Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Justin B. Araujo et al.
No. 2017-26-Appeal.
No. 2017-135-Appeal.
(PC 16-1113)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
April 11, 2019
(Dissent begins on page 18)
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. (Family Dollar), appeals from a September 20, 2016 judgment entered in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Justin B. Araujo and the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the Commission), following an August 16, 2016 bench decision dismissing Family Dollar‘s case without prejudice. Family Dollar argues on appeal that the hearing justice erred in dismissing its case because, as it contends, “the dispute involved declaratory relief related to the enforcement of a contract” and that, therefore, “the Superior Court was the correct forum for the dispute.”
Both defendants cross-appeal from a November 9, 2016 order granting Family Dollar‘s emergency motion for a thirty-day extension of time within which to file its notice of appeal. The defendants contend on appeal that “the Superior Court erred in granting Family Dollar‘s motion for extension of time” for the following reasons: (1) “Family Dollar did not make the requisite showing of excusable neglect;” and (2) “the equities did not favor granting Family Dollar‘s motion for extension because Family Dollar would not suffer prejudice by a denial of [that motion].”
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ arguments (both written and oral), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that these appeals may be decided at this time.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the September 20, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court. With respect to the cross-appeal, we affirm the November 9, 2016 order of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
The sequence of events which forms the basis of this action is not in dispute to any significant degree. In setting forth those events, we rely on the August 16, 2016 and November 9, 2016 bench decisions of the hearing justice and other documents contained in the record before this Court.
According to Family Dollar‘s complaint, it hired Mr. Araujo on or about June 12, 2007 as a Customer Service Representative/Clerk. Family Dollar states in its memorandum submitted pursuant to Article I,
“This release waives any other claims I could make against my employer, its agents, assigns, or successors, including, but not limited to, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claims with the Rhode Island Governor‘s Commission on the Handicapped, Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, FETA, United States Department of Labor, United States Department of Justice, Workers’ Compensation Court, or any other agencies, tribunals, commissions, or courts.”
As consideration for executing the settlement agreement, which includes the just-quoted release, Family Dollar paid Mr. Araujo the sum of twenty thousand dollars.
On November 28, 2014, Mr. Araujo filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which he alleged that Family Dollar discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. (The defendants acknowledge that the focus or gravamen of that charge of discrimination was unrelated to the injury that was the subject of Mr. Araujo‘s workers’ compensation claim that Mr. Araujo and Family Dollar settled, as described above.) That charge alleged that the final discriminatory act occurred on February 12, 2014—i.e., before Mr. Araujo signed the above-quoted release. On July 31, 2015, the Commission issued a finding of probable cause that Family Dollar and its district manager had engaged in disability discrimination in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act and the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act.
In accordance with
On March 10, 2016, Family Dollar filed its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the parties had entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement releasing Family Dollar from the claims that Mr. Araujo asserted against it in his charge before the Commission and also alleging breach of contract. On April 15, 2016, Mr. Araujo filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment and breach of contract action in Superior Court pursuant to
The hearing justice further noted that Family Dollar could have had the matter removed from the Commission to the Superior Court pursuant to
“Our general tendency, like that of most American courts, has been to require [parties] to stay on the dispute resolution path for which they originally opted until they reach the end of that path. In this case this matter has progressed to the point where there was to be a hearing on this matter. Given that the parties are this far along in the process before the Commission, it is appropriate to require the parties to complete that process.”
The hearing justice then granted, without prejudice, defendants’ motions to dismiss. That decision was reflected in an order entered on September 20, 2016. A judgment also entered on that same day, entering judgment in favor of defendants and against Family Dollar on all counts of its complaint. It is from that judgment that Family Dollar is appealing.
We next turn our attention to the facts forming the basis of the cross-appeal. Those pertinent facts relate to events occurring after the August 16, 2016 bench decision of the hearing justice. At some point following that bench decision, but prior to September 7, 2016, copies of the order and the judgment reflecting the decision to dismiss Family Dollar‘s case, both of which were ultimately entered on September 20, 2016, were filed with the court for the hearing justice‘s review and signature. According to the representations made by Family Dollar‘s counsel before the Superior Court and before this Court, on September 7, 2016, Family Dollar‘s counsel called the court to inquire whether the order and the judgment had been signed by the hearing justice and entered in the docket, and he was told that they were still pending. (Knowing the date of entry of the judgment and order in this case was of special pertinence to Family Dollar because the entry of a final order or judgment triggers the twenty-day period within which a party must file its notice of appeal as provided for in Article I,
For that reason, on November 3, 2016, Family Dollar filed an emergency motion for a thirty-day extension of the time within which to file its notice of appeal pursuant to
During that hearing, counsel for Family Dollar argued that his failure to file a notice of appeal on behalf of Family Dollar within the prescribed twenty-day period was the result of excusable neglect due to the fact that he did not know that the judgment he intended to appeal from had been entered on September 20, 2016. He represented that he had received numerous notifications through the Superior Court‘s electronic filing system in the course of the case but that he had received no such notification when the order and the judgment entered. He acknowledged that he had eventually come to understand that, “if the Court files something and it‘s submitted and accepted, I don‘t get a * * * notification * * *.” However, he also noted that this was his first appeal under the new electronic filing system and that his lack of familiarity was not with the rules, but rather with the new electronic filing system.
