Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc.

1912(e),” clearly § trial was violative of but the error Theresa

maintains was harmless. The YOUNG justice trial committed the child DCYF placement for foster in the absence of tes- WARWICK ROLLERMAGIC SKATING witness, timony qualified expert from a CENTER, INC., et al. requisite finding and he failed to make the placement with Mr. Robinson would 2008-111-Appeal. No. likely physi- result serious emotional or Supreme Court of Rhode Island. damage light cal to the child. of such disregard requirements, of ICWA we can- June say that the error was harmless.

Mr. argues Robinson further that his

appeal granted should be because the trial

justice “exhibited a state of mind such that

he given respondent would not have

scrupulously fair impartial trial.” We

have reviewed the record and find this

argument to be -withoutmerit.

IV

Conclusion

For the opinion, reasons set forth in this

we vacate the Family decree of the child,

finding Tameka to be a dependent

and we remand the record for a new trial.

We are mindful Mr. Robinson and

Tameka have separated during been a cru- period

cial development of the bond daughter

between father and that cir-

cumstances have changed since this

matter was heard at trial on March

2008. We are cognizant also of DCYF’s

obligation to make reasonable efforts to

preserve reunify families consistent provisions of the Indian Child direct, therefore,

Welfare Act. We

case be retried or resolved expeditiously as possible, but no later ninety than within

days from the opinion. date of this

This case came before this Court on January pursuant order directing appear and show why cause as to the issues raised in this summarily should not be appeal decided. record, Having legal the considered by parties, memoranda filed and the opinion we of the arguments, oral are cause has not been shown and that this without case should decided further briefing argument. For the reasons set Robenhymer, Esq., for Plain- Timothy J. herein, deny appeal forth and af- tiff. firm judgment Superior Court. Harris, Providence, Esq., Barbara Defendant. Facts1 and Travel GOLDBERG, C.J., Acting Present: plaintiff formerly The this case was FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, ROBINSON, general manager of Warwick Roller- (ret.). JJ., WILLIAMS, C.J. magic Skating She Center. sustained a injury July work-related on when

