Lead Opinion
Tеrra Nyree Hines (appellant) pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58 and one count of use of a firearm in the commission of one of the robberies in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence for the use of a firearm conviction because Code § 18.2-53.1 sets the maximum sentence at three years. Appellant further contends the trial court erred in imposing a thirteen-year active sentence for all three crimes despite the “substantial mitigating evidence” presented at the sentencing hearing. We hold, and the Commonwealth concedes, see Commonwealth’s Br. at 18, that the maximum sentence allowed under Code § 18.2-53.1 is the mandatory term of either three years or five years,
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 2, 2010, appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery. The trial court accepted appellant’s pleas and continued the matter for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing on December 21, 2010, appellant asked for leniency in sentencing in light of her respectable work history, full cooperation with the authorities upon her arrest, and efforts to improve her life since her incarceration. In response, the Commonwealth stated it did not have an objection to the trial court sentencing appellant below the guidelines.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE UNDER CODE § 18.2-53.1
Appellant acknowledges that she did not contemporaneously object to the trial court’s imposition of her ten-year incarceration for the use of a firearm conviction. Appellant invokes the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18 to request our consideration of her argument. Under Rule 5A:18, “[n]o ruling of the triаl court ... will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.” However, this Court may consider an alleged error to which no timely and specific objection was made when “good cause [is] shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” Id. “Determining whether the ends of justice exception should be applied requires the appellate court first to determine whether there was error as [appellant] contends and then ‘whether the failure to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a grave injustice.’ ” Howard v. Commonwealth,
Appellant contends the trial court erred in sentencing her to ten years incarceration for the use of a firearm conviction because the maximum allowable incarceration under Code § 18.2-53.1 in her case is three years. Specifically, appellant argues the “mandatory minimum” language contained within Code § 18.2-53.1 also operates as a maximum because Code § 18.2-53.1 neither specifies the class of the offense nor contains a maximum punishment. Appellant concludes that the only option for the trial court was to sentence appellant to thrеe years’ incarceration, none of which could be suspended.
The Commonwealth agrees with appellant’s interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1 and concedes “that the only sentence available for a first conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1 is three years in prison, which cannot be suspended or run concurrently with any other sentence.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 15 (emphasis in original). However, the Commonwealth points out that in 2004, the General Assembly amended Code § 18.2-53.1 to include the phrase “mandatory minimum.” The Commonwealth posits that accepting appellant’s argument would effectively rewrite Code § 18.2-53.1 and render the 2004 amendment superfluous.
Because appellant asks this Court to interpret the language of Code § 18.2-53.1 proscribing punishment, we rely on the familiar principles of statutory construction, and review this issue de novo. See Harris v. Commonwealth,
*574 When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature’s intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute. Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Meeks v. Commonwealth,274 Va. 798 , 802,651 S.E.2d 637 , 639 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Kozmina v. Commonwealth,
“It is a cardinal principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the [Commonwealth]” and “cannot be extended by implication, or be made to include cases which are not within the letter and spirit of the statute.” Wade v. Commonwealth,
Upon conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1, a defendant “shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years for a first conviction.”
The General Assembly enacted Code § 18.2-12.1 in 2004 as part of an extensive overhaul of those statutes prescribing mandatory punishments. See 2004 Va. Acts, c. 461, at 674. In the same bill, the General Assembly amended twenty-five other statutes “to make the language used in those sections consistent with the new statutory definition of ‘mandatory minimum’ set forth in Code § 18.2-12.1 and to make other minor editorial corrections where necessary.” Bullock v. Commonwealth,
We do not share the Commonwealth’s concern that interpreting Code § 18.2-53.1 to authorize only a three or five-year term of incarceration would render the inclusion of the term “mandatory minimum ” superfluous. As we have previously noted, “the General Assembly did not intend, in enacting House Bill 1059, to substantively change the existing scope of
Indeed, Code § 30-19.1:4, which was also amended by the 2004 amendment, requires the Commission to “prepare a fiscal impact statement reflecting the operating costs attributable to and necessary appropriations for any bill which would result in a net increase in period of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities.” Code § 30-19.1:4(A). “The requirement for a fiscal impact statement includes ... those bills which ... impose minimum or mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment or commitment.” Code § 30-19.1:4(C). In other words, any introduced bill that would result in additional incarceration must include a second enactment clause on the face of the bill setting forth the amount calculated by the Commission. Obviously, an amendment that was intended to increase the term of incarceration from a fixed mandatory term of three years to a potential life imprisonment would impact the operating costs of housing inmates and would require a fiscal impact statement in the bill. See, e.g., S. 1082, 2011 Sess. (Va.2011); H.D. 889, 1994 Sess. (Va.1994) (amending Code §§ 18.2-57 and -121). However, House Bill 1059, as introduced, did not include such a fiscal impact statement, nor were additional funds appropriated to pay for the additional costs. See Code § 30-19.1:4(H). Accordingly, despite the ambiguous term “mandatory minimum,” we conclude that the General Assembly’s insertion of that phrase and its decision not to specify the class of the felony amounts to a mere legislative oversight and not an intention to substantively change the range of punishment for conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1. Accord Schwartz v. Commonwealth,
Consistent with the dissent, we recognize and respect the good judgment of our trial judges to avoid immoderate results in cases. Here, however, ambiguity or uncertainty exists in the language of the statute, lending itself to potentially inconsistent applications. Accordingly, in consideration of the analysis advanced by the Attorney General and the historical framework of this and related criminal provisions, we believe that the majority interpretation accomplishes the objectives of the legislative scheme. Had the General Assembly only amended Code § 18.2-53.1 to include the phrase “mandatory
Because appellant has demonstrated error as to the imposition of a ten-year term of incarceration, we must determine whether affirming that sentencing order “ ‘would result in a grave injustice.’ ” Howard,
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a ten-year term of incarceration and
B.
IMPOSITION OF ACTIVE SENTENCE
Appellant next argues the trial court erred in sentencing her to a thirteen-year active sentence for the robbery convictions in light of the mitigating evidence she presented at the sentencing hearing. Although appellant acknowledges “the trial court sentenced [her] within the statutory maximum allowable sentence” for the robbery convictions, she nevertheless contends her evidence “should have resulted in a lower sentence.”
“When a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an abuse of discretion.” Abdo v. Commonwealth,
III.
CONCLUSION
Because Code § 18.2-53.1 does not contain a maximum range of punishment or a specification of the class of the offense, we hold a trial court may sentence a defendant only to a mandatory term of imprisonment of three years for the first conviction or a mandatory term of imprisonment of five years for a second or subsequent conviction. Furthermore, an independent review of the history of Code § 18.2-53.1 and the 2004 amendment compels this Court to accept the Commonwealth’s concession that the statute prescribes only a three-year mandatory sentence for a first offense. The trial court therefore erred in sentencing appellant to a ten-year term of incarceration. Further, the trial court did not err in imposing an active incarceration sentence of thirteen years because the sentence fell within the statutory limits for robbery. For these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Affirmed, in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Notes
. Code § 18.2-53.1 provides a "mandatory minimum" of three years for a first conviction and "a mandatory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction.”
. The parties and the trial court noted that the recommended sentencing range was high because appellant had a contemporaneous conviction in Henrico County for robbery. Appellant was convicted in that case on August 18, 2010. The trial court noted that had appellant been sentenced in the Chesterfield County circuit court, the sentence range would have been lower.
. In the sentencing order, the trial court noted that "3 years is the minimum mandatory sentence” for the use of a firearm conviction.
. Code § 18.2-53.1 also provides that a defendant shall be sentenced "to a mandatory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section.” Because it is undisputed that appellant has only one conviction of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, we refer only to the applicable mandatory minimum term of three years imprisonment.
. Ordinarily, this Court will harmonize the mandatory minimum sentence contained within a statute with the range of punishment authorized by its class specification under Code § 18.2-10. For example, Code § 18.2-308.2(A) criminalizes the "knowing[] and intentional[]" possession of a firearm by "any person who has been convicted of a felony.” That code section prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if the defendant had been previously convicted of a violent felony and a mandatory minimum sentence of two years for all other felonies. Id. "Since a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) is a Class 6 felony punishаble under Code § 18.2-10 by a term of imprisonment between one and five years, the mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm after a previous violent felony conviction equals the statutory maximum sentence.” Rawls v. Commonwealth,
. Contrary to the dissent's view that our “truncated” interpretation of Bullock takes its holding out of context, that decision provides useful guidance in interpreting the underlying purpose of the 2004 amendment. In Bullock, the defendant argued that when the 2004 amendment omitted the “Notwithstanding any other provision of law" clause, the General Assembly implicitly authorized "the courts to apply the sentencing provisions of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) to suspend any part, if not all, of a juvenile offender’s mandatory minimum sentence for a use of a firearm conviction.” Bullock,
. Ordinarily, “a criminal defendant ... is entitled to a new sentencing hearing” where "a sentence [is] imposed in violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment." Rawls v. Com.,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting in part.
Code § 18.2-53.1 establishes a “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment—not a mandatory maximum. Because the statute sets no upper limit to the potential term of imprisonment, there is no statutory limit. The trial court, therefore, did not err by imposing a ten-year sentence, with seven years suspended, for Hines’s violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.
I. Minimum Means Minimum
In 2004, the General Assembly amended the felony-firearm statute. “As a general rule, a presumption exists that a substantive change in law was intended by an amendment to
The phrase “mandatory minimum”—when used in scores of other criminal statutes—means the minimum unsuspendable sentence at the lowest point of a statutory sentencing range.
Faithful to the textualist approach to statutory interpretation, Virginia courts presume “the legislature ‘chose, with care,’ the specific words of the statute.” Va. Emp’t Comm’n v. Cmty. Alts., Inc.,
The commоn, ordinary, and accepted understanding of the word “minimum” means minimum—not maximum. To me, the analysis begins and ends there. Like Justice Eggleston, I believe it “is our duty to interpret the statute as written and when this is done our responsibility ceases.” Lynchburg v. Suttenfield,
Seeking to rebut the presumption that the 2004 amendment changed the law by replacing a fixed term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, Hines correctly points out that Code § 18.2-53.1 does not state a maximum prison term—either by specifically stating an upper limit or by incorporating a maximum term from the classification of felonies found in Code § 18.2-10. Hines finds this omission anomalous because, read literally, Code § 18.2-53.1 authоrizes life imprisonment. This anomaly, Hines reasons, empowers us to blue-pencil the statute, leaving “mandatory” but excising “minimum” from the 2004 amendment. For several reasons, I am unwilling to do so.
To begin with, what Hines views as a legal anomaly is actually settled law. It is not at all “bizarre” for a legislature
In such cases, federal and state courts uniformly hold that “in the absence of a statutory maximum penalty, the maximum penalty when a term of not less than a certain number of years is provided, means that the maximum is life imprisonment.” United States v. Sias,
A multitude of courts recognize that the minimum-means-minimum principle applies to felony-firearm statutes no less than any other criminal statute. Id.
II. The Bullock Digression
The one case the majority does rely upon, Bullock v. Commonwealth,
The majority, however, quotes only half of the pertinent sentence from Bullock. The omitted half includes an important qualification. The full sentence from Bullock reads: “Plainly, then, the General Assembly did not intend, in enacting [the 2004 amendment], to substantively change the existing scope of Code § 18.2-53.1 to permit suspension under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) of the mandatory sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1.” Bullock,
In a footnote, ante at 577 n. 6,
Nothing in the Commission’s recommendations suggested a mandatory minimum sentence, standing alone, should be interpreted as a maximum sentence. See Virginia State Crime Commission Report, House Doc. No. 15, at 5 (2004), available at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/ h & sdocs. nsf/By+Year/HD152004/$file/HD15—2004.pdf. Though the Commission’s report recommended dozens of statutory changes, see id., Part II at 1-7, Part V at 32-41, none
III. The Larger Statutory Context
Equally unconvincing is the majority’s reliance on Code § 18.2-14, which merely states that unclassified felonies should be punished “according to the punishment prescribed in the section or sections thus defining the offense.” I do not understand what this adds to the analysis. Code § 18.2-53.1 enacts an unclassified felony. So, under Code § 18.2-14, we look solely to Code § 18.2-53.1 (rather than Code § 18.2-10’s felony punishment classifications) to determine the sentence to be imposed. But this tells us nothing about what Code § 18.2-53.1 means by imposing a “mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.” Code § 18.2-14 begs, but does not answer, the question before us.
Along the same lines, I see no interpretative relevance to Code § 18.2-12.1, which confirms existing law that a “mandatory minimum” sentence cannot be suspended in full or in part. This provision merely states what we already know: The mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment in Code § 18.2-53.1 cannot be suspended. See Bullock,
IV. Plain Meaning & Statutory Absurdity
I also question Hines’s underlying assumption, apparently shared by the majority, that the sheer possibility of a life sentence for violating Code § 18.2-53.1 would be a manifest absurdity. Ante at 579-80,
A literal interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1—one that interprets “minimum” to mean minimum, not maximum—cannot be dismissed as a manifest absurdity. No court has ever suggested as much. Nor can we say a life sentence would never be appropriate under this statute. The “mandatory minimum” term of Code § 18.2-53.1 applies to various felons, including murderers and rapists who use firearms to kill, abuse, or torture their victims. I see no manifest absurdity in imposing life imprisonment upon a recidivist murderer or rapist who uses a firearm to accomplish his crime.
As for the conjectural possibility that a life sentence could be imposed upon an undeserving criminal, I am content to rely on the good judgment of our trial judges to avoid such immoderate results. That this trust is well-placed is evidenced by the fact that life sentences are “rarely, if ever,
V. The Attorney General’s Concession
Unlike the majority, I am unimpressed by what the majority calls the Commonwealth’s “concession that the statute prescribes only a three-year mandatory sentence.” Ante at 582,
The statute sets a “mandatory minimum fine of $1,000.” The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of “mandatory minimum fine of $1,000” is that the trial court or jury has the discretion to impose a pecuniary punishment greater than $1,000, and nothing in the statute supports a different conclusion. Thus, setting the fine at $2,500 was clearly within the discretion of the jury.
Neria,
Relying on Neria, the Attorney General correctly argues: “Hines, in essence, is asking this Court to rewrite the sentencing portion of § 18.2-53.1 by effectively ignoring the term ‘minimum’ in the present statute.” Appellee’s Br. at 13 (emphasis addеd). “Had the General Assembly intended the ‘mandatory minimum’ sentence of three years to be both the minimum and maximum term of imprisonment for an initial violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, it simply would have left the
The Attorney General’s brief then takes a surprising turn. After opining on Neria and the plain meaning of the phrase “mandatory minimum,” the Attorney General states he feels “constrained” to point out that under Code § 18.2-14, “while perhaps not what the General Assembly intended,” it “appears” that the three and five-year mandatory minimums in Code § 18.2-53.1 are actually mandatory maximums. Appellee’s Br. at 14-15 (emphasis added). As I noted earlier, however, Code § 18.2-14 says no such thing. Code § 18.2-14 merely directs us to the text of Code § 18.2-53.1 (rather than Code § 18.2-10’s felony punishmеnt classifications) to determine the sentence to be imposed. Once we limit ourselves to Code § 18.2-53.1, the question still remains whether “mandatory minimum” can be judicially construed to mean mandatory maximum.
Because I do not share the Attorney General’s angst over Code § 18.2-14, but agree fully with his plain reading of Code § 18.2-53.1,1 respect but cannot accept his concession. Virginia courts, of course, “have no obligation to accept concessions of error” and can never be bound by a concession on a “pure question of law.” Copeland v. Commonwealth,
VI. The “Fiscal Impact” op the 2004 Amendment
Lаcking any textual or caselaw support for its interpretation, the majority turns to the argument that the “mandatory
What is more, the assumption underlying this argument rises no higher than a speculative, guess. None of us can explain the absence of a specific appropriation for the 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1. It could be the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission simply misread the proposed amendment and, as a consequence, neglected to prepare a fiscal impact statement under Code § 30-19.1:4(A). Perhaps those charged with scoring the fiscal impact relied upon the State Crime Commission Report, not realizing the recommendations in the report addressed only nineteen of the mandatory minimum statutes needing amendment and conspicuously omitted any mention of Code § 18.2-53.1. See VCC Report, supra, at 37-38. Maybe this specific funding issue got lost in the larger decision by the General Assembly in 2004 to build two new state prisons at a cost of over $140 million. See 2004 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I, ch. 4, at 493. A year later, in 2005, the General Assembly authorized yet another new prison, see 2005 Va. Acts, ch. 951, at 2281-82, which, after being built, was promptly mothballed without ever being used.
I do not know what to make of these budgeting and appropriation decisions. But I do know what not to make of them. No matter the plausible explanations, none persuade me to interpret “minimum” in Code § 18.2-53.1 to mean anything other than minimum.
In sum, the plain wording of Code § 18.2-53.1 establishes a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment—not a mandatory maximum. Because the statute sets no upper limit to the potential term of imprisonment, there is no statutory limit. In this case, therefore, the trial court did not err by imposing a ten-year sentence, with seven years suspended, for Hines’s violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.
. See, e.g., Code §§ 3.2-4212; 4.1-305; 15.2-1812.2; 16.1-253.2; 18.2-36.1; 18.2-36.2; 18.2-46.3:3; 18.2-51.1; 18.2-57; 18.2-60.4; 18.2-61; 18.2- 67.1; 18.2-67.2; 18.2-121; 18.2-154; 18.2-186.4; 18.2-248; 18.2- 248.01; 18.2-248.03; 18.2-248.1; 18.2-248.5; 18.2-255; 18.2-255.2; 18.2-266.1; 18.2-270; 18.2-308.1; 18.2-308.2:2; 18.2-374.1; 18.2- 374.1:1; 18.2-374.3; 46.2-301; 46.2-341.28; 46.2-357; 46.2-391; 46.2-865.1; 53.1-203.
. In every instance where the legislature has chosen to do otherwise— by capping the punishment at the mandatory minimum sentence—it has done so expressly. See Code §§ 18.2-308.2(A) (possessing firearm after conviction of violent felony punished as Class 6 felony (up to five years imprisonment), with a five-year mandatory minimum); 18.2-308.4(C) (possessing firearm while possessing certain drugs with the intent to distribute punished as Class 6 felony (maximum five years imprisonment), with a five-year mandatory minimum); 46.2-1110 (misdemeanor conviction and fine of $1,000 and $2,500 for subsequent offenses, imposed as a mandatory minimum).
. See United States v. Wolak,
. United States v. Ortiz-Garcia,
. Consider, too, the counter-absurdity of capping the sentence of a rapist or murderer using a firearm at three years of imprisonment (under the majority’s interpretation of Code § 18.2-53.1) while inconsistently capping the sentence for possessing a firearm and drugs, even without using it, at five years (Code § 18.2-308.4).
. I concur with the majority's holding that the trial court did not err in imposing an active sentence of thirteen years for Hines's robbery convictions. See ante at 575, 582-84,