At the close of the November 9, 2016 hearing, the hearing justice issued a bench decision in which he began by noting that the standard that it was his duty to apply was that of excusable neglect. He then candidly stated that he himself was “not totally familiar and comfortable with the way our electronic filing system deals with the orders and judgments.” He went on to expressly state that, in his opinion, Family Dollar‘s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to “a lack of understanding of the process as distinct from a lack of understanding of the rules[.]” The hearing justice further noted that counsel for Family Dollar had contacted his chambers to inquire about the order and the judgment. He additionally stated that this was a case of excusable neglect and that he could excuse counsel “once and once only.” He consequently granted Family Dollar‘s motion filed pursuant to
The defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal from the November 9, 2016 order granting Family Dollar‘s emergency motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal.
Having summarized the travel of this case thus far, we would reiterate for the sake of clarity that Family Dollar is appealing from the September 20, 2016 judgment in defendants’ favor on the underlying issue of whether or not the case should have been dismissed. The defendants are cross-appealing from the November 9, 2016 order granting Family Dollar‘s emergency motion for an extension of the time within which to file its notice of appeal.
II
Analysis
A
The Defendants’ Cross-Appeal—Excusable Neglect
Due to the fact that the cross-appeal raises a threshold issue as to whether or not Family Dollar filed a timely notice of
1. Standard of Review
As we have previously stated, we “will review the Superior Court‘s excusable-neglect determination for abuse of discretion.” UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987 A.2d 873, 878 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Friedman v. Lee Pare & Associates, Inc., 593 A.2d 1354, 1356 (R.I. 1991)); see also Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 837 (R.I. 2009) (“Motions to enlarge time are confided to the sound discretion of the trial justice[;] * * * [t]herefore, this Court reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion or error of law.“) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Discussion
On appeal, defendants contend that “Family Dollar‘s lack of knowledge of the Superior Court‘s rules and process relative to the entry and notice of Orders and Judgments cannot constitute excusable neglect as a matter of law.” They point out that this Court has stated that ignorance of court rules and court procedures is not a defense. They further aver that, pursuant to
Pursuant to Article I,
This Court has defined “excusable neglect” as follows:
“[a] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party‘s own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and
vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.” Duffy v. Estate of Scire, 111 A.3d 358, 366 (R.I. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have further opined that “[e]xcusable neglect that would qualify for relief from judgment is generally that course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances.” Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted). What is more, “[e]xcusable neglect should be interpreted flexibly, because [t]he determination of excusable neglect is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances * * *.” Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of those circumstances include: “the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UAG West Bay AM, LLC, 987 A.2d at 880.
Turning to the facts of the instant case, after a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties’ contentions on appeal, we are not inclined to second-guess the hearing justice with respect to his conclusion that it appears that the underlying cause of the delay was counsel‘s lack of familiarity with the electronic filing system and not with the rules. Accordingly, under the circumstances of the instant case and bearing in mind that the electronic filing system was of recent vintage at the time in question,1 we cannot say that the hearing justice abused his discretion in holding that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was the result of excusable neglect.
The defendants point out that the thirty-eight notifications from the electronic filing system that were received by Family Dollar‘s counsel were notifications of filings by the parties and were not notice of the entry of any order, judgment, or decree of the court. However, even given that fact, we remain of the opinion that the expectation of Family Dollar‘s counsel that he would receive notification from the electronic filing system of the entry of the judgment at issue was understandable under
What is more, we note that Family Dollar‘s counsel represented that he made an effort to contact the court at least twice to inquire about the status of the order and the judgment. He did not behave in a careless or inattentive manner; nor did he willfully disregard the process of the court. See Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366. For that reason, it is evident to this Court that Family Dollar‘s counsel acted in good faith. See Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839. We also note that the length of the delay in the filing of the notice of appeal was only thirty days. See id.