OPINION by patron’s she was struck a automobile in parking skating lot of the roller rink. for the Justice ROBINSON Court. injury She suffered shoulder and was out Young (plaintiff), appeals to this Theresa of work for a time as a result of this grant from the Court’s period accident. Within a short of time summary judgment in favor of the defen- accident, following the she resumed her dants, Rollermagic Skating Warwick Cen- a manager working average, duties as —on (defendants). ter, Durnye Inc. and John fifty every her employ- hours week until upon We are called in this case to decide ment was terminated in June of 2000.2 a particular agree- whether written release sustaining After the above-referenced or, all-encompassing plaintiff ment as injury, plaintiff compensa- filed a workers’ contends, in scope. is rather more narrow claim in the tion Rhode Island Workers’ opinion, For the reasons set forth in this Court, which claim was still is our view that the release at issue does employment at the time her was clearly a waiver plain- indeed constitute termination, her terminated. After she right pursue of her all claims tiff charge filed a of discrimination with the might against that she have had demands Rhode Island Commission Human persons the entities and referenced 26, 2001; Rights alleged March she on the time that she release document employment the termination of her was Accordingly, opinion it. it is our signed result of unlawful discrimination summary judgment properly her granted. against physical her because of handi- injury, set forth in have been 2. As a result of her work-related facts hearing April surgical plaintiff on of 1999 underwent a adduced from defendant’s mo- summary judgment procedure and was out tion for and from the rec- shoulder following surgery. work for some time ord submitted to this Court. injury(s), injury(s) work-related cap.3 oceurrence(s) are described in a cer- plaintiff settled her On March tain Petition for Commutation claim; and, part Release, employee that relates to this settlement, parcel signed of that which Petition has or will be filed with well as a broadly resig- worded release as Rhode Compensa- Island Workers’ employment.4 nation from The release Court, hereby tion and do covenant to presence of a indemnify par- and save harmless said notary the document that was public; hereby ties released all against entitled, “RELEASE AND signed was claims and demands on ac- whatsoever SETTLEMENT OF The text CLAIM.” of, any way count or growing said entirety of that in its document reads occurrence(s) injury(s), and or their re- follows: sults, person both to the property. and ALL BY “KNOW MEN THESE It is further agreed that this Release PRESENTS, that the undersigned expresses a full complete and settlement (the YOUNG, employee), THERESA denied, liability of a regard- claimed and being age, of full for the sole consider- adequacy less of the of the aforesaid $38,038.00 ation paid by to be or on made, payments and that payment said behalf of ROLLER ROLLERMAGIC acceptance of this Release shall not insurer(s), RINKS, its and their succes- operate estoppel, as an waiver or bar sors, assigns companion companies, with respect party claim the or receipt whereof is hereby acknowl- released against have edged, hereby acquit do added.) employee.” (Emphasis discharge party forever said parties, or persons, later, and all firms corporations Several months in September of by, through liable or under the plaintiff above- an commenced action named, demands, from all against claims and Superior defendants Court action, actions and causes of damages, County, for Kent alleging violations costs, service, expenses loss of following and com- anti-discrimination statutes: pensation dependency or claims for ben- Rights Civil Act of G.L. chapter efits, benefits, 42; medical mental injury, 112 of title Employment State Fair specific use, Act, compensation, loss of chapter Practices G.L. 1956 5 of title and/or 28; disfigurement, property damages, Rights and the People Civil of, Act, on account or in any way growing Disabilities G.L. chapter 87 of injuries, out 'personal whether 42.5 The plaintiff title filed an amended known or unknown to present complaint me at the with the Superior on Oc- time resulting or to result from any and tober substantially raised all injuries course, incidents or occurring dur- identical claims. In due defen- ing my employment, especially more dants filed a motion for summary judg- occurrence(s) whereby I a requesting sustained ment that summary judgment 3. It clear disability charge from the record that the pending nation was still before the plaintiff’s which constitutes the nucleus of Rights. Rhode Island Commission for Human disability discrimination claim the work- injury related shoulder that she sustained on plaintiff Superior 5. The filed her Court action July 1996. having granted "right required after been to sue” the Rhode Island Commission for 4. At the time of her March 2002 settle- Rights July Human on ment, plaintiff's handicap physical discrimi- plain- physical handicap her discrimination in their favor and be entered dismissed; hearing a on despite be the fact that the discrimination complaint tiffs 26, 2007. was held on March motion time that claim was at the basis, signed. plain- release was On that for sum- hearing on their motion At the that, pursuant to this Court’s tiff contends argued that judgment, defendants mary Casualty Surety in Aetna decision dismissed complaint plaintiffs should (R.I.1991), 594 A.2d 379 her discrimi- (1) had following grounds: that she are not nation claims barred terms (2) her resigned employment; above-quoted release. claims; had executed release of (3) that she not established had Standard of Review case was an individual prima that she facie disability either the State with a under summary judgment It is true that Act or the Employment Fair Practices cau remedy is “an extreme that warrants At the Rights Island Civil Act. Rhode Baird, application.” tious Gardner the March hearing, argued Nevertheless, to the work- 2002 release related Rule 56 of Court Rules of not relate ers’ case and did procedural Procedure constitutes a Civil her discrimination claims. that, circumstances, in the proper device appropriate plays separating role lan- hearing justice The ruled from the chaff in litigation pro wheat and “all guage “global” of release was cess. that further stated encompassing,” she particular was “signed grant this When Court reviews claim knowledge there was ing summary judgment, of a motion for from the specifically exempted wasn’t manner, in a de novo it applies does so of Accord-

broad the release.” jus standards the motion the same as did hearing justice determined ingly, Manage tice. Planned Environments physical discrimination plaintiffs handicap 117, Robert, Corp. v. A.2d 121 ment 966 not the effect of exempt action was Voccola, (R.I.2009); A.2d Catrozza v. 962 release, and defendants’ granted 73, (R.I.2009); v. 76 Estate Giuliano summary judgment. motion Giuliano, (R.I.2008). 386, 949 A.2d 391 An order motion granting defendants’ on summary judgment was entered review, conducting such a entered judgment April must “review in the Court the evidence day. filed a plaintiff the same on light nonmoving par most favorable to the timely appeal. notice See, e.g., Town ty.” Cullen v. Lincoln (R.I.2008). Council, 246, 960 A.2d 248 appeal, plaintiff argues that the re-

