequent classification hearings before C.W. turned 21, it may hold a hearing on remand to correct the error in its prior classification.
A. PROHIBITION AGAINST APPLYING SENATE BILL 10 RETROACTIVELY
{7} The Ohio Supreme Court held that Senаte Bill 10‘s classification, registration, and community notification provisions cannot be applied to sex offenders who committed sex offenses before the effective date of those provisions, i.e. January 1, 2008. In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350, ¶6; State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, syllabus. Accord State v. Carr, 4th Dist. No. 11CA3256, 2012-Ohio-5425. In Williams, the court stated: “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as appliеd to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates
{8} Here, the state agrees that because C.W.‘s offense occurred before January 1, 2008 the court may not apply
B. REMEDY
{9} Next, we must consider the implication of declaring the juvenile court‘s classification order void. In Williams, the court remanded the matter to the trial court for re-sentencing in accordance with thе law in effect when Williams committed his offense. Accord In re J.P., 7th Dist. No. 10JE23, 2012-Ohio-3343, ¶9 (remanding matter to juvenile court in accordance with Williams).
{10} However, in this case C.W. contends that because he has reached 21 years of age, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction to re-classify him under the law in effect at the time he committed his offеnses. C.W. thus asserts that we cannot remand this matter to the juvenile court and order it to re-classify him using the law in effect at the time he committed the delinquent acts. The state counters that because the trial court‘s previous classification orders ocсurred before C.W. turned 21, the trial court may issue an order on remand that corrects the mistake in its previous classification. The state cites our 2011 opinion, In re A.R.R., 194 Ohio App.3d 40, 2011-Ohio-1186, 954 N.E.2d 1213, to support its argument.
{11} In A.R.R., the trial court originally classified the juvenile offender before the juvenile‘s 21st birthday. A.R.R. appealеd and while the case was on appeal, A.R.R. turned 21 years of age. We subsequently reversed and remanded the trial court‘s classification. On remand, the court re-classified A.R.R., who again appealed. A.R.R. asserted that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the re-classification because he had reached the age of 21. Because the original classification occurred before A.R.R.‘s 21st birthday, we disagreed and concluded that “the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction on remаnd to reenter the Tier III classification after appellant‘s 21st birthday.” Id. at ¶9.
{12} A.R.R. appealed our decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the appeal and then remanded the case for consideration of Williams. 130 Ohio St.3d 261, 2011-Ohio-5346, 957 N.E.2d 294. On Decembеr 21, 2011, the Supreme Court stayed its mandate pending the decision in J.V.. 130 Ohio St.3d 1500, 2011-Ohio-6556, 958 N.E.2d 960.
{13} On October 30, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court decided J.V., a case in which the juvenile court invoked the adult portion of J.V.‘s dispositional order. See In re J.V., 8th Dist. No. 92869, 2010-Ohio-71. However, the court‘s entry failed to mention postrelease control. J.V. then appealеd the juvenile court‘s
{14} On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, J.V. argued that
{15} The Supreme Court agreed with J.V.‘s argument and explained that under
{16} On December 5, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court lifted the stay imposed in A.R.R. and remanded the case for application of Williams and J.V.. 2012-Ohio-5625.
{17} We do not believe that our prior holding in A.R.R., which arose under the jurisdiction provided by
{18} Here, C.W. turned 21 years of age while this appeal was pending. C.W.‘s original disposition was entered before he turned 21 years of age and the juvenile court‘s dispositional order following our remand was entered before C.W. turned 21 years of age. However, his adjudication occurred prior to his 18th birthday. Now that C.W. has reached 21 years of age, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction under
{19} Thus, if we remanded this matter to the juvenile court to conduct a re-classification hearing as the state requests, we would bе disregarding the rule set forth in J.V.—that a juvenile court loses jurisdiction under
IV. CONCLUSION
{20} The juvenile court‘s order classifying C.W. under Senate Bill 10 violates the
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED. Appellee shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandatе pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McFarland, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: _________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
Notes
The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to attаining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-one years of age. If a person is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender and the court makes a disposition of the person under this chapter, at any time after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the places at which the person may be held under that disposition are not limited to places authorized under this chapter solely for confinement of children, and the person may be confined under that disposition, in accordance with division (F)(2) of section 2152.26 of the Revised Code, in places other than those authorized under this chapter solely for confinement of children.