GARRO PINCHI v. NoemGARRO PINCHI v. Noem
ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On July 3, 2025, Frescia Anthuane Garro Pinchi, an asylum-seeker from Peru who has lived in California for more than two years, was detained by officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as she was leaving immigration court in San Francisco. Ms. Garro Pinchi filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking release from detention. On July 4, 2025, this Court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the government to release Ms. Garro Pinchi and enjoining it from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-arrest hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. That temporary restraining order remains in effect until July 28, 2025. Before the Court is Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s request to convert the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, the preliminary injunction is granted.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Garro Pinchi is a 27-year-old woman from Peru. On April 14, 2023, she entered the United States from Mexico. She was briefly detained by DHS officers and then released on her own recognizance “for humanitarian reasons,” according to DHS records. She was not required to post a bond and was not subject to any conditions of supervision. Ms. Garro Pinchi was given a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings in immigration court. The NTA charged her with removability pursuant to
In April 2024, Ms. Garro Pinchi applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that she fears persecution if she returns to Peru. Since arriving in the United States, Ms. Garro Pinchi has attended all of her immigration court hearings, complied with all of the requirements the government has imposed on her, and never been arrested. She has no criminal history before or since her arrival. In the United States, Ms. Garro Pinchi has maintained full-time employment at a company where she was recently recognized as employee of the month. She has become an active member of her church community in San José and has made friends with students and coaches at the boxing gym where she takes classes. Ms. Garro Pinchi is the sole financial provider for her mother, seven-year-old daughter, and other relatives in Peru who rely on her completely. Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s mother is diabetic and depends on Ms. Garro Pinchi to pay for her medical treatment.
Ms. Garro Pinchi suffers from several serious medical conditions. She recently underwent an operation for a tumor, which requires ongoing monitoring and medication to prevent recurrence. She also requires medication every eight hours to treat her generalized anxiety disorder, clinical depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Additionally, she suffers from asthma, gastritis, and Helicobacter pylori, a bacterium that infects the stomach and is a major cause of stomach cancer and peptic ulcers, which requires a strict dietary regimen prescribed by a doctor.
On July 3, 2025, Ms. Garro Pinchi attended a routine hearing in immigration
As Ms. Garro Pinchi exited the courtroom, she was arrested by a group of ICE agents, some of whom were wearing masks to conceal their identities. Only after she was detained and removed to a separate holding room did the agents serve her with a warrant authorizing her arrest and explain the reasons for her detention.
Hours later, Ms. Garro Pinchi filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order. The following day, this Court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the government to release Ms. Garro Pinchi and enjoining it from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. That order was to remain in effect until 5 p.m. on July 14. Ms. Garro Pinchi was released from detention on July 5. On July 14, before the temporary restraining order expired, the Court held a hearing at which it heard argument on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. At that hearing, the Court extended the temporary restraining order until 5 p.m. on July 28, 2025. See
LEGAL STANDARD
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [1] [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits‘—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff‘s favor and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.‘” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Peña, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)). The final two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
ANALYSIS
I. Ms. Garro Pinchi is likely to succeed on the merits.
Ms. Garro Pinchi is likely to succeed on the merits of her claim that the Due Process Clause entitles her to a hearing before she may be re-detained.1
The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Generally, the Due Process Clause “requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty. See Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“The fact that a decision-making process involves discretion does not prevent an individual from having a protectable liberty interest.“); Hurd v. D.C. Gov‘t, 864 F.3d 671, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that re-detention after pre-parole conditional supervision requires a pre-deprivation hearing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole context). Although in some circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government‘s discretion, the government‘s decision to release an individual from custody creates “an implicit promise,” upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty “will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the ... conditions [of release].” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “[T]he liberty [of a person released from government custody] is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Due Process Clause].” Id.
Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his Court joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the present case and finds Petitioner raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim that due process requires a hearing before an IJ prior to re-detention.“); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 783561, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [a noncitizen released from immigration detention] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.“).
Applying these principles, it is clear that Ms. Garro Pinchi has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of
To determine what procedures are constitutionally sufficient to protect a liberty interest, the Court applies the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2022).2 The Mathews test balances three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335. Each of the three Mathews factors supports Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s constitutional right to a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to any future detention.
As explained above, Ms. Garro Pinchi has a substantial private interest in remaining out of custody. She has an interest in remaining in her home, continuing her employment, providing for her family, obtaining necessary medical care, maintaining her relationships in the community, and continuing to attend her church. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (cleaned up) (holding that petitioner had a substantial private interest in remaining out of custody where it would enable to him to “work[], liv[e] at home, and be[] with family and friends to form the enduring attachments of normal life“); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963 (holding that petitioner had a substantial liberty interest where he had been released from custody for 18 months and was living with his wife, spending time with his mother and other family members, working as a bicycle mechanic, and developing friendships in his community); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
The government contends that Ms. Garro Pinchi has “the same liberty interest as every other noncitizen in removal proceedings” under section 1226(a) and argues that such a liberty interest is insufficient to warrant a pre-detention hearing because Rodriguez Diaz held that the procedures
Even assuming arguendo that the post-detention bond hearing provided under section 1226(a) provides constitutionally sufficient process for those noncitizens who have never previously been detained and released by DHS, Garro Pinchi‘s circumstance is different. Her release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and Ms. Garro Pinchi has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.”
The regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. Ms. Garro Pinchi justifiably relied on the government‘s implied promise in obtaining employment, taking on financial responsibility for her family members, and developing community relationships. The more than two years that she has spent out of custody since ICE initially released her have only heightened her liberty interest in remaining out of detention.5
Turning to the second Mathews factor, it is clear that there is a significant risk that the government will erroneously deprive Ms. Garro of that liberty interest if it does not provide her with a pre-detention hearing. Where, as here, “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody ... hearing,” “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” because neither the government nor Ms. Garro Pinchi has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention. Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (cleaned up). Civil immigration detention is permissible only to prevent flight or protect against danger to the community, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, but the government has offered no evidence—including in the proceedings before this Court—that her detention would serve either purpose. Indeed, the evidence before the Court suggests the government may have difficulty establishing such a basis. Ms. Garro Pinchi was detained after more than two years of attending every required immigration hearing and despite her deep community ties and lack of any criminal record. Under these circumstances, there is a significant risk that even the two-day curtailment of liberty that Ms. Garro Pinchi already suffered upon her re-detention by ICE was not justified by any valid interest. Providing her with the procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing will have significant value in helping ensure that any future detention has a lawful basis.
The government asserts that any infringement of Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s liberty interests can be adequately addressed if she requests a post-detention bond hearing after she has been re-detained under section 1226(a). While the government contends such a hearing would be provided in a timely fashion, there is significant reason to doubt its contention. The government is unable to provide any timeline for when such a hearing would take place. In addition, Ms. Garro Pinchi continues to face the threat that the government will place her in expedited removal proceedings, despite serious questions as to the lawfulness of such a decision, and that in those proceedings she will be provided very limited procedural protections or opportunities for judicial review. Further, DHS‘s policies regarding detention pending removal and the procedures it will afford noncitizens in such proceedings are in flux and uncertain. Given the inadequacy and unreliability of the government‘s proposed post-detention procedural safeguards, there is a substantial risk not only that the period between her arrest and any bond hearing will have served no valid government purpose but also that she will continue to be detained without a bond hearing in the absence of any valid purpose.
Instead, the government contends that Ms. Garro Pinchi should be detained solely so that the propriety of her release pending the completion of removal proceedings can be evaluated in a post-detention bond hearing. In the government‘s view, this is the only existing means through which ICE can make such a determination. But whether or not the government‘s existing regulations and practices provide for pre-detention bond hearings, due process requires the government to identify some interest beyond its own administrative practices to justify depriving an individual of her liberty without any pre-privation protections. Detention for its own sake, to meet an administrative quota, or because the government has not yet established constitutionally required pre-detention procedures is not a legitimate government interest.
Nor can the government suggest that the cost of providing such protections would be fiscally or administratively onerous. If the government wishes to detain Ms. Garro Pinchi, it need only provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a minimal cost.” Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (cleaned up). Indeed, it is likely that the cost to the government of detaining Ms. Garro Pinchi pending any bond hearing would significantly exceed the cost of providing her with a pre-detention hearing.
In short, each of the Mathews factors favors Ms. Garro Pinchi. She has therefore shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that the Due Process Clause entitles her to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any re-arrest or detention.
II. Irreparable harm
Ms. Garro Pinchi is also likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. She faces the risk of immediate re-detention by ICE, likely in violation of her constitutional rights and with potentially devastating consequences for her economic livelihood, her family, and her health.
The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Ms. Garro Pinchi
Further, Ms. Garro Pinchi is likely to suffer dire material consequences if re-detained. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees whose parents are detained.” Id. Ms. Garro Pinchi is the sole financial provider for her seven-year-old daughter, her mother, and other disabled relatives in Peru. Her mother has diabetes and depends on Ms. Garro Pinchi to afford insulin. Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s detention would thus cause an immense burden on her family. Detention also poses a significant threat to Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s health. She suffers from several serious medical conditions that would likely be exacerbated by detention. She requires regular medication to prevent the recurrence of a tumor, for which she recently underwent surgery, and to treat her anxiety disorder, clinical depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She also requires a strict dietary regimen to control a dangerous stomach bacterium. The likely consequences of Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s detention—which would prevent her from providing for her family and sever her from existing medical care—are grave and irreparable.
III. Balance of equities and public interest
The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, merge in light of the fact that the government is the opposing party. These factors also weigh heavily in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (cleaned up); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Padilla v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 953 F.3d 1134, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2020)) (“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party‘s constitutional rights.“); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.“). As other courts in this district have concluded under similar circumstances, the potential harm to Ms. Garro Pinchi is significant—she faces immediate and potentially prolonged ICE detention, putting her family‘s financial survival and her already precarious health at risk—while the potential harm to the government is minimal. The only potential injury the government faces is a short delay in detaining
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Ms. Garro Pinchi‘s request for a preliminary injunction. The government may not re-detain Ms. Garro Pinchi during the pendency of these proceedings without providing her with a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. Ms. Garro Pinchi may not be detained unless the government demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 24, 2025
P. Casey Pitts
United States District Judge