On party And the who the motion opposes apply employment lease did not to her by compe “carries the burden of proving because her discrimination claims disputed evidence the of a tent existence and dis- separate therefore, material issue fact and cannot rest on tinct from those claims and or denials allegations pleadings in the in the be read release should legal conclusions or Accent opinions.” applying only compen- to her workers’ House, Design, Inc. v. barring her dis- Store Marathon claim and not as sation 1223, (R.I.1996); see 674 1225 claims. The contends crimination Carrozza, 76; 27, 962 McAdam v. ambigu- also A.2d at that the March 2002 release 911 A.2d Grzelczyk, it does refer to 259 explicitly ous because 558 (R.I.2005) (“It having conducted the review re-

Once is a fundamental principle of previous paragraph, ferred to contract law that the existence of ambigui ty grant summary judgment will affirm the vel non in a contract is an issue of law court.”); to be “if determined genuine there exists no issue of materi- see also Merrimack moving party al fact Mutual Fire Insurance v. and the entitled to Dufault, (R.I.2008); 958 A.2d Na judgment Lynch as a matter of law.” v. Refrigeration, tional Rent-A-Car, Inc., Inc. v. Spirit Standen 965 A.2d Con Co., tracting (R.I.2008); (R.I.2009); see also Carlson Town of Catanzaro, (R.I.1999) Rotelli v. Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1996) (“Whether the terms of a (holding granting summary contract are clear judgment unambiguous is itself a pursuant up- ques to Rule 56 will be * * *.”).6 tion of law Accordingly, held “when a review of the trial admissible ruling court’s as to that issue is light evidence viewed in the most reviewed favorable by this Court on a de to the novo basis. nonmoving party genuine reveals no Zarrella fact, Co., Minnesota Mutual issues of material and the Insurance moving Life (R.I.2003) (“[T]his party judgment is entitled to as a matter law”). justice’s reviews the trial interpreta novo.”). tion of contracts de Analysis When a contract is determined Controlling Legal I. The Principles to be clear and unambiguous, then “the A release is a agree contractual meaning of its terms constitute a question ment, principles various of the law of law for the court Cassidy v. govern contracts the judicial approach Springfield Co., Insurance 106 R.I. Life to a controversy concerning the meaning 615, 619, 378, (1970); 262 A.2d 380 see also of a particular release. See Lennon v. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Founda Inc./Franki 820, MacGregor, 423 (R.I.1980); A.2d 822 Gill, 440, tion Co. v. 652 A.2d 443 see also v. Zayre Corp., Julian 1994).7 120 R.I. 494, 498, 813, (1978); 388 A.2d 815 Ratzlaff In determining whether or not a Service, Inc., v. Seven Bar Flying 98 N.M. particular contract ambiguous, the court 159, 586, (“Re 646 P.2d (Ct.App.1982) 589 should read the “in contract its entirety,

leases, being nature, contractual in are giving plain, words their ordinary, and governed by the laws of general contracts meaning.” usual Mallane v. Holyoke Mu * n ly tual Salem, Insurance Company in 658 particular

Whether a 18, contract (R.I.1995); is A.2d 20 see Cerilli v. New ambiguous is not question is a port Ltd., of law. Offshore, 35, 612 A.2d 37-38 Gorman, 732, (R.I.1992) (“Unless Gorman v. 883 A.2d 738 n. 8 plain unambiguous ambiguous contrast, 6. A contract is By when it is “reason- ambiguity when there is in the ably susceptible of different constructions." language, contractual then construction of the Media, Westinghouse Broadcasting v.Co. Dial terms becomes an Cassidy issue of fact. v. 571, 579, 986, 122 R.I. 410 A.2d 991 Co., Springfield 615, Insurance 106 R.I. Life (1980); see also Dubis v. East Greenwich Fire 619, 378, (1970); Dubis, 262 A.2d 380 see 754 District, 98, (R.I.2000); 754 A.2d Flynn 100 v. 100; Tedesco, Realty, A.2d at Judd Inc. v. 400 119, Flynn, 615 A.2d 121 As we 952, (R.I.1979); Fryzel A.2d 955 v. Domestic explain opinion, in the next section of this Corp., Credit 120 R.I. 385 A.2d do not view the of the release at (1978). 666 being “reasonably issue susceptible as of dif- ferent constructions."

559 manifested, contrary resulting intent to the words or to result from and all injuries incidents or assigned occurring my contract are during used added.) employment And, ordinary meaning.”). (Emphasis while car their task, court rying out this should “re phrase any way “in growing out of mental engaging gymnastics frain from any personal injuries” which we itali- have stretching imagination to or from read cized release document that we n * n ambiguity present.” where none is quoted in the Facts and Travel section Mallane, 20; Lynch, 658 A.2d at see also is of special significance. It is 425; Casualty A.2d at & Surety 965 Aetna clear to us that plaintiffs physical handi- (R.I. Sullivan, v. cap discrimination claim being came into 1993); Co., Dairy Mullins Federal personal injury as result (R.I.1990); McGowan sustained at workplace; other Co., words, Connecticut General Insurance physical handicap discrimina- Life (1972). R.I. tion claim came being into as a result of workplace injury.9 Application II. The of Those In view of our conclusion as to the Principles Controlling unambiguous nature of the lan judgment, In our of guage, there is no reason not to accept the notarized release document at issue in apply release document and valu face unambiguous. this case is We are struck Gorman, e.10 See 883 A.2d at 739 n. 11 sweeping comprehensive nature (“Under established princi contract law the release document ples, when there is an unambiguous con replete straight contains. It is with such like, proof tract and no of duress or the “any” as “all.”8 English forward words the terms of the contract are to be applied quite We are unable read the document written.”); as see also v. Gagnon, Rivera than an all-encompassing (R.I.2004) (“If other the con released, whereby plaintiff acquitted, and tract unambiguous, terms are clear and discharged forever defendants from judicial “all construction is at an end for demands, written.”); claims and actions and causes of be applied terms will as Zarrel n n * of, la, (“If any action on account or in way 824 A.2d at 1259 the terms are n n * * * * any out growing personal injuries unambiguous, of found to be the task linguistically recog Rights 8. We are We not naive. Rhode Island Commission for Human apparently nize that there are charge occasions when her of discrimination on the of basis straightforward “any" words like and “all" physical handicap. It is therefore clear can, context, particular in a have a less un signed the approximately when she See, meaning. equivocal and more nuanced 27, {viz., 2002), year one later on March Wall, 391, (R.I. e.g., Raso v. 884 A.2d 395 plaintiff was aware that said claim still 2005) (construing statutory language provid pending. ing postconviction application that an re “may meaning filed lief be time" as we 10. Since consider the of the re application may that such an be filed “at unambiguous, lease to we are not con time."). situation, reasonable In the instant with fronted a situation in which we need however, we are convinced that the words proferentem resort contra rule. See “any" “all" as in the used release docu Tedesco, Realty, Judd Inc. v. 400 A.2d nothing straightfor ment admit of less than a 1979) (“[I]t only 955 is where contract meaning. ward ambiguous they terms are are construed drafter.”). It should be borne in mind that was on against the appellant March 2001 filed 560 (“[T]he is an end and the intent we seek not some undis- is at judicial

