Fаmily Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Justin B. Araujo et al.
No. 2020-163-Appeal. (PC 16-1113)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
April 14, 2022
(Dissent begins on Page 21)
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. (Family Dollar), appeals from the Providence County Superior Court‘s denial of its motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Justin Araujo.1 (Mr. Araujo is the defendant in this action for declaratory judgment; he was the complainant in the case before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, which we discuss infra.) The only issue before this Court is whether a release agreement signed by Mr. Araujo is, as Family Dollar contends, all-encompassing—or whether, as Mr. Araujo contends, it is much more narrow in scope. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that the release unambiguously constitutes a waiver by Mr. Araujo of his right to pursue all claims that he could make against Family Dollar. Accordingly, it is our opinion (1) that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Araujo; and (2) that the hearing justice should have granted Family Dollar‘s motion for summary judgment.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the parties’ arguments (both written and oral) and after reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
Because this is not the first time that this Court has dealt with the litigation in which the instant parties are involved,2 we shall focus in this opinion only on the facts and issues that are of immediate pertinence.
A
The Evolution of the Controversy
On January 18, 2012, Mr. Araujo filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer (Family Dollar), alleging that he had been injured on January 17, 2012 during the course of his employment. Consequently, Mr. Araujo began to receive weekly workers’ compensation benefits from January 18, 2012 to August 12, 2012 and then beginning again on April 4, 2013—both periods of benefits relating to the same January 17, 2012 injury. Thereafter, on September 12, 2014, Mr. Araujo‘s attorney sent a letter to Family Dollar in which he alleged that he had been constructively
Thereafter on September 23, 2014, Mr. Araujo entered into a written settlement agreement with Family Dollar and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (Sedgwick).3 As part and parcel of that settlement agrеement, Mr. Araujo signed a broadly worded release (the Release), which included the following pertinent language:
“KNOW ALL MEN THAT I, JUSTIN ARAUJO, in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND ($20,000.00) DOLLARS * * * paid by SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. on behalf of FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF RHODE ISLAND, INC., the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto the said SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. and FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF RHODE ISLAND, INC., * * * all manner of actions, debts, dues, claims and demands, both in law and in equity, and more especially any claim that I might have * * * under the provisions of an agreement or decree relative to workers’ compensation paid to me during the period of total and partial disability resulting from an injury sustained by me in the course of my employment on or about 01/17/2012, or under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act * * *. This release waives any other claims I could make аgainst my employer, its agents, assigns, or successors, including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the Rhode Island Governor‘s Commission on the Handicapped, Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, FETA [sic], United States Department of Labor, United States Department of Justice, Workers’ Compensation Court, or any other agencies, tribunals, commissions, or courts.”
On November 28, 2014, some two months after having executed the Release, Mr. Araujo filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, alleging that Family Dollar had discriminated against him on the basis of the above-referenced illness that was completely unrelated to his workers’ compensation injury.4 The charge of discrimination alleged that the final discriminatory act had taken place on February 12, 2014 (i.e., several months before Mr. Araujo signed the Release).
On March 10, 2016, Family Dollar filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a declaration that the parties had “entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement” which released Family Dollar from all claims that Mr. Araujo had set forth in his charge of discrimination.5 Family
B
The Motions for Summary Judgment
1. Family Dollar‘s Motion for Summary Judgment
On May 31, 2019, Family Dollar filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Release, by virtue of its explicit and broad language, encompassed not only Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claim, but also “any other claims” which he “could” make against Family Dollar—including, inter alia, claims within the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Commission fоr Human Rights. Family Dollar contended that the Release was “unambiguous” and, as such, “must be enforced according to its terms.” On July 26, 2019, Mr. Araujo filed an objection along with a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the Release was ambiguous because it was “reasonably susceptible to different constructions * * *.” Mr. Araujo contended that, because of the alleged ambiguity, extrinsic evidence should be “admissible to aid in the Release‘s interpretation” and that said evidence would reveal that the Release was not intended to encompass his charge of discrimination.
