Hurd v. District of Columbia

effectively be achieved less absent rights.... Second Amendment If ever and, time, regulation,” restraint, at the same an there was occasion for this “substantially broader than neces- Masciandaro, would seem be it.” II, sary.” (quoting Id. at 272 Heller 670 F.3d at 475-76. 1258). Namely, high- F.3d at the District Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

lights empirical connection between a profusion guns and increased violent

crime, on, alia, relying inter the studies of researchers,

leading including the National Council, legislatures

Research and of the York, Maryland

of New Jersey— New put place

all which have li- similar regimes.

censing Appellee Br. 41- Wrenn Moreover, HURD, District points Jr., to the Appellant Michael D. expert testimony of District Police Chief Cathy Lanier as commentary well COLUMBIA, OF DISTRICT Unit- United States Secret Service and Government, Appellee Capitol explaining ed States Police special security District’s concerns that No. 15-7153 warrant firearms restrictions. Id. at 44. Court of Appeals, United States good regulation The District’s reason con- District of Columbia Circuit. legislature’s analysis its of “com- stitutes dynamic” situation, plex analysis an Argued September that examines “vast amounts data” and July Decided unique needs of District. considers III, (Henderson, J., 801 F.3d at 283 Heller

concurring part dissenting part). good regulation reason emerged deference,” “ample

deserves id. is, recognizes a deference that ours, legislature’s job, is the

[i]t

weigh conflicting pol- evidence make Indeed,

icy judgments. assessing the handgun possession

risks and benefits shaping licensing scheme to max- competing objec- public-policy

imize

tives, did, precisely [the District] type discretionary judgment legislative

officials and executive government

branches of regularly state

make. bottom,

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 99. At regulation

firearms “is serious business. minutely

We do wish be even re-

sponsible for unspeakably tragic some act mayhem peace because in of our chambers as to

judicial we miscalculated argued ap-

Eric C. Rowe cause pellant. on the briefs C. With Foster, Washington, Allen DC. Wilson, L. Mary Assistant Attor- Senior General, ney Attorney Office of the Gener- Columbia, al for District of argued appellee. cause for her on the brief With Racine, General, Attorney were Karl A. Kim, General, Todd Solicitor and Loren S. AliKhan, Deputy L. Solicitor General. PILLARD, Judge, Before: Circuit RANDOLPH, EDWARDS Senior Judges. Circuit Dissenting opinion by filed Senior Judge Circuit RANDOLPH. PILLARD, Judge: Circuit the Federal Bureau of Prisons from prison released Michael Hurd after roughly he had of 42- served 13 months month sentence. If that release were mis- such, recognized quickly taken and prompt arrest re-incarceration unproblematic. seem But the Bureau discharged Prisons Hurd circum- reasonably stances that he believed re- flected a deliberate reduction. In- sentence deed, Hurd remained in the District of years Columbia and three submitted supervision by the Parole Commis- sion the Court Services and Offender (CSOSA) Supervision Agency for the Dis- trict of Columbia before the Parole Com- mission recommended his release from custody. Federal authorities dis- federal charged supervised release pleaded March of 2010. In marijuana guilty possession in D.C. Su- joined sentenced to cannot be in a perior proceeding, was three habeas jail. Af- the D.C. .Superior consecutive weekends Court’s bench unreviewed duly serving this ter his second weekend ruling not the result a full and fair sentence, Department the D.C. of Correc- opportunity litigate. opportunity explanation

tions—without merits, complaint On the states a heard—disregarded to be legally procedural process actionable “to specifying order that Hurd was liberty claim. His sufficed re- interest 2,.2011, on Sunday, released October quire that he be afforded some kind of kept imprisoned p.m.” and instead process up again. before he locked As months, apparently for an additional claim, Hurd’s substantive due original sentence. remainder in dismissing the district court erred Thus, years more than four after re- beyond claim based material com- prison, Hurd’s lease from federal weekend plaint, incorporated and not by reference marijuana possession stint stretched it, converting without the motion jail. years into two into for summary judgment dismiss one On Hurd filed a November contemplated Federal of Civil Rules petition against the United States 12(d) accordingly Procedure and 56. We Superior challenging in his the D.C. remand the case court for procedural as a violation of confinement proceedings. further process. The court substantive due July in petition his from the bench denied appealed

2012. that decision to the Hurd Background I. Appeals, D.C. Court of but the court failed from appeal granting On an order a year By for another a half. to act that motion to dismiss for failure to state a of his point, Hurd had served balance claim of under Federal Rule Civil Proce initial sentence released. The and been 12(b)(6), the dure relevant facts are those appeal his as Court of dismissed alleged complaint, light in the in the taken moot. plaintiff most to the all favorable and with filed in court Hurd then federal district in inferences his favor. reasonable drawn damages against this action the District of noted, Accordingly, except as otherwise again Columbia U.S.C. background this is based on the factual pursuing procedural both and substantive complaint. process claims. The district court dis- his missed substantive due duty from Hurd was an active Marine by precluded the D.C. Court’s Corps 1997 to and Marine reservist denying his habeas decision plead- from 2001 to 2005. In after he States, against the United and dismissed guilty possessing ed cocaine and an claims under Federal Rule Civil both unregistered of D.C. firearm violation 12(b)(6). D.C., Procedure See Hurd v. 146 law, Superior Court sentenced the D.C. (D.D.C. 2015). F.Supp.3d 57 imprisonment to 42 months’ with a Hurd three-year supervised release. term that conclude Court’s We at began serving Hurd his sentence a fed- preclusive lacks the effect decision prison Virginia September on eral perceived. West the district Because Hurd entirety 2006. If had served the unable to obtain a Hurd decision his term, been released longer no that he would have appeal once he was prison claims from 2010. custody, and because section 1983 March prison Hurd, perior The federal Hurd in released- allowed who had stable time, explanation. employment without “At the at the June 2007 serve nine- release, in local apparently day jail of his sentence over the course time believed D.C, reported for a He that his motion three sentence weekends. reduction Hurd, jail Friday night on a F.Supp.3d had and was released been successful.” days following two later. He three-year 59-60. Hurd returned then served his Sunday, But on weekend. October supervised During term of release. Department the D.C. period, acknowledges, of Corrections re- the District Hurd him. in- personnel fused release Prison District of remained Columbia and formed more Hurd than months after regularly monitoring submitted prison from his release that he had drug drug failed several tests tests. Hurd imprisonment months of still serve and he was three times but arrested never given his 2006 He any sentence.1 convicted. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. prior opportunity hearing notice Despite those violations of the terms contest his re-incarceration. Without release, supervised the Parole Commission authorities of an assertion federal inter- sufficed, reprimand decided that letters id, taking est in Hurd back into federal 37-39 n custo- court did-not ,dy, Department D.C. Corrections supervised revoke release. The continued hold Hurd almost two three-year period after Hurd’s June 2007 years. discharge par- prison—years all then his post-im-