of construction have ordi closed intent that existed in the by plain parties are bound contracting but is parties of the con minds of the nary meaning the terms of is in the tract.”); expressed Foun instead the intent that Clark-Fitzpatrick/Franki (“In contract.”).11 Co., It situations of the would be 652 A.2d dation improve upon a contractual difficult to the articulation in which the of Pennsylvania unambiguous, by Supreme its of is agreement plain crucially important principle ref con- be determined without meaning should aids.”). law; facts or tract in the case Shovel erence to extrinsic Transfer Pennsylvania Inc. Storage, Liquor the fact that acknowledge We Board, 559 Pa. Control Young Ms. not consider does (1999), that court wrote as follows: meaning to have the clear agreement firmly “It is settled that the intent of the respect plain we believe it has. While we parties to a written contract is contained mere position, her right tiffs assert * * * writing itself. When the meaning parties fact differ as to are words of a contract clear and unam- necessarily not mean agreement of an does biguous, in intent is be found agreement ambiguous. is in fact agreement.” express Liquidating Investing Company City See Co., Casualty ruling today Our is at all inconsis- Trust v. Continental (Del.1993) (“[T]he holding lan tent with this Court’s Aetna * * * Farr, Casualty is not ren guage agreement Surety of an (R.I.1991).12 case, ambiguous simply par Shirley because the In that dered declaratory its in a litigation concerning judg- ties in differ the defendant When, case, Aetna, by are ment action had meaning.”). brought in this been injured in an with an unambiguous confronted with contractual automobile accident words, driving what claimed to have been uninsured motorist while she was no subjective parties employer vehicle that was owned her intent Aetna, company moment. Vincent Co. v. First National and insured (R.I. Inc., Supermarkets, also the workers’ carrier for 1996) (“When unambiguous, employer. her Farr a claim for a contract is Ms. filed n * * the intent of the becomes workers’ benefits and even- irrelevant.”); Broadcasting tually Westinghouse favor both Media, exchange 122 R.I. 581 Aetna employer Co. v. Dial (1980) $40,000.13 payment n. n. 10 the to her of At the 991 Similarly, perceive holding 11. The footnote reference to Ms. 12. we do not our dissent's being in case as inconsistent with our Young's regarding interrogatory answer holding Department in Folan v. State Chil signing give intent in the does us release not Families, dren, Youth, (R.I. 723 A.2d 287 pause. proper interpreting A court’s role in 1999). right case That dealt with the to intent ex contract is divine "the that is statutory pursue to discrimination pressed language in the the contract.” being exclusivity claims without barred the Co., Westinghouse Broadcasting 122 R.I. at Act; provision Compensation of the Workers' 581 n. A.2d at n. 10. It is not 991 any scope way it did in address the not properly the of a court to seek "some role language in a document. release have in undisclosed intent existed * * contracting parties minds present 13. We that the factual note scenario Id.; also First National Farr, see Vincent Co. v. company in where the same insurance Inc., Supermarkets, handling responsible insurer both was .the 1996). compensation claim and Ms. Fair’s workers' executed, way time that this release was Aetna growing any personal injuries, apparently aware that Farr in- Ms. whether known or unknown to me at the * * pursue tended to a claim for uninsured present time This is (id. 381); and, motorist benefits after similar to the language contained release, signing just-referenced she did release at issue W.P. Associates For in fact cier, institute an action to recover such 637 A.2d 353 In Id. at benefits. 380. Associates, W.P. the agreement released “any obligations and all” relating to certain signed by the de- Although enumerated events. the phrase specifically fendant in Farr referred to her “promissory note” was not used in the claim, but it made release, this Court held promisso of an no mention uninsured motorist claim. ry note at issue in that “clearly case was That release document included referenced and agree released releasing claims “which been the ha[d] ment” since it arose from actions taken subject of certain proceedings matter[] respect with to certain of the enumerated under said Workers’ Act activities. Id. at Similarly, 357. Farr, Although 594 A.2d at 381. language in the release document at issue the release also contained applies this case Young’s was consistent with a both Ms. general determined that the discrimination claims any omission and her workers’ reference in the release to Ms. Farr’s claim since both arose from uninsured motorist gave injury rise to an that she on July incurred and, result, ambiguity summary judg- as a inappropriate.

ment was perceive We can no reason for invalidat- ing the instant release or its all-encom- Although at ap first blush there passing scope. generally, Guglielmi See pears to be commonality some between Rhode Island bar, Corp., Trust Financial Farr and the case at upon sustained (R.I.1990) (discussing analysis clear that Farr becomes is not factors to controlling precedent respect be considered when the validity issue). so, instant case.14 of a release being Unlike the release in That respect the release in the instant must the instant release as we case released defendant from “all claims would other agreement contractual demands, action, actions and causes of that has been properly entered into. n ** of, damages account or in the words of one distinguished jurist: benefits, would, her claim for uninsured motorist purposes, for all intents eliminate present not in the instant case. general language. effectiveness of compelled by Such a result is prece- not our (if opportunity clarify 14. We take this clari- certainly keeping dents would inbe necessary) holding fication be that our in Aet- with this Court’s constant insistence Fair, Casualty Surety na Co. v. possible, whenever disputes the settlement of (R.I.1991), should not be construed as creat- See, encouraged. e.g., Ryan should be v. Ro- ing prevent a total bar that would the enforce- Providence, Bishop man Catholic of ment of in a release document that (R.I.2008) (noting "very that it is general is spe- consistent with a when release important part much an policy of the of the cific claims are also referenced in the docu- (and general) courts of Rhode Island courts in presence ment. The mere in a encourage the amicable settlement of dis- general release that is consistent with a re- putes” citing and numerous authorities in and spe- lease that also a includes release of support proposition). of that ambiguity per cific claims does not create in a way se manner. To extend Farr a in such otherwise, would It was references to a signed contracts document.15 those “Were claim, by laid side with simi- specific side subject scraps paper, be than little more concerning larly sweeping language “all the recollection of the selective demands,” very and that were the claims Compu in interest.” D’Antuono CCH this reason Court determined F.Supp. Systems, tax in existed an both Fan" ambiguity there J.). (D.R.I.1983) (Selya, and Ritter.

