COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Tony L. BENNETT, Appellant.
No. 86 EM 2007
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Decided Aug. 23, 2007
930 A.2d 1264; Submitted Jan. 19, 2006.
for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum and Application for an Immediate Hearing are denied.
930 A.2d 1264
Terrance L. SLAUGHTER, Petitioner, v. PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, First Judicial District, Respondent.
No. 86 EM 2007.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Aug. 22, 2007.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, this 22nd day of August, 2007, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is granted and the Complaint in Mandamus is denied.
930 A.2d 1264
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Tony L. BENNETT, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Jan. 19, 2006.
Decided Aug. 23, 2007.
Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia District Attorney‘s Office, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Before CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN, FITZGERALD, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice CAPPY.
The issue before the Court is whether Appellant is entitled to reinstatement of his Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“)1
and this matter is remanded to the PCRA court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The relevant facts are as follows: Appellant and four accomplices, Kevin Wyatt, Paul Johnson, Michael Mayo, and Kecia Ray, robbed a jewelry store in 1990. During the robbery, a salesperson was shot to death. Appellant supplied the gun, but did not enter the store, remaining in the getaway car with Wyatt. Mayo and Ray pled guilty to murder. Appellant, Wyatt, and Johnson were jointly tried for murder and related crimes in 1993. Following a jury trial, Appellant, Wyatt, and Johnson were convicted of first-degree murder and the related crimes. On June 1, 1993, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison on the murder charge, and to an aggregate sentence of twenty to forty years in prison on the remaining charges. Appellant did not file a direct appeal to the Superior Court. Therefore, his judgment of sentence became final 30 days after June 1, 1993. See
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on April 5, 1995 under the prior version of the PCRA and the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent him.2 Appellant then filed an amended PCRA petition on April 9, 1997. Appellant listed multiple claims of error, including that trial counsel erred in failing to object to the trial court‘s instructions relating to accomplice liability. See Amended Petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, 4/9/1997, at 2. The amended petition also included a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal following his conviction. Id. On February 19, 1999, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant‘s PCRA petition for lack of merit. In the opinion that followed, the PCRA court explained that Appellant was not entitled to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, since Appellant “did not allege let alone prove that he requested counsel to file a direct appeal on his behalf.” PCRA court slip opinion, 10/6/1999, at 4.
PCRA counsel did not file an appeal on Appellant‘s behalf, but Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal in the Superior
Court. In his pro se statement of matters complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P.1925(b), Appellant raised the claim related to trial counsel‘s failure to challenge the trial court‘s instructions as to accomplice liability.3 See Statement of Questions Raised on Appeal, 3/19/1999.
On April 7, 1999, the PCRA court appointed prior trial counsel, whose stewardship was at issue on collateral review, to represent Appellant on his PCRA appeal. On August 14, 2000, the Superior Court dismissed Appellant‘s appeal without prejudice for counsel‘s failure to file a brief. The Superior Court did not retain jurisdiction and Appellant did not seek review in this Court.
On October 27, 2000, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, requesting
This Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Superior Court erred in quashing Appellant‘s appeal.
It is well settled that the PCRA provides the “sole means for obtaining cоllateral relief” on claims cognizable under the PCRA.
557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250 (1999) (offering that the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under PCRA). To this end, the PCRA envisions that persons convicted of a crime be permitted one review of their collateral claims.
Under
This preference for finality, however, is tempered by the insertion of three exceptions to the one-year time limitation at subsections (b)(1)(i)-(iii). These exceptions extend the one-year time limitation under limited circumstances, reflecting that the Legislature also recognized that situations might arise when the one-year time limitation must yield. The exceptions are triggered by an event that occurs outside the control of the petitioner, including when “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due dili-
gence.”
