HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY ET AL. v. TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TALEVSKI
No. 21–806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2023
599 U. S. ____ (2023)
OCTOBER TERM, 2022
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
Syllabus
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY ET AL. v. TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TALEVSKI
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–806. Argued November 8, 2022—Decided June 8, 2023
Held: The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create
(a)
The Court is unpersuaded by HHC’s argument that, because Congress seems to have enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke
(b) Under the Court’s precedent, the FNHRA provisions at issue here unambiguously confer individual federal rights enforceable under
(1) Although federal statutes have the potential to create
Gonzaga sets forth the Court’s established method for ascertaining unambiguous conferral. Courts must employ traditional tools of statutory construction to assess whether Congress has “unambiguously conferred” “individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries” to which the plaintiff belongs. Id., at 283, 285–286. Notably, it must be determined that “Congress intended to create a federal right” for the identified class, not merely that the plaintiffs fall “within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Id., at 283 (emphasis deleted). The test for unambiguous conferral is satisfied where the provision in question is “‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ ” and contains “rights-creating,” individual-centric language with an “ ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’ ” Id., at 284, 287 (emphasis deleted). If a statutory provision surmounts this significant hurdle, it “secures” individual rights that are deemed “presumptively enforceable” under
The unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions in FNHRA that Talevski’s complaint invokes meet this test. The FNHRA lays out a litany of statutory “[r]equirements relating to residents’ rights,”
(2) Even if a statutory provision unambiguously secures rights, a defendant “may defeat [the] presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend” that
6 F. 4th 713, affirmed.
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
No. 21–806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2023
599 U. S. ____ (2023)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA or Act) ensures that nursing homes that receive Medicaid funding respect and protect their residents’ health, safety, and dignity. Provisions of the FNHRA refer to rights of nursing-home residents to be free from unnecessary physical or chemical restraints and to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are satisfied. This case is about these particular provisions and whether nursing-home residents can seek to vindicate those FNHRA rights in court.
Respondent Ivanka Talevski maintains that she can enforce the rights these particular FNHRA provisions describe via
We reject both propositions. “Laws” means “laws,” no less today than in the 1870s, and nothing in petitioners’ appeal to Reconstruction-era contract law shows otherwise. Consequently, as we have previously held,
I
In 2016, when Gorgi Talevski’s dementia progressed to the point that his family members could no longer care for him, they placed him in petitioner Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation’s (VCR) nursing home.1 When he entered VCR, Mr. Talevski could talk, feed himself, walk, socialize, and recognize his family. Later in 2016, however, Mr. Talevski’s condition suddenly deteriorated. He became unable to eat on his own and began losing the ability to communicate in English (leaving him to rely primarily on Macedonian, his native language).
The problems did not end there. Toward the end of 2016, VCR began asserting that Mr. Talevski was harassing female residents and staff. Based on that claim, VCR began sending Mr. Talevski to a psychiatric hospital 90 minutes away for several days at a time. VCR readmitted Mr. Talevski the first two times it sent him away. But the third time, instead of accepting him back, VCR tried to force his permanent transfer to a dementia facility in Indianapolis. It executed these changed circumstances without first notifying Mr. Talevski or his family.
The Talevskis filed a complaint with the Department regarding Mr. Talevski’s forced transfer. While the complaint was pending, Mr. Talevski had to stay at another facility that was 90 minutes away from his family. Eventually, a Department administrative law judge nullified VCR’s attempted transfer of Mr. Talevski. Based on that determination, the Talevskis endeavored to have Mr. Talevski returned to VCR. But VCR ignored the judge’s decision and refused readmission. The Talevskis complained again to the Department, which later issued a report regarding the Talevskis’ complaints. Subsequently, petitioner American Senior Communities LLC (ASC), which manages VCR, contacted Mr. Talevski’s wife, Ivanka, to discuss the possibility of Mr. Talevski’s return. At this point, however, Mr. Talevski had acclimated to his new home, and the Talevskis feared retribution against him if he returned to VCR. So they opted to leave him in the new facility, which meant that every family visit required a 3-hour round trip.
In 2019, Mr. Talevski (through Ivanka) sued VCR, ASC, and petitioner Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County (collectively, HHC) under Rev. Stat.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It concluded that, under this Court’s precedent, the relevant FNHRA provisions “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing-home residents,” making those rights presumptively enforceable via
HHC filed a petition for certiorari,
II
A
As relevant here,
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
That is, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States may invoke this cause of action against any other person who, acting “under color of ” state law, has deprived them of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.
We have been asked before to narrow the scope of this express authorization, i.e., to read “laws” to mean only “civil rights or equal protection laws.” Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 6. We declined to do so, reasoning that a straightforward reading of the “plain language” of
Since Thiboutot, we have crafted a test for determining whether a particular federal law actually secures rights for
B
1
HHC attempts to sow renewed doubt about
Before the Civil War, few direct federal protections for individual rights against state infringements existed. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments worked a sea change in this regard. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 754 (2010); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 453–456 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344–345 (1880). Still, neither these Civil War Amendments nor the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1866 successfully prevented postbellum state actors from continuing to deprive American citizens of federally protected rights. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 240 (1972).
