SUTER ET AL. v. ARTIST M. ET AL.
No. 90-1488
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued December 2, 1991—Decided March 25, 1992
503 U.S. 347
Christina M. Tchen, Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on
Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Michael R. Dreeben, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer.
Michael G. Dsida argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Patrick T. Murphy and Lee Ann Lowder.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Louisiana et al. by William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Jesse James Marks and David A. Dalia, Assistant Attorneys General, James H. Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, John Payton, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan Brimer Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, James E. O‘Neil, Attorney General of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jan C. Graham, Solicitor General, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association for Protecting Children et al. by James D. Weill and Robert G. Schwartz; for the American Bar Association by Talbot S. D‘alemberte; for the Illinois State Bar Association et al. by Robert E. Lehrer, Dennis A. Rendleman, Roger B. Derstine, Richard L. Mandel, John J. Casey, Michael A. O‘Connor, Alexander Polikoff, Roslyn C. Lieb, Gary H. Palm, and Thomas F. Geraghty; and for the National Association of Counsel for Children et al. by Christopher A. Hansen, John A. Powell, Harvey M. Grossman, Ira A. Burnim, Henry Weintraub, Martha Bergmark, and Mark Soler.
Kenneth C. Bass III, Thomas J. Madden, and Jeffrey Kuhn filed a brief for the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges as amicus curiae.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises the question whether private individuals have the right to enforce by suit a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Adoption Act or Act), 94 Stat. 500,
The Adoption Act establishes a federal reimbursement program for certain expenses incurred by the States in ad-
To participate in the program, States must submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval by the Secretary.
“(a) Requisite features of State plan
“In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which—
. . . .
“(3) provides that the plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them;
. . . .
“(15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home. . . .”
§§ 671(a)(3) ,(15) .
Petitioners in this action are Sue Suter and Gary T. Morgan, the Director and the Guardianship Administrator, respectively, of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). DCFS is the state agency responsible for, among other things, investigating charges of child abuse and neglect and providing services to abused and neglected children and their families. DCFS is authorized under Illinois law, see
Respondents filed this class-action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Adoption Act.2 They alleged that petitioners, in contravention of
The District Court then entered an injunction requiring petitioners to assign a caseworker to each child placed in DCFS custody within three working days of the time the case is first heard in Juvenile Court, and to reassign a caseworker within three working days of the date any caseworker relinquishes responsibility for a particular case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a. The 3-working-day deadline was found by the District Court to “realistically reflec[t] the institutional capabilities of DCFS,” id., at 55a, based in part on petitioners’ assertion that assigning caseworkers within that time frame “would not be overly burdensome.” Id., at 54a. The District Court, on partial remand from the Court of Appeals, made additional factual findings regarding the nature of the delays in assigning caseworkers and the progress of DCFS reforms at the time the preliminary injunction was entered. App. 28-50.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 917 F. 2d 980 (CA7 1990). Relying heavily on this Court‘s decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498 (1990), the Court of Ap-
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), we held that § 111 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,
“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” 451 U. S., at 17 (citations and footnote omitted).
We concluded that the statutory section sought to be enforced by the Pennhurst respondents did not provide such unambiguous notice to the States because it spoke in terms “intended to be hortatory, not mandatory.” Id., at 24.
In Wright, the Brooke Amendment to existing housing legislation imposed a ceiling on the rent which might be charged low-income tenants living in public housing projects.
In both Wright and Wilder the word “reasonable” occupied a prominent place in the critical language of the statute or regulation, and the word “reasonable” is similarly involved here. But this, obviously, is not the end of the matter. The opinions in both Wright and Wilder took pains to analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire legislative enactment, to determine whether the language in question created “enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
Did Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State make “reasonable efforts” to prevent a child from being removed from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his family? We turn now to that inquiry.
Respondents do not dispute that Illinois in fact has a plan approved by the Secretary which provides that reasonable efforts at prevention and reunification will be made. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30.9 Respondents argue, however, that
In Wilder, the underlying Medicaid legislation similarly required participating States to submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan for medical assistance describing the State‘s Medicaid program. But in that case we held that the Boren Amendment actually required the States to adopt reasonable and adequate rates, and that this obligation was enforceable by the providers. We relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates. Wilder, 496 U. S., at 519, n. 17.
In the present case, however, the term “reasonable efforts” to maintain an abused or neglected child in his home,
Other sections of the Act provide enforcement mechanisms for the “reasonable efforts” clause of
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary to enforce the Adoption Act do not evidence a view that
Having concluded that
We conclude that
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Adoption Act or Act) conditions federal funding for state child welfare, foster care, and adoption programs upon, inter alia, the State‘s express commitment to make, “in each case, reasonable efforts” to prevent the need for removing children from their homes and “reasonable efforts,” where removal has occurred, to reunify the family.
In my view, the Court‘s conclusion is plainly inconsistent with this Court‘s decision just two Terms ago in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498 (1990), in which we found enforceable under
I
A
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. We recognized in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), that
In determining the scope of the first exception—whether a federal statute creates an “enforceable right“—the Court has developed and repeatedly applied a three-part test. We have asked (1) whether the statutory provision at issue ““was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff.“” Id., at
B
In Wilder, we held that under the above three-part test, the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act creates an enforceable right. As does the Adoption Act, the Medicaid Act provides federal funding for state programs that meet certain federal standards and requires participating States to file a plan with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Most relevant here, the Medicaid Act, like the Adoption Act, requires that the State undertake a “reasonableness” commitment in its plan. With respect to the rate at which providers are to be reimbursed, the Boren Amendment requires:
“A State plan for medical assistance must—
. . . .
“provide . . . for payment . . . [of services] provided under the plan through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and standards developed by the State . . . ) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and
. . .
In Wilder, we had no difficulty concluding that the reimbursement provision of the Boren Amendment “was intend[ed] to benefit” the plaintiff providers of Medicaid services. 496 U. S., at 509. We also concluded that the second part of the test was satisfied. The amendment, we held, does not simply express a “congressional preference” for reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates; rather, it imposes a “binding obligation” on the State to establish and maintain such rates. Id., at 512. In so concluding, we emphasized two features of the Medicaid reimbursement scheme. First, we observed that the language of the provision is “cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms,” stating that the plan “must” provide for reasonable and adequate reimbursement. Ibid. Second, we noted that the text of the statute expressly conditions federal funding on state compliance with the amendment and requires the Secretary to withhold funds from noncomplying States. Ibid. In light of these features of the Medicaid Act, we rejected the argument, advanced by the defendant state officials and by the United States as amicus curiae, that the only enforceable state obligation is the obligation to file a plan with the Secretary, to find that its rates are reasonable and adequate, and to make assurances to that effect in the plan. Id., at 512-515. Rather, we concluded, participating States are required actually to provide reasonable and adequate rates, not just profess to the Secretary that they have done so. Ibid.
Finally, we rejected the State‘s argument that Medicaid providers’ right to “reasonable and adequate” reimburse
C
These principles, as we applied them in Wilder, require the conclusion that the Adoption Act‘s “reasonable efforts” clause1 establishes a right enforceable under § 1983. Each of the three elements of our three-part test is satisfied. First, and most obvious, the plaintiff children in this case are clearly the intended beneficiaries of the requirement that the State make “reasonable efforts” to prevent unnecessary removal and to reunify temporarily removed children with their families.
Second, the “reasonable efforts” clause imposes a binding obligation on the State because it is “cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms,” providing that a participating State “shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . . . shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them.” Further, the statute requires the plan to “provid[e] that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made.” Moreover, as
What petitioners and amicus United States do dispute is whether the third element of the Golden State-Wilder-Dennis test has been satisfied: They argue that the “reasonable efforts” clause of the Adoption Act is too “vague and amorphous” to be judicially enforced. Aware that Wilder enforced an apparently similar “reasonableness” clause, they argue that this clause is categorically different.
According to petitioners, the Court would not have found the Boren Amendment‘s reasonableness clause enforceable had the statute not provided an “objective benchmark” against which “reasonable and adequate” reimbursement rates could be measured. Reasonable and adequate rates, the Boren Amendment provides, are those that meet the costs that would be incurred by “an ‘efficiently and economically operated facilit[y]’ providing care in compliance with federal and state standards while at the same time ensuring ‘reasonable access’ to eligible participants.” Wilder, 496 U. S., at 519 (quoting
Petitioners also argue that the right to “reasonable efforts” is “vague and amorphous” because of substantial disagreement in the child-welfare community concerning appropriate strategies. Furthermore, they contend, because the choice of a particular strategy in a particular case necessarily will depend upon the facts of that case, a court-enforced right to reasonable efforts either will homogenize very different situations or else will fragment into a plurality of “rights” that vary from State to State. For both of these reasons, petitioners contend, Congress left the question of what efforts are “reasonable” to state juvenile courts, the recognized experts in such matters.
Here again, comparison with Wilder is instructive. The Court noted the lack of consensus concerning which of vari
“may affect the standard under which a court reviews whether the rates comply with the amendment, but it does not render the amendment unenforceable by a court. While there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates outside that range that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act.” Id., at 519-520.