With this framework in mind, we now turn to Appellant‘s arguments. Appellant urges this court to consider his petition under the exception to the onе-year time limitation set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii). As we have not previously had the opportunity to consider the exception in circumstances like Appellant‘s, we will turn to the construction of
As a threshold matter, we must examine whether Appellant waived application of the exception by not raising it in his second or second amended PCRA petition. Instead, he raised it for the first time before this Court. Normally, the PCRA requires a petitioner to allege and prove an exception to the one-year time limitation in his petition.
PCRA court agreed that Appellant was entitled to relief and reinstated his appellate rights nunc pro tunc.
While Appellant‘s appeal was pending before the Superior Court, the extension theory was explicitly rejected by this Court in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003). Accordingly, the Superior Court dismissed Appellant‘s second petition for lack of jurisdiction under Robinson. Thus, the question is whether Appellant‘s failure to raise the exception at subsection (b)(1)(ii) at the time he filed this second petition precludes this Court from applying it to his case.
This Court has been faced with this type of question in the context of the PCRA on more than one occasion and we have allowed PCRA petitioners some leeway in the preservation of claims in their petitions when we determined that the circumstances demanded it. For example, we provided for liberal amendment of PCRA petitions following our decision in Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003), which announced the proper framework for alleging a “layered” ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After setting forth the framework for alleging “layered” claims, we recognized that “we [had] not been clear as to exactly what is required of a PCRA petitioner seeking to plead, present, and ultimately prove a layered claim of counsel ineffectiveness.” Id. at 1024. Accordingly, we held that a remand may be appropriate to give the petitioner another opportunity to properly plead his claim by conforming his petition to the McGill requirements consistent with Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. Id.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 572 Pa. 477, 817 A.2d 479 (2003), this Court entertained a preservation question substantially similar to the one raised herein.5 Counsel representing Hernandez
At the time, a NPT petition was the accepted filing in order to have appellate rights reinstated nunc pro tunc. This process was later deemed unavailable in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), wherein we clarified that the appropriate procedure was to file a PCRA petition seeking to have one‘s аppeal rights reinstated nunc pro tunc.
The Superior Court did not believe that Lantzy required dismissal of Hernandez‘s claim, since Hernandez had filed his NPT petition before this court‘s decision in Lantzy. Ultimately, however, the court affirmed the judgment of sentence on the basis that Hernandez‘s claims were without merit. Following the Superior Court‘s decision, we granted the Commonwealth‘s petition for allowance of appeal to determine whether it should have reached the merits of Hernandez‘s NPT petition in light of Lantzy.
Rather than rejecting Hernandez‘s claim under Lantzy, we explained that at the time of his petition Hernandez “reasonably relied” on the process utilized by the Superior Court. Hernandez, 817 A.2d at 483-84. Furthermore, we noted that Hernandez was “caught in a jurisdictional trap of [the Superior Court‘s] making.” Id. at 483. The Superior Court had set up a process for review of claims like Hernandez‘s and Hernandez had followed that procedure. Accordingly, we affirmed the Superior Court‘s decision with regard to its review of the NPT petition, but expressed no opinion on the underlying merits, since Hernandez had not filed a petition for allowance of appeal.
In this case, declining to entertain Appellant‘s petition for his failure to plead subsection (b)(1)(ii) at the time he filed his instant petition, would be inconsistent with the spirit of McGill and Hernandez.6 In this case, the Superior Court utilized a
process for review of claims like Appellant‘s, and Appellant followed that process. As occurred in Hernandez, while Appellant‘s petition was pending, intervening case law from this Court altered that process. Like the conclusion in Hernandez, we will not deny Appellant the opportunity to demonstrate that he is entitled to application of the (b)(1)(ii) exception as Appellant “reasonably relied” on the process set up by the Superior Court, which afforded petitioners nunc pro tunc relief under the “extension theory.” Accordingly, we conclude
The proper interpretation and scope of subsection (b)(1)(ii) is one of statutory construction. As such, we rely upon the Statutory Construction Act (“Act“) for guidance. See
The PCRA court properly followed a Williams-type process in Wharton when it issued a notice of intent to dismiss Wharton‘s petition, which was filed post-Robinson, on the basis that the petition was untimely and failed to assert an exception to the one-year time requirement. 886 A.2d at 1123. Consistent with Williams, Wharton was then given 20 days to amend his petition to include an exception to the one-year time requirement. Although ultimately, Wharton chose not to amend the petition and therefore, it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it is instructive that the PCRA court gave him the opportunity to amend his petition under Rule 905. In this case, because of the timing of this matter and the fact that the PCRA court automatically reinstated his appellate rights, Appellant has never been given the opportunity to amend his pleadings consistent with Williams.
