IN RE: K.S., A Minor Child
No. 97343
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
May 31, 2012
[Cite as In re K.S., 2012-Ohio-2388.]
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. DL 10123183
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 31, 2012
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: Sheryl A. Trzaska
Assistant Public Defender
250 East Broad Street
Suite 1400
Columbus, Ohio 43215
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE, C.S.E.A.
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Fallon Radigan
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Appellant, K.S., appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that adjudicated him delinquent and committed him to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS“). For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
{¶2} On December 9, 2010, a delinquency complaint was filed against appellant, then a 14-year-old child, alleging that he was delinquent for having committed acts that if committed by an adult, would constitute six counts of felonious assault, one count of improperly discharging into a habitation, and two counts of receiving stolen property. Each count contained one-, three- and five-year firearm specifications. K.S. denied the allegations in the complaint and the case proceeded to trial.
{¶3} It was the state‘s evidence at trial that on the evening of August 23, 2010, Elizabeth Ensley‘s dark green 2000 Dodge Caravan was stolen. Additionally, Linton Patrick‘s burgundy 1996 Grand Cherokee was stolen the same evening. Christine Cummings testified that she resides at 14409 Glendale in Cuyahoga County with her husband, Richard Adams, her three sons, M.C., K.C. and A.C., her daughter C.C. and her grandson, K.C. On the night of August 23, 2010, Cummings testified that from her porch, she saw M.C. being chased back to the house by two boys. M.C. identified one
{¶4} Cummings called the police who responded after the boys had left the scene. No one was injured as a result of the initial shooting. Later that evening, Cummings was on the porch with Adams when a green van pulled up in front of the house and gunshots were fired into the house from the passenger side of the van. Cummings‘s right arm was grazed by a bullet and Adams testified that he heard a bullet pass near his head. Neither Cummings nor Adams saw the face of the shooter.
{¶5} Cleveland Police officer Robert Norman witnessed the drive-by shooting from his zone car and pursued the van. Officer Norman testified that the van parked several streets away and three or four black, male teenagers exited the van and entered a burgundy Jeep Cherokee. Norman and his partner attempted to stop the Jeep and the occupants fled on foot. Officers pursued the driver and the passenger who was holding a gun. The gunman eluded arrest and Officer Norman did not see his face. The officers did arrest the driver of the Jeep, Ramone Taylor. The van and the Jeep were recovered and identified as the stolen vehicles belonging to Ensley and Patrick. Upon questioning, Taylor provided the police with the name Jermain Kurtrell as the shooter. Taylor was charged, adjudicated delinquent and committed to ODYS for one year for his role as the driver of the vehicle involved in the shooting. The day prior to his
{¶6} Prior to trial, the state filed a “motion in limine to call adverse and/or court‘s witnesses for purposes of cross-examination” pursuant to
{¶7} At trial, Taylor recanted his written statement and denied any involvement by K.S. in the shooting. Taylor testified that the shooter‘s true name was “Devonte.” Taylor testified that he and K.S. were friends. Taylor explained that he spoke with K.S. after his arrest and K.S. agreed to allow Taylor to name him as the shooter because K.S. was “already going down” for other juvenile offenses. Taylor was motivated to provide police with the name K.S. anticipating that he would receive favorable treatment at his sentencing the following day. In fact, rather than a sentence of “like four years,” Taylor‘s order of commitment of one year was imposed without objection by the state or its agents. However, Taylor testified at trial that he didn‘t understand the severity of the charges and detention time that K.S. would face and no longer desired to go through with the plan they had devised.
{¶8} K.S. and his sister, P.S., testified that they had spent the evening of August 23, 2010 at their home, located at 14109 Edgewood and that K.S. did not leave the home that night. Both testified that Taylor was present at the house earlier in the day but
{¶9} At the conclusion of trial, the trial court, sua sponte, nolled the three firearm specifications attached to count 8, one of the counts of receiving stolen property. The trial court adjudicated appellant delinquent on three counts of felonious assault, improperly discharging into a habitation and two counts of receiving stolen property. The trial court found the remaining counts of felonious assault had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and adjudicated appellant not delinquent with respect to those counts. The trial court held a dispositional hearing on June 15, 2011 and committed appellant to the legal custody of the ODYS for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of twelve months and a maximum period not to exceed appellant‘s attainment of the age of 21 years. The trial court further found that appellant, if an adult, would be guilty of a specification of the type set forth in
{¶10} Appellant‘s first assignment of error states:
The trial court erred when it permitted the State to impeach its witness with a prior inconsistent statement, and when it admitted that statement into
evidence.
{¶11} In the state‘s pretrial “motion in limine to call adverse and/or court‘s witnesses for purposes of cross-examination,” the state suggested that Ramone Taylor had adopted an uncooperative attitude toward the prosecuting attorneys and “has changed his story and has stated that he does not want to testify against his friend, [K.S.]” The state asserted that “[i]mportant to determining the credibility of the witness, the state must be able to elicit: 1) the degree of the relationship [Taylor] has with [K.S.]; and 2) any relevant prior statements the witness has made.”
