Commonwealth v. Koehler, J.Commonwealth v. Koehler, J.
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: April 24, 2020
On December 7, 2015, John Koehler filed his second petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).2 Koehler seeks, inter alia, the reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc in order to appeal anew to this Court from the denial of his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition, holding that it was without authority to grant relief. We conclude that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law, as we hold that a PCRA court possesses the authority to grant the form of relief that Koehler seeks in the event that the petitioner establishes the merits of his claim. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the PCRA court, and we remand for further proceedings.
In 2001, Koehler filed a timely PCRA petition. Therein, Koehler included a claim for relief from his death sentence due to ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase. Koehler alleged that counsel failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence that, as a child, Koehler had been a witness to and a victim of domestic violence. The PCRA court denied relief following a hearing, and Koehler appealed. This Court again affirmed. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2012) (“Koehler II”). Justice Baer authored the opinion, which was joined by former Chief Justice Castille and Justices Eakin, Todd, McCaffery, and Orie Melvin. Justice (now Chief Justice) Saylor filed a concurring opinion. With respect to Koehler’s mitigation claim, the Court held that the mitigation evidence Koehler presented at the PCRA hearing “pale[d] in comparison with the aggravating circumstances found by the jury” at trial. Id. at 151. Accordingly, the Court found no prejudice resulting from the claim of counsel ineffectiveness.
On December 7, 2015, Koehler filed a second PCRA petition, this time asserting that his due process rights had been violated during his 2012 appeal in Koehler II. Koehler premised this assertion upon the involvement of Justice Eakin in a well-publicized email scandal that included the exchange of religiously, racially, and sexually offensive emails. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 218 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 193 A.3d 350 (Pa. 2018); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 204 A.3d 326 (Pa. 2018).
[A] joke about a woman who complains to her doctor that her husband “beats me to a pulp” when he comes home drunk. The doctor advises her to swish sweet tea in her mouth and not to swallow until her husband is asleep. The punchline from the doctor: “You see how much keeping your mouth shut helps?”3
Viewing this email as suggesting a disregard for victims of domestic violence, Koehler alleged that Justice Eakin’s participation in Koehler II raised a risk of actual judicial bias as well as the appearance of bias.
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment becomes final.
Recognizing that his second PCRA petition was facially untimely, Koehler asserted that he met the timeliness exceptions for governmental interference and newly discovered facts. See
Recognizing that information continued to develop with regard to the scope of Justice Eakin’s role in the email scandal and the content of the emails, Koehler asserted that, in an abundance of caution, he filed his petition within sixty days of the October 8, 2015 publication of the Philadelphia Inquirer news article summarizing the contents of some of the emails. This article alerted Koehler to the facts that formed the basis of his claims, and Koehler asserted that he could not have discovered these facts any earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
On the merits, Koehler averred that his right to due process was violated by Justice Eakin’s involvement in Koehler II, which created an unacceptable risk of actual bias5 as
Koehler also suggested that the sheer volume of communications between sitting Justices of this Court and the Commonwealth’s prosecutors created the appearance of impropriety. Koehler believed that both the ex parte nature of the communications with prosecutors and the content of the emails as described in the media “impugn the legitimacy of the judicial process” provided by this Court in Koehler II. PCRA Petition at 19 (citing Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 733 (Pa. 2000)). According to Koehler, this judicial bias amounted to a structural defect in Koehler II that rendered the
Koehler contended that he established violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In particular, Koehler relied upon his state constitutional right to life and liberty (
In November 2016, Koehler sought discovery, and later sought leave to amend his petition. Believing that Koehler’s petition asked the PCRA court to rule either that Justice Eakin engaged in judicial misconduct or that Justice Eakin should have recused from consideration of Koehler II, the PCRA court held that the petition was “beyond the original jurisdiction and authority of this court.” PCRA Ct. Order, 6/26/2016. Accordingly, on June 26, 2016, the PCRA court transferred the case to this Court. See
In response to this Court’s subsequent request for briefing on the question of the Court’s jurisdiction, Koehler asserted that, despite the PCRA court’s transfer, this Court lacked jurisdiction and that the Court should remand the matter back to the PCRA court.