At the hearing on its motion for summary judgment, Family Dollar argued that the Release unambiguously precluded Mr. Araujo from pursuing his charge of discrimination because the language of the Release еxpressly references the fact that, in addition to having waived his workers’ compensation claim, Mr. Araujo had waived his right to assert “any other claims” that he could make against Family Dollar. It was Family Dollar‘s contention that, under the language of the Release, said “other claims” included but were not limited to: (1) claims filed with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights; and (2) claims filed pursuant to various statutes that relate to civil rights and employment discrimination. Mr. Araujo, on the other hand, contended that the Release was ambiguous because it did not specifically reference a “date of injury” or a “disability discrimination” claim. Mr. Araujo also argued that, even though the Release purported to waive “any other claims made against [Mr. Araujo‘s] employer,” the failurе to identify a specific person or entity as being the just-referenced “employer” rendered it ambiguous.
The hearing justice found that “[a] reasonable person could read [the Release] the way Family Dollar suggests,” but she further found that, “[a] reasonable person could read it as Mr. Araujo suggests[.]” The hearing justice ruled that, because “reasonable people could differ” as to the meaning of the language set forth in the Release, the Release was ambiguous; on that basis, the hearing justice denied Family Dollar‘s motion for summary judgment. The hearing on Mr. Araujo‘s cross-motion for summary judgment was continued to allow Family Dollar an opportunity to submit additional briefing.
2. Mr. Araujo‘s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
A hearing on Mr. Araujo‘s cross-motion for summary judgment was held on November 13, 2019. Despite the hearing justice‘s prior ruling that the Release was ambiguous, Family Dollar continued to insist
II
Standard of Review
This Court reviews cross-motions for summary judgment in a de novo manner. E.g., Peloquin v. Haven Health Center of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 424 (R.I. 2013). We have consistently stated that, when “reviewing the Superior Court‘s judgment on the parties’ motions for summary judgment, we * * * apply the same standards as those used by the [hearing justice].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have further stated that summary judgment is appropriate when, “viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, [the court] determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Walsh v. Lend Lease (US) Construction, 155 A.3d 1201, 1204 (R.I. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). All the while, we remain mindful of the fact that “summary judgment is an extreme remedy that warrants cautious application.” Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 952 (R.I. 2005). Finally, it must be borne in mind that “the party who opposes the motion carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact * * *.” Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 557 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Analysis
A
Pertinent Principles of Contract Law
This Court has often recognized that, because “[a] release is a contractual
In determining whether or not a contract is ambiguous, this Court views the agreement “in its entirety,” giving the words their plain and “ordinary meaning.” Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc., 890 A.2d at 62-63; see Young, 973 A.2d at 558. The question of ambiguity focuses upon “whether the language has only one reasonable meaning when construed * * * in an ordinary common sense manner.” Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc., 890 A.2d at 63 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, when undertaking this inquiry, “the court should refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity * * * where none is present.” Young, 973 A.2d at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “[w]here * * * the document is unambiguous, the language of the release itself is controlling in determining the intent of the parties and governs the legal consequences of its provisions.” Nelson v. Ptaszek, 505 A.2d 1141, 1143 (R.I. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Roadepot, LLC v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 163 A.3d 513, 521 (R.I. 2017) (“It is virtually an immutable principle of law that [t]he language employed by the parties to a contract is the best expression of their contractual intent * * *.“) (quoting Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC, 962 A.2d 740, 746 (R.I. 2009)); Furtado v. Goncalves, 63 A.3d 533, 537 (R.I. 2013) (“[I]n situations in which the language of a contractual agreement is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids.“) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
Application of the Foregoing Principles
The plain language of the Release deals with two separate matters. The first sentence of the Release unambiguously waives Mr. Araujo‘s right to bring against Family Dollar “any claim that [he] might have * * * under the provisions of an agreement or decree relative to workers’ compensation paid to [him] during the period of total and partiаl disability resulting from an injury sustained by [him] in the course of [his] employment on or about 01/17/2012, or under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act * * *.” The second sentence of the Release, in equally unambiguous language, similarly waives Mr. Araujo‘s right to assert ”any other claims” against his “employer” “including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the Rhode Island Governor‘s Commission on the Handicapped, Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, FETA [sic], United States Department of Labor, United States Department of Justice, Workers’ Compensation Court, or any other agencies, tribunals, commissions, or courts.” (Emphasis added.)
