Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New YorkCommunity Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Calabresi, Parker, Carney
Plaintiffs-Appellants, individuals who own apartment buildings in New York City subject to the relevant Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Komitee, J.). The court dismissed the complaint pursuant to
The New York City Rent Stabilization Law (“RSL”) was first enacted in 1969 as part of a decades-long legislative effort to address the myriad problems resulting from a chronic shortage of affordable housing in the City. The RSL is designed to prevent excessive rent levels and to ensure that property owners can earn a reasonable return by, among other things, capping rent increases and limiting the legal grounds for evictions. Over time, however,
The Appellants (the “Landlords”) are individual property owners and not-for-profit trade associations whose members include managing agents and property owners of both rent-stabilized and non-rent-stabilized properties. They sued to invalidate the RSL and the HSTPA on the grounds that their provisions are unconstitutional because they, facially, effect a physical as well as a regulatory taking in violation of the
BACKGROUND
In an entirely unregulated market, rent levels are governed solely by the law of supply and demand.1 See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors as Amicus Curiae at 19. Such a market, however, can be unforgiving. It has little regard for the consequences it produces, whether they are inadequate returns on investment,
exorbitant rents, housing shortages, deteriorating housing stock, or homelessness. To address these problems, the City, State, and federal governments have, over the past century, regulated the New York City rental market.
The City’s first rent regulations were passed in response to severe housing shortages around the time of World War I.2 The war caused new construction to fall and rents to soar.3 In response, renters organized rent strikes, and escalating confrontations between landlords and tenants ensued.4 Ultimately, the State Legislature stepped in and passed the City’s first rent control program in 1920, which capped rent increases and prevented evictions without cause.5 The regime, which expired after ten years, was the subject of ongoing litigation.6 The housing
problems responsible
The next regime of rent control was enacted by the federal government. In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Emergency Price Control Act (EPCA).8 The EPCA was passed in response to inflationary pressures brought about in part by World War II and created a nationwide system of price controls. The law froze New York City rents at 1943 levels for several years until Congress allowed it to expire, replacing it with the Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947.9 Under that statute, buildings constructed after February 1, 1947, were exempted from controls while older buildings remained covered.
A few years later, Congress passed the 1949 Federal Housing Act, which permitted States to take control of rent regulation.10 Then, in 1950, New York created the Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, which regulated landlord-tenant relationships—including over 2 million rental units in the City.11
Those regulations touched upon, among other things, rent levels and legal grounds for evictions.
The City’s modern regime of rent regulations was introduced in 1969 by the RSL. The RSL established the Rent Guidelines Board (“RGB”)—an official body whose members represent the interests of landlords, tenants, and the public—which was charged with setting the amounts by which rents could be increased.12 In carrying out this function, the RGB was obligated to consider the economic condition of the housing market, certain costs for which landlords were responsible, the returns generated to landlords, the housing supply, and increases to the cost of living.13
The RSL has been amended several times. In 1971, for example, the State passed the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (“ETPA”), which permits the City to renew the protections of the RSL when it declares a “housing emergency” based upon a set of statutory criteria.
1993, the law was again amended to permit the deregulation of apartments that either housed high-income tenants or became vacant.15
Recently, the RSL was amended by the HSTPA,16 which was passed in “response to an ongoing housing shortage crisis, as evidenced by an extremely low vacancy rate” that caused tenants to “struggle to secure safe, affordable housing” and municipalities to “struggle to protect their
when the affected tenant is a senior citizen or disabled. See id., Part I. These amendments are the main subject of this appeal.
This regulatory regime has all along been the subject of sharp disagreements: landlords believed that their investment returns were too low and that they retained too little control over their properties while tenants believed that their rents were too high. Landlords in particular have consistently contended the regulations impeded their ability collect sufficient rents to fund required maintenance and improvements and to generate reasonable investment returns. Landlords have consistently contended that the RSL has failed to achieve its stated goal of increasing the availability of housing to low- and moderate-income residents.17
The Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the RSL did not go far enough to enable people of modest incomes to live in the City.18 They further contend that in enacting the RSL, New York’s elected representatives were well aware of the role that rent stabilized housing played in increasing the supply of apartments for low- and moderate-income residents and reducing community
disruption resulting from frequent turnover, tenant dislocation, and eviction. These RSL protections, they argue, enable families to establish long-term homes and, in turn, allow neighborhoods to flourish.19
The City contends that the vast majority of those who benefit from rent stabilization are low- and middle-income people. In 2016, the median income for rent stabilized households was $44,560, one third lower than the median income for private, non-regulated households.20 Of the city’s 946,000 rent stabilized apartments, 189,000 units (20%) were occupied by families living below the poverty line. And more than 600,000 units (64%) were occupied by families who qualify under HUD classifications as low-income, very low-income, or extremely low-income. Eliminating rent stabilization, the Appellees contend, would
including police officers, teachers, healthcare workers, and emergency service personnel, would be unable to afford to live here.21 See generally Brief of District Council 37 as Amicus Curiae. Who has the better of these arguments is not an issue on this appeal.
Throughout its life, this regulatory regime has been the subject of continual attention in the State and City Legislatures. This is hardly surprising. Striking an appropriate balance between the sharply diverging interests of landlords and tenants involves negotiation and compromise over a very long list of complicated and difficult questions. Resolving such questions is a quintessential function of a legislature. At the end of the day, it is highly probable—indeed, virtually certain—that no interested party will be entirely satisfied by what the legislature does.
Rent regulation in the City has also been the subject of decades of litigation. Property owners have challenged New York rent control and stabilization regulations on a host of grounds, contending that it violates the Takings Clause,
the Contracts Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. See Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x 420 (2d Cir. 2011); W. 95 Hous. Corp v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 31 F. App’x 19 (2d Cir. 2002); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996); Rent Stabilization Ass’n of City of New York v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993); Greystone Hotel Co. v. City of New York, 13 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Silberman v. Biderman, 735 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Tonwal Realties, Inc. v. Beame, 406 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Somerset-Wilshire Apts., Inc. v. Lindsay, 304 F.Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Rent Stabilization Ass’n of New York City, Inc. v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156 (1993); Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 34 (1950). Each of these challenges failed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After the passage of the HSTPA, the Landlords sued the Appellees in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They alleged that the newly amended RSL effected, facially, a physical as well as a regulatory taking and that it violated the
An opinion deciding that case also issues today. The defendants moved under
The court next turned to the substantial difficulties associated with facial regulatory takings challenges. It observed that the Landlords were unable to identify a case where a facial challenge to rent-control-related legislation had succeeded. The court acknowledged the possibility that the RSL could effect an as-applied regulatory taking, but noted that “it is unlikely that [it] will be identified in the context of a facial challenge.” Id. at 45.
Next, applying factors set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)—economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and character of the governmental action—the court dismissed the facial regulatory takings claim. It reasoned that the Landlords had not demonstrated that the RSL was unconstitutional in all of its applications. This appeal followed. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under
DISCUSSION
I
A
The Landlords have leveled a facial challenge to the RSL. To prevail on a facial challenge, the plaintiff must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged] Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In other words, the plaintiff must show that the statute “is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Rep. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008). Facial challenges to the RSL have regularly fallen short of this high bar. See, e.g., Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d at 595; W. 95 Hous. Corp., 31 F. App’x at 21. The Landlords suggest, however, that this is no longer the correct standard to apply to the facial challenges they bring. They contend that, instead of applying Salerno’s well-established standard, this Court should utilize one of two more lenient approaches to striking down statutes on a facial challenge. We disagree.
They first argue that because “‘[t]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant,’” the facial challenge should focus on the law’s effect on only those landlords who wish not to comply with its strictures. Appellants’ Br. at 35 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 418 (2015)). A close reading of Patel makes clear that, when the Supreme Court referenced “the group for whom the law is a restriction,” it meant those to whom the law actually applies, not those for whom it has no plausible application—that is, those for whom the law is “irrelevant.” Patel, 576 U.S. at 419.
In Patel, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to a statute authorizing certain warrantless searches. Id. at 417. In response to the challenge, the City cited situations in which a warrant was not required under already established law: that is, “situations where police are responding to an emergency, where the subject of the search consents to the intrusion, and where police are acting
As a separate basis for avoiding the rigors of Salerno, the Landlords rely on United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), arguing that to succeed on their facial challenge, they need only establish either “‘that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.’” Appellants’ Br. at 35 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472) (emphasis in brief). The Landlords contend that, in its use of the phrase “plainly legitimate sweep,” the Stevens Court held that a facial challenge in any legal domain can succeed by meeting either one of these two standards. Again, we are not persuaded.
In Stevens, a criminal defendant challenged the statute of his conviction—criminalizing the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty—as facially invalid under the
We understand Stevens, then, not as rejecting Salerno’s demanding standards for facial challenges generally, but as reinforcing the principles that (i) Salerno provides the prevailing standard for facial challenges to statutes outside the context of the
B
The Takings Clause of the
The Supreme Court has, over the years, considered various Takings Clause challenges to government actions. See e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., Pa., 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court considered a statute requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install equipment on the landlords’ properties. The Court held that such a mandatory invasion amounted to a permanent physical occupation by a third party—the cable companies—of the landlords’ properties and was therefore a per se physical taking. In addition, the Court concluded that such a physical occupation deprived landlords of the entire “bundle of rights” associated with owning property. Id. at 435.
A decade later, in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the Court declined to apply to this logic to rent-control laws and rejected a Takings Clause challenge. Yee involved a mobile-home rent control ordinance that set rent at below-market rates. The Court held that the ordinance—even considered in conjunction with other state laws effectively permitting tenants to remain at will—was not a physical taking. It reasoned that the statutes did not facially require landlords to rent their properties in perpetuity because evictions were permitted in some conditions, id. at 528, and because the “tenants were invited by petitioners, not forced upon them by the government,” id. The Court further noted that States have wide latitude to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship, such as by placing “ceilings on the rents the landowner can charge or requiring the landowner to accept tenants he does not like.” Id. at 529 (cleaned up).
In Horne, in contrast, the Court found that a physical taking had occurred. In
physical taking because raisins are physically transferred from the growers to the government and title is passed, thereby depriving owners of the entire bundle of rights to their property. Id. at 361. The Court also held that the government cannot condition a party‘s permission to engage in interstate commerce on complying with a regulation that effects a physical taking. Id. at 364–67.
Most recently, in Cedar Point the Court evaluated a regulation granting labor organizations the “right to take access” to an agricultural employer‘s property for up to 120 days a year to solicit support for unionization. 141 S. Ct. at 2069. The Court held that because the regulation granted a right to invade the grower‘s property it amounted to a per se physical taking. Id. at 2072. Cedar Point, however, emphasized that “[l]imitations on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals ... are readily distinguishable from regulations granting a right to invade property closed to the public.” Id. at 2076–77.
Our court has also considered various Takings Clause challenges to regulations, including some to earlier versions of New York‘s RSL. See, e.g., Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that denying a land use permit did not constitute a physical taking); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 83 F.3d at 48 (finding application of rent stabilization laws to a previously exempt building did not violate the Takings Clause); Harmon, 412 F. App‘x at 422 (holding City‘s rent stabilization law did not effect a permanent physical occupation of a landlords’ property in violation of Takings Clause).
B
Applying these principles, we conclude that no provision of the RSL effects, facially, a physical occupation of the Landlords’ properties. In Cedar Point, the Court held that the government may effect a physical occupation of property by granting a third party the right to invade “property closed to the public.” 141 S. Ct. at 2077.22 That has not occurred here. Rather, the Landlords voluntarily invited third parties to use their properties, and as the Court explained in Cedar Point, regulations concerning such properties are “readily distinguishable” from those compelling invasions of properties closed to the public. Id. As the Supreme Court made pellucid in Yee, when, as here, “a landowner decides to rent his land to tenants” the States “have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant
Nor does the RSL compel the Landlords “to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.” Yee, 503 U.S. at 528. The statute sets forth several grounds on which a landlord may terminate a lease. These include failing to pay rent, creating a nuisance, violating provisions of the lease, or using the property for illegal purposes.
All in all, as with previous versions, the RSL “regulates land use rather than effecting a physical occupation.” W. 95 Hous. Corp., 31 F. App‘x at 21. The caselaw is exceptionally clear that legislatures enjoy broad authority to regulate land use without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment‘s bar on physical takings. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527.
C
The Landlords contend that the RSL effects, facially, a physical taking because it requires them to offer tenants renewal leases, interferes with their ability to evict tenants and reclaim units for personal use, and allows tenancies to be transferred to successors. These provisions, according to the Landlords, amount to a permanent physical occupation compelled by the government.
We disagree. None of these provisions involve unconditional requirements imposed by the legislature. Landlords, instead, must adhere to these provisions only when certain conditions are met. Consider, for example, the statute‘s successorship provisions. No tenant enjoys an unfettered right to transfer tenancy rights to a successor. Instead, the successor must meet a host of requirements, such as, for example, being a member of the tenant‘s family who has already lived in the apartment for two years. What is more, even assuming arguendo that the successorship provisions do unconditionally require landlords to rent to uninvited successors, that would deprive the Landlords only of the ability to
Furthermore, none of the caselaw on which the Landlords rely lends any appreciable support to their contention that the RSL effects, facially, a physical taking. The Landlords’ reliance on Loretto, Horne, and Cedar Point, their main authority, is misplaced for a common reason: None of them concerns a statute that regulates the landlord-tenant relationship, and none restricts—much less upends—the State‘s longstanding authority to regulate that relationship.24
Moreover, Yee, the only case on which the Landlords rely that does involve a statute regulating the landlord-tenant relationship, confirms our conclusion. Yee, as noted, involved a facial challenge to rent control statutes that limited owners’ ability to terminate tenancies where the initial tenant had transferred her rights to another. 503 U.S. at 523–24. Like the Landlords here, the petitioners argued that the law effectively forced property owners to rent the property out to these individuals and prevented owners from changing the use of their property. The Court upheld the law because it merely limited—but did not bar—an owners’ ability to do both of these things. Id. at 527–28. The same is true here.
II
The Landlords also mount a facial regulatory taking challenge to the RSL. Legislation effects a regulatory taking when it goes “too far” in restricting a landowner‘s ability to use his own property. Horne, 576 U.S. at 360; Yee, 503 U.S. at 529; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In determining whether a use restriction effects a taking, we apply the balancing test set out in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), a case involving a challenge to New York City‘s historical preservation law,
Penn Central instructs courts to engage in a flexible, “ad hoc, factual inquir[y]” focused on “several factors that have particular significance.” 438 U.S. at 124. Three of them are: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.” Id. The Landlords assert that, taken together, these factors support their characterization
As to the economic impact of the regulation, the Landlords contend that the RSL has a direct and substantial negative economic impact on rent-stabilized properties in New York City because stabilized rents are on average 25% lower than market rents and permissible rent increases are outpaced by increases in operating costs. In short, the Landlords contend that the RSL forces property owners to choose between making losing investments or letting their properties deteriorate. They allege that rent-stabilized properties are worth 25% to 50% less than similar properties with market-rate units.
The RSL may well have an appreciable economic impact on the profitability of some buildings subject to its provisions. When permissible rent increases are outpaced by operating cost increases, the result may be a reduction or, in some cases, the elimination of net operating income. We acknowledge that some property owners may be legitimately aggrieved by the diminished value of their rent-stabilized properties as compared with their market-rate units. Furthermore, we understand that many economists argue that rent control laws are an inefficient way of ensuring a supply of affordable housing. But while legislative judgments may take into account these varying policy perspectives, we are bound to follow the standard set forth for a facial regulatory taking under Penn Central. Appellants have simply not plausibly alleged that every owner of a rent-stabilized property has suffered an adverse economic impact that would support their facial regulatory takings claims. Thus, Appellants did not plausibly allege the economic impact factor on a facial basis, and this factor thus weighs against the conclusion that the RSL effects a regulatory taking on its face.
Instead of alleging that every landlord has suffered an adverse economic impact, the Landlords principally rely on data purporting to show the average economic effects of the RSL. But these effects do not establish that the RSL can never be applied constitutionally, which is the requirement for a facial challenge. As the Supreme Court stated in Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., the “mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); see also Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1984) (collecting cases rejecting takings claims where property value declined by 75% to 90%). We therefore conclude that the economic impact factor of the Penn Central analysis does not support the Landlords.
With respect to the Landlords’ investment-backed expectations, once again, we can assume arguendo that some property owners may have had their investment-backed expectations thwarted by the current iteration of the RSL. Thus, we may assume some property owners may not have expected, for example, that the 2019 RSL would eliminate the possibility of preferential rent increases or sunset provisions. However, the Landlords have failed to establish that the RSL interferes with every property owner‘s investment-backed expectations, which is required on a facial challenge, because such expectations can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis.