On November 2, 2016, this Court accordingly remanded the case to the PCRA court for disposition of Koehler’s PCRA petition, citing to the original jurisdiction of the PCRA courts,
Upon remand, Koehler again sought discovery and leave to amend the PCRA petition. On February 23, 2017, the PCRA court provided notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to
In response, Koehler again argued that the participation of Justice Eakin in Koehler II resulted in state and federal constitutional violations that demanded the remedy of a new appeal from the denial of his first PCRA petition. Koehler maintained that his claims were cognizable under the PCRA because he sought relief connected to, and derived from, his underlying criminal conviction and death sentence.
In July 2017, the PCRA court entered an order denying Koehler habeas corpus relief and holding that Koehler’s “claims under the [PCRA] remain[ed]” under review. PCRA Ct. Order, 7/12/2017. The PCRA court reasoned that, by grounding his due process claim on Justice Eakin’s purported disregard for domestic violence victims, Koehler challenged only this Court’s post-conviction review of his sentence, not his conviction.
Koehler again responded, asserting that the PCRA court had the power and the duty to grant relief, including reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Koehler reiterated that he was not asking the PCRA court to issue a disciplinary decision regarding the conduct of Justice Eakin, nor was he asking the PCRA court to pass on the merits of any prior appellate decision in this case. Koehler also advocated against dismissal as contrary to the prior remand order from this Court, which Koehler viewed as a rejection of the PCRA court’s belief that it lacked “jurisdiction and authority” to resolve this case. Rather, according to Koehler, this Court’s remand order foreclosed the PCRA court from again holding that it lacked authority to grant relief.
On September 4, 2018, Koehler complied, raising six issues. In particular, Koehler asserted that the PCRA court erred in the following respects: First, in failing to comply with this Court’s prior remand order by concluding that it lacked the authority to grant the requested relief, and dismissing the petition, Rule 1925(b) Statement at 1; second, in dismissing his claim that judicial bias violated his federal and state constitutional rights, id.; third, in concluding “that it lacked authority to grant each form of relief Koehler seeks,” id. at 2; fourth, in dismissing the PCRA petition “without ruling on Koehler’s requests for discovery, to amend, and for an evidentiary hearing to resolve any disputed facts,” id.; fifth, in denying relief to the extent that Koehler sought habeas corpus relief in the alternative to PCRA relief, id.; and, sixth, in construing Koehler’s petition as seeking “only relief that ultimately could result in relief from his death sentence, as opposed to relief that included reopening of his post-conviction proceedings to challenge his convictions and death sentence.” Id.
In a Rule 1925(a) opinion filed on November 6, 2018, the PCRA court explained its ruling. Preliminarily, the court conceded that, contrary to its initial assessment of this case, it had original jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to
Reviewing Koehler’s
The only claim of error that the PCRA court perceived as offering any specificity was Koehler’s sixth. Linking Justice Eakin’s alleged derision for victims of domestic violence to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Koehler II that turned on trial counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence of domestic abuse, the PCRA court surmised that Koehler sought only to attack his death penalty, not his conviction, based upon Justice Eakin’s involvement in Koehler II.
On appeal from the dismissal of Koehler’s PCRA petition, our review is limited to examining whether the trial court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014). When an issue presents a question of law, our review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011).6
Koehler makes several arguments to this Court. First, Koehler argues that the PCRA court failed to comply with this Court’s prior remand order when it again held that it lacked the power to grant the relief Koehler requested. Koehler believes that our remand order implicitly rejected the PCRA court’s view that it lacked authority to dispose of the PCRA petition, and precluded the PCRA court from later dismissing the petition based upon its perceived lack of “power.” PCRA Ct. Op., 11/6/2018, at 1. Second, turning to whether a PCRA court has the authority to reinstate a petitioner’s appellate rights nunc
Next, Koehler argues that the PCRA court misconstrued the nature of his claims when it held that Koehler ultimately sought relief only from his sentence, rather than from his conviction. Asserting that his 2001 PCRA petition attacked his underlying conviction and sentence, and that this Court’s disposition of that petition in Koehler II was tainted by Justice Eakin’s alleged bias, Koehler requests a new appeal from the denial of relief on his first PCRA petition that encompasses review of every issue that he raised on appeal.
Fourth, Koehler disputes the PCRA court’s suggestion that his
In its response, the Commonwealth focuses exclusively upon whether the PCRA court has the authority to order this Court to reconsider our prior disposition of Koehler’s first PCRA appeal. To this end, the Commonwealth makes three arguments: the PCRA court is subordinate to this Court, In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 678-83 (Pa. 2014); Koehler II is binding precedent and law of the case, Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1996); and this Court is the final arbiter of whether a jurist has engaged in misconduct. From these three arguments, the Commonwealth concludes that the PCRA court’s determination that it lacked the authority to direct this Court to reconsider Koehler II was logically sound and legally correct.
If, however, this Court believes that the PCRA court was incorrect in its assessment, the Commonwealth requests a remand back to the PCRA court with instructions to proceed in the normal course of PCRA proceedings, including: the filing of the Commonwealth’s answer after Koehler amends his petition; the litigation of
I. Scope of Remand
We resolve first the effect of this Court’s November 2, 2016 remand order on this case. When it transferred the case to this Court, the PCRA court opined that the petition was beyond its jurisdiction and authority. This Court disagreed. We first requested briefing from the parties on the question of this Court’s jurisdiction, and we later remanded the case back to the PCRA court with a citation to
Koehler blends the concepts of the jurisdiction to hear a case and the authority to grant a particular type of relief, presuming that our jurisdiction-based remand foreclosed the PCRA court’s ability to consider whether it could afford the relief requested. But resolving whether a court has jurisdiction over a certain type of claim does not resolve whether the court has the ability to grant the relief requested. See, e.g., Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 464 A.2d at 1353 (recognizing the distinction between the jurisdiction of the court to act and “whether it is able to grant the requested relief once it assumes jurisdiction”). Our remand order signifies only that we do not exercise original jurisdiction
II. Sufficiency of the Rule 1925(b) Statement
We also dispense with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Koehler was insufficiently specific in his
III. PCRA Court’s Authority to Provide Relief
Turning to the question at the heart of this case, we now consider whether the PCRA vests PCRA courts with the authority to remedy appellate-level constitutional
Our legislature has determined that the PCRA provides the sole means of obtaining collateral relief in Pennsylvania, encompassing “all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”
As we observed in our 2016 remand order, the courts of common pleas, serving as PCRA courts, are the repositories for petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA.
As this author recently observed in the Opinion in Support of Reversal (“OISR”) in Taylor, “[i]f an error of constitutional magnitude occurs during the appellate process, the PCRA is the sole means of collaterally attacking the final judgment on that basis.” Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1280 (OISR). Contrary to the PCRA court’s belief, there is no suggestion in either the text of the PCRA nor in this Court’s precedent “that alleged errors occurring in the appellate process are immune from collateral attack, or that only an appellate court can redress appellate errors.” Id.
There is nothing novel in recognizing that constitutional claims relating to the appellate process are cognizable under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (Pa. 1999), for example, this Court held that post-conviction claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness related to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal were cognizable under the PCRA, and, indeed, “the PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal.” Id. at 569-70. It is axiomatic that, if a claim is cognizable, a PCRA court is empowered to remedy it. In Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Pa. 2001), the question was whether the request for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, premised upon counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to appeal, is a claim that is cognizable under the PCRA. We concluded that “[t]he answer unquestionably is yes.” Id. at 1235.
We have likewise held that claims premised upon the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are cognizable under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 181-87 (Pa. 2016), the post-conviction petitioner filed an untimely PCRA petition alleging that counsel who represented him during the litigation of his first PCRA
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 851 A.2d 870, 875 (Pa. 2004), we held that due process entitled a post-conviction petitioner to relief on the same grounds for which a co-defendant was granted relief. The petitioner’s co-defendant obtained relief in this Court from her conviction and sentence premised upon an illegal search. See Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996). The petitioner had filed a petition for allowance of appeal to challenge the same search. Although this Court initially granted review, we later dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted. When we later provided relief to the petitioner’s co-defendant for the same search that the petitioner had challenged, the petitioner filed a PCRA petition raising a due process claim premised upon the disparate treatment afforded to the petitioner and his co-defendant by this Court. The PCRA court denied relief, and this Court reversed. We agreed with the petitioner that there were “insufficient reasons to support the contrary treatment of [Cruz] and Melendez in the course of this Court’s discretionary review and thereafter.” Cruz, 851 A.2d at 877. See also id. at 881 (Castille, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “this case involves a candidly and cogently forwarded claim that this Court committed error of
A claim asserting alleged judicial bias in an appellate court is no different from claims that we already have held fall within the ambit of the PCRA. An issue challenging the impartiality of an appellate judge, like an issue challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel, constitutionally relates directly to the validity of the decision upholding the underlying conviction and sentence. It is an attack upon the truth-determining process, a process that logically includes collateral attacks on the judgment of sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“The PCRA process, although not directly related to an adjudication of guilt, is part of the truth-determining process; otherwise, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness would not be cognizable under the PCRA.”). “Due process demands the absence of judicial bias.” Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1280 (OISR). And a litigant’s due process rights are violated if a biased appellate judge decides the fate of the litigant’s appeal. Id.; see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016). Consequently, a due process challenge to the impartiality of an appellate jurist is cognizable under
Reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc will also remedy the deprivation of effective PCRA counsel. Commonwealth v. Bennet, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007) (vacating and remanding for consideration of whether the petitioner was entitled to the reinstatement of his PCRA appeal rights nunc pro tunc in a second PCRA petition when his original PCRA appeal was dismissed because of PCRA counsel’s failure to file a brief, and reasoning that “due process requires that the post conviction process be fundamentally fair”); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1160-61 (Pa. 2003);
The dissent draws a distinction between claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness and claims of appellate-level judicial bias, and asserts that a new appeal is appropriate to remedy the former but not the latter. See Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 33-34, n.12. Whether it is a defendant’s right to appeal or the due process protection against an unconstitutional potential for bias that is infringed, both scenarios present errors of constitutional magnitude occurring on appeal. A new appeal will vindicate both types of constitutional deprivation. There is no need to fashion a new remedy out of whole cloth when an established remedy will cure the constitutional defect.
As this author recently opined in the OISR in Taylor:
To avoid rendering the Due Process Clause meaningless in the context of an unconstitutional potential for appellate-level judicial bias,
Section 9543(a)(2)(i) of the PCRA vindicates constitutional errors that occur at the appellate level. The PCRA requires inSection 9543(a)(2)(i) that the petitioner prove that the conviction or sentence resulted from a constitutional violation which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” A claim that an appellate jurist harbored an unconstitutional potential for bias during a prior proceeding calls into question the constitutionality of that proceeding and undermines the truth-determining process that resulted in that appellate decision.The unconstitutional potential for bias of an appellate court judge presents a claim no different in any substantive way from one based upon unconstitutionally deficient representation by appellate counsel. Both are errors of constitutional magnitude that occur at the appellate level. This Court has embraced the PCRA as the sole means of seeking redress for the latter, holding that unconstitutionally deficient representation by appellate counsel may undermine the truth-determining process. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 635-36 ([Pa.] 2003). If a claim based upon the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal is cognizable under the PCRA, there is no basis to hold that a claim of appellate-level judicial bias pursuant to the Due Process Clause is not. A
constitutional violation occurring at the appellate level may undermine the truth-determining process, whatever its source.
Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1281–82 (OISR).
To rule that a claim of appellate level judicial bias is not cognizable under the PCRA would effectively hold that there is no remedy for this potential due process violation.9 As a constitutional matter, this is a nonstarter. To strip the Due Process Clause of all remedies to address that clause’s violation is to eliminate the underlying right itself. Ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy).10
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a new appeal will remedy the denial of the due process right to an impartial tribunal. Williams, 136 S.Ct. 1909-10. In Williams, the PCRA petitioner filed a successive petition premised upon newly discovered facts. During discovery, the petitioner learned that then-District Attorney Ronald Castille had signed the sentencing memorandum authorizing the Commonwealth to pursue the death penalty. The PCRA court granted relief. The Commonwealth sought emergency relief in this Court. In the meantime, Ronald Castille had been elected to this Court and was serving as Chief Justice. This Court ultimately vacated the PCRA court’s grant of relief and reinstated the death sentence. Upon further appeal, the United States
The due process right to an impartial tribunal was vindicated in Williams with the award of a new, de novo appeal, If Koehler proves the merits of his due process claim (a matter not before us and one as to which we offer no opinion), such constitutional deprivation would likewise require a remedy. Like Williams, Koehler would then be entitled to an opportunity to present his appeal to a court “unburdened by any ‘possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.‘” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1910 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
To the extent that the dissent believes that the precedential effect of Williams is only that a higher court can direct a lower court to award a new appeal, see Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 27-28, n.10, this reading is not supported by the text of Williams. Williams’ claim was premised upon a due process violation resulting from an unconstitutional likelihood of bias. The relief Williams sought and obtained was a new appeal unburdened by that unconstitutional likelihood of bias. Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1910. As in Williams, the remedy for demonstrating that an appellate tribunal included a jurist with an unconstitutional likelihood of bias would be a new appeal to that tribunal without the participation of the partial jurist.
