City of Columbus, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of Ohio, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22AP-676
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
January 24, 2023
2023-Ohio-195
KLATT, J.
(C.P.C. No. 19CV-2281) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on January 24, 2023
Zack Klein, City Attorney, Richard N. Coglianese, Lara N. Baker-Morris, and Matthew D. Sturtz, for appellee.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Heather L. Buchanan, Andrew D. McCartney, and Allison D. Daniel, for appellant.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
KLATT, J.
{1} The instant matter arose out of a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleаs by plaintiff-appellee, City of Columbus (the “City“), against defendant-appellant, State of Ohio, on March 19, 2019. In the complaint, the City sought a declaration pursuant to
I. Home Rule and R.C. 9.68
{2} Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, a portion of Ohio‘s Home Rule Amendment adopted following the Constitutional Convention of 1912, provides: “[M]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” See generally Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 371 (1958) (“The power of local self-government granted to municipalities by Article XVIII relates solely to the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality, and, in the absence of statute сonferring a broader power, municipal legislation must be confined to that area.“); Maumee v. PUC, 101 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-7, ¶ 8, fn. 3. “The Home Rule Amendment provides independent authority to Ohio‘s municipalities with regard to local police regulations.” Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 168, 2017-Ohio-6909, ¶ 13, citing W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 115 (1965). However, a state statute takes precedence over a municipal ordinance where “(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rаther than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, ¶ 17. See Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, paragraph one of the syllabus (defining a general law for purposes of home rule analysis).
{3} The General Assembly enacted
{4} As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “the General Assembly, by enacting
{5} In 2018, the General Assembly passed HB 228, which in part amended
Except as specifically provided by the United States Constitution, Ohio Constitution, state law, or federal law, a person, without further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process, including by any ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, practice, or other action or any threat of citation, prosecution, or other legal process, may own, possess, purchase, acquire, transport, store, carry, sell, transfer, manufacture, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its components, and its ammunition. Any such further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process interferes with the fundamental individual right described in this division and
unduly inhibits lаw-abiding people from protecting themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers and from other legitimate uses of constitutionally protected firearms, including hunting and sporting activities, and the state by this section preempts, supersedes, and declares null and void any such further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process.
(Emphasis added.) 2019
A person, group, or entity adversely affected by any manner of ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, practice, or other action enacted or enforced by a political subdivision in conflict with division (A) of this section may bring a civil action against the political subdivision seeking dаmages from the political subdivision, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or a combination of those remedies. Any damages awarded shall be awarded against, and paid by, the political subdivision. In addition to any actual damages awarded against the political subdivision and other relief provided with respect to such an action, the court shall award reasonable expеnses to any person, group, or entity that brings the action, to be paid by the political subdivision, if either of the following applies:
(1) The person, group, or entity prevails in a challenge to the ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, practice, or action as being in conflict with division (A) of this section.
(2) The ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, practice, or action or the mаnner of its enforcement is repealed or rescinded after the civil action was filed but prior to a final court determination of the action.
2019
II. Final Appealable Order
{6} Ohio courts of appeals possess jurisdiction to review only final appealable orders of lower courts within their districts. Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio Constitution. If an order is not a final, appealable order, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction and must, therefore, dismiss the appeal. Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, ¶ 7. A trial court‘s designation of an order as final and appealable is not dispositive of the issue. G. Scottco Invest. Co. v. Korleski, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-582, 2011-Ohio-6656, ¶ 9. An order
{7}
In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
If
{8} The parties agree that the issue in the present matter is whether the trial court‘s order granting a preliminary injunction meets the requirements of
[G]rants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines thе action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
Thus, in order for
{9} A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy.
{10} Appellees concede
{11} Next, in order to meet the requirement in
{12} First, the state argues it would be denied meaningful relief absent an immediate appeal because the City moved only fоr a preliminary, but not a permanent injunction. Where the ultimate relief sought is a permanent injunction, courts have held that an appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings will ordinarily provide a meaningful and effective remedy. See Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-In-Bay, 6th Dist. No. OT-20-021, 2021-Ohio-191, ¶ 12 (stating that “[i]t is well established that the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunction, in a suit in which the ultimate relief sought is a permanent injunction, is generally not a final appealable order“) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 1st Dist. No. C-220504, 2022-Ohio-4540, ¶ 18; Clean Energy Future, LLC v. Clean Energy Future-Lordstown, LLC, 11th Dist. No. 2017-T-0110, 2017-Ohio-9350, ¶ 7; Jacob v. Youngstown Ohio Hosp. Co., 7th Dist. No. 11 MA 193, 2012-Ohio-1302, ¶ 24; Obringer v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 3d Dist. No. 3-09-08, 2010-Ohio-601, ¶ 18. Although the City did not move for both a preliminary and permanent injunction at the same time, it did specify in its complaint that it was seeking both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in addition to a declaration that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional. Because the provisional remedy at issue in this matter is a preliminary injunction and the City ultimately seeks a permanent injunction, there is some support for finding that the second prong of
{13} Next, the parties disagree as to whether the preliminary injunction in this case preserves or alters the status quo. Courts have generally held that an order granting a preliminary injunction is generally not a final appеalable order where the preliminary injunction acts to maintain the status quo pending a final determination on the merits. See E. Cleveland Firefighters, IAFF Local 500 v. E. Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 88273, 2007-Ohio-1447, ¶ 5; Aquasea Group, LLC v. Singletary, 11th Dist. No. 2013-T-0120, 2014-Ohio-1780, ¶ 10, citing Hootman v. Zock, 11th Dist. No. 2007-A-0063, 2007-Ohio-5619, ¶ 16. Ohio courts have defined “status quo” in the context of a preliminary injunction as “‘the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.‘”
{14} The trial court found that the City had demonstrated a likelihood of success on thе merits that ”
{15} As previously discussed,
{16} While analysis of the status quo can provide a meaningful guidepost in understanding whether a provisional remedy meets the requirement of
{17} Herе, in addition to its findings regarding the amendments to
{18} Although the state can claim some harm whenever a trial court enjoins a statute, this case presents a different and unique set of circumstances. The trial court‘s order does not mеrely disrupt the status quo in an abstract sense, but it displaces a longstanding statute, which had the stated purpose of promoting clarity and uniformity of regulation of firearms throughout the state, and replaces it with uncertainty and a patchwork of laws. See Ohioans for Concealed Carry, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, at ¶ 20. Thus, there is an immediate impact and harm, both to the state‘s interest and also to individuals in jeopardy of criminal prosecution undеr the newly enacted city code provisions. The state is further harmed by the enjoining of the original version of
{19} Because both prongs of
Motion to dismiss denied.
BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.