Different landlords, who purchased properties at different times and under different RSL regimes, will necessarily have a range of differing expectations. Some may have been aggrieved by various provisions of the RSL, while others may not have been and, indeed, others may
Turning to the character of the taking, a regulatory taking “may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Landlords argue that the RSL constitutes a physical invasion because it burdens property owners with non-removable tenants and, in so doing, eliminates landlords’ rights to determine the use of their property or to use it themselves. They contend that the RSL confers a local public assistance benefit on tenants that is inappropriately funded by a subset of New York City building owners rather than the government.
We are not persuaded. The Supreme Court has instructed that in analyzing the “character” of the governmental action, courts should focus on the extent to which a regulation was “enacted solely for the benefit of private parties” as opposed to a legislative desire to serve “important public interests.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass‘n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1987). The character of the government action in Penn Central, for example, cut against a finding of a taking because the law was part of a “comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest” and applied to hundreds of sites. 438 U.S. at 132. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the “judgment of the New York City Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole.” Id. at 134.
Here too, the RSL is part of a comprehensive regulatory regime that governs nearly one million units. Like the broad public interests at issue in Penn Central, here, the legislature has determined that the RSL is necessary to prevent “serious threats to the public health, safety and general welfare.”
Finally, the Landlords urge this Court to consider two additional, less commonly cited Penn Central factors that, they argue, tend to show that the RSL results in a regulatory taking: noxious use and a lack of a reciprocal advantage. Even assuming for the sake of argument that these factors apply, the claims fail.
First, the Landlords assert that because the RSL does not address a safety issue or “noxious use” of a property, this factor supports the conclusion that a regulatory taking has occurred. This argument relies on a logical fallacy that because noxious use laws typically do not constitute takings, the RSL must be a taking because it does not govern noxious use. We have never held that only regulations of noxious uses can survive takings challenges. Merely because the existence of noxious use regulation can overcome a takings challenge does not mean that, conversely, the lack of noxious use regulation supports a takings challenge. Accordingly, this factor does not support the Landlords’ takings claim.
The Landlords’ reliance on the “reciprocity of advantage” factor fares no better. Citing Justice Rehnquist‘s dissent in Penn Central, they argue that the RSL effects a regulatory taking because the Fifth Amendment prohibits the placing of an inordinate share of a public burden on a private individual. With this argument, the Landlords urge us to read a dissent as providing us with governing law. We can‘t do that. As the legislature has found, the RSL provides reciprocity of advantage: the RSL results in significant state- and citywide benefits—including to landlords—by preventing tenant dislocation and preserving neighborhood stability. Although what specific value a particular landlord receives from these benefits may be hard to quantify, that difficulty does not render the RSL a taking. As the Court said in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass‘n, “[t]he Takings Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received.” 480 U.S. at 491 n.21. Accordingly, a supposed lack of a reciprocal advantage does not render the RSL a regulatory taking.
III
Finally, the Landlords contend that they have plausibly alleged that the RSL and the 2018 City Council emergency declaration violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, we disagree. The Landlords argue that the RSL is not “rationally related” to alleviating the housing shortage, securing housing for low-income residents, addressing rent profiteering, or promoting neighborhood stability. To the contrary, the Landlords say, the law reduces the housing supply, secures housing for the wealthy, increases rent for uncontrolled units, and discriminates in favor of tenants over owners. Supporting their view, the Landlords, as we have seen, point to various economists who argue that the RSL, in several respects, causes more harm than good.
But as the Supreme Court has noted, the Due Process Clause cannot “do the work of the Takings Clause” because “where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 720–21 (2010) (cleaned up); see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Harmon, 412 F. App‘x at 423. In any event, as the Court has noted, the liberties protected by due process “do not include economic liberties.” Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 721.
Furthermore, even if a due process challenge were available, Appellants’ arguments would still fail. In evaluating a due process challenge, we would conduct a rational-basis review, see Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11–12, which requires a law to be “rationally related to legitimate government interests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). A rational basis review is not a mechanism for judges to second guess legislative judgment even when, as here, they may conflict in part with the opinions of some experts. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993) (“Where there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end.“) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it is a deferential standard that allows a law to survive if any of its justifications is valid. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). Here, the RSL was primarily enacted to permit low- and moderate-income people to reside in New York City when they otherwise could not afford to do so. See
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.