The text of the relevant subsection provides that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to petitioner and could not have been ascertained by due diligence.”
By imprecisely referring to this subsection as the “after-discovered evidence” exception, we have ignored its plain language. Indeed, by employing the misnomer, we have erroneously engrafted Brady-like considerations into our
tained in the PCRA are not a “penal provision” to be strictly construed, as it is merely the codification of the writ of habeas corpus. And, habeas corpus is characterized as a civil remedy. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Gedney, 456 Pa. 570, 321 A.2d 641, 643 (1974) (rejecting appellant‘s argument that appellate jurisdiction in extradition-related cases should be exercise under the related “criminal proceedings” provision).
9. This refers to a claim brought under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which challenges the Commonwealth‘s failure to produce material evidence. Specifically, a Brady claim requires a petitioner to show, “(1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant; and (3) the suppression prejudiced the defen-
analysis of subsection (b)(1)(ii) on more than one occasion. For example, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 580 Pa. 594, 863 A.2d 423 (2004), appellant argued that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding impeachment evidence and that this claim was cognizable under subsection (b)(1)(ii). We concluded that appellant could not establish that his Brady claim had merit, since the information could have been uncovered before or during trial. We further stated, “as we conclude that appellant‘s underlying Brady claim is without merit, we necessarily also conclude that appellant has failed to show that his petition falls within any of the exceptions to the PCRA‘s time requirements.” Id. at 425-26; see also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (2001). This conclusion conflated the two concepts as subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not contain the same requirements as a Brady claim.
The “after discovered evidence” misnomer and our suggestion that there is some overlap between the doctrine and § 9545(b)(1)(ii) have created additional problems in the Superior Court. In one case, the Superior Court specifically held that a petitioner asserting the exception provided in
dant.” Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220, 244 (2006).
§ 9543(a)(2)(vi) to justify its holding that the petitioner had to show that the evidence was not cumulative nor being used solely to impeach credibility, and that the evidence would likely compel a different verdict. Id. at 511, citing Commonwealth v. D‘Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (2004).10
Any confusion created by the mislabeling of this subsection, however, should have been dispelled by our decision in Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584 Pa. 461, 884 A.2d 848 (2005). In Lambert, the appellant raised a number of Brady claims and alleged that the court had jurisdiction over his claims under subsection (b)(1)(ii). The Commonwealth urged us to follow a similar analysis to that set forth in Johnson arguing that appellant must establish a meritorious Brady claim in order to fall within an exception set forth in subsections (b)(1)(i)-(iii). In rejecting the Commonwealth‘s argument, we made clear that the exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim. Rather, “the exception merely requires that the ‘facts’ upon which such a claim is predicated must not have been known to appellant, nor could they have been ascertained by due diligence.” Lambert, 884 A.2d at 852. Therefore, our opinion in Lambert indicated that the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) is not so narrow as to limit itself to only claims involving “after-discovered evidence.” Rather, subsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish that: 1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown” and 2) “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection. See Lambert, supra.
In this case, by invoking the exception at subsection (b)(1)(ii), Appellant alleges that he did not know that his trial counsel was appointed to represent him in his PCRA appeal until much later in the process. Likewise, he contends that he never received a copy of the Superior Court‘s order dismissing his appeal. Rather, he alleges that he attempted to find out the status of his appeal from the PCRA and Superior Courts. Ultimately, he contends that he did not know of PCRA appellate counsel‘s failure to file an appellate brief until October 4, 2000, when he received a letter from the Superior Court explaining that his appeal was dismissed due to PCRA counsel‘s failure to file a brief. Therefore, Appellant has alleged that there were facts that were unknown to him. Additionally, Appellant has provided a description of the steps he took to ascertain the status of his case. These steps included writing to the PCRA court and the Superior Court. Accordingly, Appellant alleges that he exercised due diligence in ascertaining those facts.11 Appellant‘s allegations, if proven, fall within the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii).
