UNITED STATES of America, v. Charles MACK, Appellant.
No. 99-1265.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 9, 2000. Filed Sept. 29, 2000. As Amended Nov. 1, 2000.
229 F.3d 226
III.
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the order of the District Court sua sponte dismissing Allah‘s complaint as barred by Sandin and will remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Michael R. Stiles, United States Attorney, Walter S. Batty, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Chief of Appeals, Patrick C. Askin, (Argued), Special Assistant United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
After a jury trial, defendant-appellant Charles Mack (Mack) was convicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
Facts and Proceedings Below
At approximately 8:35 a.m. on March 15, 1997, Philadelphia Police Officers respоnded to a report of gunfire outside an “after-hours” bar located at Frazier and Market Streets in Philadelphia. Upon arriving at the scene, one of the officers observed Mack bent down and crouched behind a parked vehicle. As he approached Mack, the officer noticed a handgun in Mack‘s right hand. The officer then drew his sidearm and ordered Mack to put the handgun down. In response, Mack threw the handgun under the parked vehicle. One officer then handcuffed Mack and placed him in custody, while another retrieved the tossed weapon, a loaded .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun, from underneath the parked vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, the officers encountered Gregory Wessels (Wessels) outside the bar. Wessels indicated to the officers that he had been shot in his right leg. When asked to identify the individual who had shot him, Wessels stated that it was Mack. Wessels was then transported to a local hospital where doctors removed a .380 caliber bullet from his right leg. Later that day, while in the hospital, Wessels again identified Mack as the shooter.2
From the area outside the bar, the officers recovered twelve spent .380 caliber shell casings. These shell casings were found just a few feet away from where Mack had been standing and were consistent with ejection from a .380 caliber handgun. The officers also recovered several .22 caliber shell casings from the area and found a .22 caliber rifle from inside the bar. Examination and test-firing of Mack‘s .380 caliber handgun revealed that it was operational and contained gunshot residue in its barrel. After comparing the spent shell casings recovered outside the bar with the .380 caliber handgun in Mack‘s possession, the officers determined that the casings had been fired by Mack‘s handgun. The .380 caliber bullet removed from Wessels‘s leg was also analyzed. While the bullet bore insufficient markings to positively match it to Mack‘s handgun, the bullet was of the same caliber and did in fact have markings consistent with being fired from Mack‘s handgun. Moreover, the officers determined that Mack‘s handgun had been manufactured outside of Pennsylvania and had traveled in interstate commerce.
On June 30, 1998, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted Mack under
A two-day jury trial concluded on September 25, 1998, with the jury finding Mack guilty of violating
In response to the PSR, Mack filed a pro se motion challenging the application of the ACCA enhancement on the basis that he did not receive formal pretrial notice of the government‘s intent to seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.6 However, Mack did not at any time contest the validity of the convictions reported in the PSR. On March 9, 1998, the government filed a formal notice of its intention to seek the enhanced penalties, listing four prior convictions that the government was relying on to trigger the application of the ACCA. These were the same four prior convictions that were contained in the government‘s pretrial detention motion, and they correspond to the certified copies of conviction provided to defense counsel on August 12, 1998 in response to defense counsel‘s discovery letter.
On March 19, 1998, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing, at which the district court considered Mack‘s objection to the application of the ACCA. After determining that the ACCA itself does not require pretrial notice, the district court concluded that the only remaining question was whether Mack received the requisite notice to satisfy constitutional due process concerns. The district court ruled that the actual, even if not formal, written notice provided to Mack before trial regarding his prior convictions and possible sentence, the government‘s pretrial discussions with Mack‘s counsel regarding the applicability of the ACCA and its intention to seek its enhanced penalties, and the formal notice Mack received in the PSR and the government‘s formal notice filed ten days before sentencing satisfied the requirements of due process. Therefore, the district court overruled Mack‘s notice objection. Mack was convicted of violating
Discussion
On appeal, Mack asserts the following points of error: (1) the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under the ACCA in the absence of formal pretrial notice of the government‘s intention to seek enhancement and of the specific prior convictions supporting its application; (2) the district court‘s finding that Mack used or possessed a firearm in connection with a crime of violence was erroneous because it was based on a preponderance of evidence standard rather than the required and higher “clear and convincing” evidence standard; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the district court‘s finding that Mack used or possessed a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. We consider these issues in that order.
I. Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence Under the ACCA
Mack did not challenge the validity of the convictions supporting the application of the ACCA before the district court.
As Mack concedes, the ACCA does not require formal, pretrial notice. See United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir.1997); United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 147, 150 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 262 (1st Cir.1990). Thus, only notice necessary to satisfy constitutional due process requirements need be given. This Court reviews de novo Mack‘s assertion that his due process rights were violated. See United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.1993).
In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962), the Supreme Court stated that “due process does not require advance notice that the trial on the substantive offense will be followed by an habitual criminal proceeding.” Id. at 504. “Nevertheless, a defendant must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to the recidivist charge even if due process does not require that notice be given prior to the trial on the substantive offense.” Id. at 504. The ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute and does not create a separate оffense.7 See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 220 (3d Cir.1987). See also United States v. Henry, 933 F.2d 553, 558 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1703, 118 L.Ed.2d 412, (1992); United States v. Affleck, 861 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1058, 109 S.Ct. 1325, 103 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). In Hawkins, this Court held that the government‘s filing notice of its intent to request an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, which included a list of the accused‘s prior convictions, satisfied due process. See id. However, we declined to determine to what extent, if any, notice by the government of its intention to seek enhanced penalties under the ACCA is constitutionally required. See id. Every circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that formal, pretrial notice is not constitutionally mandated. See United States v. O‘Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 125 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1010, 120 S.Ct. 433, 145 L.Ed.2d 339 (1999); Mauldin, 109 F.3d at 1163; United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 625-26 (11th Cir.1995); Hardy, 52 F.3d at 150; Craveiro, 907 F.2d at 264-65. We agree and hold that due process does not require the government to provide formal, pretrial notice of its intention to seek a sentence under the ACCA.
Although Mack did not receive formal notice by the government that he could be sentenced as an armed career criminal until ten days before the day of sentencing, he received actual notice well
We conclude that Mack received constitutionally adequate notice. First, the government provided him with actual notice prior to trial, including certified copies of the relevant prior convictions. Second, three and a half months before sentencing, Mack received the PSR, which stated that Mack was subject to being sentenced under the ACCA‘s enhancement provisions and specified the prior convictions that qualified him for that enhancement (as well as other convictions on which the ACCA‘s application might have been based). Third, the government filed an additional notice ten days before sentencing formally notifying Mack that he could be sentenced as an armed career criminal. Thеrefore, Mack received more than sufficient notice of the possibility of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. See United States v. Rundle, 318 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir.1963) (“[I]t is well settled that while a defendant ‘must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to the recidivist charge’ that ‘due process does not require advance notice that the trial on the substantive offense will be followed by an habitual criminal accusation.’ “) (quoting Oyler, 82 S.Ct. at 504); see also Hardy, 52 F.3d at 150 (finding that the following met due process notice requirements: actual, informal notice; receipt of the PSR listing all prior convictions and stating the ACCA‘s applicability; and an additional formal notice just before sentencing).
In conclusion, Mack had sufficient opportunity to contest the earlier convictions and their applicability to his sentence. He chose not to do so. Moreover, Mack makes no claim of factual surprise of either the government‘s decision to seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA or the convictions supporting the application of the ACCA. Formal pretrial notice by the government would certainly do no harm, and, given the importance of pretrial knowledge of the ACCA‘s applicability to the decision whether to plead guilty or to go to trial, we recommend it as the preferred practice. However, it is not constitutionally mandated for good reason, because “the fact of prior conviction is within the knowledge of the defendant.” Oyler, 82 S.Ct. at 504 n. 6. The notice given Mack more than satisfied due process requirements.