ties constituted believed ensuing years challeng- spent prisonment supervision—expired term ing imprisonment. In November time, July By the conduct after the District re-impris- few weeks him, prison federal released him, petitioned Supe- oned halfway during house where he lived his rior on procedural Court substantive and of prison, first few weeks out the Parole grounds for corpus due habeas Commission, Court -Services and (on against relief the United States behalf regular- Offender Supervision Agency that of the District appeared which be hold- ly him all reinforced Hurd’s monitored be- him). ing Superior sought The Court deliberately lief that he had been released responses timely from received the United prison fully and had served Columbia, the District States and of but sentence. petition languished. then al- Hurd’s After months, most seven more Hurd filed a pleaded guilty possession of petition requesting emergency re- second marijuana later, year Septem- in almost lief. of less than possession ber when two marijuana ounces of still a crime un- Superior argument was The Court on held Compare July der D.C. D.C. petition attorney Code Ann. 2012. Hurd’s Jaw. 48-904.01(d)(l) (2010) (making marijuana attempted put into evidence certain possession a punishable by Department misdemeanor of Corrections docu- D.C. that, claimed, up days jail), to 180 falsely Code ments she stated that (2015) §Ann. 48-904.01(a)(l)(A) (legalizing Superior Court re-sentenced Hurd less). possession of The gave hearing two ounces Su- 2 and him a October us, however, why remaining. It unclear Hurd would have 27 The District assures months left on his 2006 if he sentence served underlying that the sentence is not calculation only 13 months of a 42-month The sentence. dispute. Appellee issue in this n.l. at Br. 7 simple suggest math had 29 months it, 2011, ie., slip 18, 2013) (available kept when op. October at Dec. the. of at App. Appeals incarcerated at end the second The of Joint rejected his,marijuana argument weekend of that sentence. and dismissed Hurd’s Hurd’s-appeal fa- proffered counsel the documents as a moot. Id. The brication, cited passages Supreme evidence of the District’s Kemna, groundless, Spencer Court’s decision post hoc effort over paper (defense U.S. Suppl. App. its error. See L.Ed.2d (1998), concurring and Justice Souter’s arguing jail counsel “the that then went opinion, id. at both up back into the record and made that he person which concluded that 3rd, released hearing on had had October another from prison ruling before occurred, which never that he petition necessarily would not 2nd, be foreclos- on October which sentenced pursuing ed from a section 1983 claim. anywhere-on ... appears is not a date that (Court records”), at 54 Mr. Hurd’s id. then filed this suit the district asking respond proffered the District to against the District un- Columbia ... argument and to “the that documents seeking damages'for der 42 U.S.C. Department of Corrections over- period re-incarceration that he stepped its did that bounds and procedural claimed violated both and sub- Court”). purview the exclusive When process. stantive due District moved argued prosecutor the documents dismiss, ground first on the unauthenticated, were id. Superior Court’s denial Hurd’s habeas attorney requested opportunity to au- an judicata. res District ar- evidentiary hearing, them at an thenticate gued rejected Court had id. 59. The Court denied the “on the same claims constitutional expressing request, its desire to conclude merits” and that that decision was entitled Id.; day. the matter see id. credit, preclusive to full faith and thus (stating that there was “no foundation” damages Alternatively, of Hurd’s claim. and “no here to witness documents the District that Hurd’s com- contended them, that “the Court is not address” plaint plausibly allege failed a violation going ruling bring this delay order process. or substantive procedural court”). into At the close [witnesses] motion, at- support its the argument, the court Hurd’s denied habeas tached as exhibits its and some the brief from the petition bench. See id. 65-80. sentencing accompanying supervision and it filed before the Su- documents had appealed, Hurd but the D.C. Court of opposition habe- perior Hurd’s not act for did 17 months. Hurd’s petition. as appeal remained unresolved even after he September 2013.2 The was released dismissed Hurd’s sub- court argued process precluded inter- as retained live stantive due claim appeal rejected pro- est in that because a both successful the and substantive prerequisite process to a civil cedural due .claims failure First, challenging state a his claim. the district court de- re-incarceration. v, 12-CO-1364, States, United re- No. “the termined too, sentence, up. September 2. Here the numbers do not add but released Department of Corrections 2013—-justshy Nothing re-incarcerated of 24 months later. Department Hurd on October 2011. The discrepancy. explains the record remaining him he told had 27 months on his 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Banneker the merits substantive Ven [Hurd’s] solved claim,” precluding par tures, process Graham, 1119, 1128 Hurd’s due LLC v. 798 F.3d Hurd, section 1983 claim. (D.C. 2015). allel “To a motion to Cir. survive merits, Proceeding to F.Supp.3d at 63. the dismiss, complaint suffi must contain court, following parties’ the district matter, true, accepted cient factual lead, substantive due considered Hurd’s plausible ‘state a claim to relief that is ” process claim reference United Iqbal, face.’ jts v. U.S. Ashcroft (D.D.C. Merritt, F.Supp. States v. 678, 129 (2009) 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 1979). gleaned from The district court (quoting Corp. Twombly, Bell Atl. cases four factors that Merritt and other 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d help “whether re-incarceration determine (2007)). “A from claim crosses conceiv implicate is so [substantive] unfair as plausible able to when it contains factual process Id. 66. These due concerns.” that, allegations proved, if would ‘allowthe “(1) length of mistaken factors were to draw the reasonable inference (2) release; government’s level cul that the defendant is for the miscon liable (3) of, knowledge pability; prisoner’s Ventures, alleged.’” duct Banneker (4) to, mistake; contribution (alteration omitted) (quoting F.3d at 1129 re-incarceration, ie., prejudice caused 678, 129 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at prisoner readjusted has how well the “accept well-pleaded court must all the society.” Id. The district court found re- allegations complaint factual true non-prejudicial to Hurd on incarceration and draw all reasonable inferences readjust ground that he had failed to allegations in plaintiffs those favor.” society, therefore held that com determining complaint Id. “In whether a substantive plaint make out a due did claim, may to state a con fails [the court] process violation under Merritt. Id. at 69- only alleged the facts com Finally, sider the district court dismissed procedural plaint, claim on documents either attached to or ground any protected that he lacked incorporated complaint and matters liberty interest—even after the date on may judicial no which take [the court] original imprison sentence tice.” Francis Parochial EEOC St. Xavier ment, continuously, had it been served (D.C. h., Sc 117 F.3d Cir. expired—“because, unlike a would have 1997). If the district court considers other parolee, mistakenly prisoner released facts, it must convert the motion to dismiss ‘legitimate not have a claim entitle does summary judgment into a motion for (quoting ment’ freedom.” Id. “provide with notice an Simms, Henderson v. 223 F.3d 274 opportunity present support evidence in (4th 2000)) (alterations omitted); see Cir. respective positions.” of their Kim v. Unit Currier, 514 also Jenkins v. F.3d States, ed 632 F.3d (10th 2008) (“Appellant had no Cir. 2011); 12(d). see Fed. R. P. Civ. process right-to hearing a when he due complete into custody taken back was B. Claim and Issue Preclusion sentence.”). previously imposed court held that Hurd’s sub- II. Discussion process claim precluded stantive due was A. Standard Review July Supe- the D.C. decision Court, rior we hold neither claim review de novo the district We grant government’s preclusion applies. Rule issue court’s nor preclusion party a habeas

