Ronald E. DUBERRY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 14-01258 (RC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed May 28, 2015
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
It is further ORDERED Defendants’ [46] Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony Pursuant to
It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Supplemental Discovery Plan setting out a schedule for the remaining discovery. That discovery plan shall be filed no later than June 12, 2015. Because of the delay necessarily entailed by allowing additional discovery, the Court strongly encourages the parties to expeditiously complete the remaining discovery. In particular, because the need to extend discovery results almost wholly from Plaintiff‘s actions and omissions, Plaintiff shall make all reasonable efforts to accommodate an expedited schedule for completing the discovery in this case. The Court will set a fixed date for the extension of discovery after it reviews the parties’ Joint Supplemental Discovery Plan.
SO ORDERED.
Chad Wayne Copeland, Matthew Robert Blecher, Melissa Lael Baker, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, four retired correctional officers seek injunctive and declaratory relief that will require the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, their former employing agency, to classify them as retired “law enforcement officers” within the meaning of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act. They seek this classification so that, pursuant to local administrative procedures, they may obtain a current firearm certification, which, in turn, is required by the Act before retired law enforcement officers may carry concealed firearms across state lines. The defendants have moved to dismiss the ac
The Court dismisses the plaintiffs’ claims insofar as they seek relief on behalf of “future” retired correctional officers not presently before the Court, given that the plaintiffs lack third-party standing to seek such relief. The Court also dismisses all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities, given that such claims are duplicative of those against the District of Columbia. In all other respects, the Court grants the motion to dismiss as to the claims against the District: Although the Court has Article III and subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that the Department of Corrections, in refusing to classify them as retired “law enforcement officers,” violated a right enforceable under
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
In 2004, Congress enacted the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (“LEOSA” or “the Act“). See
Section 3 of LEOSA governs retired law enforcement officers, setting forth the conditions that they must satisfy in order to carry concealed firearms lawfully in any state. See
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified retired law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce....
(A) a photographic identification issued by the agency from which the individual separated from service as a law enforcement officer that identifies the person as having been employed as a police officer or law enforcement officer; and
(B) a certification issued by the State in which the individual resides or by a certified firearms instructor that is qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty officers within that State that indicates that the individual has, not less than 1 year before the date the individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been tested or otherwise found by the State or a certified firearms instructor that is qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty officers within that State to have met—
(I) the active duty standards for qualification in firearms training, as established by the State, to carry a firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm; or
(II) if the State has not established such standards, standards set by any law enforcement agency within that State to carry a firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm.
Id.
In short, if an individual is a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” within the meaning of subsection (c) and also satisfies the identification requirements of subsection (d), then he may carry a concealed firearm in any state, notwithstanding any state law providing otherwise. See
B. Factual Background and Procedural History
Before their retirement, Ronald E. Duberry, Harold Bennette, Maurice Curtis, and Robert L. Smith (collectively “Plaintiffs“) worked as correctional officers in the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC“). See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 15. In this capacity, Plaintiffs interacted daily with inmates and had authority to carry firearms, serve warrants, and make arrests on prison grounds. See id. ¶¶ 26-27, 30-32. While employed by DOC, Plaintiffs were issued identification cards indicating their status as law enforcement officers and stating that
Beginning in November 2012, Plaintiffs individually sought to enjoy the concealed carry right that they believed LEOSA afforded them. See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-59. Duberry, Bennette, and Curtis reside in Prince George‘s County, Maryland,3 while Smith resides in the District of
Columbia. See id. ¶¶ 8-11. Both Prince George‘s County and the District of Columbia issue permits allowing resident retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms subject to the various conditions provided in LEOSA. See id. ¶ 47. Because Plaintiffs already possessed photographic identification identifying them as retired DOC correctional officers, they satisfied the requirements of subsection (d)(2)(A). See id. ¶ 56; Duberry Identification Card, Pls.’ Ex. A. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought to comply with subsection (d)(2)(B)‘s firearm certification requirement. See
Before a Prince George‘s County or District of Columbia resident can seek the firearm certification required by subsection (d)(2)(B), however, he must first submit a prior employment certification form completed by the law enforcement agency for which he previously worked. See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶ 47. On this certification form, the agency must answer a series of questions by сhecking boxes for “yes” or “no.” One question asks whether the applicant, while employed, possessed various authorities enumerated in subsection (c)(2) of LEOSA, including “statutory powers of arrest.” Certification of Prior Law Enforcement Employment, Pls.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 23-2.4 Relatedly, another question asks whether the applicant was “regularly employed as a law enforcement officer” for the indicated duration of time. Id.