II. Appropriate Standard for Factfinding at Sentencing
In determining Mack‘s sentence, the application of the enhancement under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and 4B1.4(c)(2) for Mack‘s use or possession of the firearm in connection with a crime of violence—his shooting Wessels—resulted in an offense level increase from thirty-three to thirty-four and a criminal history category increase from category IV to category VI, with a corresponding guideline imprisonment range increase from a range of 188 to 235 months to a range of 262 to 327 months.8 Relying on this Court‘s holding
The government normally bears the burden of proving facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir.1993). “This is because after a jury finds a defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence no longer applies, and the protections that form a corollary to that presumption become less important.” United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1409 (3d Cir.1994). In Kikumura, however, this Court held that, under certain circumstances, a higher standard of proof may be required. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. Kikumura was convicted of twelve counts of passport and weapons offenses, which resulted in an imprisonment range of 27-33 months under the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 1093-94. The district court concluded that Kikumura‘s actions were significantly more serious than his convictions and the corresponding guideline range indicated. See id. at 1097. The district court, therefore, imposed an upward departure on several bases, including Kikumura‘s intent to cause multiple deaths and serious injuries, his planned detonation of unusually dangerous explosives, his intent to disrupt governmental functions, and the endangerment of public safety and national security. See id. at 1097-98. The district court upwardly departed from Kikumura‘s original sentencing range of 27-33 months to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment—a 330 month upward departure from the median of the applicable guideline range of 27-33 months. See id. at 1098. When making its findings at sentencing, the district court employed the preponderаnce of the evidence standard. Although recognizing this standard as “overwhelmingly” predominant, this Court held that under the circumstances of a “twelve-fold, 330-month departure from the median of the applicable guideline range” the clear and convincing standard was required in light of
Kikumura‘s heightened standard has been applied in other circumstances, albeit only to similarly extreme upward departures. See United States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206, 216 (3d Cir.1999) (applying the clear and convincing standard when reviewing a nine-level upward departure that increased the guideline range from 108-135 months to 292-365 months); Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1409-10 (concluding that an upward departure, resulting in a fifty-fold, $6.875 million increase of a defendant‘s fine, warranted the clear and convincing standard of proof); United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1288 (3d Cir.1994) (finding the clear and convincing standard governed a seven-fold, $1.5 million upward departure from the maximum fine under the applicable guidelines range). Other decisions havе considered sentencing increases that have not warranted such a heightened evidentiary standard. See, e.g., Paulino, 996 F.2d at 1545 & n. 4 (reasoning that the calculation of the amount of narcotics attributable to the defendant, and the resulting increase in his sentence, did not warrant the utilization of the clear and convincing standard); United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 458-59 (3d Cir.1992) (departing upward from a 15-21 month range to a 27-month term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284, 290-91 (2d Cir.1996) (refusing to require clear and convincing evidence where enhancements raised the defendants‘s offense levels by eight levels each); United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (7th Cir.1995) (declining to require clear and convincing evidence for attributing 1,000 kilograms of marijuana to the defendant); United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir.1995) (rejecting the clear and convincing standard where the defendant‘s status as a prior drug offender increased his sentence from a range of 63-78 months’ imprisonment to a term of 120 months); United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (7th Cir.1992) (concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate where the defendant‘s sentence was increased from 115 months to 168 months, reflecting a six-level difference in offense level); United States v. Schuster, 948 F.2d 313, 315-16 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1991) (the difference between the 21-27 month guideline range and the 60-month sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum was not so dramatic as to mandate a higher standard of proof). The application of § 4B1.4 on account of Mack‘s use or possession of the firearm in connection with a crime of violence raised Mack‘s applicable guideline imprisonment range from 188 to 235 months to 262 to 327 months. This resulted in an 83 month, or approximately thirty-nine percent, increase from the median sentence of the guideline range. Mack‘s actual sentence of 262 months was 27 months, or just under twelve percent, longer than the maximum guideline sentence absent that enhancement; the enhancement raised the bottom of the guideline range by some 74 months, or about thirty-nine percent. Even assuming arguendo that Kikumura‘s teachings apply in contexts other than upward departures,11 the increase in Mack‘s sentence does not approach the 330-month, twelve-fold increase in Kikumura or the 207-month, three-fold increase in Paster. Rather, it more closely resembles those cases rejecting the heightened burden of proof. Accordingly, the clear and convincing standard of proof is not com-
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the ACCA‘s Application
In his third claim of error, Mack contends that the evidence does not support the district court‘s finding that he possessed a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. Specifically, Mack asserts that the evidence was insufficient for the district court to conclude that he shot Wessels. As noted in Part II, the district court‘s finding on this matter must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court reviews the district court‘s findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir.1999). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Mack possessed the handgun in connection with a crime of violence. Indeed the evidence supporting that finding is more than ample.
