IN RE CROSS.
No. 2001-0152
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 11, 2002
96 Ohio St.3d 328 | 2002-Ohio-4183
PFEIFER, J.
Submitted December 12, 2001. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2000CA00122.
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
A juvenile court does not have the jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a Department of Youth Services facility after a juvenile has been released from probation.
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PFEIFER, J.
{¶1} In this case we address the issue of whether a juvenile court has the jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a Department of Youth Services facility after a juvenile has been released from probation. We find that a juvenile court has no such jurisdiction.
Factual Background
{¶2} Appellant Clayton Cross was charged with one count of delinquency for burglary on February 10, 1998, in case No. J-101241. On February 23, 1998, Cross admitted the charge of burglary, a second degree felony if committed by an adult (
{¶3} While on probation, Cross was ordered to “participate and obey terms and conditions set forth by the Probation Department and to obey all parental rules and all laws.” Further court-ordered conditions were good behavior at home, in school, and in the community, and mandatory school attendance. The court did not spare Cross entirely from confinement—it also remanded him to the Multi-County Juvenile Attention Center for 75 days.
{¶4} On December 28, 1998, Cross received a general release from probation after serving his seventy-five-day commitment to the Attention Center.
{¶5} Cross found himself back before the juvenile court about one year later. On December 3, 1999, Cross was charged with one count of petty theft, a first degree misdemeanor if committed by an adult,
{¶6} The juvenile court, ruling that Cross had violated the prior court order in committing these offenses, rescinded the stay and imposed the previously suspended felony commitment on the earlier burglary charge. The court did not find that Cross had committed a probation violation. The court remanded Cross to the Attention Center pending transfer to the Circleville Youth Center.
{¶7} Cross appealed the juvenile court ruling to the Court of Appeals for Stark County, challenging the juvenile court‘s authority to reimpose the prior DYS commitment. The court of appeals ruled that
{¶8} The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Law and Analysis
{¶9} The authority and responsibility of Ohio‘s juvenile courts is wide ranging. Juvenile courts are entrusted with the oversight of children adjudged abused, neglected, or dependent, as well as those who are adjudged delinquent. The framework of former
{¶10} The appellate court based its decision partly on its interpretation of
{¶11} Former
{¶12} In this case, however, the disposition was made entirely outside former
{¶13} However, the appellate court also relied on the case of In re Bracewell (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 133, 709 N.E.2d 938. Bracewell was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a third-degree felony if committed by an adult. He admitted the charge and was adjudged a delinquent child. The court ordered
{¶14} The court in Bracewell cited this court‘s decision in In re Young Children (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 632, 669 N.E.2d 1140, in reaching its judgment. In In re Young Children this court faced the issue of whether a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction to enter dispositional orders after the passing of the statutory time period (“sunset date“) for making such orders. The children in In re Young Children were dependent and/or neglected. The juvenile court had awarded temporary custody to the local Department of Human Services. Pursuant to
{¶15} “It seems abundantly clear that this provision was intended to ensure that a child‘s welfare would always be subject to court review. That is, given that a child, by virtue of being before the court pursuant to
{¶17} In In re Young Children, this court was dealing with dependent or neglected children, which made
{¶18} The Bracewell court extended our holding in In re Young Children to the realm of juvenile delinquency:
{¶19} “Because juvenile court proceedings are not criminal but civil in nature, and are designed to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children who engage in what otherwise would be criminal behavior, the reasoning of the court in Young, involving neglected or dependent children, is equally applicable here.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 126 Ohio App.3d at 138, 709 N.E.2d 938.
{¶20} We disagree with the Bracewell court‘s reasoning. In Young, we were applying
{¶21} Further, the characterization of delinquency proceedings as civil is one of limited applicability. While this court has held, in In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 748 N.E.2d 67, syllabus, that a juvenile court proceeding generally is a civil action, this court also noted that “there are criminal aspects to juvenile court proceedings” and that “the United States Supreme Court has carefully imposed basic due process requirements on [the juvenile justice system].” Id. at 66 and 65, 748 N.E.2d 67.
{¶22} The United States Supreme Court has held that the idealism that created juvenile courts must not be allowed to obscure the fact that a child adjudged
{¶23} In In re Gault, the court held that the Due Process Clause requires application of ” ‘the essentials of due process and fair treatment’ ” in a juvenile adjudicatory hearing. 387 U.S. at 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, quoting Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, the court included in the essentials of due process the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Breed, the court reiterated its remarks in Gault regarding the reality of the juvenile court system:
{¶24} “Although the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems of youth, including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our decisions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities. * * * [T]he court‘s response to that perception has been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions.” 421 U.S. at 528-529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.
{¶25} There is a clear difference between the role and power of the juvenile court in delinquency matters as opposed to matters involving abused or neglected children. The criminal aspects of juvenile delinquency proceedings require greater constraints on juvenile courts. We therefore reject the holding of the Bracewell
{¶26} Still, even without
{¶27} The court‘s ability to impose probation in a very broad and creative way creates the tether that allows a court to maintain some connection with a juvenile delinquent. The probationary period can be indefinite. The threat of actual incarceration, however, lasts only as long as the probation lasts. This contrasts with the power granted to juvenile courts by
{¶28} Thus, the completion of probation signals the end of the court‘s jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile. As with adults, a “court [loses] its jurisdiction to impose * * * suspended sentences once the term of probation expire[s].” State v. Yates (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 567 N.E.2d 1306. Cross was granted a general release from probation on December 28, 1998. At that time he had completed the punishment he had received on February 23, 1998. By that point he had served seventy-five days in his county‘s Attention Center, as well as over nine months of probation. The court‘s original grant of probation was
{¶29} Since the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to reimpose Cross‘s suspended sentence, it had no authority to commit Cross to a DYS facility. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment.
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.
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COOK, J. , concurring in judgment only.
{¶30} I agree with the majority that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. But because the majority‘s analysis supporting its reversal is unnecessary, I join neither the majority‘s rationale nor its syllabus.
{¶31} The court should resolve this case on the basis that the state failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court to reimpose its earlier stayed commitment. Cross‘s original juvenile proceeding—the case in which the trial court imposed the stayed commitment—was case No. J-101241. Juv.R. 35(A) provides that “[t]he continuing jurisdiction of the court shall be invoked by motion filed in the original proceeding, notice of which shall be served in the manner provided for the service of process.” Therefore, the rule permitted the state to seek reinstatement of the stayed commitment only by filing a motion in case No. J-101241. But the record does not reflect that the state ever filed such a motion in that original proceeding.
{¶32} Instead, the caption of the order in which the trial court actually rescinded the stay reads “CASE NO. J-109845/110042.” These are the case numbers for Cross‘s second juvenile proceeding (for petty theft) and his third juvenile proceeding (for unruliness), respectively. In a formal March 28, 2000
{¶33} Thus, even assuming arguendo that the trial court can retain jurisdiction over a juvenile adjudicated delinquent by imposing a stay such as the one found here, the state never satisfied the Juvenile Rules. Because the state failed to invoke any continuing jurisdiction over Cross to reimpose the stayed commitment, the trial court was unable to do so. The majority‘s rationale, however, ignores this threshold error and proceeds to determine the merits of an issue that this cause does not present.
{¶34} Accordingly, I concur in judgment only.
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David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Felice Harris, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Karen S. Dummermuth and Kristen Bates Alyward, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
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