We do acknowledge that, as defendants point out, it is the responsibility of the parties to “know the rules and procedures * * *.” Coutu ex rel. Coutu v. Porter, 744 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I. 1999) (mem.). What is more, we have certainly stated that “[i]t is incumbent upon the party intending to appeal to be watchful for the entry of a valid judgment.” Blais, 812 A.2d at 839. However, we would note that we have already concluded that the error committed by counsel for Family Dollar did not stem from a lack of knowledge of the rules, but rather stemmed from his not unreasonable (albeit erroneous) expectations relative to the electronic filing system. Moreover, a determination of excusable neglect is an equitable determination; and, for the above-stated reasons, we can detect no abuse of discretion with respect to the hearing justice‘s weighing of the equities in this case. See Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366.
Accordingly, it is our judgment that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in finding excusable neglect in this case. However, we wish to be absolutely clear: our holding in this case is the result of our careful scrutiny of the specific facts and context of this case.2
B
Family Dollar‘s Appeal—Motions to Dismiss
Having determined that Family Dollar‘s appeal is properly before us, we turn to the substance of that appeal—i.e., the dismissal of Family Dollar‘s case in Superior Court due to the fact that the charge of discrimination at issue was destined for a hearing before the Commission at the time when the complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract was filed.
1. Standard of Review
We have stated that, “[w]hen we review the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to
We further note that “[a] dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action before a hearing on the merits * * * is proper only when the pleadings demonstrate that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the declaration prayed for is an impossibility.” Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown, 964 A.2d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2009); see also Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of Newport County, 151 A.3d 1223, 1228 (R.I. 2017); Perron v. Treasurer of City of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 781, 786, 403 A.2d 252, 255 (1979).
2. Discussion
Family Dollar urges this Court on appeal to “reverse the trial court‘s decision to dismiss Family Dollar‘s declaratory judgment action * * * [and] conclude [that] the settlement agreement * * * entered into between Family Dollar and Appellee Justin B. Araujo * * * preclude[d] him from proceeding with the Charge of Discrimination * * * currently pending before the [Commission].”3 Family Dollar contends that it was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because “the question before the Superior Court was a pure question of law, which should be decided by the courts.” It notes that Family Dollar‘s “right[s] under the Release are separate and distinct from the statutory rights the Commission is empowered to enforce.”
After a thorough review of the record in this case and after careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the hearing justice erred in dismissing Family Dollar‘s action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
We have indicated that “[a] release is a contractual agreement, and the various principles of the law of contracts govern the judicial approach to a controversy concerning the meaning of a particular release.” Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I. 2009). Moreover, we have specifically stated that “[c]ontract interpretation is a question of law; it is only when the contract terms are ambiguous that construction of terms becomes a question of fact.” Dubis v. East Greenwich Fire District, 754 A.2d 98, 100 (R.I. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding whether or not to issue a declaratory judgment with respect to whether the release at issue serves as a bar to Mr. Araujo‘s recovery in this case, the Superior Court was originally and will be hereafter presented with the very limited
This Court‘s jurisprudence with respect to the election of remedies doctrine similarly leads us to conclude that the hearing justice erred in the instant case. As we have previously stated, “[t]he doctrine of election of remedies is one that is grounded in equity and is designed to mitigate unfairness to both parties by preventing double redress for a single wrong.” Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 1154 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Department of Environmental Management v. State Labor Relations Board, 799 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 2002). The doctrine applies only in cases where “the parties have two or more inconsistent remedies” and where “asserting one necessarily negates or repudiates the other.” Silva v. Silva, 122 R.I. 178, 184, 404 A.2d 829, 832 (1979); see also Coderre v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket, 105 R.I. 266, 274, 251 A.2d 397, 402 (1969). There is of course “no bar to the use of concurrent and consistent remedies.” Silva, 122 R.I. at 184, 404 A.2d at 832; see also Coderre, 105 R.I. at 274, 251 A.2d at 402.
In applying that precedent to the instant case, we do not hesitate to conclude that there is no viable election of remedies issue in this case. In the judgment of this Court, and contrary to the assertion of defendants, it matters not that Family Dollar opted not to have the case removed to Superior Court pursuant to
Additionally, we do not believe that the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to this case since we are not confronted with a situation where Family Dollar is aggrieved by a decision of an agency and must exhaust all avenues of review within that agency before proceeding to court; rather, this is a purely contractual issue. See Almeida v. Plasters’ and Cement Masons’ Local 40 Pension Fund, 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998) (“The general rule is that a plaintiff first must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an administrative decision.“). The validity and applicability of the release is a legal question, unquestionably within the jurisdiction and purview of the Superior Court. See Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 117 (R.I. 1992) (noting, in holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply in that case, that the question was a “pure question of law“). As such, in our judgment, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable to the instant case.
