Fischer v. United StatesFischer v. United States
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”
Held: To prove a violation of
(a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in
(1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal conduct in specific terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated” by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in §1512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps in the focused language of (c)(1).
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294. And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective term at the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled and defined by reference to those specific items that precede it. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458. These approaches to statutory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless the specific text that accompanies it.
Under these principles, the “otherwise” provision of §1512(c)(2) is limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive conduct beyond §1512(c)(1)‘s focus on evidence impairment, Congress would have had little reason to provide any specific examples at all. And the sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to do.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the distinct purpose of each provision. Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an official proceeding. Reading the “otherwise” clause as having been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence—rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection
(2) It makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the history of the provision. The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loophole in §1512. At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred documents. But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who destroyed records himself. The parties agree that Congress enacted §1512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loophole. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress created a catch-all provision that reaches beyond the scenarios that prompted the legislation.
(b) The broader context of §1512 in the criminal code confirms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings, much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive conduct. Given the Court‘s obligation to give meaning where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, the Court‘s narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one.
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in §1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction with penalties ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. The Government‘s reading would lump together under (c)(2) disparate types of conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate sentences.
(c) The Government‘s theory would also criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison. Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist reading” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall statute.” Yates, 574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion). Nothing in the text or statutory history gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today. And the Government‘s interpretation would give prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish with far shorter sentences. By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1), the Court affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the penalties for them. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600.
64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”
I
This case concerns the prosecution of petitioner Joseph Fischer for his conduct on January 6, 2021. That day, both Houses of Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol. As set forth in the criminal complaint against Fischer, some of the crowd eventually
According to the complaint, about an hour after the Houses recessed, Fischer trespassed into the Capitol and was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement. Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed police back about 25 feet,” and that he “was inside the [Capitol] talking to police.” Id., at 193–194. Body camera footage shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and police who were trying to eject trespassers from the building. Id., at 195–196.
A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indictment against Fischer. Six of those counts allege that Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and remained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes. See id., at 181–185;
In Count Three, the only count now before us, the Government charged Fischer with violating
Judge Katsas dissented. In his view, the language in subsection (c)(1) narrows the language that comes after the word “otherwise” in subsection (c)(2). He therefore construed Section 1512(c)(2) as applying “only to acts that,” like the ones specified in (c)(1), “affect the integrity or availability of evidence” at an official proceeding. Id., at 363.
We granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ___ (2023).
II
The controversy before us is about the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in Section 1512(c)(2). On the one hand, Fischer contends that (c)(2) “applies only to acts that affect the integrity or availability of evidence.” Brief for Petitioner 8. On the other, the Government argues that (c)(2) “capture[s] all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)‘s focus on evidence impairment.” Brief for United States 13.
Resolving such a dispute requires us to determine how the residual clause is linked to its “surrounding words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 774–775 (2023). In doing so, “we must ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.‘” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955)). To that end, we
A
1
Section 1512 provides:
“(c) Whoever corruptly—
“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
“(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
“shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”
Subsection (c)(1) describes particular types of criminal conduct in specific terms. To ensure the statute would not be read as excluding substantially similar activity not mentioned, (c)(2) says it is also illegal to engage in some broader range of unenumerated conduct.
The purpose of the “otherwise” clause is therefore, as the parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated” by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009); see Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for United States 12–13. The problem is defining what exactly Congress left for (c)(2). Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in Section 1512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest in one go. The point of (c)(1) would then be to illustrate just one type of conduct among many (c)(2) prohibits; it would be subsidiary to the overarching prohibition in (c)(2). But
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). That “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, “a ‘general or collective term’ at the end of a list of specific items” is typically “‘controlled and defined by reference to’ the specific classes . . . that precede it.” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting first Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001)); accord, Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246, 252 (2024). These approaches to statutory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless the specific text that accompanies it.