In early 1871, a Senate Select Committee produced and distributed a Report that ran hundreds of pages and recounted pervasive state-sanctioned lawlessness and violence against the freedmen and their White Republican allies. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 174 (1961) (citing S. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1871)).4 After reading the
Report, President Ulysses S. Grant implored Congress to act.
It is against this backdrop that the 42d Congress enacted, and President Grant signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The first section of that statute, as reenacted in 1874, created the federal cause of action now codified as
We have adhered to this understanding of
2
We are not persuaded by HHC’s argument (which JUSTICE THOMAS supports, see post, at 1, 35 (dissenting opinion)), that Talevski cannot invoke
HHC’s argument generally proceeds as follows. Starting with our precedent regarding Congress’s spending power, HHC begins by emphasizing our observation that federal legislation premised on that power is “much in the nature of a contract,” because, “in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
The upshot, for HHC, is that “Spending Clause statutes do not give rise to privately enforceable rights under Section 1983” because contracts were not “generally” enforceable by third-party beneficiaries at common law. Id., at 11, 13. On this basis alone, HHC thus, in effect, urges us to reject decades of precedent, and to rewrite
Two well-established principles, applied here, suffice to reject HHC’s invitation to reimagine Congress’s handiwork (and our precedent interpreting it).
First, our prior
maintain assumpsit on a promise not under
Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of action created by
We have no doubt that HHC wishes
III
The FNHRA can create
A
The FNHRA provisions at issue in this case, like the rest of the Act, stem from a longstanding national commitment to provide safe and dignified care for the elderly. Since as early as the Social Security Act of 1935, federal law has aimed in myriad ways to promote nursing homes that provide quality services. Yet, concerns about the poor condition of such facilities persisted even after Congress enacted the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid Acts,9 partly due
FNHRA is largely composed of a litany of statutory requirements that Congress laid out for Medicaid-participant States and “nursing facilities.”
The first requires nursing facilities to “protect and promote” residents’ “right to be free from . . . any physical or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.”
As for enforcement, like other aspects of Medicaid, the FNHRA anticipates “cooperative federalism”—i.e., federal and state actors working together—to carry out the statute’s aims. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473, 495 (2002). Thus, qualifying State Medicaid plans, which are approved by the Secretary of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS Secretary),
The FNHRA also establishes a detailed administrative scheme for government inspections of nursing facilities.
B
1
Although federal statutes have the potential to create
Gonzaga sets forth our established method for ascertaining unambiguous conferral. Courts must employ traditional tools of statutory construction to assess whether Congress has “unambiguously conferred” “individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries” to which the plaintiff belongs. Id., at 283, 285–286; see also Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 120 (2005). Notably, it must be determined that “Congress intended to create a federal right” for the identified class, not merely that the plaintiffs fall “within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 283 (emphasis deleted). This paradigm respects Congress’s primacy in this arena and thus vindicates the separation of powers. Id., at 286.
We have held that the Gonzaga test is satisfied where the provision in question is “‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’” and contains “rights-creating,” individual-centric language with an “‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’” Id., at 284, 287 (emphasis deleted). Conversely, we have rejected
If a statutory provision surmounts this significant hurdle, it “secure[s]”
2
The unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions meet this test. To start, we note that both reside in
The predischarge-notice provision is more of the same. Nestled in a paragraph concerning “transfer and discharge rights,”
To be sure, these two provisions also establish who it is that must respect and honor these statutory rights; namely, the Medicaid-participant nursing homes in which these residents reside. See, e.g.,
The unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions thus stand in stark contrast to the statutory provisions that failed Gonzaga’s test in Gonzaga itself. Those provisions lacked “rights-creating language,” primarily directed the Federal Government’s “distribution of public funds,” and had “an aggregate, not individual, focus.” 536 U. S., at 290. The opposite is true here. The unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions use clear “rights-creating language,” speak “‘in terms of the persons benefited,’” and have an “‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’” Id., at 284, 287, 290 (emphasis deleted). Thus, they satisfy Gonzaga’s stringent standard, and the rights
they recognize
C
Even if a statutory provision unambiguously secures rights, a defendant “may defeat t[he] presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend” that
1
Our precedent outlines what HHC must show to traverse the implicit-preclusion path. “‘The crucial consideration‘” is whether “Congress intended a statute‘s remedial scheme to ‘be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [his] claims.‘” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1009, 1012 (1984) (emphasis added)); Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252 (framing “‘[t]he critical question‘” as “‘whether Congress meant [the statute‘s remedial scheme] to coexist with . . . a
Our precedents make clear that the sine qua non of a finding that Congress implicitly intended to preclude a private right of action under
Put another way, the inquiry boils down to what Congress intended, as divined from text and context. The application of the traditional tools of statutory construction to a statute‘s remedial scheme may reveal no incompatibility between the enforcement
2
We discern no incompatibility between the FNHRA‘s remedial scheme and
As explained in Part III-A, supra, the FNHRA details administrative processes concerning inspection of covered nursing facilities and accountability for noncompliant facilities. But the statute lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude
HHC‘s argument that we need look no further than the detail of the FNHRA‘s enforcement mechanisms to find conclusive evidence of implicit preclusion is unpersuasive. Implicit preclusion is shown by a “‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
To be clear, a defendant can discharge its burden of showing that the presumption is rebutted by pointing to a comprehensive scheme. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20 (1981) (statutory “remedial devices” that are “sufficiently comprehensive . . . may suffice” to show implicit preclusion). But when a particular comprehensive remedial scheme discharges the defendant‘s burden, it does so because the application of ordinary interpretive tools reveals incompatibility, i.e., it demonstrates that “Congress intended [that] statute‘s remedial scheme to be the ‘exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [his] claims.‘” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252.