Mack does not dispute that he possessed the .380 caliber handgun, or that shooting someone with it is a crime of violence.13 Rather, Mack argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that he shot Wessels for three reasons: (1) Wessels testified at trial that Mack was not the shooter; (2) the testimony of the firearms expert did not positively identify the bullet removed from Wessels‘s leg as having come from Mack‘s handgun;14 and (3) there was no evidence on the number of guns and persons involved in the shooting outside the bar. We disagree.
Mack was in рossession of a .380 caliber handgun outside the bar, and Wessels was found by the officers outside the bar with a gunshot wound in his right leg from a .380 caliber bullet. Twelve fired .380 caliber shells were lying on the ground in the area where Mack was standing and were the only .380 caliber shells recovered from the crime scene. All twelve shells were posi-
Conclusion
We find no error in the district court‘s application of the ACCA to Mack‘s sentence. Mack‘s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring.
I join in Judge Garwood‘s fine opinion. I write separately because of the implications of his footnote 12, which deals with the potential impact on this case of the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Apprendi declared that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2362-63. Viewed through the lens of the separate opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, O‘Connor, and Breyer, see infra at 236-38, Apprendi‘s implications for the legitimacy of a variety of sentencing schemes, including the United States Sentencing Guidelines, have stirred enormous controversy, portending that the number of Apprendi challenges by incarcerated defendants will soon reach tidal proportions.1 While I ultimately conclude that we need not and should not reach the Apprendi issue in this case, the merits of that point seem to me to be close. I therefore take this opportunity: (1) to explain why the question is difficult; and (2) to identify one critical Apprendi concern that is created by the
I.
Charles Apprendi fired several shots “into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood.” 120 S.Ct. at 2351. The State of New Jersey charged him with, and Apprendi pled guilty to, inter alia, two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. See id. at 2352. The maximum sentence for this crime under New Jersey law was ten years in prison. See id. (citing
While Apprendi itself concerned only the New Jersey hate crime statute, there are numerous suggestions in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions that the case‘s scope may be quite broad indeed. Justice Thomas‘s cоncurrence argued that any fact that alters the range of punishments to which a defendant is exposed must be found by a jury, see id. at 2379-80, acknowledging that his proposed rule might invalidate the Sentencing Guidelines themselves. See id. at 2380 n. 11. Justice Scalia‘s concurrence maintained that “all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.” Id. at 2367. Justice O‘Connor‘s dissent expressed concern that the Court‘s holding “will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing reform accomplished over the past three decades.” Id. at 2394. And Justice Breyer, a key figure in the development of the Sentencing Guidelines, lamented that “the rationale that underlies the Court‘s rule suggests a principle that, unless restricted, threatens the workability of every criminal justice system (if applied to judges) or threatens efforts to make those systems more uniform, hence more fair (if applied to [sentencing] commissions).” Id. at 2402.
The majority responded to these allegations simply by noting that “[t]he Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998).” Id. at 2366 n. 21. Edwards, the only case cited by the majority, was quoted for the proposition that “a mаximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 n. 21. The Court did not cite Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), the case that originally upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.
II.
