ALPHONZO DORRELL GRAVES v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 160688
Supreme Court of Virginia
October 12, 2017
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE, Jоseph W. Milam, Judge
PRESENT: All the Justices
The Circuit Court of the City of Danville convicted Alphonzo D. Graves of, among other crimes, using a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of
BACKGROUND
Graves pled guilty to a number of charges in connection with a murder, including use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In February 2016, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He objected to the imposition of a five-year prison sentence, arguing that it exceeded the statutory maximum and was, therefore, void. The trial court denied that motion, as well as a motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court‘s interpretation of a statute de novo. Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006).
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon in a threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit murder . . . . Violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct felony and any person found guilty thereof shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years for a first conviction, and to a mandatory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section. Such punishment shall be separate and apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any punishment received for the commission of the primary felony.
In Hines v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (2012), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the three-year “mandatory minimum” sentence in
I. ALTHOUGH CODE § 18.2-53.1 DOES NOT SPECIFY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE, CODE §18.2-14 AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ANSWER THE QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A STATUTORY MAXIMUM UNDER THIS STATUTE.
A. Code § 18.2-53.1 is an anomaly.
The Virginia Code employs two methods to assign a punishment for a crime. For many crimes, the offense is assigned a numbered “class” of felony or misdemeanor. There are six Classes of felonies and four Classes of misdemeanors, each of which provides a specifically defined punishment. See
Furthermore, the Code contains 42 statutes that impose a mandatory minimum punishment. Except for
B. Code § 18.2-14 specifies that punishment is determined by resorting to the statutory text.
Offenses defined in Title 18.2 and in other titles in the Codе, for which punishment is
prescribed without specification as to the class of the offense, shall be punished according to the punishment prescribed in the section or sections thus defining the offense.
The command of
C. Legislative history explains the anomalous language of Code § 18.2-53.1.
In 2001, the General Assembly tasked the Virginia State Crime Commission “to study the organization of and inconsistencies in Title 18.2 of the Code.” H.J. Res. 687, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 2001). The Crime Commission issued its report in 2004, proposing various recommendations and suggesting “amendments throughout the Virginia Code to use consistent language when describing mandatory minimum criminal sentences.” Virginia State Crime Commission, Report to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia: The Reorganization and Restructuring of Title 18.2, H. Doc. No. 15, at 5 (2004). The report noted that “[t]he Code of Virginia currently has inconsistent language for the concept of a mandatory minimum punishment.” The Code contained such variations as “minimum mandatory;” “mandatory minimum;” “minimum, mandatory;” “none of which may be suspended;” sentence “shall not be subject to suspension;” and, that the sentence “shall not be subject to suspension in whole or in part.” Id. at 37. The Commission proposed the adoption of a definition for “mandatory minimum punishment” as well as amending existing statutes to adopt uniform language. Id.
Although the General Assembly did not adopt all of the recommendations contained in the Crime Commission‘s report, it did follow through on its suggestion to adopt a definition of “mandatory minimum punishment” and to adopt uniform language throughout the Code. 2004 Acts ch. 461, proposed as House Bill 1059. The legislation was introduced by a member of the Crime Commission. Other members of the Crime Commission also served as patrons of the bill. House Bill 1059 is attached as an exhibit to the Crime Commission‘s 2004 report.
The bill amended
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon in a threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit murder, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration as defined in § 18.2-67.2, robbery, carjacking, burglary, malicious wounding as defined in § 18.2-51, malicious bodily injury to a law-enforcement officer as defined in § 18.2-51.1, aggravated malicious wounding as defined in § 18.2-51.2, malicious wounding by mob as defined in § 18.2-41 or abduction. Violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct felony and any person found guilty thereof shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years for a first conviction, and
forto a mandatory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section.Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sentence prescribed for a violation of the provisions of this section shall not be suspended in whole or in part, nor shall anyone convicted hereunder be placed on probation.Such punishment shall be separate and apart from, and shall be made to run consecutivеly with, any punishment received for the commission of the primary felony.
Id. at 674.
This amendment and the insertion of the now standard language establishing a mandatory minimum sentence had the effect of displacing a fixed sentence without specifying a mandatory maximum. The amendments to
The fact that the General Assembly did not prepare a fiscal impact statement for the 2004 amendments yields an additional clue that it did not intend to increase the punishmеnt in
imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities.” 59 Va. App. at 578, 721 S.E.2d at 797. An amendment that intended to increase a term of incarceration from a fixed mandatory term of three years to a potential term of life imprisonment would plainly result in a fiscal impact. The bill, however, did not include a fiscal impact statement.
Finally, one would expect the imposition of a potential maximum life sentence on so common an offense to generate a heated debate. The bill passed the House and Senate Courts of Justice unanimously, passed the House on a block vote of 100 to 0 and the Senate on a 39-0 vote. This unanimity would be inexplicable unless the bill truly constituted a simple clarifying measure rather than a substantive
We acknowledge that “[l]egislation is presumed to effect a change in the law unless there is clear indication that the General Assembly intended that the legislation declare or explain existing law.” Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 420, 587 S.E.2d 584, 587 (2003). Here, however, there is a clear indication that the legislation did not effect a change in the law with respect to
D. Drawing a judicial inference of a legislative intent to impose life in prison is inapposite here and inconsistent with longstanding Virginia practice.
Many courts have adopted a rule of construction under which courts will imply a legislative intent to impose a potential maximum life sentence when a statute is silent on a maximum term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2004). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted, “[l]eaving the determination of maximum sentences to the court is not uncommon” in the federal system, United States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1976), and courts have deduced from this practice Congressional intent to allow courts broad discretion in sentencing. Id. It appears that federal courts adopted this inference in interpreting the Lindbergh Act, which did not specify a maximum sentence. See Bates v. Johnston, 111 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); Bailey v. United States, 74 F.2d 451, 452 (10th Cir. 1934). Some courts look to legislative history in applying this principle, but more often than not federal courts apply this default principle without explanation or amplification. Compare Walberg v. United States, 763 F.2d 143, 148-49 (2nd Cir. 1985) (“Since the legislative history of the Act reveals an intention to give judges maximum discretion
We conclude that it would be inappropriate to resort to the “legislative silence means life” judicial inference in construing
II. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS TO ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT.
The defendant asks us to remand the case to the trial court for a resentencing on all of his convictions. The Commonwealth disagrees, contending that there is no reason to remand when the only appropriate sеntence is a fixed three-year term of incarceration. We agree with the Commonwealth. Ordinarily, “a criminal defendant . . . is entitled to a new sentencing hearing” where “a sentence [is] imposed in violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment.” Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 221, 683 S.E.2d 549, 554 (2009). In this instance, a three-year fixed term of confinement is the only sentence available. Therefore, a new sentencing hearing is unnecessary as to the defendant‘s conviction under
CONCLUSION
We will reverse the judgment below insofar as it imposes a sentence exceeding the punishment authorized by the General Assembly in
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
ALPHONZO DORRELL GRAVES v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 160688
Supreme Court of Virginia
October 12, 2017
JUSTICE KELSEY, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I. MINIMUM MEANS MINIMUM
In 2004, the General Assembly amended the felony-firearm statute. “As a general rule, a presumption exists that a substantive change in law was intended by an amendment to an existing statute.” Commonwealth v. Bruhn, 264 Va. 597, 602, 570 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (citation omitted). That presumption holds true here.
The prior version of
The Virginia tradition has always been to ask “not what the legislature intended to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact. We must determine the legislative intent by what the statute says and not by what we think it should have said.” Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406-07 (1963).3 I thus would not inquire as to
Following this tradition, “[i]t is our duty to interpret the statute as written and when this is done our responsibility ceases.” City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfield, 177 Va. 212, 221, 13 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1941); see also Continental Baking Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 202 Va. 798, 805, 120 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1961). Because we “can only administer the law as it is written,” Coalter v. Bargamin, 99 Va. 65, 71, 37 S.E. 779, 781 (1901), the interpretative principle that precedes all
others is that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (citation omitted). We thus “presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute,” Tvardek, 291 Va. at 277, 784 S.E.2d at 284 (citation omitted), and give each word of a statute its “ordinary and plain meaning, considering the context in which it is used,” Hilton v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 293, 299, 797 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (2017) (citation omitted). The ordinary and plain meaning of the word “minimum” is minimum, not maximum.
Seeking to rebut the presumption that the 2004 amendment changed the law by replacing a fixed term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the majority correctly points out that
To begin, what the majority views as a legal anomaly has been settled law in federal and state courts for many years. It is not at all anomalous for a legislature to enact a mandatory minimum sentence and “decline to state a maximum.” United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Ex parte Robinson, 474 So. 2d 685, 686 (Ala. 1985) (“Our research reveals many statutes, both federal and state, which fix a minimum penalty for an offense but which fail to prescribe a maximum penalty.“). When legislatures impose only a “minimum sentence,” they “leav[e] it within the power of the court to fix the maximum sentences.” Turner, 389 F.3d at 120 (quoting Binkley v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 848, 849 (10th Cir. 1948)). In short, these statutes impose “a mandatory minimum sentence, not a mandatory maximum sentence.” United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1988). One court has described this principle as “so self-evident as to not need explanation.” Turner, 389 F.3d at 120.
In such cases, American courts uniformly hold that “in the absence of a statutory maximum penalty, the maximum penalty when a term of not less than а certain number of years is provided, means that the maximum is life imprisonment.” United States v. Sias, 227 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Ex parte Robinson, 474 So. 2d at 686. This conclusion merely reflects the “sensible rule of statutory construction whereby the absence of a specified maximum simply means that the maximum is life imprisonment.” Turner, 389 F.3d at 120. The mandatory minimum provision, after all, “is designed to serve as the floor, not the ceiling” for criminal sentences. Sias, 227 F.3d at 247; see also United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987); Ex parte Robinson, 474 So. 2d at 686; State v. Turnbow, 466 P.2d 100, 101 (N.M. 1970); State v. Sisneros, 464 P.2d 924, 925 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
A multitude of courts recognize that the minimum-means-minimum principle applies to felony-firearm statutes no less than any other criminal statute. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-63 (2013) (holding that any fact which increases the “mandatory minimum” sentence under the federal firearm statute must be alleged in the indictment while observing that “the maximum of life marks the outer boundary” of the sentencing range under that federal firearm statute and noting that, although the trial court could originally have imposed a sentence above the mandatory minimum, an indictment for the additional act is still necessаry to subject a defendant to a higher mandatory minimum); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994) (“The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 . . . raises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum of 10 years in prison to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole if the defendant ‘has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.‘” (alteration and citation omitted)).4
With the exception of the divided Court of Appeals panel opinion in Hines v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (2012), the majority cites no cases suggesting that the phrase “mandatory minimum” also means the statutory maximum, and I am unaware of any such cases. Nor am I persuaded by the majority‘s cursory dismissal of this unbroken line of federal and state cases on the ipse dixit that the statutes and sentencing regimes at issue in those cases have little in common with those at issue here. See ante at 10-12. Because the legal issue is the same — whеther “minimum” means minimum, not maximum — they have everything in
common. Neither Graves nor the majority, therefore, can shoulder the burden of rebutting the presumption that the 2004 amendment effected a “substantive change in law,” Bruhn, 264 Va. at 602, 570 S.E.2d at 869 (citation omitted), by replacing a fixed term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
II. THE USE & MISUSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Conceding that the text of the statute does not establish a maximum term of imprisonment, the majority infers from the statute‘s legislative history that the omission is a forgivable oversight on the General Assembly‘s part. See ante at 5-10. I have two responses. First, that inference does not stem from a proper use of legislative history; second, it is a tenuous and speculative inference at best.
A.
As to the first point, I agree that legislative history has a place in statutory interpretation. I also believe, however, that it should be kept in its place. See generally 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland‘s Statutes аnd Statutory Construction § 48:1, at 551-54 (7th ed. rev. 2014). A textually clear statute needs no judicial construction of any kind, whether based upon legislative history or otherwise. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 29 (2012) (noting that even “cases approving the use of legislative history . . . disapprove of it when the enacted text is unambiguous” (emphasis in original)).
Virginia courts turn to a statute‘s legislative history only when the statutory text is ambiguous — that is, when there are multiple, equally reasonable, ways to interpret the command or prohibition. As we have previously emphasized:
Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously. . . . If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it. When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rulеs for construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Therefore, when the language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts is not permitted because we take the words as written to determine their meaning. And, when an enactment is unambiguous, extrinsic legislative history may not be used to create an ambiguity, and then remove it, where none otherwise exists.
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citations omitted).
This point has been a mainstay of our jurisprudence. See Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 362, 370, 492 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1997) (“In the absence of ambiguity, . . . resort to . . . legislative history . . . is impermissible.“); Carter v. City of Norfolk, 206 Va. 872, 876, 147 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1966) (“The language of the act being unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to legislative history . . . .“); City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 269, 136 S.E.2d 817, 825 (1964) (“[T]he plain meaning of a statute cannot be affected by resort to its legislative history.“); Commonwealth v. Rose, 160 Va. 177, 181, 168 S.E. 356, 357 (1933) (noting that “the history of legislative dealings” is “interesting but has no value except in doubtful cases“); Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor of Va., 115 Va. 865, 870, 80 S.E. 753, 754 (1914) (“[T]he motives, purposes or intention of the legislature have no existence in law where its enactment is plain and unambiguous on its face, except as those motives may be disclosed on the face of the act itself.“).5
The majority vaults the ambiguity hurdle by focusing not on
Along the same lines, I see no interpretative relevance to
Legislative history should never be a basis for judicially amending a statute to supply a term that a court believes the legislature left out, regardless of how obvious the oversight or how clear the legislative history. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496-97 (1997) (declining to rely on the “Reviser‘s Note,” which stated that the amendments to the statute “[were] without change of substance,” because the “indication” that those “who prepared the legislation either overlooked or chose to say nothing” about removing a term from 3 of 13 consolidated statutes “does nothing to muddy the ostensibly unambiguous provision of the statute as enacted by Congress” and because “[i]n any event, the revisers’ assumption that the consolidation made no substantive change was simply wrong” (citations omitted)); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 256-60 (noting that “[the new text is the law” and that the changed language governs “even when the legislative history consisting of the codifiers’ report expresses the intent to make no change“).