Nothing in the FNHRA indicates the incompatibility evinced in our three prior cases finding implicit preclusion. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120-123, 127; Smith, 468 U. S., at 1008-1013; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6-7, 19-21. Rancho Palos Verdes, Smith, and Sea Clammers
HHC has identified no equivalent sign in the FNHRA; nor has JUSTICE ALITO, see post, at 1, 3-5 (dissenting opinion). In focusing on what the FNHRA contains, they ignore what it lacks—a private judicial right of action, a private federal administrative remedy, or any “‘carefu[l]‘” congressional “‘tailor[ing],‘” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 255, that
One last rebuttal argument warrants addressing. The United States says that, because private entities owned most nursing homes when the FNHRA was enacted in 1987 (as they do now), the FNHRA is a rare bird for implicit-preclusion purposes. In the United States’ view, because Congress knew that most nursing homes could not be subject to suit under
This argument is unavailing. The implicit-preclusion inquiry looks to “the statute creating the right” and any “‘comprehensive enforcement scheme‘” Congress has created in the statute “‘that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
The difficulty for HHC and the United States is that implicit preclusion, in this
* * *
At oral argument, HHC‘s counsel remarked that the “right question” is “what rights are secured by law within the meaning of
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
No. 21-806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2023
599 U. S. ____ (2023)
GORSUCH, J.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
Section 1983 permits individuals to sue to vindicate their “rights . . . secured by . . . la[w].” Rev. Stat. §1979,
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
No. 21-806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2023
599 U. S. ____ (2023)
BARRETT, J.
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring.
Today‘s opinion makes three important points. First, Maine v. Thiboutot remains good law. 448 U. S. 1 (1980). Second, Gonzaga University v. Doe sets the standard for determining when a Spending Clause statute confers individual rights, and the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) satisfies it. 536 U. S. 273 (2002). Third, courts must carefully consider whether individual rights established by a Spending Clause statute are enforceable through
As to the first point: Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, under color of state law, violates “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” In Thiboutot, we held that the plain language of the statute was not limited to “some subset of laws.” 448 U. S., at 4. Rather, the term “laws” encompasses all federal laws, including those passed pursuant to Congress‘s Spending Clause authority. Ibid. Like the Court, I would not abandon that holding based on petitioners’ novel contract-law theory.
Second, our decision in Gonzaga establishes the standard for analyzing whether Spending Clause statutes give rise to individual rights. Under Gonzaga, courts must ask whether “text and structure” indicate that the statute “unambiguously” confers federal rights. 536 U. S., at 283, 286. Relevant considerations include whether the statute is “‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited,‘” whether it uses “explicit rights-creating terms,” and whether it has an “individual,” rather than an “aggregate,” focus. Id., at 284, 290.
This bar is high, and although the FNHRA clears it, many federal statutes will not. As the Court explains,
The third point is that even when a statute unambiguously confers rights, Congress can “supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under
As the Court notes, the presence of an “express private judicial right of action” typically demonstrates that a
But an actual clash—one private judicial remedy against another, more expansive remedy—is not required to find that a statute forecloses recourse to
Courts must tread carefully before concluding that Spending Clause statutes may be enforced through
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
No. 21-806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2023
599 U. S. ____ (2023)
THOMAS, J.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) cannot be enforced through Rev. Stat. §1979,
Since Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), however, this Court has ignored that fundamental distinction, permitting third parties who benefit from spending conditions to enforce them in
I
This case arises from a
These conditions largely consist of requirements that funding recipients protect certain “rights” of nursing-home residents. In a subsection entitled “[r]equirements relating to residents’ rights,” the Act requires recipients to “protect and promote the rights of each resident,” including “[t]he right to choose a personal attending physician” and make informed medical decisions; “[t]he right to be free from physical or mental abuse, corporal punishment, involuntary seclusion, and any [medically unnecessary] physical or chemical restraints“; and “[t]he right[s] to privacy” and “confidentiality.”
The Act also imposes many requirements directly and uniquely upon participating States, including in a subsection
FNHRA‘s scheme is illustrative of many modern federal spending programs, which often impose obligations directly on States as a condition of funding. For example, as a condition on highway funding, the Clean Air Act requires States to draft “State implementation plans” if their metropolitan areas fail to satisfy national ambient air quality standards.
The ubiquity of such spending conditions, combined with the Federal Government‘s overwhelming financial heft, has made Spending Clause legislation an extraordinarily potent instrument of federal control.2 Congress and federal agencies “regularly us[e] conditions to direct state and local governments in their regulatory and spending policies.” P. Hamburger, Purchasing Submission 139 (2021) (Hamburger). As a result, “the priorities and programs of state and local governments have increasingly come to reflect federal decisions,” to the point that the States have virtually become “disaggregated sites
II
This case presents one aspect of that question: whether spending conditions that impose obligations on States for the benefit of third parties may be enforced under
In Thiboutot, the Court held that “the plain language of [
It is obvious, however, that conditional spending legislation does not function—and, in particular, does not “secure rights“—like laws enacted under Congress’ enumerated legislative powers, such as the Commerce Clause. The latter, which I will refer to as “sovereign legislative” or “regulatory” powers, include powers to directly impose obligations, duties, prohibitions, and the like on individuals and entities beyond the Federal Government, and hence to secure corresponding rights in the persons and entities to which such obligations are owed. Laws that Congress enacts pursuant to its regulatory powers are binding on the regulated parties and pre-empt contrary state law of their own force. Whatever rights such laws secure, those rights are secured “by the . . . laws” themselves.