Conclusion interpretation the light majority’s In opinion, Farr, in this reasons set forth For the this in that Court’s decision case Farr, Superior the is review. deserves In judgment the 379-80, affirmed, injured is dis- in plaintiffs appeal the the defendant was an may be automobile accident with an uninsured mo missed, papers the in this case and driving while she a vehicle that torist Superior to the Court. remanded by her and employer was owned insured FLAHERTY, dissenting. provided Aetna by Justice Aetna. also had a employer compensation with workers’ respectfully, vig but nonetheless I most policy coverage insurance that afforded majority’s holding orously dissent from the accident, at 380. the Farr. Id. After Farr view, my no in In there is this case. filed a claim for workers’ question that under the set forth principles and later a signed benefits con Casualty Surety Aetna nection with the settlement of that claim in (R.I.1991) v. Man 594 A.2d 379 and Ritter $40,000 exchange for from Aetna and her Corp., A.2d 601 tissa Investment release, the employer. signing Id. After 2005), Farr instituted action to recover unin -respectfully disagree I with ambiguous. sured-motorist benefits under Aetna efforts majority’s to make its liability policy. automobile Id. Aetna consistent with this case this Court’s declaratory an action seeking filed relief Therefore, opin holding my in Farr. it is later, summary a judg motion for law, our ion that under well-settled ment, arguing by signing was not amenable to resolution case claim, in the workers’ Farr summary judgment, judgment Aetna all causes of had released ac See Superior Court should be vacated. accident, arising tion out of the automobile (a Ritter, about dispute her claim including for uninsured-motorist genuine intent creates a issue of material coverage. Id. at 380-81. This Court ex may not be in a motion fact that decided that it amined release and held summary judgment). although ambiguous, reasoning some Court, affirming the ma- consistent release was jority impressed “sweeping with spe “the general document nature comprehensive cifically only to the refer[red] However, the release document contains.” compensation claim” that it made no majority simply overlooks the refer- claim. mention of uninsured-motorist specific in that it to ences to claim set forth Id. at 381. Court considered Release, specific ployee forth as that relates which 15. The released is set to this Peti- occurrence(s) whereby "an I follows: sus- will be the Rhode tion has or filed with Island inju- injury(s), tained a work-related (Emphasis Workers' Court.” occurrence(s) ry(s) are described in added.) Petition for of the em- certain Commutation in a the face of broad of Farr’s that Aetna was aware significant general with a a file an uninsured-motorist that is consistent intention com ambiguous. that her workers’ at the time release nonetheless This Id. pending. claim was pensation principle, this we held that Applying Id. “[ajmbi- therefore, concluded, ambiguous Court on the agreement inferred from this omission.” may be guity it barred the ex-wife’s question of whether of the “[b]eeause Id. The Court said Nunnery agree- because the claim to the specific of this in the release inclusion specifically to the divorce ment referred compensa relating to workers’ any not contain reference to and it did any specific such tion and the exclusion Id. a re- Nunnery. As ownership of claims, the to uninsured-motorist reference sult, that a factual dis- this Court decided release is unclear.” Id.16 effect precluded intent pute parties’ as to the Therefore, that the ambi the Court held Id. entry summary judgment. a factu question requiring created guity Young’s comparison After a about the intent of al determination Farr, executed in it is with the release for resolu inappropriate that was immediately apparent they are strik- summary judgment. a motion for tion on similar, in the manner in ingly especially Id. each which the alternates beT Ritter, recently applied In wording global general tween that is by a signed to a release holding in Farr in nature and that is focused on with a divorce plaintiff-wife connection compensation claim. specific workers’ Ritter, property settlement. Farr, stated, part, in pertinent case, the In that defendant-ex- 607-08. from, payors that Farr released summary judg- a motion for husband filed * * * actions, “any and all manner of plaintiffs suit seeking ment dismiss demands, in law claims and both ownership in a former marital res- alleging equity, under the Workers’ Com Nunnery.” known as “the Id. idence of Rhode pensation Act of the State case, the trial In that we reversed n those especially Island but claims finding previous pro- that a divorce court’s as a result of arising out of a certain loss agreement ceeding separation and related happening August which occurred specific to the plaintiffs claims barred * * *, which has been sub During the divorce settle- property. Id. proceedings of certain ject matters [sic] ment, a mutual release the wife had Compensation Act.” under said Workers’ party in which each released all claims Farr, A.2d at 381. spouse of the other and released property Here, release in- Young’s similar to every “any from and all claims of each cludes, significant, It nature.” Id. at 608. * * * in any “all and demands however, claims property settlement any inju- way growing personal properties, but agreement specific listed * * * ries, result resulting or to ownership of the Nun- not address did injuries all incidents or occur- ruled that even nery. Id. This Court * * * Thus, Forcier, Act.’ omission 16. In W.P. Associates (R.I.1994), an uninsured motorist prin reference to this Court reiterated this ambiguity.” W.P. claim created an Associ ciple. explained that release in "[t]he We ates, (quoting Aetna Casu claims 637 A.2d at 356-57 specifically delineated those Farr * * * Fair, Surety alty Co. v. subject matter 'which been the ha[d] (R.I.1991)). proceedings Workers’ certain under said ter, during my employment, ring espe- rejected argument more that a release occurrence(s) cially whereby containing an I sus- broad must be con- injury(s), Furthermore, tained a work-related general strued as a release. occurrence(s) injury(s) reading are weight de- such into the words “all scribed a certain Petition for “any” Commu- claims and demands” and without employee tation of the that relates to context our contravenes well-settled rules Release, this which Petition interpreting has or will for contracts. “In determin- be filed with the ing Rhode Island Workers’ whether an agreement is clear and unambiguous, Court.” the document must be entirety viewed in its and its parties situation of the and circum- given plain, ordinary its and usual mean- existing stances at the time the release Associates, ing.” W.P. 637 A.2d at 356 signed was are markedly also similar to added). Further, (emphasis “such lan- Farr. Aetna knew about Fair’s uninsured if, guage ambiguous upon [is] considering motorist claim because it whole, agreement aas the language release, signed the time she even allows more than one interpretation though no suit or demand for arbitration and, thus, the true intentions of the initiated, Farr, had been 594 A.2d at Ritter, remain uncertain.” 864 A.2d at 607 here, Young’s employer and its carrier added).18 (emphasis both were aware of her claim before the Commission, Human Rights although she Turning to the release signed by Young, yet had to file her employee discrimination significantly, the document does not ex claim the Court. pressly application reserve of the broad The majority opinion appears ignore language before identifying a specific precedent Court’s “ambiguity clearer, claim. For example, to be may be inferred from the omission of an have included such language explicit as, reference to a claim in a release.” especially, “more without limiting the Forcier, Inc., W.P. Associates v. 637 A.2d generality of the foregoing.” McBurney v. (R.I.1994) Fair, Teixeira, (citing I 381).17 When the Court decided Farr significant also consider it that Young’s and reiterated the principles same in Rit- purport release does not even gener- to be Associates, holding 17. The easily equally W.P. compelling employees concern distinguished. The release in that case in unwittingly may who prospective waive their * * * discharge cluded the "any and all law, rights civil claims. Under federal an * * * * * * arising debts actions taken enforceable release of discrimination claims * * * in connection with the Condominium knowing voluntary, must be as evidenced Parcel, Improvements, Golf Course Parcel or "totality of the circumstances.” Me n operation of the Golf W.P. Course." Industries, Inc., Browning-Ferris lanson v. Associates, 637 A.2d at 357. This Court con (1st Cir.2002); 281 F.3d Rivera- promissory cluded that a note was such a Caribbean, Bristol-Myers Squibb Flores v. debt, though and even it was not listed in the (1st Cir.1997). F.3d light, In this I discharged by agreement. it was question enforceability would of this re Fair, Id. The Court reasoned that unlike in Young's interrogatories, lease. answers to there were claims, "specifically no delineated” she said that she intended to settle her case, debts, or in that that created an claim and that ambiguity. Id. at 356-57. was told that the document she on the day, majority's "Resignation 18. The same entitled Employ thrust is its ment,” encouraging concern for for the "amicable settle- workers' However, disputes.” ment of there company's purposes only. insurance purpose the of “anti-discrimi- that nature; designa edged lacks common it the inal compen- goes beyond well of all nation statutes “release or release” “general tion of inability to or physical injury singu sating in the simply is entitled and claims” at 292. Id. employment A duties.” perform lar, of Claim.” and Settlement “Release “em- the focus on FEPA and CRA but controlling, “is not title contract’s equal op- that the conduct undermines ployer rest of along considered whereas workplace” in the portunity v. 780 L.L.C. in the document.” and his or employee on “the DiPrima, focuses 611 N.W.2d WCA Neb.App. Id. at 290-91 (2000) inconsistency injury.” work-related her (holding 644-45 Industry Re- (quoting Byers Labor signature title document between Commission, 388, 561 ambigui view 208 Wis.2d created contract line of document (1997)). 678, N.W.2d ty). majority’s position, require to the