Claim bars denied the motion on the merits.” Hurd, re-litigating a claim that or 146 F.Supp.3d was at 63. Because the prior been asserted in a ac not should have had issued written opinion, tion. See Nat. Res. Council v. the district court obtained au- Defense (D.C. EPA, recording of 513 F.3d dio Court’s hear- preclusion ing Issue makes “the determination to discern that the court had ruled directly against of a in one on question involved ac the merits of his substan- tion as to in tive question ... conclusive a claim. Id. Hardware, B B second suit.” & Inc. v. appeal, On contends — Indus., Inc., -,

Hargis damages his section 1983 claim not was 1293, 1302, (2015). L.Ed.2d claim, same as his habeas because the faith The federal full and credit statute damages claim not was and could not have requires give courts to federal proceeding. been raised the habeas We court’s “the same full faith decision and agree. designed Preclusion is to limit a as a D.C. court would. 28 credit” U.S.C. plaintiff one bite at apple, 1738; see Marrese v. Am. Acad. Or prevent single pre even that It bite. thus 373, 380, 105 thopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. pleas later or cludes theories relief (1985). 84 L.Ed.2d 274 arising only out of the if they same claim matter, preliminary As a it bears men- have in the could been asserted earlier tion that Hurd’s habeas was observed, Supreme As the case. Court has States, against the United whereas the preclusion generally “claim not apply does against case is the District Co- current plaintiff rely where was unable ‘[t]he lumbia. Neither the nor the district theory certain the case or seek a why preclusion whether or discussed remedy certain the limitations despite apply non-mutuality. could Be- subject jurisdiction on the matter question cause that was briefed and we Marrese, courts.’” U.S. at application pre- find district court’s (quoting Restatement S.Ct. 1327 (Second) was clusion doctrine erroneous other op judgments 26(l)(c) (1982)); see Wilson grounds, we do resolve it. Hart, (D.C. 2003). v. 514 n.4 A.2d Claim Preclusion. The district applying preclusion where a Cases claim damages analysis preclu court limited its claim different amount was available sion, first, using compared action inquiry the familiar for assess the second ing precluded by hardly support a claim is see Dissent at can prior whether preclusion damages That where no judgment. inquiry “focuses whatsoever (1) it is following questions: whether the claim were available the first action. And action; joined adjudicated finally the first far from clear that Hurd could (2) present damages petition. whether the claim is the same claim with his Generally speaking, Dissent at 689-90. thé which was raised which See might prior pro Supreme have been raised in the Court has reserved habeas (3) ceeding; party against seeking release from confinement and whether those plea preclusion] seeking whom the 1983 for other is asserted and section those [of relief, damages. party privity or in such as See Skinner party with a Switzer, Klein, prior case.” Patton v. 131 S.Ct. 746 A.2d (2011); 1999) curiam). (per also 179 L.Ed.2d 233 see Wolff 539, 554, McDonnell, 94 “only ques court 418 U.S. district held that real (1974) (“[H]abeas 2963, tion” 935 was “whether the 41 L.Ed.2d 680 preclusion apply or does not appropriate an Issue

corpus is not available claims.”); damages v. nor remedy Preiser because the neither defense-was raised Rodriguez, 93 decided below is forfeited. therefore (1973) 1827, (“[D]amages 907, 880, 439 Taylor Sturgell, 36 v. 553 L.Ed.2d See U.S. corpus in (2008) are not available habeas federal 128 S.Ct. 171 L.Ed.2d 155 Blair-Bey Quick, proceedings.”); v. 151 (both preclusion forms are affirmative (D.C. 1998) 1036, 1041 (assuming F.3d Cir. pled proved by defenses that must be damages “clearly claims be cannot defendant); Canonsburg Hosp. Gen. cf. Burgos v. Hop in corpus”); heard (D.C. Burwell, v. F.3d 302 Cir. 807 (dam 1994) kins, (2d Cir. F.3d 2015) (“[A]n failure raise issue agency’s ages not York state habé- available New preclusion in its court answer federal Thus, is not proceedings). the issue here waiver.”) may (emphasis constitute omit may litigant have two chances whether a ted). event, if any even the matter were damages allegedly for an unlaw obtain forfeited, not preclusion equi issue cannot incarceration, is but enti ful whether here, tably apply where the any. F.3d Burgos, See tled judge, bench, ruling from the (“[W]here plaintiff from' was precluded refused documents Hurd’s law consider damages by recovering action initial proffered or yer provide evidentiary an barriers, or jurisdictional statutory formal hearing, and where was released and choice, subsequent by plaintiffs ac not the-appeal as moot dismissed before the damages normally tion for not will D.C. Court of judg reached by judicata it arises res even where barred . petition. ment the merits It has from as the the same factual circumstances general been “the view of com courts and action.”); see also v. Hanni initial Rhodes among critical mentators most (10th 1993); gan, 12 F.3d Cir. guarantees of in applying fairness collater (7th McCaughtry, v. F.3d Ward a.k,a. estoppel,” preclusion, al “is issue order). 2000) (unpublished guarantee party estopped to be only had not fair opportunity full and

2. Issue Preclusion. The District adequate litigate an ‘to incentive -the alternatively court’s defends Haring question.” hilt’ issues in judgment ground on the that Hurd’s due Prosise, 103 S.Ct. process precluded. are issue claims Under (1983). Consistent L.Ed.2d 595 law, preclusion generally pre issue that “to the proviso, preclusion hilt” issue parties re-litigating vents issues against if apply party, does “[t]he proceed fact or an law decided earlier issue, not, preclusion sought could “(1) ing actually .litigated if whom law, (2) a-valid, matter obtained by review judg determined final actipn.” judgment (3) in the initial merits; ment on the a full and fair after Restate op Judgments 28(1); see (Second) opportunity litigation ment Davis, 503; (4) 663 A.2d at Ali Baba Co. v. privies; their under circumstances Wilco, (D.C. Inc., 482 A.2d n.17 where the was essential to determination commentary judgment, merely Restatement’s dictum.” Davis, explicit that, “controversy when Davis 663 A.2d earlier 1995). According appeal, has moot” on the unre- District, Supe to the become judgment rior Court lower cannot have already determined that Hurd’s viewed op Restatement, preclusive give to a sub re-incarceration did effect. (Second) rise Judgments mooted-ap- 28 cmt. a. stantive due That claim.

681 law, peal exception, by ap- D.C. spawned embraced versies that them became moot. See, to plies treat the Lewis Hotel here, e.g., Emps. We decline mooted- and Rest. 297, Union, (D.C. 1999) on-appeal Superior, 727 A.2d 299-300 Court as dis- decision (despite disfavoring rule when positive of common also at vacatur issues stake sought by parties by who caused mootness damages case. action, voluntary appropriate vacatur was appears to concede The District that the government’s where legisla new behest exception to issue mooted-appeal preclu claims); Goulart, tion mooted Wheeler v. here, normally apply argues sion would (D.C. 1993); 623 A.2d 1177 Howell v. that nevertheless we should treat the Su States, 455 United A.2d n.1 judgment perior preclusive Court be (en banc). 1983) the But District has cause not ask specifically Hurd did the case, nor pointed to no are we aware of Appeals Court the of to vacate Supe any, in D.C. court ,a which a held that For point, Court’s rior decision. that the party’s to seek vacatur defeated the failure Munsingwear, District relies United States v. to exception preclusion. issue mootness See ., 340 U.S. 71 S.Ct. Inc Judgments (Second) Restatement (1950), Munsingwear, the L.Ed. Reporter’s (cautioning that the Mun- Note argued—as government Hurd'does here— singwear appear not rule to “does not preclusion apply that did issue gained adherence courts the the for .injunctive the relief became moot , statds”). government before the had a chance Second,, the even if courts em D.C- appeal. it Id. at overturn S.Ct. .aspect Munsingwear,. braced we rejecting argument, the 104. In Court apply Munsingwear would not it here. The practice,” cited its “established consistent “equitable” rule involves considerations court,” duty appellate “the with- it' gives requires. when “fairness” way judgment or vacate the below” “reverse See Co. v. Bancorp Mortg. U.S. Bonner appeal. became moot when a while case 18, 25, 115 P’ship, 513 Mall U.S. S.Ct. 39-40, 104. Id. at 71 S.Ct. This “clears the (1994). In Munsingwear, L.Ed.2d 233 relitigation path for future issues government “acquiesced had in. the a judg between and eliminates yet dismissal” failed seek vacatur. ment, prevented review which was 104. U.S. 71 S.Ct. The Court held at. through happenstance.” Id. at that, “having slept rights,” gov on.its Here, because, the D.C. could, preclusive ernment avoid the Appeals did .vacate court,judgment. effect Id. at dismissed, merely Court’s order but contrast, Hurd, 71 S.Ct. never moot, argues appeal as acquiesced in the dismissal the habeas preclusive. decision is asserting claims, reasons, disagree For two we with the he- his own appeal did cause argument Munsingwear District’s by voluntary-action. Lewis, See mooted exception overrides mootness issue (noting that the “principal A.2d at 299-300 First,, preclusion. the D.C. courts have.not factor be considered” whether Munsingwear followed hold mooted- vacate decision “whether mooted appeal exception inapplicable merely, be- judgment party seeking relief from the judgment court’s was not voluntary cause'a lower below mootness caused action”); recognize Bancorp Mortg., that the D.C. courts vacated. We (same). Rather, Munsingwear regarding have cited courts’ power urged to vacate the contro- the D.C. Court opinions when decide 682 Sufficiency Complaint on petition precisely its merits re- C.