By contrast, legislation that conditions a State‘s receipt of federal funds on compliance with certain requirements imposes no obligations and secures no rights of its own force. The stated conditions simply have no effect and do not arguably secure any rights (“by law” or otherwise) unless and until they are freely accepted by the State. Not only that, the Executive Branch can prevent the conditions from taking effect
Indeed, spending conditions like those in FNHRA do not function as laws enacted under Congress’ regulatory powers, and, if they did, they would unconstitutionally commandeer the States to administer federal programs ranging from welfare, to healthcare, to air quality, and much more. Such conditions are thus constitutional, if at all, only if understood as setting forth the terms of a federal-state contract, rather than as binding federal law imposing legally enforceable obligations of its own force. In holding that FNHRA secures rights by federal law, the majority ignores the contractual understanding of spending conditions and, by doing so, calls their very constitutionality into question.
A
As noted earlier, a defining characteristic of modern spending legislation is the imposition of obligations on States that accept federal funds. Understanding a State‘s breach of such obligations as akin to violating rights secured by federal law is incompatible with this Court‘s anti-commandeering doctrine. Under this bedrock constitutional principle, Congress generally cannot directly regulate the States or require them to implement federal programs.
“When the original States declared their independence, they claimed the powers inherent in sovereignty.” Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 14) (citing Declaration of Independence ¶32).4 Later, in ratifying the Constitution, the people of the original States granted carefully enumerated legislative powers to the new Federal Congress, while preserving the States’ pre-existing legislative power. 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). “[C]onspicuously absent from” Congress’ enumerated powers was “the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States.” Ibid.
Thus, as this Court has made clear, the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 166 (1992).5 As a corollary, Congress “may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” Id., at 188.6
Yet that is precisely what many spending conditions require the State to do. Spending conditions like FNHRA’s are nothing more than commands to States, qua States, to administer federal benefits programs on terms dictated by Congress. Such conditions cannot be treated as having the force of federal law imposing direct obligations on the States and securing correlative rights of private parties without violating the anticommandeering doctrine.
It is no answer that the States consent to direct regulation by agreeing to the spending conditions in return for federal dollars. As the Court held in New York, “[w]here Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.” Id., at 182. Because the people have surrendered only limited and enumerated powers to the Federal Government, the States and Congress cannot jointly circumvent the ratification and amendment process by agreeing “to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.” Ibid. The Federal Government cannot buy (or rent) the States’ power to implement a federal program and then regard the conditions that the States are implementing themselves as having the force of federal law.
B
Of course, it is ultimately the States’ consent that gives effect to conditions in spending legislation, but it does so in an entirely different manner from an illicit expansion of Congress’ regulatory powers. Rather, as the Court observed in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract.” Id., at 17. A federal statute imposing conditions upon the receipt of federal funding does not enact those conditions with “the obligation of law”; it merely “proposes them as the terms of a contractual promise.” Hamburger 132. Such spending provisions “merely stipulate what the government expects from recipients if it is to pay them or, later, not withhold further payment and demand its money back.” Ibid. Thus, “even when fully recited in statutes, federal conditions do not come with legal obligation.” Ibid.
Further, and as already noted, the conditions in spending legislation only come into force upon the acceptance of another party. Such conditions are thus “obligatory only by virtue of such agreement and not by force of law.” D. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L. J. 1, 104 (1994). To be sure, “it is a statute that prescribes the
. . . are ‘secured’ (if at all) not by any ‘law,’ but only by the contract between the recipient and the United States.” Ibid.
This contractual understanding of conditional spending legislation is much more than a mere analogy; it is the only possible explanation for why such legislation is not an unconstitutional direct regulation of the States. To deny or downplay this principle is to seek to have it both ways. Much spending legislation conditions States’ receipt of federal funds on their undertaking obligations with respect to third parties. For such legislation to survive a federalism challenge, it must not directly impose obligations on the States with the force of federal law. But, for those conditions to be enforceable under
III
This contractual understanding of spending conditions is also a necessary consequence of the limited nature of Congress’ spending power, as consistently understood for nearly two centuries of our Nation’s history. Indeed, this is one point on which the Framers all seem to have agreed. Despite heated debates over the source and scope of Congress’ power to spend, all understood that this power did not carry with it any independent regulatory authority. That agreement persisted throughout the 19th century. And, in the 20th, it was a critical underpinning of this Court’s precedents upholding expansive uses of the spending power as consistent with Congress’ limited legislative powers and our federalist system of government.
A
At the outset, while Congress undoubtedly possesses the power to direct the expenditure of federal funds, it is important to note that the Constitution contains no “spending clause.” From the beginning, some have located the spending power in the General Welfare Clause, and that view has generally been accepted by this Court’s modern doctrine. See Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J., at 53, and n. 220 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s views); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 206 (1987). Yet, there are serious problems with that view.