The unambiguous language of the Release clearly expresses the parties’ intent to address both Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claim and also
C
The Remaining Issues
1. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr is Readily Distinguishable
Our decision in the instant case is not at all inconsistent with our ruling in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr, 594 A.2d 379 (R.I. 1991). In that case, the defendant, one Shirley Farr, was injured in аn automobile accident while driving a company car during the course of her employment. Id. at 379-80. She filed a claim against her employer for workers’ compensation benefits, and she eventually signed a release running to both her employer and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Aetna).8 Id. at 380. In actuality, Aetna was both the workers’ compensation insurer and also the insurer of the company car that Ms. Farr had been operating at the time of the accident. Id. Several months after signing the release, Ms. Farr “instituted an action to recover uninsured-motorist benefits, pursuant to the Aetna policy * * *.” Id. In due course, Aetna proceeded to commence a declaratory judgment action alleging that, by executing the release, Ms. Farr had “forfeited all causes of action arising from the automobile accident,” including her right to recover uninsured motorist benefits under the Aetna policy. Id.
The release in Farr made reference only to Ms. Farr‘s workers’ compensation claim and made no mention whatsoever of
Our holding in Farr is not at all inconsistent with the case at bar. The Release executed by the parties in this case is certainly not silent аs to the waiver of possible claims in addition to the workers’ compensation claim. Unlike the situation in Farr, there is in this case no “omission” from which “ambiguity may be inferred.” Id. at 381. Rather, the Release states in plain language that Mr. Araujo waives his right to assert any other claims that he could make against Family Dollar. The release in Farr did not include such broad language, and it made no reference to the uninsured motorist coverage; rather, it contained language which specifically referred to claims which were “the subject matter[] * * * of certain proceedings under said Workers’ Compensation Act * * *.” Id. In addition, the Release in the instant case (unlike the one at issue in Farr) details some of the conceivable claims that Mr. Araujo agreed to waive; and it further states that Mr. Araujo‘s waiver is “not limited to” those claims. It is noteworthy that it is specifiсally stated in the Release that the claims being waived include those that might fall under the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights.9 As such, it is unequivocally clear to us that the Release unambiguously precludes Mr. Araujo from pursuing a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights.
2. The Terms of the Release
Mr. Araujo avers that the Release is ambiguous because it states that the consideration “was to be paid by Sedgwick * * *, which was the entity tasked with administering the workers’ compensation claim only * * *.” It is a basic principle of contract law, however, that it matters not from or to whom consideration moves; what is required is that “the performance or the return promise is bargained for“—and that is just what occurred here. 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.03 (4th ed. 2022); see Cardoza v. Pereira, 53 R.I. 460, 462, 167 A. 532, 532 (1933); see also John Deere Co. v. F.L. Broomfield, 803 F.2d 408, 410 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Payment made to a third persоn at the promisor‘s request constitutes consideration.“). Accordingly, the fact that it was Sedgwick that paid consideration to Mr. Araujo on behalf of Family Dollar has no bearing on the validity of the Release, nor does it render it ambiguous.
Mr. Araujo also contends that the Release is ambiguous because the payment of
Mr. Araujo also alleges that the phrase “other claims,” which is contained within the second sentence of the Release, is ambiguous. We are unpersuaded by this contention. When read in the context of the entire Release, its meaning is clear. See Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc., 890 A.2d at 62-63. As discussed above, the Release waives both Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claims and also his right to assert further hypothetically possible claims (some examples of which are mentioned in the Release).
Mr. Araujo further argues that the Release is ambiguous because it does not contain specific citations to the employment-related provisions that are the subject of his multi-faceted waiver. His contention in that regard verges on the frivolous, as even a quick glance at the actual language of the Release will indicate. While the Release does not make specific reference to statutes by their numerical designations, it clearly and unambiguously states that Mr. Araujo waives, inter alia, his right to pursue “claims with the * * * Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights“—which, we note, would include charges of discrimination. See
Lastly, Mr. Araujo contends that the Release is ambiguous because it does not define the term “employer” in the second sentence of the Release, which states: “This release waives any other claims I could make against my employer * * *.” This argument is without merit. The term “my employer,” when considered in the context of the two-рage release document, definitively rebuts Mr. Araujo‘s contention that there is some ambiguity as to the identity of the “employer” being referenced.11 It is clear from the four corners of the Release that the reason for the existence of that document was a desire to settle Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claim as well as any other claims that Mr. Araujo may have had against Family Dollar. It goes without saying that workers’ compensation claims involve an allegedly injured employee and his or her employer. Accordingly, when the reader bears in mind that employment-related context and when the same reader notes that the Release proceeds to address “other claims” immediately after addressing the workers’ compensation claim of Mr. Araujo (Family Dollar‘s former employee), it is clear to us
As is so often the case, taking into account the entirety of a contractual agreement dispels any asserted ambiguity. See Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc., 890 A.2d at 62 (“When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the agreement is viewed in its entirety * * *.“); Rivera, 847 A.2d at 284 (“[I]t is well established that a document must be viewed in its entirety * * *.“). It is our definite opinion that, when the instant Release is read in its entirety, the term “employеr” therein refers to Mr. Araujo‘s employer, Family Dollar, and to no other entity or person.