Other defendants raising due process claims resulting from an unconstitutional likelihood of bias would, if warranted on the merits, also be entitled to this relief. Pursuant to the dissent‘s characterization of Williams, however, only Williams was entitled to a new appeal. All other defendants who raise the same type of claim and request the same
In Williams, the Supreme Court held that “Chief Justice Castille‘s significant, personal involvement in a critical decision in Williams‘s case gave rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias. This risk so endangered the appearance of neutrality that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.‘” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1908–09 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Any other defendant who can establish an unacceptable risk of actual bias in his or her case would be entitled to the same relief the High Court deemed appropriate in Williams. As the High Court explained, “[a]llowing an appellate panel to reconsider a case without the participation of the interested member will permit judges to
Were this Court to hold to the contrary, affirming the PCRA court‘s lack of authority to grant relief to remedy a purported due process violation committed by an appellate court, we would be closing the door to PCRA relief for any constitutional error occurring in the appellate process. There is no logical basis to distinguish between claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness and claims of judicial bias in the appellate courts, or to hold that the former are cognizable under the PCRA because they undermine the truth-determining process, while the latter are not. Make no mistake: a ruling that claims of appellate-level judicial bias are not cognizable under the PCRA eventually would sound the death knell to all claims of constitutional magnitude that occur in the appellate process, including claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness.
The PCRA court found itself precluded from granting relief to Koehler, believing it was powerless to impose discipline upon a judicial officer or to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dissent shares this belief. Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 23-30. But these are irrelevancies. Clearly, the PCRA court had no ability to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct against Justice Eakin. Reilly by Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1298 (acknowledging this Court‘s exclusive right to supervise the conduct of officers of the judicial branch of government pursuant to
The PCRA court‘s reasoning and that of the dissent reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the relief that Koehler sought. Koehler did not ask the PCRA court to impose discipline against Justice Eakin or to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct as if it were a disciplinary board. Rather, Koehler asked for the opportunity to prove his due process violation and, if he prevailed on the merits, to obtain reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights nunc pro tunc. A PCRA petitioner‘s ability to vindicate the deprivation of constitutional rights does not disappear when the conduct at issue may also implicate the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is of no comfort to a petitioner who has directly suffered the harm of a substantiated constitutional deprivation that this Court has the authority to police the conduct of jurists. To mean anything, the violation of individual rights requires individualized remedies.
If, as the PCRA court held and the dissent would have it, Reilly precludes a petitioner from raising any issue that implicates consideration of a jurist‘s conduct because of the applicability of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then the same rationale necessarily would preclude a petitioner from challenging the effectiveness of counsel because of the applicability of the Code of Professional Conduct. Such is not the case, as neither the Code of Judicial Conduct nor the Code of Professional Conduct are instruments to enforce individual rights. Courts undeniably possess the authority to grant relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of an impartial tribunal, and to remedy due process violations that occur during appellate proceedings, notwithstanding the obligations created in the separately enforced codes of conduct.