The General Welfare Clause is simply part of the Taxing Clause, which reads in
Consider also that the General Welfare Clause references not only the “general Welfare” but also “the common Defence.” If the Clause were construed as an affirmative grant of power to spend for the common defense, it would make redundant Congress’ powers to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” also found in
The Taxing Clause is also a strange candidate for the source of a general congressional spending power because “it fails to provide any authority at all to spend money acquired otherwise than by taxation.”
The Clause certainly is not an independent grant of regulatory power to legislate for the general welfare, as the history of the Constitution’s framing and ratification makes clear. The Philadelphia Convention initially adopted a resolution that Congress be authorized “‘to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.’” J. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour), 33 John Marshall L. Rev. 81, 104 (1999) (Renz). But the Convention later abandoned this vesting of a broad power to legislate for the general welfare in favor of the enumeration of specific federal legislative powers and the creation of a taxing power limited by the General Welfare Clause. See R. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 1, 23–29 (2003) (Natelson); see also Renz 104–105 (counting five instances in which the Convention considered and rejected attempts “to insert a grant of general legislative power into the Constitution”).8
Federalists went out of their way to specifically disclaim that the General Welfare Clause would vest any independent regulatory power. For example, James Madison expressly rejected Anti-Federalist attempts to portray the General Welfare Clause as granting “an unlimited commis- sion to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare.” The Federalist No. 41, p. 262 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Similarly, in rebutting Patrick Henry’s warning that the Clause would vest a regulatory power, Governor Randolph observed: “You must violate every rule of construction and common sense, if you sever it from the power of raising money, and annex it to anything else, in order to make it that formidable power which it is represented to be.” 3 Elliot’s Debates 600. Again and again, leading Federalists represented the General Welfare Clause simply “as qualifying the fiscal power.” E. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 552 (1923) (citing The Federalist Nos. 30 and 34 (A. Hamilton), and 41 (J. Madison)). “It was generally understood” by the Constitution’s ratifiers “that the General Welfare Clause did not confer power to regulate”; such regulatory powers were conferred only by specific enumerations such as the Commerce Clause. T. Sky, To Provide for the General Welfare 67 (2003) (Sky).
Thus, even if one implausibly regards the General Welfare Clause as a “Spending Clause,” it is unambiguous that the Clause confers no independent regulatory power. Importantly, the same holds for every other plausible textual anchor for Congress’ general spending power. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause is a natural candidate for the spending power because spending funds may be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.
A second plausible source of the spending power is the Property Clause, which provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”
B
In the early decades after ratification, both the source and the scope of the spending power were hotly contested, usually in debates over “internal improvements” such as roads and canals. One side, represented by Madison, maintained that federal spending must be strictly in aid of the Federal Government’s specifically enumerated powers—for instance, expenditures to construct a road would be justified only if the road could be constructed under the Post Roads Clause or some other enumerated power. See Renz 108–119; see also J. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 63, 72 (2001). As this side of the debate also took a narrow view of the enumerated powers, it generally argued that the Federal Government could not fund internal improvements without a constitutional amendment. See Sky 140–141. The other camp, associated with the nationalist views of Hamilton and Joseph Story, understood the General Welfare Clause to “include a very broad spending authority,” which could be applied to purposes not specifically enumerated by the Constitution. Natelson 12; see also Renz 124–126.
Even this camp, however, understood that “the General Welfare Clause does not include a power to regulate.” Natelson 12; see also Sky 96. Hamilton, for example, made clear that the spending power did not “imply a power to do whatever else should appear to Congress conducive to the general welfare.” Report on the Subject of Manufactures 37 (1791). As he further elaborated, “[a] power to appropriate money [does] not carry a power to do any other thing, not authorized in the Constitution, either expressly or by fair implication.”
The limited nature of the spending power was also a rare point of agreement in Hamilton and Jefferson’s bitter quarrel over the constitutionality of a national bank. Reflecting the ratification era understanding of the General Welfare Clause, Jefferson observed that “the laying of taxes is the power and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised.” Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 277 (J. Boyd ed. 1974) (emphasis in original). If the General Welfare Clause went beyond “describing the purpose of the” Taxing Clause and represented “a distinct and independent power to do any act [Congress may] please, which might be for the good of the Union,” it “would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.”
In sum, the Framers and Ratifiers understood the Taxing and General Welfare Clause as granting only a power to tax. What our modern cases refer to as the “Spending Clause”—in fact, the General Welfare Clause—was understood by the Framers and the ratifying public as granting no regulatory authority. One thing that the opposing men and factions of the founding generation agreed upon was that the Federal Government’s power to spend was just that—a power to spend, involving no regulatory authority. Instead, the power to bind with the force of law must come from Congress’ enumerated legislative powers rather than its spending power.
C
Though the scope and source of the spending power continued to be vigorously contested into the 19th century, the fundamental understanding that federal spending measures could not bind with the force
Upon assuming office, President James Monroe sent a message to Congress agreeing with Madison’s views; the message was then referred to a special Committee in the House of Representatives led by Congressman Henry Tucker. Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 559–560. The Tucker Committee produced an exhaustive report on internal improvements, which disagreed with nearly every aspect of Madison and Monroe’s position.