A jury convicted Charles Mack of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
The District Court sentenced Mack to 262 months in prison. This sentence was the result of the combination of two sentence enhancements found by the District Court pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The first enhancement, which I will refer to as “the ACCA enhancement,” applied because Mack was “subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions” of the ACCA. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a) (defining such an individual as “an armed career criminal“); id. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) (mandating that the offense level for any “armed career criminal” shall be no less than 33); id. § 4B1.4(c)(3) (enhancing the criminal history rating for all “armed career criminal[s]” to at least Category IV). A simple finding that Mack was an armed career criminal would have, without more, raised his sentencing range under the Guidelines to between 188 and 235 months. See id. § 5A.
The second enhancement, which I will henceforth refer to as the “crime of violence enhancement,” applied because the District Court concluded that, in addition to being an “armed career criminal,” Mack had also “possessed [a] firearm ... in connection with a crime of violence,” i.e., the shooting of Gregory Wessels. Id. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A);2 id. § 4B1.4(c)(2).3 This еnhancement further raised Mack‘s potential sentence to between 262 and 327 months. See id. § 5A.4 As noted above, the District Court ultimately sentenced Mack to serve 262 months in prison.
III.
The Apprendi inquiry has two stages. A court must first determine the “prescribed statutory maximum” sentence for the crime of which the defendant was convicted and assess whether the defendant‘s ultimate sentence exceeded it. If it did, the court must consider the second-order Apprendi question: whether the enhanced sentence was based on “the fact of a prior conviction.” If it was, then the sentence is constitutional.5 If it was not, then the
A.
In his footnote dealing with the Apprendi issue in this case, Judge Garwood resolves the inquiry at stage one, stating that “[w]hat was before the Court in Apprendi were facts (other than the fact of prior conviction) ‘that increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.’ [Citing Apprendi]. That is not the case here, where the statutory maximum is life imprisonment. (see note 4 and 7, supra).” Maj op. at 234-35 n. 12. I am not so sure.
What was the prescribed statutory maximum in this case? There are two possibilities. The first and most obvious answer is 120 months. The jury convicted Mack of violating the felon-in-possession statute; he was not charged with, nor convicted of, any other crime. The maximum possible sentence for violating the felon-in-possession statute simpliciter is 120 months. See
The other possibility, which Judge Garwood endorses, is that the prescribed statutory maximum in this case was life imprisonment, i.e., the maximum sentence statutorily authorized by the ACCA. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 487. If this is true, then Apprendi is not implicated because Mack‘s ultimate sentence (262 months) was within the prescribed statutory maximum.
1.
While not spelled out in his opinion in these terms, Judge Garwood‘s position appears to be as follows: (1) a jury convicted Mack of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the felon-in-possession statute; (2) the ACCA applies “[i]n the case of a person who violates [the felon-in-possession statute] and has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony;” (3) under Apprendi, the District Court (rather than a jury) was entitled to find that Mack “ha[d] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony,” and thus to sentence Mack under the ACCA; (4) the ACCA statutorily authorizes a life sentence; (5) the prescribed statutory maximum in this case was thus life imprisonment; and, therefore, (6) Mack‘s ultimate sentence of 262 months was within the prescribed statutory maximum and Apprendi is not implicated.
While not without force, this approach to determining a prescribed statutory maximum is in tension with the methodology applied by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. Demonstrating why this is so requires a comparison of the sentencing mechanics at issue in this case with those at issue in Apprendi:
- Apprendi was “convicted of possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351. Mack was convicted of knowingly violating the felon-in-possession statute; - Absent any additional findings by the trial court, the maximum sentence that Apprendi faced would have been ten years in prison. See id. Absent any additional findings by the District Court, the maximum sentence that Mack faced would have been ten years in prison. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) ; - New Jersey law provided that the trial court was required to sentence Apprendi to “an extended term” of up to twenty years if it found that he “acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual ... because of race.”
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) ; see id.§ 2C-43-7(a)(3) (providing that the extended term for a person convicted by a jury of a “crime of the second degree” shall be “between 10 and 20 years“). The ACCA provides that the District Court was required to sentence Mack to an “enhanced sentence” of up to life imprisonment, see Custis, 511 U.S. at 487, 490, if it found that he “ha[d] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony.”18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) ; - The New Jersey trial court found that Apprendi had committed his crime “with a рurpose to intimidate” and sentenced him to a “12 year term of imprisonment,” which was 2 years longer than Apprendi could have been sentenced to serve but for the “purpose to intimidate” finding. 120 S.Ct. at 2352. The District Court found that Mack “ha[d] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony” and sentenced him to serve 262 months (or 21 years and 10 months) in prison, which was 11 years and 10 months longer than Mack could have been sentenced to serve but for the “three previous convictions ... for a violent felony” finding;
- Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The Supreme Court held that Apprendi‘s sentence violated this constitutional rule. See id. at 2363. For the Court to do so, it needed to conclude that the “purpose to intimidate” finding “increase[d] the penalty for [Apprendi‘s] crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” But if the New Jersey trial court‘s “purpose to intimidate” finding increased Apprendi‘s sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, then the District Court‘s “three previous convictions ... for a violent felony” finding did the same to Mack—the mechanics are identiсal.
2.
There are, to be sure, some differences between Apprendi and this case, but these differences are not material to the determination of the prescribed statutory maximum sentence. The first difference exists in the wording of the statutes. Apprendi was convicted of possession of a firearm with an unlawful purpose, which is defined as a “crime of the second degree.”
Title 18 of the United States Code operates somewhat differently. Mack‘s substantive offense was violating the felon-in-possession statute. Section 924 provides two different sentencing options for such a person. Section 924(a)(2) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly violates [the felon-in-possession statute] shall be ... imprisoned not more than 10 yeаrs.” The ACCA,
In light of this juxtaposition, one could argue that while New Jersey law required a trial court to impose a base sentence and then to extend it after concluding that the defendant had acted with a “purpose to intimidate,” federal law requires no such thing. Instead, the argument would go, a district court faced with a defendant who has been convicted of violating the felon-in-possession statute needs only to determine whether Section 924(a)(2) or the ACCA provides the appropriate sentence. And if the court concludes that the defendant “has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony,” the argument continues, it should bypass Section 924(a)(2) altogether and instead sentence under the ACCA. Under this interpretation, the ACCA did not enhance Mack‘s sentence, it simply determined his sentence, as though Section 924(a)(2) began with the words “except as otherwise provided in Section 924(e).”
However, this argument, which I аcknowledge is not without force, appears foreclosed by Apprendi as well. In responding to New Jersey‘s claim that the “purpose to intimidate” finding was merely a “sentencing factor” (that may be found by a judge) rather than an “element” (that must be found by a jury), the Court emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury‘s guilty verdict alone?” 120 S.Ct. at 2365. Under this standard, it does not matter whether the ACCA is drafted in such a way as to “bypass” Section 924(a)(2). The question is whether the District Court‘s finding that Mack “ha[d] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony” exposed him “to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury‘s guilty verdict alone.” Based on the jury‘s guilty verdict alone, the longest sentence that Mack could have faced was ten years, but he was sentenced to serve over twenty years. As a result, the first Apprendi question cuts in Mack‘s favor.6
In sum, I conclude that the District Court‘s finding, pursuant to the ACCA, that Mack “ha[d] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony” increased his sentence beyond the “prescribed statutory maximum” as defined in Apprendi.
B.
If the foregoing is true, Apprendi would require us to ask whether Mack‘s sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum of 120 months was based on “the fact of a prior conviction.” As noted above, Mack‘s enhanced sentence was based on two findings made by the District Court: (1) that he was an “armed career criminal,” and (2) that he had “possessed [a] firearm ... in connection with a crime of violence.”