In response to both of these questions on Duberry‘s prior employment certification form, a DOC human resources officer checked the boxes for “no” and wrote that Duberry was “not a law enforcement officer.” See Certification of Prior Law Enforcement Employment, Pls.’ Ex. B; see also Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-51, 55, 57.5 DOC took the same position with respect to the other Plaintiffs. See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶ 55. In response to inquiries, a DOC official explained that DOC correctional officers have no “statutory powers of arrest” within the meaning of subsection (c)(2). See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55; see also
In July 2014, Plaintiffs initiated this action against the District of Columbia, Mayor Vincent Gray in his official capacity, and Director of DOC Thomas N. Faust in his
Defendants moved to dismiss the corrected amended complaint, contending that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, that the individual defendants sued in their official capacities should be dismissed, and that the corrected amended complaint fails to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 19.6 After the motion was fully briefed, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for oral argument. See Mot. Oral Argument, ECF No. 26.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, to survive a
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Defendants contest this Court‘s jurisdiction on two separate grounds. First, they contend that Plaintiffs lack standing, as required by Article III of the United States Constitution. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9-19, ECF No. 19. Second, they argue that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking under
1. Standing
Standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The party invoking federal court jurisdiction bears the burden to establish the three elements of standing, which are (1) that the plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact“; (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of“; and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “general factual allegations” supporting injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability suffice to establish standing, though the burden of proof grows heavier at successive stages of litigation. Id. at 561.
Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy two of the three standing elements—injury-in-fact and redressability. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9-17. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective injunctive relief on behalf of “future” retired DOC correctional officers who might seek under LEOSA to carry concealed firearms. See id. at 17–19. For the reasons given below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as to themselves, but not as to future retired correctional officers.
a. Injury-in-Fact
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Suprеme Court explained that the injury-in-fact required for standing is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Lujan Court also described this protected interest as a “cognizable interest.” Id. at 562. Such an interest could consist of the mere “desire to use or observe an animal species” for “purely esthetic purposes,” though the Court went on to hold that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently shown themselves to be within this interested class. Id. at 562-67.
In Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Secretary of State, the D.C. Circuit held that a “colorable” allegation that a plaintiff was deprived of a statutory “right” sufficed to establish an injury-in-fact. 444 F.3d 614, 618-19 (D.C.Cir.2006). In that case, Zivotofsky contended that her son had a statutory right to have “Israel” listed as his birthplace on his U.S. passport instead of “Jerusalem,” and that the Secretary of
In Parker v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit seemingly took a more generous approach, distinguishing the “cognizable interest” required for standing from an enforceable “legal right.” 478 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C.Cir.2007). The Parker court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to challenge under
The Court recognizes a tension between Zivotofsky and Parker—a tension originating, at least partially, in the Lujan Court‘s grappling with the elusive boundaries of Article III standing. Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (discussing statutorily created standing); accord Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 617, with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63 (discussing a “cognizable interest“); accord Parker, 478 F.3d at 377. Zivotofsky suggests that courts may consider to some degree whether a plaintiff‘s assertion of a protected “individual right” is “at the least... colorаble.” Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619. Parker, by contrast, limits the standing inquiry to ascertaining the existence of a “cognizable interest,” reserving any analysis of “legal rights” for the merits. Parker, 478 F.3d at 377. The two cases might be harmonized in this way: Zivotofsky could be read to mean that the alleged violation of a “colorable” legal right is “sufficient” for standing, but not necessary, Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619, whereas Parker could stand for the principle that at a minimum, the invasion of a “cognizable interest” is necessary for standing, Parker, 478 F.3d at 377. On the other hand, Parker appears to counsel strongly against any analysis of the merits in the course of determining standing, such that a court could not even ask whether a plaintiff‘s claim is “colorable.” See id. (calling “unsound” the Ninth Circuit‘s approach of determining existence of individual right for standing analysis and explaining that “when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of his or her legal claim” (emphasis added)).7
Lastly, Defendants argue that the injury alleged by Plaintiffs is too “conjectural or hypothetical” to support standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.11 Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not “demonstrate a current violation of law, much less... future violations,” and that Plaintiffs’ claims that they will be “subjected to potential future threats” without the protection of a concealed firearm are purely speculative. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 17-18. But because all Plaintiffs have already been refused the prior employment certification requested from DOC and are still unable to proceеd in obtaining a concealed carry permit, see Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-51, 55, 57, the injury to Plaintiffs’ “cognizable interests” (or alleged “legal rights“) has already occurred and continues to occur, absent a change in DOC‘s legal position. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff challenging constitutionality of police arrest methods had standing to seek damages but not to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, in the absence of evidence that he would be arrested again or would otherwise be subjected to the same allegedly unlawful methods).
Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice to establish the injury-in-fact required for standing under Article III, whether such injury impinges on their colorable “legal rights” or merely a “cognizable interest.” Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619; Parker, 478 F.3d at 377.
b. Causation
Standing further requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. That is, the injury
The parties do not dispute causation. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9-17. The Court, however, cannot rely on the parties’ silence, given that jurisdiction must be confirmed when in doubt. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998). The Court nonetheless readily concludes that causation is satisfied. Plaintiffs allege that DOC‘s erroneous interpretation of LEOSA and resultant refusal to recognize Plaintiffs as retired “law enforcement officers” directly caused their injury-in-fact. See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55. No “lengthy chain of conjecture” undermines the alleged causal nexus. Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 670-72 (D.C.Cir.1996) (concluding that wildlife organizations failed to establish causation in challenge to tax credits for alternative fuel additive that allegedly caused more ethanol production, which increased corn and sugar production, which in turn increased agricultural pollution, which would allegedly impact areas inhabited by wildlife).
c. Redressability
Lastly, a party seeking to establish standing must show that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff does not have standing to sue when redress for its injury depends entirely on the occurrence of some other, future event made no more likely by its victory in court.” Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Def., 785 F.3d 719, 726 (D.C.Cir. 2015).
Here again, the Court‘s analysis is straightforward. A “favorable decision” for Plaintiffs, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, would result in an order directing Defendants to “certify and/or acknowledge Plaintiffs as retired law enforcement officers” under LEOSA, Corr. Am. Compl. 17. This order would “likely” (if not certainly) enable Plaintiffs to obtain the prior employment certification from DOC indicating that they were indeed “law enforcement officers” under LEOSA, thereby remedying their injury-in-fact. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-57; cf. Nat‘l Chicken Council v. EPA, 687 F.3d 393, 396 (D.C.Cir.2012) (concluding that petitioners representing consumers of livestock and poultry feed lacked standing to set aside EPA interpretation of statute promoting renewable fuels, where they could not show a “substantial probability” that a narrower statutory interpretation would reduce ethanol production, which would in turn lower corn demand and feed prices).
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury would not be redressable on grounds that the proposed relief would run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). LEOSA, Defendants contend, cannot be read to authorize an unconstitutional remedy that forces DOC officials to administer LEOSA‘s federal regulatory scheme. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 16-17. Once again, Defendants confuse the question of standing with whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim. Although the anti-commandeering doctrine bars Congress from commanding state officials “to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program,” Printz, 521 U.S. at 935,
d. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief on Behalf of Future Retired Correctional Officers
Besides satisfying the three standing elements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, a plaintiff “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (assuming that standing requirements are satisfied before considering “the alternative threshold question whether [plaintiffs] have standing to raise the rights of others“). The prohibition on third-party standing helps ensure that plaintiffs have “the appropriate incentive” and assert their claims “with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129. This prohibition is relaxed, however, where “the party asserting the right has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right” and where “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor‘s ability to protect his own interests.” Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs request that the order directing Defendants to “certify and/or acknowledge Plaintiffs as retired law enforcement officers” under LEOSA be made “applicable to all future former D.C. Department of Correction Officers who otherwise meet the qualifications of LEOSA.” Corr. Am. Compl. 17 (emphasis added). Those “future” retired officers are, naturally, not presently before the Court, and Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to establish both a relationship to those future officers and a hindrance that prevents them from asserting their rights. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130-34 (holding that future, hypothetical attorney-client relationship was not a “close” relationship and that attorneys failed to show any hindrance precluding indigent individuals from challenging state laws as future plaintiffs themselves); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs may not assert the rights of “future” retired DOC correctional officers, they lack standing to seek any declaratory and injunctive relief applicable to those officers.13
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The corrected amended complaint alleges that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under
Defendants contend that this action implicates no federal question because DOC, in determining that Plaintiffs were not “law enforcement officers” with proper arrest powers, applied only D.C. law, not federal law. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 7-8. Defendants, however, concede that federal-question jurisdiction would lie over challenges to District of Columbia or state agency actions “if the right of [Plaintiffs] to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002) (citation and internal alterations omitted); accord Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 7.