The dissent believes that, by awarding relief in this case, the PCRA court would be, essentially, sanctioning a Justice of this Court—an interest that the dissent seems to
A court‘s concern cannot principally focus upon the collateral consequences that flow from the vindication of constitutional rights. The judiciary‘s paramount duty instead lies with the solemn obligation to protect, safeguard, and uphold those rights. While ruling upon a due process violation resulting from an unconstitutional likelihood of bias, the Supreme Court acknowledged the role of statutes or Rules of Professional Conduct, which may provide more safeguards than due process requires. Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1908. Because due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications,” id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)), the High Court recognized that “[m]ost questions of recusal are addressed by more stringent and detailed ethical rules.” Id. That conduct may prove to be a due process violation simultaneously or is conduct that is regulated by the Code of Judicial Conduct is no reason to ignore constitutional violations. Rather, a court hearing a due process claim is bound to examine the limits of the due process clause. When a defendant‘s due process rights are violated, the defendant is entitled to relief. We violate our constitutional
With regard to the PCRA court‘s discomfort in addressing a purported constitutional violation occurring in the appellate courts, we rely upon the PCRA itself as providing such a means. If a petitioner can meet the statutory obligation to plead and prove that the facts and circumstances of a particular case demonstrate that the conviction or sentence resulted from a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United States that “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,”
The dissent believes that the appropriate relief for the unconstitutional potential for appellate-level judicial bias is the reinstatement of the rule-based right to seek reargument. Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 31-33; Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1292 (OISA) (citing
More importantly, it is the PCRA that is the General Assembly‘s chosen framework for collateral judicial review of convictions, and that statute is the sole means for seeking and achieving post-conviction relief.
This Court is not equipped to receive evidence, assess that evidence, or make credibility determinations. A claim of judicial bias may be supported, as it was in this instance, by requests for discovery, leave to amend the petition as the case develops, and requests for an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed facts. We can expect that claims of judicial bias would require precisely the kind of factual development best suited to the courts of common pleas. And, not coincidentally, the courts of common pleas are also statutorily vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate post-conviction claims.
This Court recognized as much when we remanded this case back to the PCRA court to consider the claims in the first instance. We are an appellate court. We require for our appellate review the development of a record as warranted and, where a hearing is appropriate, an assessment of the facts by the trial court hearing the evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 411 (Pa. 2015) (recognizing that our appellate review depends upon findings of fact, determinations of credibility, and legal
The proper forum to consider the allegations and evidence of judicial bias is the PCRA court. Once factual and evidentiary development occurs in that forum as needed, and the PCRA court makes its rulings, the appellate court can review those rulings on appeal in due course.
Moreover, the approach suggested by the dissent based upon a litigant‘s right to request nunc pro tunc reconsideration would insulate claims of constitutional error committed by an appellate court from the same relief afforded to remedy other claims of constitutional magnitude that occur on appeal, creating a bifurcated system of post-conviction review, where all post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, except for post-conviction claims premised upon alleged judicial bias. This suggested bifurcation is inconsistent with the legislature‘s intent to channel all post-conviction claims into the PCRA‘s framework as the sole means of obtaining collateral relief from criminal convictions. See Judge, 916 A.2d at 520 (recognizing that the legislature intended for the PCRA to encompass all post-conviction claims); Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 569-70 (rejecting the suggestion that the PCRA would support a bifurcated system of post-conviction review).
Nor is it apparent how a post-conviction petitioner would obtain reinstatement of the rule-based right to seek reargument. If the answer is that the petitioner should seek reinstatement from the PCRA court, then the same arguments that the dissent makes against the reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc could be made against the
Addressing the dissent‘s and the Commonwealth‘s belief that Koehler II is binding precedent and law of the case and, therefore, that the PCRA court lacks the authority to grant nunc pro tunc relief, see Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 25-29, we observe that the PCRA court‘s grant of a nunc pro tunc appeal would not overturn Koehler II. Generally, as with any other grant of relief, if the Commonwealth is dissatisfied with the reinstatement of appellate rights in any given case, it is entitled to appeal the order to the appellate courts, which have the appellate authority to reverse the award of relief if that award is not supported by the record or free from legal error. If the Commonwealth decided not to appeal an award of nunc pro tunc relief in favor of a post-conviction petitioner, then the petitioner would exercise the relief afforded by filing the nunc pro tunc appeal in the appellate court. The appellate court would then consider the appellate issues presented. The extent to which the appellate court decided to deviate from the court‘s prior decision in the case would be a matter for the court to decide. In this case, an award of a nunc pro tunc appeal by the PCRA court would not vacate or overturn our decision in Koehler II. The Commonwealth may choose to appeal the grant of relief. And, if it does not so choose, Koehler II would be vacated, overturned, or modified only if this Court, in Koehler‘s new appeal, decided to vacate, overturn, or modify Koehler II. It is not the PCRA court, but this Court, that has the final say on the continuing validity of Koehler II.