As we have held with respect to Mr. Araujo‘s contention about the consideration for the Release and about the Release‘s reference to “other claims,” we similarly perceive absolutely no ambiguity with respect to the identity of the “employer” referenced in the Release. In our judgment, the Release is entirely free from any ambiguity.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, and order that judgment be entered in favor of Family Dollar on its declaratory judgment claim. The record may be returned to that tribunal.
Justice Long, with whom Chief Justice Suttell joins, dissenting. Because I believe that the release is ambiguous, I respectfully dissent.
In reviewing the Superior Court‘s decision on Family Dollar‘s motion for summary judgment, this Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Mr. Araujo. E.g., Walsh v. Lend Lease (US) Construction, 155 A.3d 1201, 1204 (R.I. 2017). I submit that the following undisputed facts are therefore pertinent to this appeal.
Family Dollar hired Mr. Araujo as a customer service representative/clerk on June 12, 2007, and promoted him to the position of store manager a little more than a year later. Mr. Araujo was managing a store in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, on January 17, 2012, when he suffered a workplace injury to his neck and back. Mr. Araujo received workers’ compensation benefits from January 18, 2012, until August 12, 2012, when he returned to work. Mr. Araujo experienced a recurrence of his neck and back injuries in March 2013 and thereаfter pursued further workers’ compensation benefits.
By letter dated September 12, 2014, counsel for Mr. Araujo asserted that Family Dollar had constructively discharged Mr. Araujo on February 12, 2014, after Mr. Araujo‘s supervisor learned that Mr. Araujo had been diagnosed with HIV and allegedly took several adverse employment actions against Mr. Araujo because of that diagnosis.1 Counsel for Mr. Araujo advised
On September 23, 2014, Mr. Araujo signed a petition for commutation of workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to
Applying these principles of contract law to the instant matter, I begin by viewing the document, simply titled “RELEASE” (hereinafter the Release), in its entirety, giving the language used “its plain, ordinary and usual meaning.” W.P. Associates, 637 A.2d at 356. In the first sentence of the Release, the plain language establishes that Mr. Araujo, in exchange for $20,000, waived any claims he could make against Family Dollar and Sedgwick related to workers’ compensation benefits paid for a specific workplace injury. That specific injury was sustained by Mr. Araujo on January 17, 2012, in the course of his employment. In the second sentence of the Release, the plain language establishes that Mr. Araujo “waive[d] any other claims [he] could make against [his] employer, its agents, assigns, or successors, including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the Rhode Island Governor‘s Commission on the Handicapped, Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, FETA [sic], United States Department of Labor, United States Department of Justice, Workers’ Compensation Court, or any other agencies, tribunals, commissions, or courts.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the Release concludes with Mr. Araujo‘s representation that he has not applied for or ever received Medicare or Social Security benefits, which information is relevant for lump-sum commutation in lieu of periodic workers’ compensation payments. See Medicare Secondary Payer provisions of the
It is my view that the language in the Release waiving “any other claims * * * including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the * * * Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, [and] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” is reasonably susceptible of different constructions
The latter interpretation aptly describes the circumstances this Court faced in Young, where this Court held that a broadly-worded release governed the settlement of both a plaintiff-employee‘s workers’ compensation claim for a work-related shoulder injury and her disability discrimination claim resulting from the same injury. Young, 973 A.2d at 555-56, 559. In Young, the plaintiff-employee waived “all claims * * * in any way growing out of any personal injuries * * * resulting or to result from any and all incidents or injuries occurring during [the plaintiff-employee‘s] employment[.]” Young, 973 A.2d at 556 (emphasis added). The Court noted the significance of the connection between the disability and the work-related injury, id. at 556 n.3, and stated that “[i]t is clear * * * that [the] plaintiff-employee‘s physical handicap discrimination claim came into being as a result of the personal injury that she sustained at the workplace; in other words, the physical handicap discrimination claim came into being as a result of the workplace injury.” Id. at 559.
