Columbus v. StateColumbus v. State
DECISION
Rendered on August 15, 2023
On brief: Zack Klein, City Attorney, Richard N. Coglianese, and Matthew D. Sturtz, for appellee. Argued: Richard N. Coglianese.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Heather L. Buchanan, and Andrew D. McCartney, for appellant. Argued: Benjamin M. Flowers.
On brief: Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, and Shannon Price, for Amicus Curiae of the City of Cincinnati.
EDELSTEIN, J.
{¶ 1} The Ohio General Assembly modified the framework of Ohio‘s firearms and self-defense laws when it enacted 2018 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228 (“H.B. 228“). In addition to modifying existing
{¶ 2} Before H.B. 228 went into effect, plaintiff-appellee, the City of Columbus (“City“), sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against the original and amended versions of
{¶ 3} The State now appeals from this judgment. Because we find the preliminary
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
{¶ 4} This case arises from the City‘s constitutionality challenge to the original and amended versions of
{¶ 5}
{¶ 6} In 2018, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 228, which amended 13 existing statutes—including
{¶ 7} On March 19, 2019, the City challenged both the original and amended versions of
{¶ 8} The State filed its written opposition to the City‘s motion for a preliminary injunction on April 19, 2019.2 It contended the City was not entitled to the preliminary injunction because the City could not satisfy its burden to prove that the four preliminary-injunction factors weighed in favor of the City‘s request for temporary relief. And, just as it argues now on appeal, the State relied on Ohio Supreme Court precedent to argue against the City‘s constitutionality challenge to the
{¶ 9} The trial court held a hearing on the City‘s motion for a preliminary injunction on May 13, 2019.
{¶ 10} On November 2, 2022—nearly three and one-half years after it held the hearing on the City‘s motion for preliminary injunction—the trial court issued a decision and entry granting a preliminary injunction “against
{¶ 11} The State timely appealed from the November 2, 2022 decision. At the State‘s request, the trial court stayed the preliminary injunction pending the resolution of this appeal. (See Nov. 10, 2022 Decision and Entry.)
{¶ 12} Before the record was filed, the City moved this court to dismiss this case because, it argued, the November 2, 2022 decision on a preliminary injunction is not a final appealable order under
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 13} The State asserts the following three assignments of error for our review:
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENJOINED BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND 2018 VERSIONS OF
R.C. 9.68 (THE “FIREARMS-UNIFORMITY LAW“) ON THE GROUND[S] THAT THE LAW VIOLATES MUNICIPAL HOME-RULE AUTHORITY UNDER THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CITY OF COLUMBUS (THE “CITY“) WAS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENJOINED H.B. 228 IN ITS ENTIRETY.
III. ANALYSIS
{¶ 14} Because the City concedes the trial court erred in enjoining H.B. 228 in its entirety and our resolution of the State‘s third assignment of error narrows the scope of our review, we address it first. We next address the State‘s second assignment of error, as our resolution of it controls our disposition of the State‘s first assignment of error.
A. Applicable Law
{¶ 15} ” ‘An injunction is an extraordinary remedy in equity where there is no adequate remedy available at law. It is not available as a right but may be granted by a court if it is necessary to prevent a future wrong that the law cannot.’ ” Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶ 15, quoting Garono v. State, 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 (1988). See also Mid-America Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd., 95 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-2427, ¶ 74. “Thus, in determining the propriety of injunctive relief, adequate remedy at law ‘means that the legal remedy must be as efficient as the indicated equitable remedy would be; that such legal remedy must be presently available in a single action; and that such remedy must be certain and complete.’ ” Mid-America Tire, Inc. at ¶ 81, quoting Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., Inc., 135 Ohio St. 509 (1939), paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶ 16} A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy.3 Thus, it is ancillary to a pending action. See
{¶ 17} In general, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a trial and decision on the merits. See, e.g., Intralot, Inc. v. Blair, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-444, 2018-Ohio-3873, ¶ 31, citing P&G v. Stoneham, 140 Ohio App.3d 260, 267 (1st Dist.2000); Rock House Fitness, Inc. v. Himes, 11th Dist. No. 2020-L-075, 2021-Ohio-245, ¶ 22; Neal v. Regina Manor, 6th Dist. No. L-07-1055, 2008-Ohio-257, ¶ 11. “The primary function of an injunction is to restrain motion and to enforce inaction[;]” thus, it “ordinarily is employed to prevent future injury.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State ex rel. Great Lakes College, Inc. v. State Med. Bd., 29 Ohio St.2d 198, 201 (1972), quoting State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 475
(1955). See also State ex rel. Kilgore v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. No. C-110007, 2012-Ohio-4406, ¶ 21 (“An injunction granted before litigation is ordinarily limited to preserving the status quo ante litem so that the pending trial is not a hollow proceeding. The status quo ante litem is the last, uncontested status that preceded the litigation.“).
{¶ 18} In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court must consider four factors:
- Whether there is a strong or a substantial likelihood the movant will prevail on the merits;
- Whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted;
- Whether third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted; and
- Whether the public interest will be served by the injunction.
See, e.g., Vanguard Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Edwards Transfer & Storage Co., 109 Ohio App.3d 786, 790 (10th Dist.1996), citing Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St.3d 41 (1986) and Goodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio St. 271 (1877). See also Escape Ents., Ltd. v. Gosh Ents., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-834, 2005-Ohio-2637, ¶ 22; Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Columbus v. Anderson, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-151, 2015-Ohio-5083, ¶ 11, quoting P&G at 267.
{¶ 19} “Irreparable harm” is an injury for which, after its occurrence, there could be no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and for which money damages would be impossible, difficult, or incomplete. See, e.g., Dimension Serv. Corp. v. First Colonial Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-368, 2014-Ohio-5108, ¶ 12; Franks v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-962, 2012-Ohio-1920, ¶ 36. A showing of irreparable harm requires proof of “actual irreparable harm or the existence of an actual threat of such injury.” Clark v. Mt. Carmel Health, 124 Ohio App.3d 308, 315 (10th Dist.1997). ” ‘Actual irreparable harm is usually not presumed, but instead must be proved[]’ ” by the movant. See, e.g., Hydrofarm, Inc. v. Orendorff, 180 Ohio App.3d 339, 2008-Ohio-6819, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), quoting Levine v. Beckman, 48 Ohio App.3d 24 (10th Dist.1988), paragraph four of the syllabus; Redding v. United States Parachute Assn., 11th Dist. No. 2022-G-0024, 2023-Ohio-884, ¶ 50.
{¶ 20} In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, Ohio courts have recognized that the four preliminary injunction factors must be weighed with the ” ‘flexibility which traditionally has characterized the law of equity.’ ” Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 1, 14 (8th Dist.1996), quoting Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir.1982). Accordingly, to establish a right to a requested preliminary injunction, the movant must demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of each of these four factors. See, e.g., Vanguard Transp. Sys., Inc. at 790, citing Mead Corp. v. Lane, 54 Ohio App.3d 59 (4th Dist.1988). See also Intralot, Inc. at ¶ 31; Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-421, 2020-Ohio-4664, ¶ 32, citing Hydrofarm, Inc. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 21} The standard of “[c]lear and convincing evidence” is defined as “that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 54, quoting State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. ” ‘Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’ ” State v. Golden, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1004, 2010-Ohio-4438, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Townsend, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-371, 2008-Ohio-6518, ¶ 7, citing Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 22} Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has advised courts to take “particular caution” in granting injunctions, particularly
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} “[T]he specificity provisions of [
{¶ 25} To satisfy the form and scope requirements of
{¶ 26} “An injunction is overly broad when there is a risk that it restrains legal conduct, or the injunction prohibits
B. Standard of Review
{¶ 27} We review legal determinations de novo, including the likelihood of success on the merits, but we review the trial court‘s ultimate determination as to whether the four preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting or denying a party‘s request for preliminary injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Toledo, 2018-Ohio-2358 at ¶ 15. See also State ex rel. Bowling v. DeWine, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-380, 2021-Ohio-2902, ¶ 30, citing Danis Clarkco Landfill Co., 73 Ohio St.3d at 591, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 28} “[A]buse of discretion connotes that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Weaver, 171 Ohio St.3d 429, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 60, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support the decision.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Fernando v. Fernando, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-788, 2017-Ohio-9323, ¶ 7, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). A decision is arbitrary if it is made “without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Hill, 171 Ohio St.3d 524, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). A decision may also be arbitrary if it lacks any adequate determining principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standards. See id., quoting Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359 (1981), quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed.1979). See also State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, ¶ 19. A decision is unconscionable if it “affronts the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Fernando at ¶ 7, citing Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP v. Frutta Del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion may also be found where a trial court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). See also New Asian Super Mkt. v. Jiahe Weng, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-207, 2018-Ohio-1248, ¶ 16.
{¶ 29} Thus, while the standard is deferential, we are to consider whether the trial court improperly applied the governing law, used an erroneous legal standard, relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, or lacked a sound reasoning process in its ruling. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Montgomery, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1059, 2012-Ohio-4304, ¶ 7; Trent v. Taylor, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-89, 2017-Ohio-7189, ¶ 34.
C. Legal Analysis
{¶ 30} The trial court‘s November 2, 2022 decision and entry granted a preliminary injunction “against
1. Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 31} In its third assignment of error, the State attributes error to the trial court‘s imposition of a preliminary injunction against H.B. 228 in its entirety. (Appellant‘s Brief
at 46-47.) Construing this assignment of error as relating to all statutes affected by H.B. 228‘s enactment except
{¶ 32} At oral argument before this court, the City conceded it did not intend to request a preliminary injunction against the two statutory provisions created by H.B. 228 or the 12 existing statutes other than
{¶ 33} We recognize the City‘s admittedly inartful drafting of pleadings filed in the trial court precipitated this error. The City nomenclated the amended version of
{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it issued, sua sponte, a preliminary injunction against H.B. 228 in its entirety. Accordingly, we sustain the State‘s third assignment of error.
2. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 35} In its second assignment of error, the State contends the trial court erred in finding the City was entitled to a preliminary injunction. It argues the City failed to establish the four preliminary injunction factors by clear and convincing evidence. (See Appellant‘s Brief at 15-46.) Given our resolution of the third assignment of error, we limit our analysis of this assignment of error to the preliminary injunction imposed
a. The preliminary injunction against R.C. 9.68 is impermissibly overbroad and violates Civ.R. 65(D) ‘s specificity requirements.
{¶ 36} We first find the trial court failed to follow the form and specificity requirements of
{¶ 37} The trial court‘s consideration of the first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—mostly concerned the 2018 amendment‘s addition of “manufacture” to
{¶ 38} The trial court also analyzed the merits of the City‘s constitutionality challenge to the original and amended versions of
{¶ 39} The trial court‘s analysis of
{¶ 40} Significantly, too, we note the trial court did not address in its decision the City‘s likelihood of success on the merits of its challenge with respect to
{¶ 41} For the second factor—irreparable harm to the City without the injunction—the trial court found the City would “suffer irreparable harm because of the ambiguity in the statute [amended
{¶ 42} Although the trial court only found it was likely some provisions of amended
{¶ 43} Regarding original
{¶ 44} When it analyzed amended
{¶ 45} In the absence of such analysis, we must conclude, for the limited purposes of this case, that the preliminary injunction against amended
b. The City was not entitled to a preliminary injunction against amended R.C. 9.68 because the second, third, and fourth preliminary injunction factors are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the current record.
{¶ 46} Despite its overbreadth, indefiniteness, and failure to comply with
{¶ 47} We acknowledge the parties’ principal arguments on appeal primarily concern whether amended
{¶ 48} In addition to failing to satisfy
{¶ 49} Turning to the second preliminary injunction factor, we do not find the evidence in the record before us clearly and convincingly established the City would suffer imminent and irreparable injury in 2022 if the trial court did not temporarily enjoin the State from enforcing a statute that had, at that point, been in effect for almost four years. In analyzing the irreparable harm factor, the trial
{¶ 50} It is true that “[w]hen constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.” Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir.2012). See also Ohio Democratic Party, 2020-Ohio-4664 at ¶ 60-64. But, that presumption of irreparability does not change the fact that the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must still demonstrate imminence in order to warrant this extraordinary relief. See, e.g., Sommer v. Mt. Carmel Health, 10th Dist. No. 94APE07-1087, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1300, *5-6 (Mar. 28, 1995), citing Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Dayton Human Relations Council, 81 Ohio App.3d 436 (2d Dist.1992); Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 2022-Ohio-1802 at ¶ 27; Rock House Fitness, Inc., 2021-Ohio-245 at ¶ 34. See also Kohler v. Cincinnati, 6th Cir. No. 21-3466, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32574, *5-6 (Nov. 1, 2021).
{¶ 51} We emphasize that a preliminary injunction is an ” ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” never awarded as of right, and only granted ” ‘if it is necessary to prevent a future wrong that the law cannot.’ ” Toledo, 2018-Ohio-2358 at ¶ 15, quoting Garono, 37 Ohio St.3d at 173. See also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Mitchell v. Cincinnati, 6th Cir. No. 21-4061, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 27444, *6-12 (Sept. 29, 2022). It follows, then, that a lack of imminence does not justify such an “extraordinary remedy” when adequate relief can otherwise be granted—e.g., permanent injunction or declaratory relief, as also sought by the City here—at the close of litigation and following a trial on the merits.
{¶ 52} For these reasons, a movant‘s failure to show it is facing imminent and irreparable harm can, by itself, justify the denial of injunctive relief without consideration of the other three factors. See, e.g., Total Quality Logistics, LLC at ¶ 27; Winter at 22-24; A.R.D. v. St. Paul Catholic School, N.D.Ohio No. 5:13 CV 0307, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61588, *3-4 (Apr. 30, 2013); Mitchell at *6-12. This is because “[t]he gravamen of the remedy * * * is that a defendant is about to commit an act which will produce immediate and irreparable harm for which no adequate legal remedy exists.” Hack v. Sand Beach Conservancy Dist., 176 Ohio App.3d 309, 2008-Ohio-1858, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.). As such, “even the strongest showing on the other three factors cannot ‘eliminate the irreparable harm requirement[]’ ” that gives rise to preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cty. Schools, 942 F.3d 324, 326-27 (6th Cir.2019), quoting Friendship Materials, Inc., 679 F.2d at 105. See also Union Home Mtge. Corp., 31 F.4th at 366; Bowling, 2021-Ohio-2902 at ¶ 56-60. “Thus, although the extent of an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is mandatory[]” for a preliminary injunction‘s issuance. (Emphasis sic.) D.T. at 327.
{¶ 53} In this case, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction order years after the City requested it. While this delay, alone, certainly undercuts the notion of imminent, irreparable harm, its more pertinent
{¶ 54} The changed circumstances since the 2019 hearing bore on the issue of whether there remained, in 2022, a risk of irreparable harm to the City if the injunction against a then-in effect statute was not imposed, the harm to third parties if it was imposed, and whether the public interest would be served by the injunction. (See, e.g., May 13, 2019 Tr. at 35-37.) Thus, it is probable much of the evidence offered by the parties in 2019—before H.B. 228‘s amendment to
{¶ 55} In its preliminary injunction order, the trial court bypassed this critical question—namely, whether the arguments and evidence presented by the City at the May 2019 hearing supported the issuance of a preliminary injunction against amended
{¶ 56} In light of the changed circumstances after the preliminary injunction hearing was held and significant delay in the trial court‘s issuance of the preliminary injunction, we find the record before us cannot provide clear and convincing proof that the City would face imminent, irreparable harm in 2022 (when the trial court issued its decision) without the preliminary injunction against amended
{¶ 57} In analyzing the third factor—whether third parties would be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction against amended
{¶ 58} Furthermore, we find the City failed to satisfy its burden of proof as to the third factor, as no evidence in the current record supports finding that third parties, including the State, would not be unjustifiably harmed in 2022 by an injunction against the enforcement of a statute currently in effect. (Compare with May 13, 2019 Tr. at 34-37.) Although the City sought in 2019 a remedy that would have maintained the status quo at that time, the trial court instead rendered an order in 2022 that prohibited the State from enforcing a controlling Ohio statute due to constitutional deficiencies yet to be proven. This order went beyond the scope and purpose of preliminary injunctive relief—“to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). See also Dimension Serv. Corp., 2014-Ohio-5108 at ¶ 18; Neal, 2008-Ohio-257 at ¶ 11. When a preliminary injunction “goes beyond a restoration of the status quo and imposes new obligations[,]” that purpose is not served. (Emphasis sic.) Blaylock v. Cheker Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1976). See also Carter v. United States, S.D.Ohio No. 1:17-cv-248, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205303, *6-7 (Dec. 13, 2017), citing Southern Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir.1991).
{¶ 59} As to the fourth factor—whether the public interest will be served by the injunction—the trial court did not analyze it. Rather, it merely recited that factor before summarily concluding that the public interest “would be better served by granting the injunction” because “there is nothing in this record that would establish that an injunction would cause harm to the interest of the public.” (Decision and Entry at 11.) Again, the trial court mischaracterized the burden of proof associated with that factor. And even assuming evidence presented by the City in 2019 clearly and convincingly proved the public interest would be served by enjoining the State from enforcing amended
{¶ 60} Accordingly, we find the trial court‘s November 2, 2022 judgment entry granting a preliminary injunction against amended
{¶ 61} Given our disposition of the State‘s second assignment of error, the State‘s first assignment of error is thus rendered moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 62} Having sustained the State‘s second and third assignments of error, and rendered the State‘s first assignment of error moot, we reverse the November 2, 2022 judgment of the trial court, vacate the preliminary injunction, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed;
preliminary injunction vacated;
case remanded.
LUPER SCHUSTER and MENTEL, JJ., concur.