{¶12} The state called Ramone Taylor as a witness and was allowed by the trial court to impeach his testimony by reading his entire prior written statement. Over the objection of appellant‘s trial counsel, the trial court labeled Taylor a “hostile witness” to the state.1 Furthermore, over the objection of appellant‘s trial counsel, the trial court admitted Taylor‘s prior written statement, in the form of an exhibit.
{¶13} Generally, evidentiary rulings made at trial rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lundy, 41 Ohio App.3d 163, 535 N.E.2d 664 (1st Dist. 1987); State v. Graham, 58 Ohio St.2d 350, 390 N.E.2d 805 (1979). The term “abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error of law or judgment. It implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶15} The record reflects that the trial court treated Taylor as an adverse witness to the state as opposed to a hostile witness.
“Traditionally, a ‘hostile witness’ is one who surprises the calling party at trial by turning against him while testifying. * * * An ‘adverse witness’ is one who identifies with the opposing party because of a relationship or a common interest in the outcome of the litigation. Many times, the terms ‘hostile’ and ‘adverse’ are used interchangeably without drawing a clear distinction between the meaning of the terms.” State v. Darkenwald, 8th Dist. No. 83440, 2004-Ohio-2693, ¶ 15.
{¶16}
{¶18}
{¶19} In the case sub judice, the state cannot make the requisite showing of surprise because the state‘s own motion in limine demonstrates the state‘s pretrial knowledge that Taylor had “changed his story.” The 1980 staff notes to
{¶20} Pursuant to
{¶21} Furthermore, even if it had been proper for the state to impeach Taylor‘s testimony with his prior inconsistent statement, “it is well settled in Ohio that under
{¶22} Taylor‘s prior out-of-court statement, accepted as substantive evidence in the form of an exhibit by the trial court, qualifies as hearsay.
{¶23} The state argues that the statement was properly admitted into evidence pursuant to the hearsay exception contained in
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown by the testimony of the witness to have been made or adopted when the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
{¶24} We have previously held that
{¶25} In the absence of a valid hearsay exception, Taylor‘s prior inconsistent statement was inadmissible as substantive evidence. State v. Kelly, 8th Dist. No. 85662, 2006-Ohio-5902, ¶ 28. “An extra-judicial, unsworn, signed statement of a witness which has been denied by the declarant under oath is not admissible as proof of the allegations contained therein.” Dick, 27 Ohio St.2d 162, 271 N.E.2d 797 (5th Dist.1971), at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶26} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶27} Appellant‘s second assignment of error states:
Insufficient evidence supported [appellant‘s] adjudication, and the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges.
{¶28} An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
{¶29} Appellant does not argue that the state failed to present sufficient evidence in regard to any specific element of the crimes for which appellant was adjudicated delinquent. Instead, appellant argues that the only evidence presented by the state linking appellant to the crimes was the improperly admitted, out-of-court statement of Taylor. Appellant argues that because the statement was inadmissible hearsay there was actually no evidence that he committed the offenses.
{¶30} Appellant‘s argument is without merit pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, where the court held that in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support an appellant‘s conviction, a reviewing court must consider all the testimony that was before the trial court, whether or not it was properly admitted. Brewer held, “when evidence admitted at trial is sufficient to support a conviction, but on appeal, some of that evidence is determined to have been improperly admitted, the Double Jeopardy Clauses
{¶31} In this case, after viewing the admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. For purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that if believed, all the testimony that was before the trier of fact, whether or not it was properly admitted, would convince the average mind of appellant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, while we find that a reversal is necessary based upon trial errors, we do not find that a discharge is warranted based upon insufficient evidence.
{¶32} Although not specifically raised by appellant, we do note that the state failed to secure an explicit in-court identification of appellant as the shooter during Taylor‘s testimony. It is well-settled that, in order to warrant a conviction, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the accused as the person who actually committed the crime. State v. Lawwill, 12th Dist. No. CA2007-01-014, 2008-Ohio-3592, at ¶ 11, citing State v. Scott, 3 Ohio App.2d 239, 210 N.E.2d 289 (7th Dist. 1965). However, there is no general requirement that the defendant must be visually identified in court by a witness. Identification can be proved by circumstantial evidence, just like every other element the state must prove. State v. Kiley, 8th Dist. Nos. 86726 and 86727, 2006-Ohio-2469.
{¶34} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶35} Appellant‘s delinquency adjudications are reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial. Reversing appellant‘s delinquency adjudications and ordering a new trial renders his third assignment of error challenging the manifest weight of the evidence and his fourth assignment of error asserting ineffective assistance of counsel moot. State v. Holloway, 8th Dist. No. 95703, 2011-Ohio-3586, ¶ 28.
It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the lower court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR