ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES
No. 23-7483
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 20, 2025
606 U.S. ___ (2025)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
NOTE: Whеre it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 (1906).
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-7483. Argued February 25, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025*
Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, and the District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison followed by a 6-year term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Esteras was arrested and charged with domestic violence and other crimes. The District Court revoked Esteras‘s supervised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, explaining that Esteras‘s earlier sentence had been “rather lenient” and that his revocation sentence must “promote respect for the law,” a consideration enumerated in
Held: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant‘s term of supervised release may not consider
(a) In determining the appropriate sentence for a federal defendant, a district court must consider 10 factors set forth in
A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may also impose a post-imprisonment term of supervised release. Section 3583(c) enumerates the factors that a court must consider when deciding to impose supervised release. Eight of the ten
(b) The Court agrees with Esteras. District courts cannot consider
The statutory structure confirms this negative inference. Neighboring provisions governing the imposition and revocation of other kinds of sentences instruct courts to consider all the
The Court has twice interpreted the omission of
(c) The Government‘s counterarguments are unpersuasive. The Government reads the exclusion of
Next, the Government argues that Esteras‘s reading is unworkable because considering other enumerated factors—such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense” under
Finally, the Government interprets
(d) When appellate courts review a claim that the district court has impermissibly relied on
88 F. 4th 1163, 95 F. 4th 1004, vacated and remanded.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which JACKSON, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 23–7483
EDGARDO ESTERAS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
TIMOTHY MICHAEL JAIMEZ, FKA TIMOTHY M. WATTERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
TORIANO A. LEAKS, JR., PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
[June 20, 2025]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and a term of supervised release.
We disagree. Congress‘s decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting
I
In 2018, Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin. Varying downward from the 15-to-21-month sentencing range, the District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison, to be followed by a 6-year term of supervised release.
When Esteras completed his term of imprisonment, his period of supervised release began. Three years in, the probation office notified the District Court that Esteras had been arrested. According to the mother of his children, Esteras had threatened to kill her and had fired three rounds into her vehicle. Esteras was charged in municipal court with domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and criminal damaging, although the charges were ultimately dismissed at the request of the victim.
The District Court held a revocation hearing, at which it found that Esteras had violated the conditions of his supervised release. The District Court remarked that Esteras was “no stranger to law violations and no stranger to federal court” and that his previous drug sentences had been “rather lenient.” App. 96a. The District Court revoked his supervised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, an upward variation from the advisory 6-to-12-month range, with three more years of supervised release to follow.
At this point, Esteras‘s counsel objected, arguing that the District Court had impermissibly considered “the factor in Seсtion 3553(a)(2)(A).” Id., at 105a. While Esteras‘s counsel lodged his objection for the record, he recognized that Sixth Circuit precedent allows district courts to consider
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, providing two justifications for its view that district courts may consider
The circuits are divided as to whether district courts may consider
II
A
When a district court sentences a federal defendant, the judge may impose a term of imprisonment, a term of probation, or a fine. See
While all these factors are important,
“the need for the sentence imposed—
“(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
“(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
“(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
“(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
“These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of sentencing generally.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 325 (2011). They speak to the questions at the core of any system of criminal justice: What sentence does the defendant deserve? What sentence will deter criminal conduct in the future? What sentence will protect the public? And what sentence is most likely to help the defendant rehabilitate for transition back into society?