While Young evinces a reasonable, alternative interpretation of the language in the present case waiving “any other claims * * * including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the * * * Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, [and] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission[,]” there is a critically important distinction in Mr. Araujo‘s case that underscores the ambiguity of the Release: Mr. Araujo‘s disability discrimination claim did not come into being ”as a result of” his workplace injury. See Young, 973 A.2d at 559. Mr. Araujo has alleged that Family Dollar discriminated against him because of his HIV status, a claim with no factual nexus to his January 2012 workplace injury and one that arose more than two years after the workplace injury, when he allegedly suffered a constructive termination.
Like the Court in Farr, cited previously, I deem the omission of any explicit reference to a known claim to be significant. “Despite Aetna‘s apparent knowledge that [the employee] intended to pursue her claim for uninsured-motorist benefits during the pendency of the workers’ compensation action, the release mentions specifically only ‘those claims arising out of a certain loss as a result of the happening which occurred on August 12, 1983, while in the employ of the above employer-payor, which has been the subject matters [sic] of certain proceedings under said Workers’ Compensation Act.‘” Farr, 594 A.2d at 381. Family Dollar knew, during the pendency of Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claim, that Mr. Araujo intended to pursue his HIV-status disability discrimination claim before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. Nevertheless, the representative from Family Dollar who drafted the Release mentioned only the workers’ compensation claim with specificity.
It is also important to note that, although Mr. Araujo signed the Release as “EMPLOYEE,” the Release identifies neither Sedgwick nor Family Dollar as the employer. In fact, viewing the document in its entirety, at no point does the Release define Mr. Araujo‘s employer or reference a petition for commutation for workers’ compensation benefits. Cf. Young, 973 A.2d at 556 (quoting release in full, which identifies only one potential employer and references a petition for commutation). Additionally, there is no consideration set forth for Mr. Araujo‘s general release of “any other claims,” which only serves to emphasize that the Release is facially incomplete and therefore ambiguous.
Because the Release is facially ambiguous, I turn to the undisputed extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.2 See W.P. Associates, 637 A.2d at 356; Waterman v. Waterman, 93 R.I. 344, 349-50, 175 A.2d 291, 294 (1961). Specifically, I look to Mr. Araujo‘s petition for commutation, filed in the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) pursuant to
The undisputed extrinsiс evidence, properly considered in light of the facial ambiguity of the Release, demonstrates that Family Dollar paid $20,000 in consideration of the workplace injury and the commutation of future weekly indemnity benefits. The parties agreed to include in the waiver any potential claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act only.
Ambiguities in a contract are construed against the drafter. E.g., Fryzel v. Domestic Credit Corporation, 120 R.I. 92, 98, 385 A.2d 663, 666-67 (1978). I therefore construe the release of “any other claims” against Family Dollar, and I conclude that the Release did not extend to Mr. Araujo‘s disability discrimination claim related to his HIV status. Accordingly, it is my opinion that Mr. Araujo did not waive his known disability discrimination claim by virtue of signing the Release, and that the trial justice‘s decision, and the resulting judgment, should therefore be affirmed.
Notes
“[Ms. Farr does] hereby remise, release, discharge and forever quit-claim unto the said payors, their successors and assigns, any and all manner of actions, causes of actions dues [sic], claims and demands, both in law and in equity, and under the Workers’ Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island (including any other injuries and all claims for specific compensation and/or disfigurement) but especially those claims arising out of a certain loss as a result of the happening which occurred on August 12, 1983, while in the employ of the above employer-payor, which has been the subject matters [sic] of certain proceedings under said Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, between me and said employer-payor and of certain proceedings for commutation between me and both payors before the Workers’ Compensation Commission.” Farr, 594 A.2d at 381.
The contrast with Farr, cited supra, could not be more stark. In Farr, it was held that an omission created an ambiguity; and, therefore, fact-finding was held to be necessary. Farr, 594 A.2d at 381, 382. Here, there is no ambiguity.“This release waives any other claims I could make against my employer, it agents, assigns, or successors, including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the Rhode Island Governor‘s Commission on the Handicapped, Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission * * *.”