We must acknowledge, however, that this is not our first time interpreting this subsection. In Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (2000), we held that an allegatiоn of PCRA counsel‘s ineffectiveness could not be invoked as a newly-discovered “fact” for purposes of this subsection. See also Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911, 916 (2000). We have steadfastly adhered to this principle. Commonwealth v. Crews, 581 Pa. 45, 863 A.2d 498 (2004); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 580 Pa. 594, 863 A.2d 423 (2004); Commonwealth v. Howard, 567 Pa. 481, 788 A.2d 351 (2002)
(2002). Accordingly, we must consider whether Appellant‘s claim is precluded by this line of reasoning.
In Gamboa-Taylor and subsequent cases, we addressed situations when PCRA counsel had allegedly ineffectively narrowed the class of claims raised by not including all of the viable claims in the first petition. In such instances, we concluded that by allowing the claim to go forward “the timeliness requirements crafted by the legislature would thus effectively be eviscerated by any petitioner who was willing to file serial PCRA petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.” Howard, 788 A.2d at 355 (citing Gamboa-Taylor supra). Thus, we firmly rejected any such attempts “to circumvent the one-year time limitation” via claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness. Id. This interpretation is consistent with the federal constitutional standard guiding claims of appellate counsel‘s ineffectiveness, which allow
Those cases, however, have no relevance when the claim emanates from the complete denial of counsel. Rather, in such instances, the United States Supreme Court mandates the presumption of prejudice because the process itself has been rendered “presumptively unreliable” under the Sixth Amendment. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481-82, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). The Court has extended the presumptively prejudicial reasoning to the failure to appoint counsel for purposes of direct appeal. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). Likewise, the Court has declared that counsel‘s failure to file a requested notice of appeal was presumptively prejudicial. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029.
Consistent with this jurisprudence, this Court has recognized a distinction between situations in which counsel has narrowed the ambit of appellate review by the claims he has raised or foregone versus those instances, as here, in which counsel has failed to file an appeal at all. Commonwealth v. Halley,
582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999). To this end, we have repeatedly indicated that the failure to file a requested direct appeal or a 1925(b) statement in support thereof is the functional equivalent of having no counsel at all. Halley; Lantzy. In such instances, the deprivation requires a finding of prejudice. Id. Accordingly, following our prior case law, we hold that the analysis set forth in Gamboa-Taylor and subsequent case law does not apply to situations when counsel abandons his client for purposes of appeal. Additionally, allowing such claims to go forward would not eviscerate the time requirements crafted by the Legislature. Rather, subsection (b)(1)(ii) is a limited extension of the one-year time requirement under circumstances when a petitioner has not had the review to which he was entitled due to a circumstance that was beyond his control.
Furthermore, we believe that the Statutory Construction Act requires such a result. In addition to requiring us to interpret the language plainly, the Act requires that we employ the presumption that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions, see
There is no federal constitutional mandate requiring collateral review. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). It is not part of the criminal process, and is, in fact, civil in nature. Id. Therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the procedural due process protections are less stringent than for purposes of either a criminal trial or direct appeal. Id. Nevertheless, due process requires that the post conviction process be fundamentally fair. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289, 809 A.2d 271, 283 (2002). Thus, petitioners must be given the opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).
As part of the PCRA process, indigent petitioners may apply for the assistance of counsel for purposes of their first PCRA petition. We have held this rule to be absolute inasmuch as we have concluded that a petitioner need not establish that his
In this case, Appellant alleges that his counsel abandoned him by failing to file an appellate brief. The record establishes that Appellant filed a pro se statement under Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) indicating a desire to appeal. It was then that counsel was appointed, but failed to file anything with the Superior Court. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has made sufficient allegations that counsel abandoned him for purposes of his first PCRA appeal by failing to file an appellate brief and that Appellant‘s relief under subsection (b)(1)(ii) is not controlled by the Gamboa-Taylor line of case law.
Thus, as discussed previously, Appellant has made sufficient allegations to invoke subsection (b)(1)(ii). Appellant alleges that he did not receive the review to which he was entitled through no fault of his own. On appeal, Appellant was assigned counsel who could not raise the ineffectiveness claims he wanted to pursue. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 689 A.2d 891 (Pa.1997) (holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own
ineffectiveness). Such an infirmity was compounded when counsel abandoned Appellant by failing to file an appellate brief in flagrant violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(F)(2). In such an instance, Appellant must be given the opportunity to seek the review to which he or she was entitled.12
Having concluded that Appellant‘s allegations bring his claim within the ambit of subsection (b)(1)(ii), he must still prove that it meets the requirements therein. Under subsection (b)(1)(ii), he must also prove that the facts were “unknown” to him and that he could not uncover them with the exercise of “due diligence.” Such questions require further fact-finding and the PCRA court, acting as fact finder, should determine whether Appellant met the “proof” requirement under
The dissent by Justice Eakin points out that Appellant cannot establish that the facts were “unknown” to him as a matter
In Chester, petitioner filed a PCRA petition nearly 10 years after his conviction and argued that he had “after discovered evidence” that his trial counsel was arrested for driving under the influence only days after entering his appearance on behalf of petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the arrest created a conflict of interest. In considering the petitioner‘s claim, we explained that just because the petitioner did not discover the evidence did not mean it was “unknown” to him for purposes of § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Instead, we held that information is not unknown to a PCRA petitioner when the information was a matter of public record. Id. at 523, 733 A.2d 1242.
The dissent concludes that Chester should control the instant case, since the Superior Court filed its order dismissing Appellant‘s appeal on August 14, 2000. An order dismissing an appeal is a matter of public record, and therefore, the dissent would hold that Appellant cannot meet § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Respectfully, we disagree since implicit in the decision in Chester was the recognition that the public record could be accessed by the defendant.
While the dissenting opinion is attractive in its simplicity, it does not give due consideration to the circumstances the instant case raises. The August 14th order was a matter of “public record” only in the broadest sense. Such orders are not sent directly to the prisoner. Rather, counsel is sent the notice on the assumption that counsel will inform his client of the court‘s action. In a case such as the instant one, it is illogical to believe that a counsel that abandons his or her client for a requested appeal will inform his client that his case has been dismissed because of his own failures. More importantly, in light of the fact that counsel abandoned Appellant, we know of no other way in which a prisoner could access the “public record.”13 Rather, we believe this situation is sufficiently distinct from the situation in Chester, since in this case, the matter of “public record” does not appear to have been within Appellant‘s access.14
Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for remand to the PCRA court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.1516
Justice BAER, Justice BALDWIN and Justice FITZGERALD join the opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion in which Justice CASTILLE joins.
Justice EAKIN files a dissenting opinion in which Justice CASTILLE joins.
Justice SAYLOR, Dissenting.
The majority repeatedly invokes the plain meaning of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of
Section 9543 of the PCRA, entitled “Eligibility for relief,” covers the range of claims that may give rise to relief under the statute. Section 9543, on its plain terms, is written to require, as the operative element of each cognizable claim, pleading and proof “[t]hat the conviction or sentence resulted from“: 1) a constitutional violation which so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place (or that yielded “prejudice“); 2) ineffective assistance of counsel yielding prejudice;
tions to the one-year time limitation in his PCRA petition or before this Court. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157. Rather, this case presents the first opportunity to examinе the contours of subsection (b)(1)(ii) under circumstances when PCRA counsel has abandoned his client.