The same principles apply here. There may be a “range” of “efforts” to prevent unnecessary removals or secure beneficial reunifications that are “reasonable.” Ibid. It may also be that a court, in reviewing a State‘s strategies of compliance with the “reasonable efforts” clause, would owe substantial deference to the State‘s choice of strategies. That does not mean, however, that no State‘s efforts could ever be deemed “unreasonable.” As in Wilder, the asserted right in
Petitioners’ argument that the “reasonable efforts” clause of the Adoption Act is so vague and amorphous as to be unenforceable assumes that in Wright and Wilder the Court was working at the outer limits of what is judicially cognizable: Any deviation from Wright or Wilder, petitioners imply, would go beyond the bounds of judicial competence. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that this is so. See Wilder, 496 U. S., at 520 (inquiry into reasonableness of reimbursement rates is ”well within the competence of the Judiciary“) (emphasis supplied). Federal courts, in innumerable cases, have routinely enforced reasonableness clauses in federal statutes. See, e. g., Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U. S. 515, 518, 550 (1937) (enforcing “every reasonable effort” provision of the Railway Labor Act and noting that “whether action taken or omitted is . . . reasonable [is an] everyday subjec[t] of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their decrees“). Petitioners have not shown that the Adoption Act‘s reasonableness clause is exceptional in this respect.
II
The Court does not explain why the settled three-part test for determining the enforceability of an asserted right is not applied in this case. Moreover, the reasons the Court does offer to support its conclusion-that the Adoption Act‘s “reasonable efforts” clause creates no enforceable right-were raised and rejected in Wilder.
The Court acknowledges that the Adoption Act is “mandatory in its terms.” Ante, at 358. It adopts, however, a narrow understanding of what is “mandatory.” It reasons that the language of
The Court‘s reasoning should sound familiar: The state officials in Wilder made exactly the same argument, and this Court rejected it. In Wilder, we noted that the Medicaid Act expressly conditions federal funding on state compliance with the provisions of an approved plan, and that the Secretary is required to withhold payments from noncomplying States. See 496 U. S., at 512 (citing
The Court attempts to fend off this conclusion in two ways, neither of them persuasive. First, the Court seeks to distinguish Wilder, asserting that our conclusion-that the Boren Amendment gave the health-care providers a substantive right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement-“relied in
Even assuming that it is accurate to call the statute and regulations involved in that case “detailed,”4 the Court has misread Wilder. The Court there referred to the relative specificity of the statute and regulations not to demonstrate that the health-care providers enjoyed a substantive right to reasonable and adequate rates-we had already concluded that the State was under a binding obligation to adopt such rates, see Wilder, 496 U. S., at 514-515-but only to reinforce our conclusion that the providers’ interest was not so “vague and amorphous” as to be “beyond the competence of judicial enforcement.” See 496 U. S., at 519, n. 17. Under our three-part test, the Court would not have inquired whether that interest was “vague and amorphous” unless it had already concluded that the State was required to do more than simply file a paper plan that lists the appropriate factors.
The Court has apparently forgotten that ever since Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), the power of the Secretary to enforce congressional spending conditions by cutting off funds has not prevented the federal courts from enforcing those same conditions. See id., at 420, 422-423. Indeed, we reasoned in Wilder that a similar “cutoff” provision supports the conclusion that the Medicaid Act creates an enforceable right, because it puts the State “on notice” that it may not simply adopt the reimbursement rates of its choosing. See 496 U. S., at 514. As for the Court‘s contention that
The Court, without acknowledgment, has departed from our precedents in yet another way. In our prior cases, the existence of other enforcement mechanisms has been relevant not to the question whether the statute at issue creates an enforceable right, but to whether the second exception to § 1983 enforcement applies-whether, that is, “‘Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.‘” Wilder, 496 U. S., at 508 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S., at 423).
The Court does not find these demanding criteria satisfied here. See ante, at 360-361, and n. 11. Instead, it simply circumvents them altogether: The Court holds that even if the funding cutoff provision in the Adoption Act is not an “express provision” that “provides a comprehensive remedial scheme” leaving “no room for additional private remedies under § 1983,” Wilder, 496 U. S., at 520, that provision nevertheless precludes § 1983 enforcement. In so holding, the Court has inverted the established presumption that a private remedy is available under § 1983 unless “Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy.” 496 U. S., at 509, n. 9 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 106-107 (1989), and Wright, 479 U. S., at 423-424).
III
In sum, the Court has failed, without explanation, to apply the framework our precedents have consistently deemed applicable; it has sought to support its conclusion by resurrecting arguments decisively rejected less than two years ago in Wilder; and it has contravened 22 years of precedent by suggesting that the existence of other “enforcement mechanisms” precludes § 1983 enforcement. At least for this case, it has changed the rules of the game without offering even minimal justification, and it has failed even to acknowledge that it is doing anything more extraordinary than “interpret[ing]” the Adoption Act “by its own terms.” Ante, at 358, n. 8. Readers of the Court‘s opinion will not be misled by this hollow assurance. And, after all, we are dealing here with children. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.5 I dissent.
Notes
Neither of these factors marks a significant difference between Wilder and the present case. The difference between requiring States to consider certain factors, as in Wilder, and permitting States to provide certain listed services, as in the present case, is hardly dramatic. As for the second asserted difference, Wilder itself emphasized that States must retain substantial discretion in calculating “reasonable and adequate” reimbursement rates.