In his second term, President Monroe set forth the fullest exposition of the understanding that the spending power involved no regulatory authority. In 1822, Congress passed a bill to establish a system of internal improvements, asserting the “power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of tolls by [federal] penalties.” Sky 147 (internal quotation marks omitted). President Monroe then vetoed the measure, judging that Congress’ spending authority did not extend to such “a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of internal improvement, and not merely the right of applying money under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations.” 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1908, p. 142 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) (Richardson). Because Monroe understood “that Congress do[es] not possess this power [and] the States individually can not grant it,” he agreed with Madison and Hamilton that the “power can be granted only by an amendment to the Constitution.”
To explain his veto, President Monroe sent Congress an extensive report entitled
In the centerpiece of the Views, Monroe explained that the spending power carries no incidental power to regulate individuals or States. Echoing Hamilton, Monroe understood the spending power to consist of “a right to appropriate the public money, and nothing more.” Richardson 162. It carries with it “no incidental power, nor does it draw after it any consequences of that kind.”
Applying this understanding of the spending power to the question of internal improvements, Monroe explained that Congress could only “appropriate the money necessary to make them.”
Monroe’s summation of the federal spending power, reflecting that it does not carry with it any regulatory power, was accepted throughout the 19th century by friends and foes of federal power alike. In his 1825 inaugural address, President John Quincy Adams explained that Monroe’s Views had “conciliated the sentiments and approximated the opinions of enlightened minds upon the question of constitutional power.” Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1825, in 5 American State Papers, Foreign Relations 753, 755 (1858). Five years later, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the Maysville Road Bill of 1830 for the same reasons Monroe had vetoed the Cumberland Road Bill of 1822: Congress lacks “[t]he right to exercise as much jurisdiction as is necessary to preserve the works and to raise funds by the collection of tolls to keep them in repair,” and “[w]ithout [such power] nothing extensively useful can be effected.” Richardson 492.
Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution also recognized that the spending power did not carry with it any auxiliary power to bind individuals or States. Citing Monroe’s Views liberally, Story agreed that Congress could not enact a system of internal improvements under the General Welfare Clause. Although he located the spending power in that Clause, Story understood that the power was confined “to mere appropriations of money,” and that, as a result, the Federal Government could not regulate internal improvements except pursuant to its legislative “enumerated powers.” 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, §1269, p. 150 (1833); see also Sky 224 (“[A]s read by Story, the General Welfare Clause did not constitute a regulatory power, independent of the spending power, authorizing Congress to enact whatever measures it wished . . . under an unlimited
Although disagreement on whether Congress could spend for purposes beyond the enumerated powers persisted through the Antebellum and Reconstruction eras, the understanding that the spending power did not imply regulatory power persisted. See generally Sky 232–240, 270–291. Because Congress was acting solely under its power to spend, it relied on the States’ acceptance of terms and upon the States’ legislative powers to carry out federal spending programs.
D
Given this consensus, it is not surprising that the first federal grant-in-aid spending programs were contractual in nature. The Morrill Act of 1862, perhaps the first such program, extended an offer to the States to accept donations of federal lands on the condition that the State use the land to establish a college. 12 Stat. 504–505. States had two years to accept the federal terms in the form of an Act by the State’s legislature.
In the early 20th century, the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and the national income tax vastly expanded the revenue available to the Federal Government. But the increasingly ambitious spending programs that followed did not break the contractual pattern established by the Morrill Acts. Thus, early-20th-century highway grants took the form of an offer to enter a contract, with the consequence of noncompliance being the cutoff of federal funds. See Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 574, n. 72 (describing Federal Highway Act of 1916); see also
Even in the New Deal era, advocates of far-reaching spending programs continued to understand the spending power as a mere power of appropriation. Professor Corwin, for example, recognized that the States must be depended upon to exercise the legislative power needed to implement such programs. Thus, “federal highway construction relie[d] on the state power of eminent domain, as well as on state power to police and protect highways during and after their construction.” National-State Cooperation—Its Present Possibilities, 46 Yale L. J. 599, 617 (1937). Similarly, national protection of forests depended on “the power of the states to regulate the conduct of persons entering forests,” and the provision of maternity benefits depended on “the power of the cooperating states to compel birth registration, the licensing of mid-wives, etc.”
In sum, from the framing of the Constitution to well into the 20th century, it was virtually undisputed that Congress’ spending power was nothing more than a power
E
When cases concerning expansive federal spending programs first began to reach this Court, they vividly illustrated both the enduring understanding of the spending power as a nonregulatory power and the contractual understanding of spending conditions. The Federal Government defended major spending programs on the basis of that understanding, and the programs survived this Court’s review only because of those traditional premises.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), the Court rejected as nonjusticiable Massachusetts’ claim that the Maternity Act of 1921 was “an attempt to legislate outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to the States.” Id., at 482. The Court first stated that it “[p]robably . . . would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject.” Id., at 480. In other words, the State could not be injured because the Act was not a direct legal regulation. Rather, it was a mere offer to bargain—it “imposed” no “burden . . . upon the States” and did not require them “to do or to yield anything” of its own force. Id., at 482. The State could not seek judicial redress because the contractual nature of the Act’s provisions meant that States could vindicate their own rights “by the simple expedient of not yielding.” Ibid.; see also Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 579 (noting that the Maternity Act adhered to the traditional requirements of state consent and the “general caveat against jurisdictional rights following in the wake of appropriations”). “[T]he Justices in Mellon understood that Congress’ power to spend money is not a legislative power.” Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 498 (emphasis in original).