To see why, consider a straightforward example. A zoo might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.” If a visitor eats lunch in front of a hungry gorilla, or talks to a friend near its enclosure, has he obeyed the regulation? Surely yes. Although the smell of human food or the sound of voices might well disturb gorillas, the specific examples of impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with and harassment of the zoo animals. Merely eating or talking is so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it
The idea is simply that a general phrase can be given a more focused meaning by the terms linked to it. That principle ensures—regardless of how complicated a sentence might appear—that none of its specific parts are made redundant by a clause literally broad enough to include them. See Yates, 574 U. S., at 545–546 (plurality opinion). For instance, a football league might adopt a rule that players must not “grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.” If a linebacker shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind. See 64 F. 4th, at 365–366 (Katsas, J., dissenting).
Similarly improbable consequences can result from untethering an “otherwise” provision from the rest of a criminal statute. Take Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015)). The question there was whether driving under the influence qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A “violent felony” was defined in relevant part by ACCA as a crime, punishable by more than a year‘s imprisonment, that “‘is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.‘” 553 U. S., at 139–140 (quoting
The “otherwise” provision of Section 1512(c)(2) is similarly limited by the preceding list of criminal violations. The offenses enumerated in subsection (c)(1) cover someone who “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” Complex as subsection (c)(1) may look, it simply consists of many specific examples of prohibited actions undertaken with the intent to impair an object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding: altering a record, altering a document, concealing a record, concealing a document, and so on. That list is followed immediately by a residual clause in (c)(2). Guided by the basic logic that Congress would not go to the trouble of spelling out the list in (c)(1) if a neighboring term swallowed it up, the most sen-
If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers “all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)‘s focus on evidence impairment,” Brief for United States 13, there would have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specific examples at all. The sweep of subsection (c)(2) would consume (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to do. Indeed, subsection (c)(1) would be an elaborate pumpfake: a list of four types of highly particularized conduct, performed with respect to a record, document, or object and “with the intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” followed in the very next subsection—in the same sentence, no less—by a superseding prohibition on all means of obstructing, influencing, or impeding any official proceeding. Construing Section 1512 in such a way gets the “familiar” analysis we apply to these types of statutes “exactly backwards,” eliminating specific terms because of broad language that follows them, rather than limiting the broad language in light of narrower terms that precede it. Bissonnette, 601 U. S., at 252, 255.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the distinct purpose of each provision. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 208 (2012) (“evident purpose” helps define scope of catchall provision). As we have explained, subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an official proceeding. When the phrase “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” is read as having been given more precise content by that narrower list of conduct, subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it
The dissent supposes that because the word “otherwise” in (c)(2) can mean “in a different manner,” “by other means,” or “in other respects,” (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct and independent prohibitions.” Post, at 2, 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the word “otherwise” is not by itself “sufficient to demonstrate that the examples do not limit the scope of the clause.” Begay, 553 U. S., at 144 (emphasis deleted). “Otherwise” can link a set of examples to a general phrase and give it more definite meaning—even in statutory sentences that rival the complexity of Section 1512(c). See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431, 437–438 (1982); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67, 91–92 (1989).
2
It makes sense to read subsection (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the history of the provision.
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 1512 imposed criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person” to, among other things, shred documents.
The parties agree that to plug this loophole, Congress enacted Section 1512(c)—the provision at issue here—as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress actually hid away in the second part of the third subsection of Section 1512 a catchall provision that reaches far beyond the document shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legislation in the first place. The better conclusion is that subsection (c)(2) was designed by Congress to capture other forms of evidence and other means of impairing its integrity or availability beyond those Congress specified in (c)(1).
B
1
The broader context of Section 1512 in the criminal code confirms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings. See
If the Government were correct, then the “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” provision—which is buried in subsection (c)(2) of Section 1512—would largely obviate the need for that broad array of other obstruction statutes. In light of our obligation to give meaning where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, our narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one.
2
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in Section 1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction, with varying degrees of culpability and penalties ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. Section 1512(a)(2)(B)(iv), for example, authorizes up to 30 years’ imprisonment for someone who uses or attempts to use physical force against another person with the intent of causing him to be absent from an official proceeding. See
Reading (c)(2) to cover all forms of obstructive conduct would override Congress‘s careful delineation of which penalties were appropriate for which offenses. Most instances of those prohibited acts would instead fall under subsection (c)(2)‘s sweeping reach, which provides a 20-year maximum term of imprisonment. Such a reading of subsection (c)(2) would lump together disparate types of conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate penalties in (a)(2) and (d)(1).2
3
The Government‘s responses to this surplusage problem are not convincing.
It first argues that because other provisions in Section 1512 would allow conviction in some circumstances on a “lesser mens rea than ‘corruptly,‘” they have “a broader compass” than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34. For instance, the Government contends that subsection (b) can be violated by “knowing use of intimidation or threats, or misleading conduct.” Id., at 35. But the Government concedes that “Congress did not define ‘corruptly’ for purposes of Section 1512.” Id., at 44. And while the Government suggests that “corruptly” is “‘normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil’ conduct,” ibid. (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 705 (2005)), it
The Government also contends that its interpretation creates no surplusage because Section 1512‘s other “provisions sweep more broadly than an official proceeding.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 64; Brief for United States 34. To be sure, subsections (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2) criminalize various means of preventing someone from giving a judge or law enforcement officer information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense or a violation of conditions of supervised release. And subsections (d)(3) and (4) make it a crime to harass someone and thereby dissuade them from arresting or prosecuting a person alleged to have committed a federal offense. None of these crimes requires an “official proceeding.” But not much if any conduct covered by those provisions would escape the Government‘s expansive interpretation of subsection (c)(2). For a person to have violated (c)(2), “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted.”
The dissent points out that our reading creates some surplusage, too. See post, at 12–13. In a wide-ranging scheme like Chapter 73, it is true that some provisions will inevitably cover some of the same conduct. But “surplusage is nonetheless disfavored,” and our “construction that creates substantially less of it is better than a construction that creates substantially more.” 64 F. 4th, at 374 (Katsas, J., dissenting).
III
On the Government‘s theory, Section 1512(c) consists of a granular subsection (c)(1) focused on obstructive acts that impair evidence and an overarching subsection (c)(2) that reaches all other obstruction. Even setting surplusage aside, that novel interpretation would criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyists alike to decades in prison. As the Solicitor General acknowledged at oral argument, under the Government‘s interpretation, a peaceful protester could conceivably be charged under
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist reading” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall” statute, as the Government would have us do here. Yates, 574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion); see also Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–11 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U. S., at 703–704. And there is no reason to depart from that practice today. Nothing in the text or statutory history suggests that subsection (c)(2) is designed to impose up to 20 years’ imprisonment on essentially all defendants who commit obstruction of justice in any way and who might be subject to lesser penalties under more specific obstruction statutes. See, e.g.,
Rather than transforming this evidence-focused statute into a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of justice, we cabin our reading of subsection (c)(2) in light of the context of subsection (c)(1). Doing so affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the penalties for them. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600. We have long recognized that “the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department,” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820), and we have as a result “‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,‘” Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11 (quoting Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600). The Government‘s reading of Section 1512 would intrude on that deliberate arrangement of constitutional authority over federal
For all these reasons, subsection (c)(2)‘s “surrounding words” suggest that we should not give this “otherwise” provision the broadest possible meaning. Yates, 574 U. S., at 536 (plurality opinion). Although the Government‘s all-encompassing interpretation may be literally permissible, it defies the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and (c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of statutory text mere surplusage. Given that subsection (c)(2) was enacted to address the Enron disaster, not some further flung set of dangers, it is unlikely that Congress responded with such an unfocused and “grossly incommensurate patch.” 64 F. 4th, at 376 (Katsas, J., dissenting). We therefore decline to adopt the Government‘s interpretation, which is inconsistent with “the context from which the statute arose.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 860 (2014).
* * *
To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so. See supra, at 9. The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the D. C. Circuit may assess the sufficiency of Count Three of Fischer‘s indictment in light of our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2).
It is so ordered.
On January 6, 2021, an angry mob stormed the United States Capitol seeking to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty to certify the electoral votes in the 2020 Presidential election. See ante, at 1–2. The peaceful transfer of power is a fundamental democratic norm, and those who attempted to disrupt it in this way inflicted a deep wound on this Nation. But today‘s case is not about the immorality of those acts. Instead, the question before this Court is far narrower: What is the scope of the particular crime Congress has outlined in
In the United States of America, “men are not subjected to criminal punishment because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions or thwarts a general purpose sought to be effected by specific commands which they have not disobeyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of offenses which the statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to define and condemn.” Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 245 (1943). Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law requires the courts to faithfully apply criminal laws as written, even in periods of national crisis, see, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 46–48 (1945), and even when the conduct alleged is indisputably abhorrent, cf. Michaels v. Davis, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (JACKSON, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 3).
I
Our goal in interpreting any statute should be “to give effect to the intent of Congress.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940). There is no question that intent is generally expressed through the text of a statute. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). “[H]ewing closely to Congress‘s will” as embodied in the statute that it wrote “is especially important” when construing laws like this one, which implicate the possible imposition of punitive sanctions. Pugin v. Garland, 599 U. S. 600, 612 (2023) (JACKSON, J., concurring).
Here, the majority rightly interprets the scope of
The majority‘s football-based example is illustrative. In a football league, says the majority, “a rule that players must not ‘grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise
We recognize this intuitive fact—that there is a certain category of conduct the rule is designed to prohibit—because we recognize, albeit implicitly, that the drafters of this rule have included these particular examples for a reason. We understand that, given the preceding list of examples, this rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning its scope. So, though a broad conception of “harm” is “literally covered by the language” of the rule, ibid., we appreciate that the rule‘s drafters did not intend for that term to take on its most expansive meaning. Instead, the examples help illuminate what the drafters actually intended the rule to cover. From the preceding list, we can confidently discern that the drafters meant to proscribe only conduct that risks injuries with severity akin to facemask pulling, not trash talk or murder.1
II
Turning to the statutory provision at issue here, the purpose of
This understanding of
Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute. As the majority notes, “[f]ederal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings.” Ante, at 10. Outside of the Government‘s proposed interpretation of
Given that Congress has never before passed a similarly broad obstruction law when others have long existed, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended for subsection (c)(2) to establish a first-of-its-kind general federal obstruction crime. Nothing in the enactment history of
This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, unlike
The Government‘s interpretation of
Finally, it is worth remembering the statutory context in which Congress chose to prohibit the obstruction-related conduct we are considering today. The statute Congress wrote addresses this matter in a 13-word phrase, enumerated “2,” that is located within subsection (c) of a much broader
* * *
In my view, the Court properly interprets
Joseph Fischer allegedly joined a mob of rioters that breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021. At the time, Congress was meeting in a joint session to certify the Electoral College results. The riot forced Congress to suspend the proceeding, delaying it for several hours.
The Court does not dispute that Congress‘s joint session qualifies as an “official proceeding“; that rioters delayed the proceeding; or even that Fischer‘s alleged conduct (which includes trespassing and a physical confrontation with law enforcement) was part of a successful effort to forcibly halt the certification of the election results. Given these premises, the case that Fischer can be tried for “obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding” seems open and shut. So why does the Court hold otherwise?
Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant what it said. Section 1512(c)(2) is a very broad provision, and admittedly, events like January 6th were not its target. (Who could blame Congress for that failure of imagination?) But statutes often go further than the problem that inspired them, and under the rules of statutory interpretation, we stick to the text anyway. The Court, abandoning that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—
I
The case for the Government‘s interpretation is straightforward. It can be accomplished in three paragraphs, as compared to the Court‘s many, many more. Ante, at 4–12.
Start with the verbs: To “obstruct” and to “impede” mean to “hinder” or “retard” something‘s “passage” or “progress.” 10 Oxford English Dictionary 668 (2d ed. 1989); 7 id., at 705. We have previously explained that these words are “broad.” Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 7 (2018). To “influence” is similarly expansive, meaning “[t]o affect the condition of” or “to have an effect on” something. 7 Oxford English Dictionary, at 940. The object of these verbs is an “official proceeding,” defined to include “a proceeding before the Congress.”
“[O]therwise,” which introduces
Joseph Fischer allegedly participated in a riot at the Capitol that forced the delay of Congress‘s joint session on January 6th. Blocking an official proceeding from moving forward surely qualifies as obstructing or impeding the proceeding by means other than document destruction. Fischer‘s alleged conduct thus falls within (c)(2)‘s scope.
II
A
Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take (c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the evidentiary focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2) only by “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding.” Ante, at 16. Other means of obstructing a proceeding—say, by shutting it down—are out.
This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute, because the limit comes from a related provision rather than thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive principles. “‘[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.‘” Dean v. United States, 556 U. S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29 (1997)). And “‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,‘” we generally presume that Congress did so intentionally. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972) (per curiam)). The Court‘s reasons for departing from these rules are thin.
1
The Court begins with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons. Ante, at 5. The noscitur canon counsels that “words grouped in a list should be given related meanings.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law §31, p. 195 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is particularly useful when interpreting “‘a word [that] is capable of many meanings.‘” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 569 (2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 573–575 (1995) (employing the canon to interpret “communication” in the statutory list “‘prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication‘“). The ejusdem canon applies when “a catchall phrase” follows “an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals.” Scalia & Garner §32, at 199. We often interpret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001). See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 375, 385 (2003) (employing the canon to construe the general term in the statutory list “‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process‘“).
These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to (c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks like it might work, but using it botches the job. Unlike the
To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these canons to a statute resembling
The Court‘s football example is only slightly better. As a refresher:
“[A] football league might adopt a rule that players must not ‘grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.’ If a linebacker shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind.” Ante, at 6.
Put aside that it is hard to imagine anyone describing “trash talk” as inflicting an “injury” or “harming” a player in a football game. The league rule plainly forecloses the possibility. Consistent with the noscitur canon, “harm” takes its meaning from its companions “attack” and “assault.” And while the Court tries to track
Consider a rule that actually mirrors
“Any player who:
“(1) punches, chokes, or kicks an opposing player with the intent to remove him from the game; or
“(2) otherwise interrupts, hinders, or interferes with
the game, “shall be suspended.”
While the specific verbs in the first clause involve actions directed at an opposing player, the second clause is a separate prohibition with an entirely different object. Imagine that, just before the opposing team‘s kicker attempts a field goal, players leave the sidelines and storm the field, some tackling referees in the process. Those players have surely “interrupt[ed], hinder[ed], or interfer[ed] with the game,” even though they have not physically injured any opponent. This hypothetical, not the Court‘s, is analogous to
2
The Court next recruits help from Begay, which interprets an “otherwise” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Ante, at 6; 553 U. S., at 140. The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.”
But
Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held ACCA‘s residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory interpretation.
3
The Court argues that “there would have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specific examples” in (c)(1) if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct. Ante, at 8. Conduct like destroying and concealing records “obstructs, influences, or impedes a[n] official proceeding,” so Congress could have enacted just (c)(2) and been done with it. On the Government‘s interpretation, the Court asserts, the second prohibition swallows the first. If (c)(1) has any function, it must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2).