A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may—and sometimеs must—impose a postimprisonment term of
When a court “determin[es] whether to include a term of supervised release,” as well as the length and conditions of such a term, it must “consider the factors set forth in section
The reason for excluding
more significant—and here, controversial. Esteras argues that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose articulated in
B
To see what is at stake, keep in mind that
So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke a defendant‘s term of supervised release (per
III
A
We agree with Esteras: District courts cannot consider
The statutory structure confirms this negative inference. Neighboring provisions that govern the imposition and revocation of sentences other than supervised release instruct the court to consider all the factors in
Congress‘s decision to exclude retribution from the calculus also comports with the role of supervised release in our current criminal justice scheme. Fines, probation, and imprisonment are a court‘s primary tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original offense. Supervised release, by contrast, “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 50 (1994). Rather, it “fulfills rehabilitative ends” and “provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U. S. 53, 59–60 (2000). So when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with this Court‘s precedent. We have twice interpreted the omission of
B
We are unpersuaded by the Government‘s and the dissent‘s counterarguments. First, the Government and thе dissent read the exclusion of
When interpretive disputes arise, it is easy to imagine how Congress could have drafted the statute to avoid them. But Congress cannot anticipate (much less account for) every future statutory skirmish—and even if it could, courts have no authority to hold Congress to a “perfect as we see it” standard of drafting. On the contrary, we have “routinely construed statutes to have a particular meaning” even when “Congress could have expressed itself more clearly.” Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U. S. 452, 472 (2016). What Congress said here gets its point across just fine: The itemized list in
It makes much less sense to read
The dissent has no response to this point, so it instead analogizes to different—and inapposite—contexts. For example, the dissent says, suppose that a law clerk is directed to complete a certain number of bench memos before a deadline; surely that instruction would not carry the inference that the law clerk may not complete more work too. Post, at 5. But the important difference between that context and this one is that sentencing considerations, unlike bench memos, can be zero
A play on the dissent‘s own analogy reveals its weaknesses. Imagine that a judge tells her hypothetical law clerk to prepare a bench memo with a recommendation formed “after considering” statutory text, context, and structure, as well as any relevant precedent. Having looked at these sources, the law clerk is inclinеd to recommend that the judge reverse the court below. But the law clerk decides to look elsewhere—say, to social science studies—and she uses these sources to inform her recommendation. In the end, she submits a memo recommending that the judge vote to affirm the lower court‘s decision. According to the dissent, the law clerk has obeyed her boss‘s instructions. Needless to say, we disagree.
More to the point, the dissent never explains why Congress omitted
Next, the Government and the dissent argue that Esteras‘s reading of
The answer is straightforward. A court may consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant for the considerations set forth in
The dissent, for its part, argues that we are simply wrong to understand
the fourth. Not to mention that the provision speaks in retributive terms: the “seriousness of the offense,” the need “to promote respect for the law,” and, in particular, the need “to provide just рunishment for the offense.”
Finally, the Government suggests that
We need not resolve the dispute because it does not affect our analysis. To begin, the Government‘s reading of
IV
At oral argument, the Government expressed concern that it would be difficult for appellate courts to determine whether a district court has impermissibly relied on
Much will turn on whether the defendant objects. If the defendant does not make the district court aware that it may be impermissibly relying on
If the defendant does object to the district court‘s reliance on
not harmless, then the court of appeals should vacate the court‘s order and remand for the court to apply the correct standard. See
This does not mean, as the Government suggests, that our reading of
* * *
District courts may revoke a term of supervised release after considering the factors enumerated in
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all but Part II-B of the Court‘s opinion. I agree that district courts may not rely on the retributive sentencing factor set forth in
The question in these cases is whether, despite Congress‘s omission in the supervised-release statute of any reference to retribution, courts may consider retribution when they decide whether to revoke a term of supervised release. The answer is no. In specifying the factors courts should consider before revoking a term of supervised release, Congress cross-referenced eight out of the ten familiar
The majority approaches the question differently. “In the context of a revocation hearing,” it reasons, the word “offense” in
The problem with that framing is that it relies on an interpretive question with no clear answer. The term “offense” in
Because the majority frames the question as one about retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exacting retribution for the defendant‘s supervised-release violation. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward. As the Court holds today, the supervised-release statute does not permit consideration of
In sum, when a court considers whether a supervised-release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment (its primary task during revocation hearings), it must look only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute. As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of bounds. Although I would have made this point explicit, nothing in the Court‘s opinion is inconsistent with it. Accordingly, I otherwise join the Court‘s opinion.
JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The question presented in this litigation is whether sentencing courts can reference and rely upon the retributive concerns outlined in
That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has taken off the table. Ante, at 7-8. Venturing into this territory is not necessary in the context of this litigation. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explains, whatever
I disagree with the Court‘s discussion of the scope of “offense” in
In any event, because
Part II-B of the majority‘s opinion is both unnecessary to the outcome of this litigation and inscrutable in light of how revocation sentences are actually determined and imposed. Therefore, I cannot join that Part of the opinion.
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.
Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings. Today‘s decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit A in the trial bench‘s catalog of appellate otherworldliness. The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that a federal district-court judge, when considering whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in mind-bending exercises. The judge must take into account “the nature and circumstances” of a defendant‘s offеnse but is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.”
The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the interpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure of the Act supports the Court‘s interpretation.
I
A
In order to understand these cases and the points on which the majority and I disagree, some background information about federal sentencing is required. When a defendant is “found guilty of an offense,” he may be sentenced to “a term of probation,” “a fine,” or “a term of imprisonment.”
If a sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment, the court generally has discretion to include “as a part of the sentence” a term of supervised release.
During a term of supervised release, a defendant must comply with certain standard conditions, such as reporting to a
In these cases, the lead petitioner, Edgardo Esteras, violated a term of his supervised release by assaulting the mother of his children and shooting at her vehicle. The sentencing judge revoked supervised release and, in doing so, referred to Esteras‘s criminal history and the need to “encourage [him] to be respectful of the law.” App. 96a. Citing these remarks, Esteras contends that the judge based his decision on an impermissible factor, namely, a desire to “promote respect for the law.” This factor, which appears in
B
The question in these cases is what to make of the omission of
Although this canon has its place, Reading Law emphasizes that it “must be applied with great caution, since its application depends so much on context.” Scalia & Garner 107. Our cases have made the same point and have often rejected use of the canon because of the context in which the expression appeared. See, e.g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (“The expressio unius canon applies only when circumstances support[] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[T]he canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does
In these cases, I agree with the Court that the omission of two of the sentencing factors from the list of supervised-release factors gives rise to a negative inference, but I disagree with the Court about the nature of that inference. The most likely—and in my view, the appropriate—inference is simply that
Consider this example. Suppose I tell my law clerks on a Monday that by the end of the week they must complete the bench memos in 6 of the 12 cases scheduled for argument during the next sitting. That statement would strongly imply that completion of other bench memos by the end of the week is not mandatory. But the statement would not suggest that finishing other bench memos is forbidden. Many other similar examples could be provided.
To salvage its far-reaching inference, the Court offers its own variation on the law-clerk hypothetical. In the Court‘s hypothetical, a judge tells a clerk “to prepare a bench memo with a recommendation formed ‘after considering’ statutory text, context, and structure, as well as any relevant precedent.” Ante, at 12. As the Court sees it, if the law clerk also reviews secondary sources “to inform her recommendation,” the law clerk did not “obe[y] her boss‘s instructions.” Ante, at 12-13.
But nothing about the Court‘s hypothetical suggests the law clerk must exclusively consider those four factors. Would the clerk necessarily infer from the judge‘s instruction that nothing else could be considered? I doubt it. And if the clerk knows that the judge thinks that other factors, such as statutory purpose or legislative history, are relevant considerations, the inference is unlikely.
For this reason, the Court‘s use of the expressio unius canon exceeds its customary and proper use, and the Court provides no good reason for its aggressive use of that interpretive tool. The Court finds it significant that Congress included in the list of supervised-rеlease factors “almost the entire list” of sentencing factors but left out
This is illogical. When a provision sets out a rule and lists items to which the rule applies, the length of the list may bolster the strength of the inference that the list is exhaustive, but it does not alter the scope of the rule. Suppose I tell friends who are visiting Washington, D. C., for the first time that they must visit a list of enumerated sites. If the list is long, they might infer that I do not think that there are any other sites that they should necessarily try to squeeze in. But it is doubtful that they would infer that I am suggesting that they should necessarily avoid seeing anything else that might catch their interest.