Cases involving New Deal spending programs teach the same lesson. For example, United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), concerned the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which offered subsidies to farmers not to sell crops. The Government defended the Act on the ground that it did not regulate any private or state party. Instead, “[a]ny commands or restrictions in the Act [were] imposed only upon the use by [federal] administrative officials of the money granted.” Brief for United States in United States v. Butler, O. T. 1935, No. 401, p. 264. In line with the traditional distinction between mere spending and regulatory commands, the Government urged that “Congress ha[d] not gone beyond its power of authorizing an expenditure” precisely because “[i]t ha[d] not sought to force or command citizens to receive the money offered and to perform the conditions upon which the funds are to be disbursed.” Id., at 265. The Government expressly relied on the contractual nature of the Act’s conditions, as distinct from any “exercise of sovereign regulation”:
“It would be most unusual to suppose that a contract of this nature, entered into freely by both parties, is an exercise of sovereign regulation and control over one of the parties or over the subject matter with which the contract deals. . . . The rights of the United States under the contracts are no greater than would be the rights of a private citizen under similar contracts, and enforcement must be by ordinary judicial
process according to the law of the forum. The contracts are not derogatory of any sovereign rights of the States; they are carried out pursuant to and under the protection of the laws of the States. . . . The purpose and effect of the contracts so entered into are simply to accomplish the spending of the money on the conditions imposed by Congress, and in authorizing execution of such contracts Congress was not exerting a power outside of the field of appropriation.” Id., at 266–267.
The Government also disclaimed that the Act would have pre-emptive effect: Because it went “no further than offering benefits to those who comply with certain conditions,” States “remain[ed] as free after the passage of this Act as before to pass laws rendering it impossible for any of their inhabitants to comply with such conditions.” Id., at 268. Thus, to avoid a Tenth Amendment problem, the Government relied on the traditional distinction between the Federal Government’s power to spend and its power to regulate:
“The distinction between an application of the Federal lawmaking power to enforce compliance with the desire of Congress and the use of the spending power to offer benefits which might persuade people to that end [was] recognized in this manner by th[e] first Congresses.
. . . . .
“When the United States goes no further than extending benefits to citizens who arrange their affairs in a manner thought beneficial by Congress, there is no direct exercise of Federal power on those affairs and they remain subject to the unhampered control of the States. Consequently, in a case of this nature, the effect which the Act of Congress will have in a State is dependent entirely upon the voluntary action of that State and its inhabitants.” Id., at 274, 276.
In deciding the case, the Court took the Government’s concessions as given, stating, “[i]t is not contended that [the General Welfare Clause] grants power to regulate agricultural production.” Butler, 297 U. S., at 64. The Court then agreed with Justice Story’s observation that “the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for the general welfare.” Ibid. Congress’ spending power, even if located in the General Welfare Clause, conferred no regulatory power.
The Court proceeded to hold the Act unconstitutional precisely because it was, in reality, “a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government.” Id., at 68. That was because the “regulation [was] not in fact voluntary,” as it would lead to “financial ruin” for farmers who refused the Act’s benefits. Id., at 70–71. Confirming another aspect of the traditional doctrine, the Court held that even the purely voluntary consent of private parties could not expand Congress’ limited regulatory powers. Id., at 74–75.10
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The challenge to the Social
This time, the Court agreed with the Government, finding that the Act was not coercive and thus did not “go beyond the bounds of” Congress’ spending power. Steward Machine Co., 301 U. S., at 591–592. Then, in rejecting a federalism challenge to the measure, the Court observed that once the State accepted the federal conditions, it was bound with even lesser force than an ordinary contract. Id., at 594–595. The State was “still free, without breach of an agreement, to change her system over night.” Id., at 595. “No officer or agency of the national Government [could] force a compensation law upon her or keep it in existence,” id., at 677–678 (joint dissent). Indeed, the anticoercion rule supplements those doctrines through its recognition of the practical realities of Congress’ modern spending power: Because the Federal Government‘s overwhelming fiscal resources enable it to create “gun to the head” situations in which there is no practical possibility of opting out, the rule prevents the Government from purchasing the States’ regulatory powers to implement federal goals that it cannot attain through its own more limited powers. Id., at 581 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); accord, id., at 677 (joint dissent) (“Congress effectively engages in this impermissible compulsion when state participation in a federal spending program is coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a federal regulatory program is rendered illusory“). nor could they “supervise or control the application of the payments.” Ibid.11
The Court again demonstrated its adherence to the traditional view in Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm‘n, 330 U. S. 127 (1947). There, the U. S. Civil Service Commission determined that an Oklahoma highway commissioner had violated the Hatch Act, pledging to withhold a portion of the State‘s highway grants equal to two years’ of the commissioner‘s compensation if the State failed to remove him. Oklahoma challenged the Commission‘s order and the Act on which it was based as an illicit attempt to regulate the State‘s internal affairs. Id., at 133. Citing Mellon, the Court held that the Act was valid because it did not directly regulate the State, which had “adopted the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding” by refusing to remove its highway commissioner. 330 U. S., at 143.