3) an unlawfully induced plea of guilt where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent; 4) improper obstruction by government officials of the petitioner‘s right of appeal, in certain circumstances; 5) the unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome if it had been introduced; 6) the imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum; or 7) a proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
It is apparent that Appellant‘s allegation of ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel for failure to file a brief does not qualify as a “claim” that is cognizable under the express language of the PCRA, both because Appellant‘s conviction and sentence did not result from such ineffectiveness, and because the asserted prejudicе does not go directly to the truth-determining process, as the language of the PCRA contemplates. Correspondingly, as a matter of a pure plain-meaning reading of the statute, Appellant‘s assertion of ineffectiveness in the post-conviction appeal process also is not the subject of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)‘s exception to the one-year time bar, which clearly contemplates a “claim,” of a type such as would be cognizable under the claim provision of the PCRA.
I recognize that this type plain-meaning approach to Section 9543 was adopted by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Petroski, 695 A.2d 844 (Pa.Super.1997), and was overturned by our decisions in Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242 (1999), and Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999). The problem that we encountered in Chester and Lantzy stems from the fact that the Post Conviction Relief Act subsumes incompatible objectives. On the one hand, the Legislature expressly intended for all forms of post-conviction relief, including relief available under traditional habeas corpus doctrine, to be included within the PCRA‘S jurisdictional and procedural framework. See
PCRA, the statute narrows the categories of claims as to which relief is available, excluding, for example, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a direct appeal (or, more directly
My point here is that, in light of the incompatible objectives of the PCRA, the Court was required to move beyond a plain-meaning interpretation of the “claim” provision of the post-conviction relief statute. Since the subject of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to the one-year time bar concerns a “claim” under the PCRA, and the majority‘s construction of that provision subsumes a segment of the broader category of claims sanctioned in Chester and Lantzy, whatever kind of approach the majority‘s is, it is not a plain-meaning one.
This is also apparent from other aspects of the majority rationale. Despite revamping the conventional understanding of the legislative intent underlying Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) with the stated purpose of implementing the plain language, see Majority Opinion, at 392-95, 930 A.2d at 1270-71, the majority
opinion nonetheless largely approves the effect of the decisions that have held that the Legislature did not intend for derivative allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be considered in connection with the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to the PCRA‘s one-year time bar. See id. at 396-98, 930 A.2d at 1272-73 (citing Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780 (2000), which had categorically rejected attempts to “interweave concepts of ineffective assistance of counsel and after-discovered evidence as a means of establishing jurisdiction,” id. at 79-80, 753 A.2d at 785). The majority, however, does not develop why these decisions are any more deserving of respect under its “plain meaning” approach to the statute than those that it displaces.1 Further, in place of the conventional understanding of Section 9545(b)(i)(ii), the majority substitutes its own, new limiting principle by transporting to the time-bar context a tailored version of the substantive Sixth Amendment principle of structural error, fashioned loosely upon the doctrine as embodied in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See id. at 396-400, 930 A.2d at 1272-74. None of these turns finds any basis in the statutory language. Indeed, the majority opinion displaces this Court‘s previous understanding that “a plain reading of the PCRA‘s timeliness requirements
Moving beyond the subject of plain meaning, the majority opinion appears to rest primarily on its conclusion that application of the one-year time bar in Appellant‘s circumstance represents a due process violation. See Majority Opinion, at 396-400, 930 A.2d at 1272-74. Thus, the majority invokes the presumption that the General Assembly does not intend an unconstitutional result to support its new construction of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), namely, that the exception extends to structural error at the post-conviction stage, in the form of a complete or constructive denial of counsel. See id. at 397-98, 930 A.2d at 1273.
In the first instance, the majority‘s rationale in this regard does not account for previous decisions of this Court that have held that the one-year time bar applies generally to claims of structural error. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baroni, 573 Pa. 589, 593, 827 A.2d 419, 421 (2003). Indeed, previously the Court had squarely rejected invitations to transport aspects of structural error doctrine to the time-bar context. See id. (“The precept that structural errors can never be deemed harmless does not serve to create state court jurisdiction that is otherwise absent.“).