Moreover, as this author observed in Taylor, it is interesting to ponder the ramifications of the Commonwealth‘s approach “in a scenario where the appellate court that purportedly committed the constitutional violation is not this Court, but the Superior
By happenstance, the Superior Court‘s decision in the first petitioner‘s case was published, but the Superior Court‘s decision in the second petitioner‘s case was not. The Superior Court decision for the second petitioner would not, therefore, be precedential. Accordingly, the PCRA court would not be disturbing precedent by awarding the second petitioner a nunc pro tunc appeal, while the PCRA court would be disturbing precedent by awarding the same relief to the first petitioner. While clearly beyond the scope of this appeal, we would suggest that the availability of redress for constitutional errors should not rest on so frail a distinction.
We also reject the Commonwealth‘s argument that is premised upon the law of the case doctrine. See Tilghman, 673 A.2d at 903 (explaining that a majority opinion is binding on the parties before us under the doctrine of law of the case). Departure from the law of the case is warranted in circumstances “where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice if followed.” Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1282 (OISR) (quoting Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (Pa. 1995)). Whenever new evidence arises that indicates the potential bias of a sitting jurist, there could be a change in the law and facts that would warrant reconsideration of the prior opinion.
Attempting to erect yet another barrier to the review of Koehler‘s PCRA petition, the dissent challenges this Court‘s jurisdiction over the present appeal and raises various justiciability concerns. The dissent believes that the only appropriate disposition of this
Of course, the PCRA‘s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional, and a PCRA court cannot address the merits of an untimely petition. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Pa. 2003). But the PCRA court in this case has addressed neither jurisdiction nor the merits of the underlying claim. Rather, the issue the PCRA court believed was dispositive, and which was appealed to this Court, concerns the PCRA court‘s perceived authority to grant relief. Whether the PCRA court had the authority to grant the requested relief is separable from both merits and jurisdiction. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not run afoul of the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA; rather, it avoided applying the PCRA entirely out of its mistaken belief in the limits of its own authority.
This belief precluded the PCRA court from addressing the PCRA petition, or even affording the Commonwealth the opportunity to file an answer. Indeed, the PCRA court believed that it was entirely powerless to entertain the PCRA petition. See PCRA Ct. Order, 12/28/2017, at 1 (“no purpose would be served by any further proceedings“); ¶ 7 (“This court is powerless to conclude that Justice Eakin demonstrated bias“); ¶ 8 (explaining the PCRA court‘s belief that only this Court may “pass judgment” on officers of the judicial branch). As a matter of law, the PCRA court‘s own belief that its authority
If the PCRA court had been correct in its determination, it would have ended the case and obviated the need to address jurisdiction or the merits of the underlying claim. Having concluded that the PCRA court‘s legal determination was incorrect as a matter of law, this Court must say so. If this Court does not rectify the PCRA court‘s misperception, and reverse the order dismissing the petition, the case would be over. The only reason the PCRA court did not permit the case to develop, which may involve a jurisdictional challenge by the Commonwealth, was its mistaken belief about the limits of its own authority. This was not a decision premised upon the PCRA or cases interpreting it. Our reversal of the order dismissing the petition does nothing more than dispel the legal error under which the PCRA court felt it was constrained, and permit the PCRA petition to proceed in the normal course. This is consistent with our prior remand order directing the PCRA court to dispose of the case.
The PCRA court believed that it was precluded from allowing the case to proceed. It offered a legal analysis to support this disposition. This legal analysis is the basis of the present appeal, involving two parties advancing arguments for and against the PCRA court‘s authority. It is for this Court to resolve the present legal dispute that ended the case in the lower court.
The dissent would evoke prudential concerns sua sponte to deny review, although the parties themselves do not share its concerns. Here, the concerns raised by the dissent fall within the notion of case or controversy. “Several discrete doctrines—including standing, ripeness, and mootness—have evolved to give body to the general notions of case or controversy and justiciability.” Rendell v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Com‘n,, 983 A.2d 708, 717 (Pa. 2009); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (identifying standing, ripeness, mootness, and political question, as “doctrines that cluster about [the] Article III” case or controversy requirement (citation omitted)).