Thus, to defend these spending programs in the first half of the 20th century, the Government relied on the long-settled understanding that the power to spend carries with it no sovereign legislative power to create rights and duties. To the contrary, the Government represented that these programs had the binding force, at most, of contracts. They did not pre-empt, nor did they bind States with the force of law; they merely spent federal
In sum, the historical record is clear and consistent on a critical proposition: The spending power is the power to spend only. Any duties imposed by regulatory legislation, and any correlative rights secured by law, must find their source in one of Congress’ enumerated powers or the legislative powers of the States. Congress’ spending power cannot secure rights by law.
IV
The contractual nature of spending conditions was taken as a given until the second half of the 20th century, when individuals first began to bring
The traditional understanding of both the spending power and
The stage was thus set for Thiboutot to discard nearly two centuries of settled spending-power doctrine by holding that federal spending conditions secure rights by law. Ignoring both the contractual nature of spending programs and the enforcement-power-based understanding of
But the Court‘s opinion completely missed the deeper conceptual question whether spending-power statutes can ever impose obligations, and thus secure corresponding rights, with the force of federal law.13 As explained at length above, the limited nature of the spending power dictates a negative answer. And, a contrary understanding would transform the terms of federal-state agreements into binding regulations of state entities by federal law—violating the constitutional prohibition against directly regulating or commandeering the States.
It took less than a year after Thiboutot for the Court to realize the “‘constitutional difficulties’ with imposing affirmative obligations on the States pursuant to the spending power” and to take the first step toward ameliorating the problems with Thiboutot. Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17, n. 13. In Pennhurst, the Court held that a provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (a conditional spending Act) could not be enforced against a state entity under
Without that understanding, however, it is unavoidable that spending conditions that impose substantive obligations on the States with the force of federal law are unconstitutional.15 As shown above, the federal spending power is nothing more than the power to spend. It neither contains nor implies any sovereign regulatory power to legislate rights and duties with the force of federal law, and the regulated party‘s consent cannot change that conclusion. The contractual nature of the spending power was essential to the Government‘s defense and this Court‘s approval of far-reaching spending programs; the programs survived only with that traditional understanding as a premise.16 The Federal Government and private litigants cannot now discard that understanding to argue that such programs impose obligations directly on the States that are enforceable against state and local officials under
* * *
By holding that FNHRA creates rights enforceable under
The line from Mellon and Butler, to Thiboutot, to this case amounts to a constitutional bait and switch that cannot continue to be glossed over or ignored. In holding that spending conditions are not merely contractual, but can directly impose obligations on the States with the force of federal law, the Court unravels the very rationale for their constitutionality. Either conditions in statutes enacted under the spending power are in the nature of contract terms and do not secure rights by federal law, or they are unconstitutional because they exceed the spending power and illicitly commandeer the States. The consequence of the majority‘s rejection of the contractual understanding is not that spending conditions are enforceable under
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED
No. 21–806
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[June 8, 2023]
Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
ALITO, J.
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.
I agree with the Court‘s understanding of the high bar required to bring an action under
I
The majority and JUSTICE BARRETT correctly identify the plaintiff ‘s burden under
The two FNHRA provisions that respondent invokes demonstrate what it takes to satisfy this demanding standard. First, the Act mandates that a “nursing facility must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including . . . [t]he right to be free from . . . chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required to treat medical symptoms.”
II
A
When determining whether individual rights are enforceable under
Finally, I agree that there is no bright-line rule for when a statute evidences an intent to preclude
B
When all is said and done, my disagreement with the majority is thus narrowly focused on how this standard applies to this case. In my view, FNHRA “foreclose[s] a private cause of action” even though it “admittedly create[s] substantive private rights.” Alexander, 532 U. S., at 290. The Act creates a reticulated remedial regime that both balances federal and state enforcement and channels disputes through that regime. Allowing
Consider the remedial provisions that the Act provides. When federal officials find that a nursing home does not comply
By specifying limited remedies for federal authorities and tasking States with otherwise determining the consequences for violations, the Act creates a clear division of authority that ensures States retain their historical control over nursing-home regulation. Allowing
The exclusivity of FNHRA‘s enforcement regime is buttressed by the grievance remedy FNHRA gives to nursing-home residents. Residents have the “[r]ight to voice grievances with respect to treatment or care” and “the right to prompt efforts by the facility to resolve grievances.”
This grievance process dovetails neatly with FNHRA‘s centralized enforcement regime because it funnels private complaints to the same state authorities that the Act tasks with enforcement. Indeed, respondent in this case wielded FNHRA‘s grievance process to obtain relief for both of the rights petitioners allegedly violated. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 79a–80a. But because FNHRA‘s remedies are more limited than the direct judicial highway that
The only textual evidence the majority can identify in response to this tailored remedial framework is FNHRA‘s saving clause, which states that the Act‘s remedies “are in addition to those otherwise available under State or Federal law.”
These results are understandable. There is a considerable difference between preserving existing remedies for conduct that happens to violate other laws and providing a one-stop remedy for the precise provisions in a statute. See Alexander, 532 U. S., at 289–290. The latter interpretation runs against a century of holdings that a statute “‘cannot be held to destroy itself’ ” through a saving clause. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)). Conversely, concluding that FNHRA “may be enforced only through the statute‘s express remed[ies]” gives full effect to
In short, “[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent [FNHRA‘s] administrative remedies would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.” Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984). I would thus hold that the Act precludes enforcement under