The majority‘s reasoning, however, effectively amends
B.
I am also unconvinced by the majority‘s understanding of the legislative history surrounding the 2004 amendment to
The majority also turns to the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission‘s failure to prepare a fiscal impact statement to accоmpany the 2004 amendment as an “additional clue” supporting its argument that the phrase “mandatory minimum” in the 2004 amendment also includes the maximum sentence. See ante at 8-9 (citing
Truth be told, none of us can explain the absence of a fiscal impact statement for the 2004 amendment to
III. STATUTORY ABSURDITIES
I do not deny that textualism has its limits. We should not adopt a literal reading of a statute when such an interpretation “would result in a manifest absurdity.” Butler v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 291 Va. 32, 37, 780 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2015) (citation omitted).6 That said, “the anti absurdity principle — understood in its legal sense — serves only as an interpretative brake on irrational literalism. This fail-safe applies in situations in which a purely literal reading forces the statutory text into an ‘internally inconsistent’ conflict or renders the statute ‘otherwise incapable of operation.‘” Tvardek, 291 Va. at 280, 784 S.E.2d at 285-86 (quoting Butler, 291 Va. at 37, 780 S.E.2d at 280).
A literal interpretation of
IV. HINES & THE COMMONWEALTH‘S CONCESSION
When this issue arose in Hines, the Commonwealth conceded that, “while perhaps not what the General Assembly intended for violators of
Appellee‘s Br. at 14-15, Hines, 59 Va. App. 567, 721 S.E.2d 792 (Record No. 0228-11-2) (emphasis omitted). The Commonwealth‘s brief in Hines, however, admitted that ”Hines, in essence, is asking this Court to rewrite the sentencing portion of
The Commonwealth in Hines also pointed out that the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion regarding another statute, held that “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of ‘mandatory minimum fine of $1,000’ is that the trial court or jury has the discretion to impose a pecuniary punishment greater than $1,000, and nothing in the statute supports a different conclusion.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Neria v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3088-07-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 136, at *10 (Mar. 24, 2009) (Elder, J.) (unpublished), aff‘d, Record No. 090813, 2010 Va. LEXIS 300, at *1-4 (Feb. 19, 2010) (unpublished)).
Despite these observations, the Commonwealth nevertheless encouraged the Court of Appeals panel to accept Hines‘s invitation to “rewrite” the statute, “effectively ignoring” its plain language. Id. at 13. Having convinced 2 of 15 activе and senior judges on the Court of Appeals that this approach was consistent with Virginia law, the Commonwealth now relies on Hines as settling the matter for all time. For two reasons, I am unwilling to accept either the Commonwealth‘s concession or the split decision in Hines as persuasive.
First, “an ‘issue which is a question of law is not subject to a concession binding on this Court.‘” Virginia Marine Res. Comm‘n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371, 389, 757 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2014) (alterations and citation omitted). “An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo.” Manu v. GEICO Cas. Co., 293 Va. 371, 378, 798 S.E.2d 598, 602 (2017) (alteration and citation omitted). I consider it a given that, when exercising this review, a Virginia court should reject any litigant‘s invitation to rewrite a statute in an admitted effort to ignore its plain language.
Second, the Commonwealth‘s position in Hines prevented that case from being appealed to this Court from the Court of Appeals. After the Commonwealth conceded the issue, there was no aggrieved litigant to appeal the case to our Court or, for that mattеr, to file a petition for rehearing en banc with the Court of Appeals. This truncated appellate review, based upon an ambivalent concession and resulting in a split panel decision that was never tested by any further rehearing or appeal, leads me to one conclusion: Any persuasive precedential value that Hines might have is, at best, inconclusive. We thus should do in this case what appellate courts are designed to do — review de novo a lower court decision on a pure question of law. If we were to apply the winnowing fork of de novo review to this case, Hines would never make it to the threshing floor.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain wording of