his action against subsequent move bar a The district court also held that Hurd’s damages. rejecting for In Hurd’s concerns to state a complaint failed the merits potential adverse effects of the about granted. claim on relief be could order, the D.C. Court of Court’s Hurd claimed that his re-incarceration vio- Supreme opinion cited the Court’s rights procedural his substan- lated and 17, Kemna, 1, Spencer 118 process.3 tive due address the due We (1998), 140 S.Ct. 43 and Jus- L.Ed.2d arguments in turn process below. concurrence, 20-21, at tice id. 118 Souter’s prospect which held that the of a S.Ct. 1. Procedural Due Process damages future action under section 1983 “undisputed It is that the District could sustain a habeas claim otherwise no provide any prior failed to Hurd with by prisoner’s mooted release. See hearing,” only tice and therefore “the 12-CO-1364, States, Hurd v. United No. question protected he had a whether slip op. App. Ct. Dec. liberty him to interest” would entitle passages, Spencer the cited procedure some before re-incarceration. that it “not ... noted certain that a Hurd, F.Supp.3d The district damages be foreclos- “pro a concluded Hurd lacked habeas, ed” the denial of id. at liberty tected interest his continued justices concurring and the four parolee, freedom.” Id. at 71-72. a Unlike “a no prisoner, elaborated that former constitutionally to a who is entitled revoca n custody,’ longer may bring a Brewer, hearing, Morrissey tion being satisfy action ... without bound 33 L.Ed.2d requirement favorable-termination it (1972), the district court concluded impossible would be as a matter of law mistakenly prisoner that “a does released satisfy.” him to Id. at 118 S.Ct. 978. legitimate claim of not have entitlement F.Supp.3d freedom.” 71. This no We see reason treat Hurd’s due proposition squared categorical cannot process simply claims as barred A prisoner law. who is established step filing failed take added prison early from does in released certain motion for vacatur—particularly where protected in liberty circumstances have a point pressed passed was neither nor entitling pro terest him to some form of below. D.C. law appear require does re-incarceration, cess before the facts and it, Appeals’ and the D.C. Court of dismiss- pleaded as plausibly here show such an appeal reasonably al Hurd’s read as interest. confirming. so therefore hold that the We may Court’s unreviewed denial The Due Process Clause preclude protected a procedurally does itself confer liber asserting ty living from openly section due interest someone what, claims against society years Co- after unbeknownst him, premature lumbia. from release complaint right 3. The District contends that Hurd’s and he "to asserted notice and a ¶ separate damages hearing,” sought "damages did not include a claim for id. at 62. He alleged procedural right liberty” for an violation of due of his violation constitutional process. But Hurd claimed that he was "de- as well other "[s]uch and further relief as prived procedural may just proper.” of” both and substantive the Court deem Id. at ¶¶ ¶ process, Compl. see First Am. protects family The Due Process Clause free to prison. [ ] be with and friends Const, V, XIV, liberty, U.S. amend. to form the other enduring attach- bodily is at the “freedom restraint” ments of normal life.” Id. For released very protected of that interest. Bd. alike, core prisoners parolees “[sjociety has Roth, 564, 572, 92 Regents v. 408 U.S. S.Ct. a may stake whatever be the of chance (1972); L.Ed.2d 548 see also 33 restoring normal [the individual] Washington Glucksberg, 521 v. U.S. law,” useful society life within so also 719, 117 2258, 138 (1997) S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 772 “has an in not having parole interest re- (referring physical “the absence of re voked”—nor imposed— re-incarceration liberty straint” as the uncontested baseline of “because erroneous Id. information.” at protects). the Due Process Clause 484, 92 Morrissey S.Ct. 2593. therefore person of a to conduct his life freedom a re-incarcerating parolee held “calls physically government unconfíned orderly for infor- process, some however among the most of consti is fundamental mal.” at 92 Id. S.Ct. 2593. liberty Supreme tutional interests. distinguished The district court Morris- repeatedly Court has held that at least sey ground on the that the at parole issue circumstances, person a who is some time,” there “is in lieu of prison served if physical fact free of confinement—even release, supervised while suc- Hurd lawfully that freedom is a revocable—has cessfully completed between 2007 and him liberty interest that entitles to consti only prison “is served after the term process tutional he is re-incar due before F.Supp.3d ended.” 146 at The dis- Young Harper, See cerated. tinction parole supervised re- between 143, 152, 117 137 L.Ed.2d 270 S.Ct. procedur- lease of dispositive (1997) (pre-parole supervision); conditional Indeed, process al due claim. character 411 Gagnon Scarpelli, supervised of as a follow-on to a release (1973) (proba S.Ct. L.Ed.2d imprisonment, together of sentence with tion); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at of his of Hurd’s fulfillment entire term (parole). release, supervised reinforces the reason- instance, Morrissey, In the Court expectation of his that he had ableness person a of recognized that who is out sentence, completed strengthens his prison justice supervision, criminal liberty person his interest. a lives When though subject to re-incarceration at even through society large years, goes parole any noncompliance time for that, by appearances, transition all marks conditions, liberty a personal has interest stage formal of the of his end last trigger procedural pro- sufficient to sentence, only then faces re-incarcera- protection parole may before his be cess ground premature- tion on he was revoked. 408 U.S. S.Ct. 2593. released, ly prospect of re-incarcera- descriptive equally applicable terms tion him implications both for and the has his re- Hurd’s circumstances between other individuals in his life as substantial re-incarceration, Morrissey lease and 2011 parolee Morrissey. those of the “liberty parolee of a noted that the enables liberty alleges support Hurd facts that range things open him to do wide crystallized sufficiently by the interest persons have never been convicted who period supervision close of to entitle Id. at 2593. Once crime.” him re- him into to some before Parole Commission released kind aware, Hurd, incarceration. As was community, parolee, like a was original was—“gainfully impose did not mandar employed able be—and sentence edged, Department of tory- App, minimum. 47. The Federal the D.C. Correc Joint unilaterally him from a 42- re-incarcerated Hurd tions Bureau Prisons released despite or without a a detainer warrant prison month As sentence after -months. the--authority to fact detain by;his shown submission and successful Bu statutorily committed the Federal completion years supervised of- three Prisons, Hurd, F.Supp.3d reau release, thought reasonably the re- lease, 68; (prisoners see D.C. Code 24-201.26 Indeed, lawful. if deliberate and in the “shall convicted District Columbia might it he believed was an error had' committed, imprison their terms of be corrected, it is hard to discovered Attorney n see custody ment ... to the why have remained in the of the United author General States Columbia, (though successfully representative”). If ized Hurd had received apparently flawlessly), out his serving hearing notice his re-incar and before prescribed supervised of release. term ceration, might have raised ultra an. terms, government The documented challenge authority to vires the District’s . otherwise, of temporal both and Hurd’s 146 F.Supp.3d to See at 68-69. detain him. supervision. Supervised of His Certificate timely hearing A could also have allowed 18,2007 July as the date of Release-recited to present Hurd his substantive claims prison, his release from enumerated the against It is to re-incarceration. difficult and, supervision, of of conditions behalf imagine highly fact-specific nature how Commission, the Parole that stated analysis the district court and was “to be released to supervised release parties applicable, hinging deemed sub for a of 36 from upon term release months stantially whether Hurd had successful imprisonment.” 85. com- App. Joint around,” ly his life id. “turned at could OSOSA, reporting regu- plied by officers fairly been have assessed without Hurd larly submitting years, three urine having present chance his had own e drug training testing, samples and . cas well-paid obtaining job. During and 2007- parties post- all which treated his 2. Due Process Substantive release, period supervised incarceration of The and the district court ana the Parole Commission monitored Hurd lyzed Hurd’s substantive due any governmen- at point expressed and no challenging reimprisonment his in.revoking tal interest his release re- and Merritt, F.Supp. the court incarcerating By regulation, him. once early, leading as “one identified supervision complete, Hurd’s term was finding prisoner cases a released that revocation., longer subject it no 28 could not be re-incarcerated.” 2.211(d). Hurd’s C.F.R. communi- many F.Supp.3d it violat Merritt held that govern- cations interactions principles liberty ed “fundamental his ment under- reinforced reasonable justice” to an re-incarcerate individual who standing continuing that he was to serve discharged from prison been state had making prog- sentence and he was openly for years lived three before the ress toward unconditional release from government realized that it should have justice supervision. criminal prison than moved him federal rather features of this case under- discharging upon completion

