THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT.
No. 2009-2280
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 29, 2010
128 Ohio St.3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318
Submitted October 12, 2010
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether
I. Procedural History
{¶ 2} In 2006, the General Assembly enacted
{¶ 3} Before the General Assembly enacted
{¶ 4} In March 2007, the city filed a complaint against the state of Ohio, defendant-appellant, seeking a declaration that
{¶ 5} The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for entry of summary judgment in favor of the city. In so ruling, the court of appeals held that
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 6} We begin by recognizing the fundamental principle that a court must “presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.” Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, citing Univ. Hts. v. O‘Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 22 O.O.3d 372, 429 N.E.2d 148, and Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 405 N.E.2d 1047. Therefore, we begin by presuming that
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} We first turn to the words of the statute in question.
{¶ 9} “(A) The individual right to keep and bear arms, being a fundamental individual right that predates the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitu
{¶ 10} Traditionally, we have used a three-part test to evaluate conflicts under the Home Rule Amendment. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when “(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.
{¶ 11} The first and third parts of the analysis are not involved in this case. The city acknowledges that its firearm ordinances are an exercise of municipal police power. Further, the city does not argue that its local firearm ordinances do not conflict with
A. Is R.C. 9.68 a General Law for Purposes of Home Rule Analysis?
{¶ 12} “A general law has been described as one which promotes statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 602 N.E.2d 1147. “Once a matter has become of such general interest that it is necessary to make it subject to statewide control as to require uniform statewide regulation, the municipality can no longer legislate in the field so as to conflict with the state.” State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron (1962), 173 Ohio St. 189, 194, 19 O.O.2d 3, 181 N.E.2d 26.
{¶ 13} In Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, this court held that to constitute a general law for purposes of home rule analysis, a statute must “(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton at syllabus.
{¶ 14} Applying the Canton test, the court of appeals concluded that
{¶ 15} Under the first prong of the Canton test, we must examine whether
{¶ 16} In Clyde, this court held that “[t]he General Assembly reiterated the need for uniformity in
{¶ 17} Therefore, today we reaffirm what we held in Clyde—that
{¶ 18} In addition, there are statutes that prohibit certain persons from possessing firearms. See, e.g.,
{¶ 19} Other state statutes establish a framework of laws regarding carrying concealed handguns. See, e.g.,
{¶ 20} Finally, our state firearm laws also integrate federal firearm laws. See, e.g.,
{¶ 21} A comprehensive enactment need not regulate every aspect of disputed conduct, nor must it regulate that conduct in a particularly invasive fashion. See Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 20 (“There is no requirement that a statute must be devoid of exceptions to remain statewide and comprehensive in effect“). “‘[C]omprehensive’ does not mean ‘perfect.‘” Dayton v. State, 157 Ohio App.3d 736, 2004-Ohio-3141, 813 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 89. Nor does “comprehensive” mean “exhaustive.” And the fact that regulations of firearms appear in various code chapters does not nullify the fact that they are all part of a comprehensive enactment concerning firearms. This court, in Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, held that the General Assembly had enacted comprehensive consumer mortgage lending regulations even though the applicable provisions—
{¶ 23} “Considered in isolation, * * * a provision may fail to qualify as a general law because it prohibits a municipality from exercising a local police power while not providing for uniform statewide regulation of the same subject matter.” N. Olmsted, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 245, 602 N.E.2d 1147. Rather than considering
{¶ 24} We note that when we determined in Clyde that
{¶ 25} We reaffirm the holding that
2. Uniform Operation Throughout the State
{¶ 26} As noted by the court of appeals, it is undisputed that
{¶ 27} Under the third prong of the Canton test, a general law must set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations rather than simply granting or limiting municipal legislative power. The court of appeals held that
{¶ 28} However, the fact that some states have more regulations than Ohio does not warrant a conclusion that Ohio‘s statutory scheme for regulating firearms is not comprehensive, nor does it mean that
4. Prescribes a Rule of Conduct Upon Citizens Generally
{¶ 29} The court of appeals held that
B. Separation of Powers Analysis
{¶ 30} In addition to regulating possession and ownership of firearms,
{¶ 31} The court of appeals held that the General Assembly‘s decision to include a provision that awards attorney fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs in
{¶ 32} The General Assembly has enacted many statutes that provide for the award of attorney fees and costs to parties who prevail in certain types of cases, as a means to deter certain conduct. See, e.g.,
{¶ 33} Moreover, in Sorin v. Warrensville Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 177, 75 O.O.2d 224, 347 N.E.2d 527, this court considered whether a statute authorizing a court to grant “the relief prayed for in the petition as may be proper in accordance with the evidence” impliedly permitted the trial court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, to permit the recovery of attorney fees in situations where the public policy of the state would otherwise be subverted. This court held that it did not: “The General Assembly has expressly provided for the recovery of attorney fees, as part of the costs of litigation, with respect to certain statutory actions. See, e.g.,
{¶ 34} Thus, the General Assembly is clearly within its legislative authority to authorize the award of attorney fees and costs in
III. Conclusion
{¶ 35}
O‘CONNOR, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 36} The Home Rule Amendment,
{¶ 37} In Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 31, the court stated: “A statement by the General Assembly of its intent to preempt a field of legislation is a statement of legislative intent * * * but does not trump the constitutional authority of municipalities to enact legislation pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment * * *.” From this, I conclude that the General Assembly is incapable of casting a preemption blanket over an entire field.
{¶ 38} The key issue when analyzing whether a local ordinance is a proper subject of home rule is whether the ordinance conflicts with general laws. Id. In Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 169, 60 O.O.2d 117, 285 N.E.2d 714, we stated that “in order for * * * a conflict to arise, the state statute must positively permit what the ordinance prohibits, or vice versa, regardless of the extent of state regulation concerning the same object.” We have also stated that “[n]o real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.” Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 N.E. 519. When applying legal tests, such as the test set forth in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 9, it is possible to overlook the commonsense principles that undergird the test. It is not enough to determine that
{¶ 39} Paragraph three of the syllabus in Sokol is even more specific; it states: “A police ordinance is not in conflict with a general law upon the same subject merely because certain specific acts are declared unlawful by the ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the general law * * *.” I believe that
BROWN, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, and Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Law Director, for appellee.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
McNamee & McNamee, P.L.L., Cynthia P. McNamee, and Michael P. McNamee, urging affirmance for amicus curiae city of Englewood.
Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P., William F. Abrams, Karen Lu, and Christopher Chang; and David Cannon, urging affirmance for amici curiae Legal Community Against Violence, Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, States United to Prevent Gun Violence, Violence Policy Center, Ohio State University Youth Violence Prevention Advisory Board, National Council of Jewish Women Cleveland Section, Ohio State Public Affairs of the National Council of Jewish Women, Toledo Area Ministries, Toledo Police Patrolman‘s Association, city of Akron, city of Cincinnati, city of Columbus, city of East Cleveland, city of Parma, city of Shaker Heights, and village of New Albany.
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League.
Lydy & Moan, Ltd., Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc.
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, L.L.P., and James B. Vogts; and Lawrence G. Keane, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.