II
The Court‘s interpretation is also inconsistent with the text and structure of the Sentencing Reform Act.
A
Starting with the text, I note three features that counsel against acceptance of the Court‘s interpretation.
First, the relevant provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act lack language like that included in other provisions of the Act that limit a court‘s consideration of specified factors. For example,
Second, we can infer that the Sentencing Reform Act allows a judge to consider all the sentencing factors because there are some situations in which factors omitted from the list of supervised-release factors must be considered. One such situation occurs when a judge decides how to respond to a defendant‘s violation of the terms of supervised release because in that situation the judge must consider exactly what is set out in
Consideration of “the kinds of sentences available” may be required during a revocation proceeding for yet another reason. When a sentencing court revokes a term of supervised release and sends the defendant back to prison, the maximum period of additional confinement authorized depends on the class of the underlying offense. See
Third, and most important, the Court‘s interpretation cannot account for the inextricable relationship between the omitted sentencing factor at issue in these cases, i.e.,
Another part of
The Court struggles in vain to explain away this clash between what its interpretation forbids and what the Sentencing Reform Act demands. It entirely ignores the relationship between “afford[ing] adequate deterrence” (a mandatory consideration) and “promot[ing] respect for the law” (outlawed under its interpretation). And as for the conflict between requiring consideration of the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and banning consideration of “the seriousness of the offense,” the Court‘s response is an elaborate theory that has no grounding in the statutory text.
The Court begins by claiming that
After that flawed beginning, the Court tells us that the supervised-release factors operate as a kind of purpose filter. Section
None of this has any textual support, and it does not solve the problem faced by a judge who is compelled to consider the nature and circumstances of an offense but forbidden to consider its seriousness. If taken seriously, it does not alter in any way the information that judges may consider. Instead, it merely calls on them to probe their mental processes to ensure that no thoughts of retribution entered in.3
Imposing such a soul-searching obligation as a requirement that may be enforced in litigation is utterly impractical.
B
No more is needed to reject the Court‘s interpretation, but I note for good measure that the structure of the Sentencing Reform Act also weighs against the Court‘s interpretation. The Act gives express instructions about the way in which the sentencing factors apply to decisions regarding the imposition of each of the Act‘s three primary penalties (i.e., imprisonment, probation, fines). These instructions fall into one of two categories. Instructions in the first category either mandate consideration of all the sentencing factors4 or require their consideration to the extent they are relevant to the type of sentence in question.5 By contrast, instructions in the second category expressly prohibit consideration of specific sentencing factors.6
What is remarkable about
Such discretion is consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act‘s general approach tо supervised release, which confers broad discretion on trial judges. In most cases, sentencing courts “may include” a term of supervised release “as a part” of “a sentence to a term of imprisonment,”
This grant of discretion tracks the background principles against which the Act was drafted, namely, “the established tradition of district courts’ sentencing discretion.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, 495 (2022). As we recently noted, “[t]he only limitations on a court‘s discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” Id., at 494; see
III
A
The Court attempts to buttress its interpretation by citing statements made in
This reads too much into what is plainly peripheral dicta. For one thing, it is not even clear that the statement means what the Court claims. The verb “may” sometimes denotes “permission” and sometimes denotes “possibility.” Random House Webster‘s Unabridged Dictionary 1189 (2d ed. 2001). The Court reads the statement in Tapia to mean permission: a judge may not consider retribution because that is not allowed. But the statement could also mean “possibility“: a judge, as a matter of discretion, may choose not to take retribution into account. It is debatable which reading is better, and in any event, as the opinion stated twice, the statement was merely “statutory background.” 564 U. S., at 323, 326. Moreover, Tapia “dealt with a different sentencing law” concerned with imposing imprisonment, not supervised release, and the Court‘s drive-by analysis of
The Court‘s other precedent, Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, is no better. The holding in that case—that sentencing courts adjudicating motions to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act have discretion to consider intervening changes in the law or relevant facts—is far re-moved from the question here. After emphasizing that sentencing judges have generally exercised broad discretion regarding the facts considered in sentencing determinations, the opinion noted that Congress has sometimes imposed restrictions; as an illustration, it simply cited the statement made in Tapia. See 597 U. S., at 494.