Additional of his him of pre-deprivation process score the value state sentence. Merritt court started re-incarcerating per someone in premise Hurd’s that “[a] before from convicted serving As district court son excused from situation. acknowl- will not be or merely someone favored sentence were neutral Hurd: The district by capacity thought length makes' mistake” ministerial- time at id. early. F.Supp. large relief, 67; releasing support could authorities, pres additional factors must be federal “Several the District Co- Hurd, violation of ent” make out a substantive at fault for the were lumbia release, id.; result at process: “questionable due “the must and that the au- himself; thority” tributable the defendant the District opposed to the action of the government authorities must amount federal to take Hurd into back neglect; the situa id. simple custody “concerning,” more than at 68. tion brought about defendant’s court noted that release “the itself seems unequivo and his must be re-incarceration its lack authori- acknowledged cally princi ty”; inconsistent with fundamental court thus thought “arguable it Id. ples liberty justice.” was ultra imprisonment that Hurd’s factor weigh plain- vires”—a -that “does petition, On Merritt’s federal in, Id. process analysis,” tiffs favor “[r]esponsibility court found for the held, at 68-69. The court also for the.pur- prison defendant’s release and his dismiss, poses of motion that “there subsequent at-large entire- status rest[ed] no indication Hurd was aware Id. ly governmental with the authorities.” the he was re-incarcerated.” mistake.until considered the lack fault on court Id. at 69. the part, responsibility Merritt’s of the error, government for the the “actual- and decisive, however, deemed court consequences” of an requiring order had not “successfully turned his Id. to his federal serve sentence. at 808. during supervised life around” his release. Merritt requir- that “[a]n concluded order view, Id. at In its' re-incarceration “is ing service of sentence defendant’s now really only fundamentally unfair” where jeopardize long-term needlessly his story.” the “a prisoner has become success adjustment- society, disrupt his both Id. at 69. judicial Taking notice exhibits life, family destroy his family and his and the District filed with motion its dis base, for no economic all other purpose miss, recognized the that Hurd “suc court than secure blind obedience the 1973 cessfully completed three-year term of his Id. imposed.” sentence as it then supervision, jour as a sheet metal worked Here, completed neyman, anger management the district court the rel- an restated “(1) course, and evant considerations under Merritt as ties to his re-established his Id. (2) length release; the of mistaken the wife and children.” The court however, (3) decided, government’s that his culpability; the arrests and level of, knowledge to, or prisoner’s drug-testing “negate[d] any argu contribution records mistake; (4) successfully ment life prejudice and caused turned his that"[he] re-incarceration, i.e., Id. The court reached that con pris- how well the around.” readjusted society.” despite acknowledging oner has 146 clusion that" Hurd’s only his F.Supp.3d 66. The district court conviction after release was de- (and closely analogous marijuana possession to for scribed Hurd’s case as ended); perhaps stronger supervised or Merritt than in most after release had weakness, respects; dispositive acquit his other in claim’s arrests resulted.either dismissals; view, in the district court’s was that Hurd tals Parole Commis super reintegrated society had not into suc- sion had decided not revoke as release, cessfully after three determined had Merritt. Several factors vised notice of may judicial court take “a years successfully completed that he had federal subject dis- it. Id. at 60. fact that is not to reasonable generally if with- pute” it either “is known purposes appeal, For of this we jurisdiction” in trial court’s territorial assume, parties’ merely accord with the accurately readily or “can be deter- case, approach in this and district court’s accuracy mined from whose sources cannot that Merritt applies. Treating as relevant questioned.” R. reasonably be Fed. Evid. prisoner readjusted has [ex-] “how well 201(b). purposes This court has for various id. society,” hold that abbrevi we judicial taken notice of court records procedure court ation district in Jankovic v. example, other cases. For re requires a remand. The district court Group, International Crisis F.3d 1080 beyond pleadings on material lied case, 2007), we defamation per motion to grant the dismiss without filing as a drew an unrelated case mitting discovery summary judgment record what was said. Id. at 1088. But briefing on the substantive due not, not, it for rely did could we and, particular, on the element Id.; see 21B truth the matter asserted. court deemed determinative (2d ed.) Prac. Fed. & Proc. Evid. 5106.4 neces own evidence would (“[A] judicial court cannot notice of take sarily highly he had relevant: whether simply of a the truth document “turned his life around.” Id. at 70. In con files.”). put it the court’s someone cluding Hurd was not to relief entitled judicial That limitation on Merritt, common-sense beyond looked particularly apt notice is in a ease where allegations complaint to evidence purports the court a noticed fact treat noted government submitted. The court “If preclusive. permissible it were Hurd, that after his release an acknowl judicial court to notice of a fact mere- addict, take edged repeatedly posi had tested in times, ly because it been found to be true has drugs for four tive and was arrested action, other the doctrine of collater- a conviction. Id. Those in some resulting once United estoppel superfluous.” al be alleged facts in com would were neither Hurd’s Jones, (11th that the States v. nor in F.3d plaint included documents 1994). argues judicial In The District complaint incorporated by reference. stead, appropriate District of notice was the Columbia attached here dispute authenticity documentary drug of Hurd’s tests did the the evidence to its to and arrest records motion dismiss. documents that the district court consid- moving party authenticity But to acquiescing When a introduces “matters ered. the in pleadings” support outside the in of a mo introduced an earlier case is documents dismiss, 12(d) cry agreeing to far requires tion Rule the a those docu- ignore present picture to or of a district court either that evidence ments a full fair 12(b)(6), right dispute motion a a to in a deciding party under Rule matter has here, or to convert the into for sum is especially motion one later case. That true mary judgment. highly The district court nei where the factual issues include the did contextual, case-specific question wheth- ther. post-release er conduct rendered argues The District of Columbia ineligible him for relief. court appropriately considered the documentary go beyond testing District’s order to evidence because it adequacy allegations of the com was filed Hurd’s Court habeas pro- A subject judicial plaint, and was to notice. a district court must follow the case so, converting proffered. for a motion to dismiss of To cedures Columbia it do summary judgment. notify for The Fed have had to into one its intention to give consider factual submissions and prescribe doing Rules eral opportunity to discover and offer evi- give The court must notice so: of his dence own—whether to rebut of the court’s intention to convert the mo or negative facts inferences the district to opportunity tion a reasonable dis might government’s draw from the present cover and relevant evidence. Fed. or provide exhibits to facts and context 12(d). 12(d) R. Civ. P. The text Rule 12(d), own support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. that, “[i]f, specifies on a motion under Rule By casting the issue as one of the 12(b)(6) 12(c), matters outside the judicial authority court’s take presented are pleadings exclud stage, notice at the motion-to-dismiss court, by motion ed must be treat sought to sup- have documents for summary judgment ed as one portive potentially disputed of its view of All parties given must a rea Rule of fact if they issues considered as were opportunity present sonable all the ma part plaintiffs allegations. own But pertinent terial that is the motion.” See not, a may movant with consistent Kim, 719; also 632 F.3d at 3M Co. v. Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil support (D.D.C. Boulter, F.Supp.2d 96-97 12(b)(6) by pointing motion con- leading explains, As a treatise “[t]he tent evidence other cases rebut court, sponte, may sua convert a motion adequately facts opposing par- stated an 12(b)(6) summary under Rule into one for ty’s pleading. reasoning set forth in judgment, the conversion dis opinion the district court’s therefore fails judge great trict should be exercised dismissal, support and the case must be parties’ proce caution and attention to the proceedings. further remanded rights.” 5C FED. PRAC. PROC. dural & again by emphasizing We close that this 12(b)(6) Conversion Mo Rule yet forth court has had occasion set Judgment Summary tion Into a Motion analyzing prematurely framework (3d ed.). The district court has discretion re-incarceration, prisoner’s released other whether consider affidavits or fac merely deciding assume here we without but, pleadings tual matter outside the applies. type that Merritt This is not the 12(d)’s obligatory use of the Rule “must” process issue that courts have plain, makes a court that decides to consid nearly “reduced to detailed and mechanical extra-pleading required er material rules,” pre but rather one which “the motion to one convert the dismiss into for cepts very general, everything are summary judgment, proce with attendant turns on the circumstances.” v. DeWitt case, protections. In such a the mo dural Ventetoulo, 32, (1st 6 F.3d 32 Cir. standard, tion is decided under Rule 56’s jurisdictions Other have looked to Merritt keyed legal evidentiary sufficiency, guidance. for v. Raem See Lima-Marin Catrett, 317, Corp. see Celotex v. 477 U.S. 16-cv-31216, isch, slip op. No. 2548, (1986), 106 91 265 L.Ed.2d (Colo. Ct., County, May Arapahoe 103-105 D. 12(b)(6) rather than the Rule standard 2017) 16, (placing Merritt the context of 662, plausible Iqbal, see 556 pleading, U.S. development of federal law state and 129 S.Ct. 1937. governing challenges to re- constitutional release); early court after United district did take the incarceration Martinez, (9th 861, requisite steps looking beyond the com v. 864 States 837 F.2d cases). 1988) (collecting plaint the material the District Cir. But since consider 688 decided, Supreme proceedings further with this consistent was