The first of these findings is—at leаst for now, see supra note 5—unquestionably valid under Apprendi. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a person is an “armed career criminal” if he is “subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of [the ACCA].” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). The ACCA applies to any person convicted of violating the felon-in-possession statute who also “has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”
Apprendi problems arise, however, when the District Court‘s second finding is considered. For Mack to have been eligible for any sentence over 235 months, the District Court needed also to conclude that Mack had “possessed the firearm ... in connection with a crime of violence.” For while the ACCA statutorily authorizes a life sentence, see Custis, 511 U.S. at 487, the Sentencing Guidelines operate to deprive a district court of the ability to impose it in a case such as Mack‘s. Even with the crime of violence enhancement, the maximum sentence allowed by the Guidelines would have been 327 months. More precisely, with the ACCA enhancement, but without the crime of violence enhancement, Mack‘s offense level would have been 33 and his criminal history rating would have been IV. See supra Part II. With these ratings, the maximum allowable sentence would have been 235 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. Even with the crime of violence enhancement (which raised Mack‘s offense level to 34 and his criminal history rating to VI,
In other words, with or without the two sentence enhancements, Mack could not have been sentenced to life in prison. This is because a defendant with a criminal history rating of IV (as Mack would have been without the crime of violence enhancement) is not eligible for a life sentence unless his or her offense level is at least 39. A defendant with a criminal history rating of VI (as Mack was after the crime of violence enhancement was applied) is not exposed to a potential life sentence unless his or her offense level is at least 37. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. There has been no suggestion that Mack‘s offense level was even potentially as high as 37, much less 39.
In this case, the District Court found that Mack had unlawfully possessed the firearm in connection with the shooting of Gregory Wessels. While shooting another person would unquestionably qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines, see id. § 4B1.2(a)(1), Mack has never been charged, much less convicted by a jury, with shooting Wessels.7 As a result, this finding does not fall within the “fact of a prior conviction” exception to Apprendi‘s general rule. If this logic is correct, then the maximum allowable sentence under Apprendi in this case was 235 months—27 months less than the 262 month sentence ultimately imposed.
There is, so far as I can tell, but one possible response to this argument. One could acknowledge that the “prescribed statutory maximum” in this case was 120 months and concede that Mack‘s sentence of 262 months exceeded it, but nevertheless assert that the (unquestionably valid) statutory ACCA enhancement increased Mack‘s potential sentence to life imprisonment. Because the District Court‘s ultimate sentence of 262 months fell within the range that could have been authorized by the ACCA finding, the argument goes, the sentence does not violate Apprendi.
The question whether a valid sentence enhancement may operate to raise the potential as well as the actual sentence for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum has not been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court. Neither of the Court‘s recеnt cases involving the validity of sentence enhancements involved two separate enhancements. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351 (involving a single enhancement imposed if the presiding judge concluded that “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” (quoting
I am not certain of the correct answer to this question. The Supreme Court has implied that the “fact of a prior conviction” exception should be narrowly construed. Cf. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2361 (noting that the exception, first enunciated in Almendarez-Torres, “represents at best an exceptional departure from ... historic practice“). Since the Supreme Court has not extended the Almendarez-Torres “exception” to cover increases in potential sentences, perhaps we should not do so either.
On the other hand, a fairly strong argument can be made that an ultimate sentence does not violate the Constitution so long as it is within the range of sentences authorized by a valid sentence enhance-
IV.
Having fleshed out the potential Apprendi problem in this case, the fact is that neither Mack nor his counsel explicitly raised the issue. While it is true that Apprendi had not been decided at the time of the filing of the briefs in this case, the argument was certainly available in light of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Dicta in Jones stated that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 243 n. 6. Although we doubtless have the power to do so, “[w]e do not generally consider issues not raised by the parties.” Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir.1991) (en banc). In light of our reluctance to make binding decisions about issues not fully briefed and argued by the parties, and because I am not certain what the proper resolution of any Apprendi challenge to Mack‘s sentence would be, I am content not to decide the issue. Accordingly, I am satisfied to join in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
I write separately with mixed emotions. In the wake of a retroactively unsettling Supreme Court pronouncement such as Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995),9 I have no desire for a repeat performance, or to contribute to the constitutional haze enveloping the appropriate relationship between judge and jury in our system of criminal justice. I do, however, believe that it has been useful to explore one aspect of the Apprendi problem with which the judiciary will doubtless soon be required to grapple. See supra note 1 (referencing recent Apprendi-based filings in this Court).