Whatever weight these dicta merit, they are surely insufficient to support today‘s decision.
B
The Court attempts to justify its interpretation by drawing a hard line between the Act‘s primary penalties—“[f]ines, probation, and imprisonment“—and supervised release. Ante, at 9. In its view, the former are a court‘s main “tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original offense.” Ibid. But “[w]hen a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release,” the Court reasons, “it makes
This argument exaggerates the distinction between the two classes of penalties to which the Court refers. Contrary to the Court‘s suggestion, a decision about the revocation of supervised release may call for consideration of certain backward-looking factors. For example, under
A defendant‘s original offense may also be important when a judge is considering whether a violation of a condition of supervised release is serious enough to justify sending the violator back to prison for a particular length of time. Consider a defendant convicted for the possession of child pornography who later violates a special condition of his release restricting his viewing of any sexually explicit materials, including material that depicts teenagers who are not actually under the age of 18. In such a case, the serious nature of the original crime may be thought to have a bearing on the implications of the later violation and the need for reimprisonment to deter the defendant from future backsliding, to protect society from the consequences of child pornography, or to provide the opportunity for further rehabilitation efforts in prison.
It is revealing that the Court only half-heartedly buys its forward-looking/backward-looking distinction. In a footnote, the Court refuses to take a position on the question whether a sentencing court may revoke supervised release in retribution “for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release.” Ante, at 8, n. 5 (emphasis deleted).
IV
In addition to all these faults, the Court‘s interpretation, as I emphasized at the outset of this opinion, defies common sense.
The Court‘s interpretation of which sentencing factors a сourt may consider in altering a term of supervised release must also apply when a court is initially imposing a term of supervised release. The relevant wording in
Other daunting practical problems will arise when judges are deciding whether to alter a defendant‘s term of supervised release. When sending a violator of supervised release back to prison, a court must carefully control every word that is uttered to explain the decision. Avoiding the language of
The potential consequences of the Court‘s interpretation are so alarming that many of the lower courts that have adopted today‘s interpretation have squirmed to avoid its effects. See, e.g., United States v. Miqbel, 444 F. 3d 1173, 1182 (CA9 2006) (“[A] sentence would be unreasonable if the court based it primarily on an omitted factor, such as a factor provided for in
Today‘s decision is similar. After adopting an impractical interpretation, the decision takes the remarkable step of outlining ways in which sentencing judges and courts of appeals can avoid strict compliance. At the trial level, if the defense objects that a comment made by the judge crosses the line, the Court counsels that the judge can easily ward off reversal. The judge can “withdraw any impermissible” remark or recast any “stray reference to a
After providing this roadmap for district judges, the Court turns to the courts of appeals. The Court reminds circuit judges that an appeal based on today‘s decision “will be governed by plain-error review,” assuming the defendant fails to object in the district court. Ibid. And plain-error review, as we have long observed, is an “exacting” standard and is meant to correct “only particularly egregious errors” that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1, 15 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reading between the lines, the Court‘s message is clear. Unless a district judge obdurately fails to backtrack as recommended when there is an objection based on today‘s decision, there should be few problems. The Court‘s outline shows that
* * *
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the Court‘s decision, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
Notes
The effect of the Court‘s filtering scheme is to complicate the judge‘s consideration of all these matters by demanding that he search his conscience and ask: “Have I let any thought of retribution enter into my thinking? I am inclined to send the defendant back to prison for x months, and I think I‘m doing that to achieve deterrence and incapacitation. But was I somehow influenced by moral disapproval of the defendant‘s conduct and the feeling that at least part of the x additional months is simply what he deserves?”
Congress may have rendered the three