Contrary my opinion, does not reasonably and is to con- application gymnastics” the release “mental my susceptible interpretation Young’s injury an clearly to clude that work-related to bar rights release was not intended as the not the same denial the Rhode arising under in her disabili- Young’s opportunity alleged claims loss of statutes Although her employment-discrimination claims. ty-discrimination Island waive did intend to Young not out of her em- grew discrimination claims specifically employer’s alleg- Not does her ployment, these claims. statute, rights discriminatory terminating reference to a civil edly omit conduct claim, disability or of her employment-discrimination employment an because before they grow that was handicap, her claim or did Commission, Rights injury fact that Human discrete she suffered to indicate job. contains terms tend on the There- her left shoulder while being purpose fore, for the payment perceive made I in whether the ambiguity * claim. settling injuries resulting] a workers’ “personal terms to such specific contains injuries The release terms and all or oc- from incidents benefits, claims, including “dependency during my include curring employment” * * * compensa- specific disability-discrimination benefits claims. Young’s medical use, tion, disfigurement.” loss and/or reasons, my opinion that For these it is terms, “re- Indeed, by its own case is com- majority’s holding in this Young’s workers’ lates” to inconsistent with our well-estab- pletely in “Petition Commu- claim described the ma- further that precedent, lished filed, filed, to be tation” Workers’ gossamer-thin relies on rationale jority Compensation Court. our distinguish this case from an effort suffered under the Workers’ Injuries Therefore, re- holdings. I most previous those Act from are different hold- majority’s dissent from the spectfully employment discrimination. resulting judgment I would ing, and vacate State, 287, 291 See Folan the record Court and remand 1999) (holding exclusivity provision of in this case to tribunal. (WCA) does Compensation Act

Workers’ statutory created

not bar claims the. (FEPA) Act Employment

Fair Practices Act Rights Rhode

and the Island Civil

(CRA)). Indeed, has acknowl- this Court

Case Details

Case Name: Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date Published: Jun 30, 2009

Citation: 973 A.2d 553

Docket Number: 2008-111-Appeal

Court Abbreviation: R.I.