The bulk of the dissent‘s concerns fall under the doctrine of standing. See City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“The requirement of standing under Pennsylvania law is prudential in nature, and stems from the principle that judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract.“). Under Pennsylvania law, however, the matter of standing cannot
Turning to the dissent‘s assertion that this matter is not ripe for disposition because the PCRA court has not yet assessed jurisdiction and resolved the merits of the case, we have recognized that “ripeness [ ] overlaps substantially with standing.” Rendell, 983 A.2d at 718. In Rendell, we noted that it “would be peculiar indeed if we were to maintain that the components of the standing doctrine. . . (including advisory-opinion and hypothetical-verses-concrete aspects) are unavailable for sua sponte consideration by the courts, yet nonetheless may be considered sua sponte by simply restyling them as ripeness (or, more generally, case-or-controversy or justiciability) concerns.” Id.
The cases cited by the dissent concern claims of ripeness advanced by the parties, not raised sua sponte by the Court. See Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 937 A.2d 385, 391 (Pa. 2007) (resolving an argument that a constitutional challenge to an ordinance was not yet ripe); Palisades Park, LLC v. Com., 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005) (resolving preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer contending that the matter was not ripe for adjudication); Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Jubelirer, 614 A.2d 204, 212 (Pa. 1992) (declining to opine on the constitutionality of legislation when the parties contested whether the legal question was ripe for disposition); Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm‘n v. Allegheny County, 203 A.2d 544, 546 (Pa. 1964) (resolving the appellees’ argument that the matter was moot and declining to issue an advisory opinion); see also Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newtown Twp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (resolving the argument that an issue had become moot); Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass‘n, 901 A.2d 991, 1002 (Pa. 2006) (same); In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. 1978) (same).
Moreover, “[t]he basic rationale underlying the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 937 A.2d 385, 392 (Pa. 2007). The disagreement in the present case is far from abstract. It centers on the discrete legal ground that resulted in Koehler‘s petition being thrown out of court.
More specifically, it is difficult to envision a more focused legal inquiry than addressing the legal basis for the disposition of a PCRA petition that is appealed and contested by both parties. We are deciding the discrete legal issue presented to us by the parties on appeal and abiding by the existing limitations on sua sponte judicial review. We have before the Court a narrow legal issue that the lower court believed was dispositive of its ability to assess jurisdiction under the PCRA or resolve the merits of the
IV. Motions for Discovery, Amendment, and a Hearing
Next, we consider Koehler‘s argument that the PCRA court‘s mistaken understanding of its authority to grant relief in this case prevented the court from disposing of Koehler‘s motions for discovery, to amend the PCRA petition, and for an evidentiary hearing. We agree with the Commonwealth that the proper disposition of these outstanding motions is to be addressed in the first instance by the PCRA court. The case should proceed in the normal course, with the PCRA court permitting the Commonwealth to file an answer to the PCRA petition raising whatever arguments the Commonwealth chooses to advance. The parties can then litigate any issues involved with discovery13
V. Entitlement to Relief
Similarly, with respect to the PCRA court‘s belief that Koehler ultimately sought relief only from his sentence, rather than his conviction, this determination was tied to the PCRA court‘s erroneous belief that its authority to grant nunc pro tunc relief in this case was circumscribed. Having reversed the PCRA court‘s legal ruling in this regard, it remains to be seen whether Koehler is entitled to relief at all and, if so, whether that relief includes a nunc pro tunc appeal solely from the denial of the mitigation claim in his first PCRA appeal, or whether Koehler more broadly is entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal from the dismissal of that petition. This merits-based determination will have to await the potential for further development in due course.
VI. Conclusion
We recognize that Koehler challenges this Court‘s consideration of his PCRA appeal in Koehler II based upon his allegation of actual bias, the appearance of bias, or the unconstitutional risk that bias affected the adjudication. If Koehler is able to prove this claim on the merits, appropriate relief would include a new appeal free from bias that
Justice Donohue and Judges King, Kunselman and Nichols join this opinion.
Justice Dougherty files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Mundy joins.
Judge Nichols files a concurring statement.
Notes
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.