Merritt egre opinion. emphasized “only that the .most has “shocks gious official conduct”—that So ordered. to -be arbi

the conscience”—“can be said sense,” Cty. trary in the constitutional RANDOLPH, Judge, Circuit Senior 833, Lewis, v. 523 Sacramento dissenting: (1998), 1043 118 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d complaint D. Hurd,; Jr.’s Michael lan on this and some courts have relied damages, brought U.S.C. possi if guage to narrow not eliminate alleged that the District Columbia de- persons re-incarcerated bility relief for process in prived him of due violation of release, see Hawkins premature after the Fifth to the Constitution Amendment 1999) (4th Freeman, Cir. F.3d reimprisoned when he District after (en banc) (suggesting that the fact authorities that he had been discovered surprisingly is a “erroneous ... release prison. released prematurely widespread recurring phenomenon” brought action after he this finished see- arbitrariness); weighs against finding-'of ing original the balance sentence. Grant, 16- United States but see No. F.3d WL problems One with Hurd’s (4th 2017) July (assuming at *3 I complaint, only and the one need ad- circumstances, dress, com “that federal in some he filed this action in is that before- possibility mon prisoners brought law offers court he claims federal same erroneously liber spent credit for time of procedural process and substantive due Still, offi ty”), recognized Lewis when in a corpus luxury” to make Court, cials have “the of “time of Columbia and lost. judgments,” “such extended unhurried Here, the district ruled opportunities to do better are teamed with Superior preclud habeas decision Court’s care, failure even to indiffer protracted claim,1 process' ed Hurd’s substantive due shocking.” ence is truly procedural not his claim that he was If were return S.Ct. 1708. this case to hearing being before reimpri- entitled court, to this we trust claims, the district court soned. Procedural Merritt would focus whether should reasoned, “largely are irrelevant” habe- circuit, factoring become the law this petitions, so Hurd “could thresh the Lewis “shocks the conscience” D.C., raised” Hurd v. such claim. non- accounting arguably old while (D.D.C. 2015). F.Supp.3d n.3 exigent deciding circumstances involved court’s un source theory not a re -prisoner who whether clear, elsewhere, proce In D.C. courts and early leased re-incarcerated should be legality dural due affects years later. See, Golden, e.g., detentions. Wells v. (D.C. 641, 2001); A.2d Hill v. D.C. Bd. 643 ' Conclusion (D.C; Parole, 497, 766 498-500 A.2d of reasons, 2000). foregoing why proce For the the is Hurd raised the we vacate That judgment Superior in the Court. district court’s and remand issue dural 2005); Appeals, properly The district court reviewed ha- Cir. v. D.C. 1. the Stanton Court of (D.C. 72, 1997). deciding See beas decision in dismiss Hurd’s 127 Cir. also F.3d 76-77 See, e.g., Mortg. Corp., § 1983 action. Covad Co. re Bankers 324 Commc'ns Colonial F.3d 1220, (D.C. 12, (1st 2003), Corp., 407 1222 Bell Atl. F.3d 16-20

689 argues appeal, On that why because there no is reason could have Appeals the of Columbia Court of joined District damages the 1983 claim the with moot, appeal Hurd’s dismissed habeas petition. majority habeas relies Re preclu- Court’s decision lacks the (Second) of statement Judgments effect. But Hurd never asked the 26(l)(c) sive (1982) (stating preclusion claim of judgment Court vacate Appeals the inapplicable “plaintiff when the was unable denying his habeas and the Court rely theory a certain of the case or to Appeals result, of never did so. As a remedy seek a certain of limi because preclusive decision retained its habeas tations on subject matter jurisdiction holding force. That is of United States courts”), but pro that Restatement Inc., 36, 39-41, Munsingwear, 340 U.S. is inapposite.3 vision damages 104, (1950). 95 71 S.Ct. L.Ed. 36 District likely contingent would have been on him preclusive Columbia controls the law in, effect prevailing petition, his. habeas. Heck v. judgment against Hurd, of the habeas see Humphrey, 477, 489, 512 U.S. 114 S.Ct. Migra City v. Warren Sch. Bd. Dist. 2364, (1994), 129 L.Ed.2d 383 but D.C. 75, Educ., 80-81, 465 104 U.S. S.Ct. 79 Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure (1984), 56 L.Ed.2d and the District Co 18(b) joinder allows the of such claims. The highest appellate lumbia’s en has federal rules allow the same. See R. Fed. Munsing- dorsed the as set forth in law 18(b). McDonnell, Civ. P. See also v. Wolff wear, See, e.g., Hotel Lewis v. & Rest. 539, 554, 418 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Union, CIO, Employees AFL Local (1974). L.Ed.2d 935 And the (D.C. 1999); 727 A.2d 299-302 Wheeler oyer jurisdiction have had Gaulart, (D.C. 1177, 1177 1993) 623 A.2d V. separate § 1983 claim. See Haywood v. curiam); Smith v. (per Mgmt. Town Ctr. Drown, 729, 731, 129 S.Ct. (D.C. Corp., 1974).2 329 A.2d (2009); D.C., 173 L.Ed.2d 920 Smith v. majority (D.C. rejects claim preclusion on A.2d 780-81 That grounds. “Supreme different It first states has reserved habeas damages could raised seeking have claim in those release from confinement petition. and, That But section 1983 seeking those other accurate. case, majority says precluded. 2. The that "D.C. courts have "If hardship there is in this it Munsingwear regarding cited power preventable.” Munsingwear, courts’ U.S. at opinions vacate when controversies 10 moot,” spawned argues them became involving no D.C. court—at least cases is- provision 3. Even if the Restatement were rele preclusion—has Munsing- sue vant, enforced we must follow District of Columbia requirement. Maj. Op. law, vacatur 681-82. wear the views the Restatement draft When the D.C. Court has discussed Migra, ers. See 465 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. however, — Munsingwear, 892; Nebraska, -, it has noted con- Kansas v. sequences failing (Sca (2015) to vacate the decision 191 L.Ed.2d 1 lia, J., concurring part under review. The decision dissenting would "remain in permit judg- patt). when, here, force unreviewed” and would "a especially That so ' n ment, mootness," unreviewable rejected courts Columbia .,, Lewis, “spawn[] legal consequences.” precise Restatement subsection on which (internal quotation majority opinion A.2d at marks omit- Maj. Op. relies. See ted). The evidence suggests Compare available thus Corp., Portals Shin v. Confederation given 1999), opportunity, light and in of Hurd’s A.2d id. (Ruiz, J., request judg- failure to dissenting). vacatur the habeas Dicta Wilson v. ment, Hart, (D.C. 2003), Appeals the D.C. en- would 829 A.2d 514 n.4 does - Munsingwear change analysis. force Maj. Op, claims not See find Hurd’s the reaffirm relief,” grounds. In Id. Other decisions have Maj. Op. point. the misses 18(b), holding. v. Portals this See Shin Con light Superior Court Rule ed 615, 619-20 Corp., § A.2d joined could have a 1983 claim with his federation 1999) (“This that court has held such habeas claim. in amount of available discrepancy a the case, Even if that were not the the res damages is not relevant whether of “claim” Columbia’s definition claim.”); Molovinsky a v. judicata bars not preclusion depend does purposes Inc., A.2d Monterey Co-op., available D.C. law the the relief. Under (D.C. 1996). Ward, v. also See Williams scope of a ‘cause of action’ is “nature and (Friend (2d 1977) 1143, 1154 556 F.2d Cir. nucleus, by the factual the determined J.) (“[T]he ly, remedy fact that the mere theory plaintiff a Faulk- relies.” from sought in one action is different that Co., Employees Ins. 618 A.2d ner Gov’t in not alone sought another does suffice (D.C. 1992). Here, Hurd’s habeas claims.”). underlying That differentiate the §his action petition and arose precluded party did not choose “the the same factual nucleus and thus consti- the jurisdiction” has first forum with limited preclu- “claim” D.C. tuted the same Shin, not mattered under D.C. law. See sion law. (Ruiz, J., dissenting). 621 n.4 728 A.2d at majority’s contrary view—that notes, true, majority It is as the that the effect, the preclusive have avail order damages above cases involved actions in the first proceeding able relief must Maj. forums. the first and second both the relief in meet exceed available the Op. reasoning in the decisions 680. But the support no in D.C. second—finds law. D.C. directly applies “aggrieved case. An this repeatedly opposite. held the courts given opportunity one party should be Argana, In 618 A.2d 712 Osei-Kuffnor allege” particular wrong, the court (D.C. 1993), instance, the D.C. Court Molovinsky, preclusion so claim wrote rejected plaintiffs argument Appeals first may apply even when the forum judicata apply that did not res when jurisdictional competence” “lacked place took prior jurisdietionally- action sought in the provide the relief second judicata court. “Res limited based action. 689 at 533. A.2d premises aggrieved party sure, given opportunity squarely but one To be no D.C. court has should be wrote, allege wrong,” prior pre can the court “and held that a habeas decision give legal action. no D.C. where the facts that rise clude a later But forum, fully litigated opposite. are in one court has we action held Because law, relitigating apply preclusion Migra, there is no rationale for those must D.C. see (quotation facts elsewhere.” Id. at and 465 U.S. at rele omitted). fact D.C. Court of question alterations “The is how the vant jurisdictional question. decide this In this amount greater jurisdictional way, than the the case mirrors Gonzales v. Califor Corrections, Georges County Department amount of Prince Dis nia F.3d (9th 2014). Gonzales, Court,” continued, trict the court the court “does law, underlying California analyzed demonstrate that facts and whether under already adjudication precluded prior claims the instant case have court. Maryland in the before the Id. at 1230- adjudicated been case.” 1983 action upheld state had not Id. The court therefore the dismiss 32. California courts decided precise question, on res but because “Califor- complaint judicata al

691 preclusion 72, nia’s of claim does Appeals, doctrine Court 127 F.3d 78 n.4 (D.C. 1997). require identity sought,” relief Cir. unanimously Ninth Circuit held These others support cases and the con- adjudication preclude could habeas § clusion that Hurd’s 1983 action pre- § action. Id. at too 1983 1232. So here.4 cluded.5 I judg- would therefore affirm the The Gonzales decision is no outlier. ment of the district court dismissing Rodriguez, Preiser v. § complaint. 1983 500, 1827, (1973), 36 L.Ed.2d 439 example, Supreme holding Court’s provided that habeas the exclusive federal

remedy good-con- for the restoration depended part

duct-time credits

prospect preclud- of state decisions habeas Williams, §

ing actions. See later many at 1153 n.4. Our court

F.2d appeals recog-

other courts of also have may

nized that federal habeas decisions preclusive rights effect later civil See, e.g., Sec’y Navy, actions. Monk v. (D.C. 1986); 793 F.2d 366-67 Cir. ENERGY, AMERICANS FOR CLEAN Pennsylvania Reaves v. Bd. Prob. & al., Petitioners et Parole, (3d Fed.Appx. 53-54 Cir. 2014) curiam); (per Risley, Hawkins v. v. (9th 1993) curiam); (per F.2d Cir. McCall,

Warren v. 709 F.2d ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (7th 1983); Williams, Cir. F.2d Pruitt, AGENCY and E. Scott J.). (Friendly, 1153-54 also v. Administrator, See Stanton Respondents majority pe- categories privies” 4. states that "Hurd’s this action. habeas "Traditional States, against tition was the United whereas represent- include "those whose interests are against current case the District of Klein, by party ed to the action." Patton Maj. Op. Columbia.” the District of Yet (D.C. 1999) curiam) (per 746 A.2d may party Columbia have also been a to the (internal omitted). quotation marks In this habeas case. asked case, the District Columbia stated its Attorney’s [sic] "United Office State’s and/or response repre- that the United States Attorney Columbia General’s sented its See District of Columbia interests. Office, respondent(s),” responses to file Response 2. The Habeas United States was petition, the habeas and the District of Colum- only party also the habeas case response contesting bia its inclusion in filed unique enforcing of its role in District of addressing the case and See Order merits. See, e.g., law. D.C. Code 23-101 Columbia Cause, States, to Show No. 05- Hurd United (prosecution responsibilities); D.C. Code 24- 21, 2011); Super. FEL-4391 Ct. Nov. (parole responsibilities). Non-Party Department District of Columbia Response Motion Correction’s Plaintiff's express I no view on whether Heck v. Hum- Corpus for Writ of Habeas Hurd v. phrey, 512 U.S. 114 S.Ct. States, (D.C. Super. United No. 05-FEL-4391 (1994), may L.Ed.2d 383 also warrant dis- 2011). Ct. Dec. The D.C. part missal of or all of Hurd’s claims. The apparently question did not resolve the party, did not brief the issue and the circuits whether the District Columbia was a split. Longshore, are See 621 F.3d Cohen v. Even if the District of not a Columbia was (10th party, privity it is in with the United States for 1315-17

Case Details

Case Name: Hurd v. District of Columbia

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Jul 28, 2017

Citation: 864 F.3d 671

Docket Number: 15-7153

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.