Defendants’ assertion that this case presents no federal question is belied by their own arguments. The parties’ dispute on the merits concerns the scope of the term “statutory powers of arrest” (and more precisely, “arrest“).
At this juncture, the Court may not “peek at the substance of plaintiff[s‘] arguments” any more than is necessary to confirm its jurisdiction. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 492 F.3d 471, 475 (D.C.Cir.2007). For now, it suffices to conclude that because Plaintiffs’ success depends on whether a provision of LEOSA is “given one construction,” Verizon Maryland, 535 U.S. at 643 (citation and internal
* * *
Because Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on their own behalf and because their claims present a federal question, jurisdiction lies over these claims under both Article III and
B. Dismissal of Individual Defendants Gray and Faust
Plaintiffs assert their claims against the District of Columbia, along with Mayor Vincent Gray and Director of DOC Thomas N. Faust, both in their official capacities. See Corr. Am. Compl. 1. In their motion, Defendants contend that Gray and Faust should be dismissed from this action because the claims against them are duplicative of the claims against the District. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 28.
“Official capacity suits... ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.‘” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). Bringing a claim against both an employer and an officer in his official capacity is usually “redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 973 F.Supp. 184, 187 (D.D.C.1997) (dismissing Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act claims against officers); see also Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C.Cir.1996) (applying principle to
Here, Plaintiffs have not proffered any reason why Gray and Faust‘s presence in the case is necessary. Cf. Cooke-Seals, 973 F.Supp. at 187 (“Plaintiff‘s argument that maintenance of the claims is necessary to obtain discovery from the officers is accompanied by no showing that the individuals have been unavailable for discovery.“). Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed altogether to respond to Defendants’ argument, thereby conceding the issue. See Hopkins v. Women‘s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.“).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Gray and Faust as parties to this action. Accordingly, the Court‘s analysis below refers only to the remaining defendant, the District of Columbia.
C. Failure to State a Claim
In its motion to dismiss, the District contends that Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed because it does not assert any right enforceable under
1. Legal Framework
Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States, by a person acting under color of any State or District of Columbia statute, custom, or usage.
In Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court enumerated three factors governing a court‘s determination of whether a federal statute creates a “right” enforceable under
Subsequently, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court reviewed its precedents governing determination of rights enforceable under
In concluding that the FERPA provisions at issue did not create an individual right enforceable under
Additionally, the Gonzaga Court clarified the relationship between
Applying the above principles, the Court now considers whether the right at issue in this action is enforceable under
federal right“—that is, whether LEOSA “unambiguously” creates the right that Plaintiffs seek to effectuate through the remedy provided by
2. The Right Asserted by Plaintiffs
The Court begins by ascertaining the right that Plaintiffs seek to enforce, which is itself a subject of dispute. Close analysis of the complaint is required to discern “exactly what righ[t], considered in [its] most concrete, specific form,” Plaintiffs seeks to enforce. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346 (remanding the case to enable the district court to review the complaint).