In conclusion, we hold that the hearing justice erred in dismissing Family Dollar‘s declaratory judgment action. It certainly has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Family Dollar would not be entitled to relief under any set of conceivable facts on either its declaratory judgment or breach of contract claims. See Chase, 160 A.3d at 973. What is more, it is certainly clear that defendants have not borne their burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the declaration requested in the declaratory judgment count in the complaint is an impossibility. See Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC, 964 A.2d at 1140.
Accordingly, Family Dollar‘s declaratory judgment action may proceed in Superior Court on remand.
III
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the November 9, 2016 order of the Superior Court is affirmed. The September 20, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court is vacated. The record may be returned to that tribunal.
Chief Justice Suttell, with whom Justice Indeglia joins, dissenting. Although I am not unsympathetic to the plight of the plaintiff‘s counsel in navigating the intricacies of the court‘s relatively new electronic filing system, I would point out that
As the majority explains, the defendants’ cross-appeal is grounded in two procedural rules and this Court‘s previous interpretation and application of those rules.
We have previously described “excusable neglect” as
“a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party‘s own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.” Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 838 (R.I. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Pleasant Management, LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 224-25 (R.I. 2008)).
“Relief from the repercussions of failure to comply with procedural requirements will not be granted ‘unless it is first factually established that counsel‘s neglect was occasioned by some extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable.‘” UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio, 987 A.2d 873, 880 (R.I. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting King v. Brown, 103 R.I. 154, 157, 235 A.2d 874, 875 (1967)). “We have characterized such circumstances as those that are ‘out of that party or counsel‘s control.‘” Id. (quoting Boranian, 983 A.2d at 840). This Court has declined to grant relief from a counsel‘s failure to timely file a notice of appeal when the failure to file “was fully within his or her control, and his or her failure to do so derived from his or her own conduct.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Astors’ Beechwood v. People Coal Company, Inc., 659 A.2d 1109, 1116 (R.I. 1995)).
This Court has also stated that, “[w]hen determining whether or not the evidence in a particular case indicates that the conduct at issue amounts to excusable neglect, this Court asks whether what transpired was a ‘course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances.‘” Duffy v. Estate of Scire, 111 A.3d 358, 366 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839). “[T]he determination of excusable neglect ‘is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party‘s omission.‘” Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839 (quoting Pleasant Management, LLC, 960 A.2d at 225).
There is no question here that the final judgment was signed and entered on the docket on September 20, 2016. The plaintiff‘s counsel asserts that he was caught unaware of the entry of judgment on September 20 because he did not receive a notification from the electronic case management system that the judgment had been entered, and some of his attempts to inquire directly at the Superior Court went unanswered. The plaintiff‘s counsel submitted an affidavit with plaintiff‘s motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal in which he attested that he had received thirty-eight electronic notifications about this case from the electronic filing system since he filed the complaint in March 2016, but that he had not received a notification that the order and judgment had been entered on September 20, 2016. There is no indication, however, that he had received notifications in the past when an order in the case was entered on the docket—only that he received a notification when opposing counsel electronically filed the proposed order and proposed judgment as well as many other notifications (the content and context of which were not provided in the written arguments to the Superior Court or to this Court).
The record indicates that plaintiff‘s counsel received an electronic notification on August 24 that the proposed final judgment
Taking all of the relevant circumstances into account and considering our high standard for excusable neglect, counsel‘s confusion as to the process of docketing orders and judgments does not rise to the level of excusable neglect because counsel has not established extenuating circumstances that were out of his control. See Cambio, 987 A.2d at 880. Despite the hearing justice‘s acknowledgment that there were many areas of confusion as the Superior Court transitioned to the electronic filing system, the plaintiff‘s counsel‘s misplaced expectation that he would be notified electronically when the judgment entered was not “occasioned by [an] extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable.” Id. (quoting King, 103 R.I. at 157, 235 A.2d at 875). And, in my opinion, the hearing justice abused his discretion by so concluding. See id. at 878. Accordingly, I would sustain the defendants’ cross-appeal, vacate the Superior Court‘s November 9, 2016 order granting the plaintiff‘s motion for extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal, and dismiss the plaintiff‘s appeal from the September 20, 2016 judgment in favor of the defendants.
Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Justin B. Araujo et al.
No. 2017-26-Appeal.
No. 2017-135-Appeal.
(PC 16-1113)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE
April 11, 2019
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ.
Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III; Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court; Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht
OPINION COVER SHEET
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Plaintiff: John D. Doran, Esq. Eric B. Mack, Esq.
For Defendants: Richard A. Sinapi, Esq. Danilo A. Borgas, Esq. Francis A. Gaschen, Esq. Marissa Janton, Esq.