The majority‘s resolution appears to be directed toward ameliorating the discomforting aspect associated with a denial of additional judicial review in the present circumstances.3 It should be noted, however, that the Superior Court has previously attempted to implement various equitable exceptions to the one-year time bar in circumstances that would seem at least as compelling, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, 781 A.2d 152 (Pa.Super.2001), but those efforts have been consistently rebuffed by this Court, see, e.g., Robinson, 575 Pa. at 500, 837 A.2d at 1157. See generally Commonwealth v. Bennett, 842 A.2d 953, 958 (Pa.Super.2004) (“The Court in Robinson further sealed shut the door to circumventions, and in doing so, emphatically admonished this Court‘s ‘tinkering’ with the jurisdictional mandate of the PCRA.“). Further, the majority offers nothing to explain why structural error at the
post-conviction stage renders a petitioner more deserving of collateral judicial review than structural error that occurred at trial.4 In my view, therefore, the limiting principle that the majority imposes cannot fairly be contained along the
Candidly, any formulation of a time limitation curtailing collateral judicial review must accept that some legitimate claims may possibly escape review.6 Nevertheless, a time bar
applicable to post-conviction review is a rational, and perhaps necessary, legislative response to serial challenges raised by prisoners that undermine finality and tax government resources, and to effectively implement a limitation, exceptions by their nature must contain effective boundaries to prevent them from undermining the general rule. As reflected in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998), consistent with constitutional norms, the Legislature may impose reasonable limitations on state collateral review in criminal cases. See id. at 556, 722 A.2d at 642. Notably, the judicial process contains multiple and overlapping checks, including the trial, direct-appeal, and post-conviction procedures and the affordance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants at each stage.7 It remains my position that this scheme allows criminal defendants the reasonable opportunity to vindicate meritorious legal challenges, and the time bar represents and remаins a reasonable limitation on habeas corpus review, even in the absence of the availability of an endless series of potential as-applied challenges and/or the new construct that the majority fashions to address the present one. I joined Peterkin based on this belief, which I reaffirm today.8
Court, provide: “There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.” FJC Pattern Jury Instruction # 21 (1998).
638 A.2d 961 (1994). See Majority Opinion, at 1266 n. 3. It should be noted, however, that, in terms of their culpability, Appellant and Wyatt are not identically situated relative to the underlying robbery-homicide, since Wyatt did not supply the accomplice with the handgun used to perpetrate it, as Appellant did. See Majority Opinion, at 1266. Moreover, as the Commonwealth develops at length in its brief, the Huffman issue is a discrete typе of claim that goes solely to a conviction for first-degree murder. See Huffman, 536 Pa. at 198, 638 A.2d at 962. Given Appellant‘s conviction for the associated robbery and the jury‘s express finding that the killing was perpetrated in the course thereof, the crime of second-degree murder is a lesser included offense to his first-degree murder conviction. See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 484 Pa. 500, 503, 399 A.2d 404, 405 (1979). Since Appellant‘s challenge does not impact on this lesser included offense, I believe that the most that Appellant should be able to expect from his Huffman claim, if it were to prevail, is a modification of his sentence from first to second-degree murder. See generally James A. Shellenberger and James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 Marq. L.Rev. 1, 183-89 (1995) (collecting cases relative to the appellate courts’ power to modify judgments of sentence in cases in which trial error does not affect lesser included offenses). Notably, such a change would have no impact on the life sentence that Appellant is serving. See
In accordance with the above, I respectfully dissent, as I would uphold the traditional understanding of the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA‘s one-year time bar, since I believe that it is more closely in line with the Legislature‘s intent than the majority‘s present construction and
appropriately has been held to satisfy constitutional requirements.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.
Justice EAKIN, Dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 A.2d 520 (2006) controls this matter.
Under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
Because the time-bar is jurisdictional, and this PCRA petition is clearly time-barred, I respectfully dissent.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.