What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also eliminates the need for (c)(1)‘s examples. The Court‘s interpretation assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step approach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integrity or availability of records, documents, or other objects for use in an official proceeding.” So why didn‘t Congress just say that? And if the Court is right about what (c)(2) means, why do we need the specific examples in (c)(1)? Those acts are already covered. The problem of (c)(2) subsuming (c)(1) is therefore not unique to my theory.
It bears emphasis, though, that the broad overlap makes sense, given the statute‘s backstory. When the Enron scandal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was taken aback to discover that seemingly criminal conduct was actually not a federal crime. As it then existed,
So contrary to the Court‘s suggestion, it would not be “peculiar” for (c)(2) to cover conduct “far beyond the document shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legislation in the first place.” Ante, at 10. Enron exposed more than the need to prohibit evidence spoliation—it also exposed the need to close statutory gaps. And in any event, statutes often reach beyond the “principal evil” that animated them. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998). That is not grounds for narrowing them, because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Ibid.
4
While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot seem to settle on the “common attribute” in the first subsection that cabins the second. See Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. On one hand, the Court says that “(c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding.” Ante, at 8 (emphasis added). This “physical evidence” limitation tracks the District Court‘s interpretation. See United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022). On the other hand, the Court says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding,” such as “witness testimony” or “intangible information.” Ante, at 9. This broader “evidence impairment” theory resembles Judge Katsas‘s interpretation. 64 F. 4th 329, 363 (CADC 2023) (dissenting opinion).
The Court‘s uncertainty about the relevant “common attribute” is a tell that Congress did not intend to define (c)(2) by reference to (c)(1). Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to limit [
B
The Court relies on statutory context to “confir[m] that
The Court exaggerates. Subsection (c)(2) applies only to conduct that obstructs an “official proceeding.” The Court highlights several provisions that cover obstruction of investigations. See, e.g.,
The Court responds by stressing that for purposes of
Moreover,
This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordinary meaning—overlaps with several offenses in Chapter 73. See ante, at 10–11. Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy amount of work for other obstruction offenses. And besides, “substantial” overlap “is not uncommon in criminal statutes.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4 (2014); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 714, n. 14 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J.). “The mere fact that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar conduct says little about the scope of either.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 358, n. 4 (2005). That is especially true here, because Congress enacted (c)(2) after it had already enacted other subsections of
In any event, the Court‘s formulation does not begin to cure the statutory overlap. Killing a person with the intent to prevent the production of a record in an official proceeding constitutes conduct that impairs the availability of a
In fact, the broader statutory context works against the Court‘s interpretation. Congress did not select the verbs “obstruct,” “influence,” and “impede” at random. Those words were already in
The Court concludes with an appeal to consequences: Construing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lobbyists alike to decades in prison.” Ante, at 14. This fear is overstated.
To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof that a defendant acted “corruptly.” The meaning of this term is unsettled, but all of its possible definitions limit the scope of liability. On one proposed interpretation, a defendant acts corruptly by “‘us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing] with an unlawful purpose, or both.‘” United States v. Robertson, 103 F. 4th 1, 8 (CADC 2023) (approving jury instructions for (c)(2)). On another, a defendant acts “corruptly” if he “act[s] ‘with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit either for himself or for some other person.‘” 64 F. 4th, at 352 (Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Marinello, 584 U. S., at 21; alterations omitted). Under either, the “corruptly” element should screen out innocent activists and lobbyists who engage in lawful activity. And if not, those defendants can bring as-applied First Amendment challenges.
The Court also emphasizes (c)(2)‘s 20-year maximum penalty. Ante, at 14–15. But it simultaneously “glosses over the absence of any prescribed minimum.” Yates, 574 U. S., at 569 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). “Congress presumably enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut from major to minor.” Ibid. Indeed, given the breadth of its terms, (c)(2) naturally encompasses actions that range in severity. Congress presumably trusted District Courts to impose sentences commensurate with the defendant‘s particular conduct.
* * *
There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an expansive statute. Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the