Plaintiffs challenge DOC‘s refusal to certify on the prior employment certification form that Plaintiffs were previously “law enforcement officers” under LEOSA, where such refusal is based on DOC‘s determination that they did not have the requisite “statutory powers of arrest” within the meaning of subsection (c)(2). See Certification of Prior Law Enforcement Employment, Pls.’ Ex. B; Corr. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55. By way of remedies, Plaintiffs seek an order directing Defendants to “certify and/or acknowledge Plaintiffs as retired law enforcement officers” under the Act, and a declaratory judgment stating the same. Corr. Am. Compl. 17. If DOC is compelled to “acknowledge” Plaintiffs as re
Plaintiffs’ request implicates a statutory wrinkle. The prior employment certification form at issue asks whether the applicant was “regularly employed as a law enforcement officer,” and Plaintiffs seek an order that would effectively compel DOC to answer “yes.” Certification of Prior Law Enforcement Employment, Pls.’ Ex. B; see also Corr. Am. Compl. 17. On its face, however, LEOSA does not define the term “law enforcement officer“—only “qualified retired law enforcement officer,” whose definition appears in subsection (c). See
The parties appear to agree, however, that for purposes of this case, subsection (c)(2) functionally defines the term “law enforcement officer.” That subsection enumerates the attributes that “qualified retired law enforcement officers” must have possessed “before their sepаration“—i.e., when they were still employed as “law enforcement officers.” Id.
Having elucidated the relief sought by Plaintiffs and the relevant statutory provisions, the Court now frames the right at issue in this case. In the most precise terms, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate a negative right—the right to be free from Dis-
3. Enforceability Under § 1983 of the Right Asserted by Plaintiffs
The Court now considers whether the right asserted by Plaintiffs—the right to be classified by DOC as retired “law enforcement officers” consistent with subsection (c)(2)‘s definition—is enforceable under
The Court is guided in its analysis by the Second Circuit‘s and Third Circuit‘s analyses of a similar, neighboring statutory provision—
tions, to transport firearms from a state where they are legal to another state where they are legal, while passing through a state where they are illegal.22 In Torraco v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the three plaintiffs were stopped in New York and delayed during their travels (and two arrested) for possession of firearms without a New York firearm license. 615 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2010). They sued various state entities and officials under
Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the рassenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver‘s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console.
The Third Circuit undertook a similar analysis of
Turning to section 3 of LEOSA, the Court begins (and ends) with the first Blessing factor—whether Congress “intended that the provision in question benefit” Plaintiffs. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. Mindful that this inquiry requires an “unambiguously conferred right” borne out in the “text and structure” of the statute, see Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 282, 285, and finding guidance in Torraco and New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, the Court holds that Congress did not intend to confer upon Plaintiffs the right that they seek to enforce in this action.
Section 3 of LEOSA confers a singular individual right—the right to carry a concealed firearm, as articulated in subsеction (a). Subsection (a), in turn, conditions the existence of this right on two requirements—status as a “qualified retired law enforcement officer,” as defined in subsection (c), and possession of identification documents explained in subsection (d). See
Notably, the Torraco court further suggested that
But on the facts alleged here, the Court declines to blur the boundaries of LEOSA‘s concealed carry right. Here, Plaintiffs do not possess the requisite firearm certification and aver that they have no plans to carry a concealed firearm without first obtaining a LEOSA permit issued by local authorities. Accordingly, subsection (a)‘s concealed carry right offers them no relief; subsection (a) does not create an implicit, standalone procedural right to be classified correctly under subsection (c)(2)‘s definition of “law enforcement officer.” See Corr. Am. Compl. ¶ 84 (alleging that the District deprived Plaintiffs of “right to carry“); Pls.’ Mem. Opp‘n 14 (same). Such bootstrapping cannot be squared with the Supreme Court‘s mandate to look to whether a specific right, asserted by the complaint in “concrete, specific” terms, Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346, is “unambiguously” secured by the statute at issue, Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 282. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ appeal to proximate causation misses the mark: The question under the
The Court is not unsympathetic to Plaintiffs’ plight. Today‘s decision in no way implies that DOC‘s determination of Plaintiffs’ status complied with subsection (c)(2). That, of course, is a matter for the merits, which the Court does not reach. Rather, the Court concludes that even if DOC misclassified Plaintiffs and violated the “law,” Congress did not intend through LEOSA to confer a “right” to have this mistake corrected, at least by way of
Plaintiffs rely on subsection (c)(2) for an alleged procedural right to have DOC apply LEOSA‘s definition of “law enforcement officer” in processing their prior employment certification form. But having considered the “text and structure” of the Act, the Court concludes that because Congress conferred no such right, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the District.31 Additionally, for the same reason, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for municipal liability under
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ motion for oral argument (ECF No. 26) is DENIED AS MOOT. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge