CLARK Et Al. v. LEIGH Et Al. (And Vice Versa)CLARK Et Al. v. LEIGH Et Al. (And Vice Versa)
On Appeal from the State Court of Bibb County No. 20SCCV091967
PETERSON, Chief Justice.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the noneconomic damages cap on wrongful death damages set forth in
I. Facts and Procedure
In May 2019, April S. Clark had surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the surgery, while under the care of Dr. Thomas Leigh, Dr. William Shirley, Dr. John Williams, and Dr. Thomas Woodyard, Clark experienced complications and ultimately died on June 27, 2019. Clark‘s husband, Charles Clark, and Clark‘s daughter, April D. Clark (collectively “the Clarks“), brought claims for the wrongful death of Clark: Charles as the statutory wrongful death plaintiff, and April D. as administrator of Clark‘s estate, for conscious pain and suffering and medical bills. The Clarks initially sued multiple parties, and several of them settled before trial. The defendants who went to trial (and who now appeal) — Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP (“the doctors“) — participated in Clark‘s post-operative care.
At a jury trial in July 2024, the jury returned a verdict in the Clarks’ favor. The jury awarded $29,250,000 for the full value of Clark‘s life, $2,500,000 for Clark‘s pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses. The doctors brought a motion for new trial, which was later amended, and a motion to remit and amend the judgment. The trial court denied the doctors’ motion
Case No. S26A0349
II. The Clarks’ Appeal
The Clarks appeal the trial court‘s order granting the doctors’ motion to remit and amend the judgment. The Clarks argue that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that the doctors had not waived the right to assert the noneconomic damages cap in
We begin with a brief historical summary of Georgia‘s constitutional right to trial by jury as well as the recent history of its application to relevant statutes.
1. Right to Trial by Jury
Georgia‘s guarantee of the right to trial by jury first appeared in our state constitution in 1777. See
2. Application to Relevant Statutes
In 2005, the General Assembly enacted
In 2010, this Court in Nestlehutt held that the cap statute‘s noneconomic damages cap as applied to pain and suffering and loss of consortium damages in medical malpractice actions violated Paragraph XI(a). Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 731, 738. See also Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc. v. Turner, 322 Ga. 129, 131–32 (2025). In so holding, the Court in Nestlehutt explained that Paragraph XI(a) “guarantees the right to a jury trial only with respect to cases as to which there existed a right to jury trial at common law
Nestlehutt‘s holding and its framework for analyzing right to trial by jury claims were confirmed in two recent cases — Taylor v. Devereux Foundation, Inc., 316 Ga. 44 (2023), and Turner, 322 Ga. 129.
Taylor upheld the statutory cap on punitive damages found in
In Turner, a jury awarded the plaintiff $7,200,000 in noneconomic damages for wrongful death. 322 Ga. at 129. The defendants there brought a motion in the trial court to reduce the noneconomic damages award to the maximum amount allowable under subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the cap statute. Id. at 129–30. The trial court denied the motion, stating that this Court had already “found [the caps] to be unconstitutional” in Nestlehutt. Id. at 130. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See id. (citing Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc. v. Turner, 372 Ga. App. 644, 652–55 (2024)). We granted certiorari, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for the trial court to apply “the analytical framework set out by our precedent to the wrongful death claim and the ‘full value of the life’ damages awarded in this case.” Id. at 131. Turner described the Nestlehutt framework as follows:
[W]e consider[] whether the type of underlying claim of liability at issue (i.e., a medical malpractice claim) existed in Georgia in 1798, whether the right to trial by jury attached for that type of claim in Georgia in 1798, and whether the damages awarded by the jury (i.e., noneconomic damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium) were damages determined by juries for that type of claim in Georgia in 1798.
Id. at 131–32. The Court also stated that “[i]n evaluating the type of underlying claim of liability at issue under Nestlehutt‘s framework, we do not require a perfect match in nomenclature
B. The Parties’ Arguments
The Clarks argue that the doctors waived their right to assert the cap statute‘s damages cap by failing to raise it in the Pretrial Order. And relying on principles of severability and statutory construction, the plaintiffs3 argue that in the light of Nestlehutt, the cap statute‘s damages cap may not be applied to
C. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the doctors to raise the application of the cap statute for the first time in their post-trial motions. We reject the defendants’ invitation to reconsider NestlehuttNestlehutt, the Clarks’ appeal is resolved under ordinary principles of statutory construction, because the cap statute is not capable of being applied in a case like this one, where a jury‘s verdict includes noneconomic damages for a cause of action to which the right to trial by jury applies. Because we resolve this case under the plain text of the cap statute in the light of Nestlehutt, we need not and do not decide most of the constitutional questions raised by the parties.
The Clarks argue that the trial court erred in determining that the doctors did not waive the right to assert the cap by failing to raise it in the Pretrial Order. We review the trial court‘s ruling for abuse of discretion. See Ga. Dep‘t. of Human Res. v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 319–20 (1997). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The Civil Practice Act provides that the pretrial order, “when entered, controls the subsequent course of the action unless modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice.”
Here, multiple consolidated pretrial orders were submitted and entered by the trial court prior to trial. In each pretrial order, including the operative Pretrial Order, the doctors argued that the Clarks are not entitled to any award of damages against the doctors but stated that “should the jury find in favor of plaintiffs, the applicable damages would be those damages appropriate pursuant to
In its order granting the doctors’ motion to remit and amend the judgment, the trial court rejected the Clarks’ argument that the doctors waived the cap by not raising it in the pretrial order. The trial court determined that the doctors “properly asserted the caps’ application after a verdict and judgment were entered, establishing a ‘total amount recoverable’ in excess of the cap.” The trial court explained that the cap statute‘s “caps do not present an issue for the jury to decide; they define the limits of the recovery a plaintiff may actually obtain following the jury‘s decision.” And, the trial court reasoned, because the damages caps “‘are automatically triggered when a damages award exceeds the threshold amount[,]’ Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 737[,] ... their enforcement only arises once there is a ‘total amount recoverable by a claimant’ which exceeds the cap, and they apply as a matter of law in that situation.”
The Clarks argue that the trial court contravened this Court‘s decision in Phillips. See Phillips, 268 Ga. at 316. But Phillips is different from this case. There, the parties expressly agreed in the pretrial order that the $1,000,000-per-person damages cap in the Georgia Tort Claims Act would apply, but the trial court entered judgment in excess of the agreed-upon caps. See Phillips, 268 Ga. at 317–18. We held that “the trial court abused its discretion by implicitly modifying the pretrial order” to
Here, in contrast, there were neither affirmative representations nor an express agreement by the parties that a damages cap would or would not apply — there was merely silence. And the Clarks have cited no case from this Court where the right to assert a statutory damages cap following a cap exceeding jury verdict was waived for failure to raise that issue in the pretrial order or during trial. Although certain defenses can be waived (e.g., improper service or statute of limitations) if not timely raised,4 the cap statute is not an affirmative defense. Instead, the cap statute sets a statutory limit as to the amount of damages for certain claims. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the doctors to raise the application of the cap statute for the first time in their post-trial motions. Cf. Scott v. Battle, 249 Ga. App. 618, 622 (2001) (rejecting the plaintiff‘s argument that the defendant waived the right to seek a reduction in punitive damages pursuant to
2. We adhere to Nestlehutt.
The Clarks and the appellee in the similar cases of Cayamcela v. Advocacy Trust, LLC and Hospitalist Services of Georgia, P.C. v. Advocacy Trust, LLC (collectively across all the cases, “the plaintiffs“) argue that applying the cap statute‘s limit
We start by determining whether to overrule Nestlehutt. We conclude that stare decisis warrants adhering to Nestlehutt. Whether or not Nestlehutt was inarguably correct that the right to trial by jury includes the right to have a jury determine without legislative interference claims and remedies that juries decided as of 1798, history and precedent provide material support for that holding. And that, at the very least, means that Nestlehutt was not clearly wrong. This conclusion, viewed through the lens of stare decisis, preserves Nestlehutt‘s holding. Accordingly, we adhere to Nestlehutt.
(a) Stare decisis is a strong default rule and preserves holdings absent a showing of clear or obvious error.
“When we are asked to reconsider and overrule one of our prior decisions, stare decisis is the strong default rule.” Homewood Assocs., Inc. v. Unified Gov‘t of Athens-Clarke County, 323 Ga. 62, 70 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). There are a variety of reasons for this rule:
Ours is a system of precedent, built on the premise, if not a promise, that future cases will be decided like similar past cases. Sticking to our precedent promotes a system of equal treatment under the law rather than one of arbitrary discretion. Such a system not only yields a body of law that is more stable, predictable, and reliable: it is also the only kind of system that is consistent with the rule of law.
Id. (quotation marks omitted). This system “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).
In applying stare decisis, we consider “features of the precedent at issue that bear on whether it would be more harmful to leave the question at issue ‘decided’ or have it ‘decided right.‘” Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 645 (2025) (quoting Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2017)). “Some of those features bear quite directly on rule-of-law concerns. As a threshold matter, precedents that are not just wrong but unreasoned, or which disregard the basic legal principles that courts use to do law, are ripe for overruling.” Id. (cleaned up). Such cases allow for “arbitrary discretion,” as do cases that set out rules of decision that are “truly ‘unworkable‘: precedents that leave courts without manageable standards to cabin judicial discretion and invite courts to make policy decisions instead of doing law.” Id. at 646. “In a similar vein, we have been less inclined to preserve holdings that conflict with — or as we have put it in various decisions, are a departure from, dissonant with, inconsistent with, contrary to,
“In addition to those concerns driven by respect for the rule of law, we have considered a limited set of more practical consequences when applying stare decisis.” Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 647.
First, we have long considered so-called reliance interests: at the least, when parties have long relied on a legal rule in making decisions affecting property or contract rights, courts are especially hesitant to unsettle precedents that could disrupt or destroy such thought-to-be-settled rights. Second, although the age of a precedent by itself is a poor gauge of whether it should be retained, a legal rule might be so deeply entrenched in the body of law that trying to dig it out would do more harm than good. Third, we have typically applied stare decisis with less force to precedents that interpret a constitutional provision than to precedents that
interpret statutes, reasoning that it is harder as a practical matter for the people to correct constitutional precedents.
Id. (cleaned up). That said, although “stare decisis carries less weight when our prior precedent involved the interpretation of the Constitution,” that “doesn‘t mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether[.]” Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245. Instead, the soundness of the reasoning of the prior precedent “becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other factors to preserve it.” Id. We generally do not overrule cases unless they are “clearly” or “obviously and harmfully” wrong. Stephens v. State, 321 Ga. 651, 658 (2025); Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 647 (quotation marks omitted).
Finally, “[t]hese considerations are guideposts, not a mechanical formula or a multi-factor test. At bottom, the question whether to overrule a precedent comes down to whether getting the law right is worth the cost to the rule of law of unsettling what had been settled. For the overwhelming majority of precedents, the juice is not worth the squeeze. But in rare cases — when a precedent is not just wrong, but ‘obviously and harmfully’ so — stare decisis is not a bar to getting the law right.” Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 647 (citations omitted).
(b) History and precedent provide support for Nestlehutt‘s holding that the right to trial by jury is substantive, not merely procedural.
This is not one of those rare cases; the defendants have not shown that Nestlehutt‘s holding was obviously and harmfully wrong. We consider Nestlehutt‘s holding in three parts. First, we consider the holding that the right to trial by jury is substantive
In invalidating the cap statute as applied to pain and suffering and loss of consortium damages in medical malpractice actions, we concluded in Nestlehutt “that at the time of the adoption of our Constitution of 1798, there did exist the common law right to a jury trial for claims involving the negligence of a health care provider, with an attendant right to the award of the full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, as determined by the jury.” Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 735. We held that the same right was preserved by the 1983 Constitution. These conclusions find support in history and precedent.
The defendants argue that we should overrule Nestlehutt because, as stated by a defense brief, it “erroneously morphs the procedural right to have a jury decide facts into a substantive guarantee of a particular result.” They claim that the right to trial is in terms of a constitutional requirement that the procedural right to trial by jury be meaningful, and that a right to trial by jury that permitted legislative invalidation of jury verdicts protected by that right is simply not sufficiently meaningful. But we need not and do not resolve this framing question to decide the issues presented in this case, and so our use of the term “substantive” throughout the opinion should be understood in this light.
The defendants also point out that one member of this Court raised similar questions about Nestlehutt‘s holding in a special concurrence to our decision in Taylor, noting that “it appears inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the constitutional right to trial by jury.” Taylor, 316 Ga. at 102 (Colvin, J., concurring specially). Pointing to Blackstone‘s Commentaries, that concurrence stated that “[a]t common law, the right to a trial by jury functioned primarily as a procedural safeguard, limiting the potential for a corrupt or biased judge to work injustice on a party by dividing authority between judge and jury.” Id. (citing 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *379–80 (1768)). That division of authority between judge and jury included the right, at least in civil cases, of the jury to decide questions of fact, while judges decided questions of law.6 See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *373, 380; Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 677 (1918) (“It may safely be said that at the time of the American Revolution the general principle was well established in the English law that juries must answer to
Today, we conclude that history and precedent support the idea that the right to trial by jury has a substantive component and is not merely a procedural right to have juries, rather than judges, decide questions of fact that may then be rendered irrelevant by statute. A merely procedural right to a jury trial would be hollow and illusory.
(i) The Historical Importance of the Right to Trial by Jury
Since this Court‘s beginning, we have recognized that the right to trial by jury is a “principal bulwark of English and American liberties.” Craig v. Maltbie, 1 Ga. 544, 546 (1846). The right long predates the first Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States. The right to trial by jury was protected in Article 39 of the Magna Carta in 1215: “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send
It is therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every man owes to his country, his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power this valuable constitution in all [its] rights; to restore it to [its] [ancient] dignity, if at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated from its first institution; to amend it, wherever it is defective; and, above all, to guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.
In September of 1846, just seven months after the first session of this Court was held, we wrote that the provision of Magna Carta that guaranteed the right to trial by jury “deserves to be written in letters of gold; and is justly esteemed an inestimable privilege in all civilized countries.” Craig, 1 Ga. at 546. Two years later, we described the right to trial by jury in similar terms:
In England, it has long been esteemed the great bulwark and safeguard, both of civil rights and of political freedom. It is incorporated prominently into Magna Charta. Our ancestors, when they removed to this country, brought this admirable system with them, as their birth right and inheritance. And for greater security, have had a guarantee for its preservation inserted, not only in the Federal, but in all their State Constitutions. So sensible were they of its value, that when this right was abridged by the British Parliament, the Congress of 1774 declared, (see the 5th of their resolutions,) “that the respective colonies are entitled to the Common Law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable principle of being tried by their peers of the vicinity, according to the course of that law.”
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 205 (1848). See also Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 188 (1848) (“The right came with
(ii) Defining the right to trial by jury as merely a “procedural right” would undermine the historical importance of the right.
Our long recognition that the right to trial by jury is fundamental to our system of government provides the backdrop against which we evaluate the current scope of our constitutional right to trial by jury. As a general matter, the importance the right historically has been understood to have appears incompatible with the view that it is, nonetheless, a mere “procedural right” to have a jury decide questions of fact without any obligation that the jury‘s findings be given legal effect. If the jury trial right guaranteed only that 12 people sit in a box during
And a closer look at the common law history of the right supports the idea that the jury trial right is a right of substance, not mere procedure. For instance, at common law, juries’ determinations of damages were not readily disturbed. In Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1676), the plaintiff brought an action for slander (“scandalum magnatum“), and the
Moreover, we have found nothing in the history of the jury trial right that expressly limits the constitutional right in the way the defendants view it. The historical allocation of questions of fact to the jury, and questions of law to the judge, says nothing about whether the legislature can nullify or materially limit certain findings of fact made by the jury. And, looking again to Blackstone‘s writings, it is true that in his Commentaries
Here therefore a competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice. For the most powerful individual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another‘s right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of trial; and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the law must of course redress it. This therefore preserves in
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *380 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed this issue regarding its own Constitution‘s right to trial by jury. See Horton, 359 Or. at 226–50. The Oregon Constitution provides, “[i]n all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate.”
To the extent that the Oregon court, in characterizing this statement by Blackstone, was acknowledging the critical differences between colonial England and America, we agree. But it is because of those differences that we cannot simply transpose the lack of substantive limitations on Parliament‘s authority to the legal system of this state. Under the Georgia Constitution, our state has a different structure of government than Blackstone-era England, and our state has a specific constitutionalized jury trial right. Blackstone was not writing to explain the constitutional
In Flint River Steamboat Co., this Court explained that the framers of our constitutions included the right to trial by jury in our constitutions to ensure “greater security” of the right. 5 Ga. at 205 (“Our ancestors, when they removed to this country, brought this admirable system with them, as their birth right and inheritance. And for greater security, have had a guarantee for its preservation inserted, not only in the Federal, but in all their State Constitutions[.]” (second emphasis added)). The “greater security” to which this Court was referring was that the Georgia Constitution‘s command that the right to trial by jury shall remain “inviolate” necessarily means that the legislature may not legislate in a manner inconsistent with that right. And in outlining the General Assembly‘s powers, our Constitution
Accordingly, because the right to a jury trial is a “principal bulwark of English and American liberties,” and history supports the view that the right was substantive in part, we are unpersuaded that Nestlehutt was wrongly decided merely because much of the historical focus has been on the procedural aspects of the right or on the allocation of rules between judge and jury. Cf. Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 618, 619 (1846) (“[W]hile we admit it is in the power of assembly to pass any act regulating merely the mode of trial by jury — provided that, in doing so, they do not destroy, or materially impair, the right — we should feel constrained to disregard any act which would deprive the citizen of the benefit of the security to which we have just alluded[.]“).
The defendants also point to Alexander Hamilton‘s statements in The Federalist No. 83 for the proposition that the legislature could alter the common law through legislation. Hamilton wrote, “It is evident that [the right to a civil jury trial] can have no influence upon the legislature, in regard to the AMOUNT of taxes to be laid, to the OBJECTS upon which they
Thus, the history of the right to trial by jury contains support for the idea that juries’ determinations of damages were not readily disturbed, and that the right was not limited to procedural aspects of the jury right. And ample precedent of ours provides similar support. See, e.g., Pollard v. State, 148 Ga. 447, 454 (1918) (“We are of the opinion that the constitutional provisions quoted above preserved not merely the form or mode of trial, but the right of trial by jury in all its essential elements as it existed at common law and as it obtained in this State at the date of the adoption of our earliest constitution.“); Boon, 1 Ga. at 619 (“’ [T]rial by jury, as heretofore used,’ means something more than a trial merely, by twelve men, regardless of the mode by which they may be selected. It protects the accused against the passage, by the Legislature, of any law which would materially trench upon his rights, or endanger his safety, by depriving him of any of those privileges guaranteed by the common law.” (spelling modernized)). Cf. Hargis v. Dep‘t of Human Res., 272 Ga. 617, 617 (2000) (declining to give a statute removing the right to a jury trial in a paternity suit retroactive effect, because “[t]he
Thus, history and precedent both provide support for Nestlehutt‘s more substantive view of the jury trial right than is proposed by the defendants. Some of us find this history and precedent sufficiently compelling to conclude that Nestlehutt was correct. Some of us are less certain about that. But we all agree on this: the defendants have not shown that Nestlehutt was clearly wrongly decided.12 And nothing has changed since we
(c) The scope of the right to trial by jury includes at a minimum the right as it existed at common law, and we need not decide today whether the right also extends to all of the ways Georgia used juries as of a later date.
In recent cases, there has been some discussion as to which point in time should be the focus of the right-to-trial-by-jury analysis — that is, at which point in time did the scope of the inviolate right to trial by jury become fixed? Nestlehutt stated that 1798 was the key date for the analysis, pointing to our past precedent that has said so. See Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733 (“It is well established that Article I, Section I, Paragraph XI(a) ‘guarantees the right to a jury trial only with respect to cases as to which there existed a right to jury trial at common law or by statute at the time of the adoption of the Georgia Constitution in 1798.‘” (quoting Benton, 258 Ga. at 66 and citing Tift, 5 Ga. at 188–89)). Taylor also stated that it was “well-settled” that 1798 was the key date. 316 Ga. at 57. While acknowledging that “[it] [was] not entirely clear” why the Court previously had reached that determination, Taylor did not reconsider that issue because “no one ... asked us to reconsider our precedents setting the key date at 1798.” Id. at 57 n.19 (“The consequence of this well-settled cutoff is significant.“). See also Turner, 322 Ga. at 131–32 (reiterating the Nestlehutt framework for the jury-right analysis with 1798 as the key date). The majority in Taylor noted that the provision in the 1798 Constitution contained unique language (“as heretofore used“) not present in any other constitution and that the jury trial right provision was omitted from the 1861 and
Here, the plaintiffs argue that they would prevail even if the key date was not 1798, as stated in Nestlehutt, but instead either 1868 or 1983. But in adhering to Nestlehutt, it is not necessary for us to reach the key-date question or even affirmatively confirm whether 1798 is the correct date. Nestlehutt‘s holding turned on the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law, which Georgia adopted from England as it existed on May 14, 1776. See Oliver H. Prince, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 310 (1822). Nestlehutt‘s reference to 1798 rather than an earlier date made no difference because there was no indication the constitutional right changed from 1776 to 1798.13 And because Nestlehutt‘s holding prevents the cap statute (as interpreted below) from applying as a matter of statutory construction, we need only hold today that the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury includes, at a minimum, the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law. Whether the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury also extends to all of the ways that Georgia used juries as of 1798 or even as of some later date is a question we need not and do not decide today.
Nestlehutt‘s holding that the cap statute‘s limit on
That the scope of the right to trial by jury includes the scope of the right as it existed at common law is a proposition with overwhelming support in our precedent. Much of our precedent analyzing the constitutional right to trial by jury has either looked to the common law to determine whether the Georgia Constitution‘s right to trial by jury was violated or has stated that the Court looks to the common law to define the scope of the jury trial right. See, e.g., Bell v. Cronic, 248 Ga. 457, 458 (1981) (“In construing the provision of the Georgia Constitution which states
The claims at issue in Nestlehutt were claims and damages decided by juries at common law. No party argues that any possible alternative date would render those claims outside the scope of the right. And so we can and do reaffirm Nestlehutt without considering whether an alternative date might instead apply.
(d) Stare decisis also preserves Nestlehutt‘s claim- and remedy-focused framework for evaluating the substantive scope of the right to trial by jury.
Our determination to leave undisturbed Nestlehutt‘s
Nestlehutt‘s framework, at its core, requires us to determine whether the type of underlying claim of liability at issue existed and had a right to trial by jury at common law and whether the damages awarded by the jury were damages determined by juries for that type of claim at that time. See Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733–35; Taylor, 316 Ga. at 57–59; Turner, 322 Ga. at 131–32. Nestlehutt applied this framework to damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium in medical malpractice actions and determined “that at the time of the adoption of our Constitution of 1798, there did exist the common law right to a jury trial for claims involving the negligence of a health care provider, with an attendant right to the award of the full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, as determined by the jury.” 286 Ga. at 735. And as applied to those claims, Nestlehutt held that the cap statute “clearly nullifies the jury‘s findings of fact regarding damages and thereby undermines the jury‘s basic function” and therefore violates the constitutional right to trial by jury as applied to the damages in that case. Id. at 735.
Nestlehutt‘s claim- and remedy-focused framework was the product of applying sound, generally accepted legal principles. Nestlehutt‘s claim- and remedy-focused framework may not have
No legal developments since Nestlehutt was decided have undermined its claim- and remedy-focused framework. Instead, we have since applied Nestlehutt‘s framework in one case, see Taylor, 316 Ga. at 63–80, and in another case we have directed the Court of Appeals to return a case to the trial court to apply Nestlehutt‘s framework, see Turner, 322 Ga. 129. Indeed, in Taylor, we expressly “decline[d] the invitation” of the Attorney General to overrule Nestlehutt. See Taylor, 316 Ga. at 60 n.20.
The defendants argue that Nestlehutt‘s framework is unworkable because, as stated in one defense brief, it “t[ies] up significant resources in historical research in order to make a judgment call about whether modern claims and damages sufficiently analogize to common law claims and remedies.” But that is not the sort of unworkability that our stare decisis caselaw contemplates. See Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 646 (unworkable precedents are “precedents that leave courts without manageable standards to cabin judicial discretion and invite courts to make policy decisions instead of doing law“). In practice, Nestlehutt‘s
3. As a matter of statutory construction, the cap statute cannot apply at all to a verdict that includes damages to which Nestlehutt‘s holding applies.
That brings us to the verdict in this case. The parties offer different takes on how Nestlehutt‘s holding affects the verdict in this case. In addition to arguing that applying the cap statute‘s damages cap to wrongful death claims violates the right to trial by jury, the plaintiffs rely on principles of severability and statutory construction to contend that, in the light of Nestlehutt,
As an initial matter, severability principles, at least as traditionally applied, do not bear directly on the question of whether
Instead, addressing the defendants’ argument for applying the cap despite Nestlehutt‘s holding calls for traditional statutory construction. And after doing that construction, we conclude that the cap statute‘s damages cap is not capable of being applied in a case like this one, where a jury‘s verdict includes noneconomic damages for a cause of action to which the right to trial by jury applies (the estate‘s medical malpractice claim for pre-death pain and suffering) — even if that verdict also includes damages for a cause of action to which the right allegedly does not attach (the wrongful death claim that is the subject of the defendants’ argument).14 Here is why.
Start with
In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care
providers, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the number of defendant health care providers against whom the claim is asserted or the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
Putting all of this together, it is clear that
Whether or not there is a constitutional right to a jury trial for a wrongful death claim, applying this statutory cap here to all of the noneconomic damages violates the core holding of Nestlehutt, because the pain and suffering damages cannot constitutionally be capped. There is no mechanism in the statute for applying that cap on an individual basis to only certain claimants or causes of action, such as the wrongful death claim in this case. To do so would ignore the plain text of
That is the fundamental problem with the defendants’ request to apply the cap to the verdict like the one in this case, which includes some noneconomic damages for the estate‘s pre-death injury claim. Code section
Now consider the verdict here. The jury awarded the Clarks $2,500,000 in damages for pain and suffering (to April D. Clark, as administrator of Clark‘s estate) and $29,250,000 in damages for the full value of the decedent‘s life (to Charles Clark, as the statutory wrongful death plaintiff), totaling $31,750,000.15 Without taking the right to trial by jury into account,
To avoid violating the right to trial by jury in this way, the defendants suggest that the statute‘s damages cap may instead be applied to a subset of damages to which the right to trial by jury does not attach (in their view, the wrongful death damages). Here, for example, that would mean capping the noneconomic portion of the $29,250,000 awarded for wrongful death at $350,000 but leaving alone the $2,500,000 awarded for pain and suffering. But the statute as written offers no procedure for achieving this kind of bifurcated application of its cap. For one thing, applying the statute like this would treat the wrongful death plaintiff and the estate as different claimants, rather than “a single claimant,” directly contradicting the express statutory language that defines all claimants in a medical malpractice action as a single claimant to which the statute‘s cap applies. See
In sum, the cap statute‘s damages cap applies using a single operative mechanism: combine all the noneconomic damages awarded to all the parties into a single number and then limit that number to $350,000. No statutory text permits doing so only for some parties and some damages. So, in a case like this — where noneconomic damages to which the right to trial by jury applies are awarded as part of a jury‘s verdict in a medical malpractice action — there is simply no way to apply the statute‘s cap on noneconomic damages as written without violating the right to trial by jury. And the defendants’ proposed revisions to the statute to permit such operation would require us to rewrite statutory text in excess of our constitutional power. So the cap statute‘s damages cap may not be constitutionally applied to the verdict in this case.
Case No. S26X0350
III. The Doctors’ Cross-Appeal
On cross-appeal, the doctors argue that the trial court erred by (1) using a special verdict form that did not allow for distinct decisions regarding liability and apportionment on the distinct claims; (2) charging the jury on aggravation of preexisting conditions; and (3) denying the doctors’ motion for new trial on the general grounds by refusing to exercise discretion and weigh the evidence. We reject these claims. Our holding that the trial court erred in applying the cap statute means that the trial court now needs to resolve on remand one additional argument the doctors raised below.
A. There is no cause for reversal for the trial court‘s use of a verdict form that did not allow for distinct decisions regarding liability and apportionment on the distinct claims.
The doctors argue that the trial court erred by using a verdict form that did not allow for distinct decisions regarding liability and apportionment on the estate‘s claim for pain and suffering and the wrongful death claim. This argument fails.
The jury returned a verdict in the Clarks’ favor. The jury then allocated fault: 40 percent to Dr. Leigh and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP, 35 percent to Dr. Shirley and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP, 0 percent to Dr. Williams, 15 percent to Dr. Woodyard, and 10 percent to Coliseum Medical Center, LLC. (Dr. Williams, Dr. Woodyard, and Coliseum Medical Center, LLC are nonparties for purposes of this appeal.) The jury awarded $29,250,000 for the full value of Clark‘s life, $2,500,000 for Clark‘s pain and suffering, and $1,715,716 for medical expenses.18 The doctors again renewed their objection to the special verdict form after the jury returned its verdict. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, apportioning damages according to the jury‘s fault allocation and distinguishing between the estate‘s award for pain and suffering and Charles‘s award for wrongful
The doctors timely filed a motion for new trial, which was later amended, in which the doctors challenged the special verdict form. After a hearing, the trial court denied the doctors’ motion for new trial. In that order, the trial court rejected the doctors’ argument “that given the chronology of medical care at issue, the verdict form needed to have separate and distinct “apportionment” allocations for the claims for pain and suffering, on the one hand, and the wrongful death claims, on the other.” The trial court reasoned that (1) there is a strong presumption in upholding verdicts and the evidence supported the jury‘s allocation of fault, (2) the plain language of
Under
Here, when explaining the verdict form to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it “shall consider the fault of all persons or entities whose negligence contributed to the injury or damage.” And the ultimate verdict form allowed for apportionment of fault among each potential tortfeasor. So any jury decisions as to liability and apportionment for particular claims were inherently included in the ultimate apportionment decision made by the jury. The jury was instructed to consider the fault of each potential tortfeasor, and any distinction between whether a tortfeasor should be liable for Clark‘s pain and suffering, or her death, or both (and if so, for what apportionment per claim), would have been reflected in the ultimate apportionment determination made by the jury. Cf. Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 848, 852 (2011) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to use a special verdict form requiring the jury to make a specific finding as to the date that the plaintiff should have known of the breach of contract, and “because the trial court charged the jury on [the statute of] limitations defense,” there was
The doctors point to Glisson, 265 Ga. 239, in support of their argument that the verdict form was “not adequately crafted to elicit a decision on the issues before the court.” Id. at 240. But Glisson does not apply here. In Glisson, the appellee had contended that he did not sign a deed, and that if he did, he was induced to do so by fraud, but the only question on the jury form was whether the appellee executed the deed. See id. The Court held that the “verdict form and the accompanying instructions, which called for the jury to decide mixed questions of law and fact, were not adequately crafted to elicit a decision on the issues before the court.” Id. Glisson thus involved a key issue — fraud — that was missing from the verdict form. No key issue was missing here.22
B. The trial court did not err by charging the jury on aggravation of preexisting conditions.
The Clarks’ arguments at trial focused on the negligent treatment following Clark‘s initial surgery and bowel perforation — not negligence regarding the initial surgery itself. As such, in their requests to charge and during the charge conference, the Clarks asked for a jury charge on the aggravation of preexisting conditions, pointing to the bowel injury resulting from Clark‘s initial surgery, and arguing that Dr. Leigh‘s and Dr. Shirley‘s subsequent “failure to diagnose and treat it exacerbated it.” The doctors objected at the charge conference on the grounds that any failure by the doctors to timely treat Clark‘s perforated bowel did not constitute aggravation of a preexisting condition. The trial
There can be no recovery for any injury or disability that was not proximally caused by a Defendant‘s negligence. However, if you find that the Plaintiff already had an injury or preexisting condition prior to the time of the malpractice alleged but that the malpractice exacerbated her condition, or made it worse or more long lasting, then Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages to the extent that her condition was worsened or prolonged. The Defendants take … the Plaintiff as they find her and the fact that the Plaintiff has already had a preexisting condition and may have been more vulnerable or susceptible to injury does not relieve the Defendants from liability for any aggravation of that condition.
Relatedly, the trial court also instructed the jury:
No Plaintiff may recover for injuries or disabilities that are not connected with the act or omissions of the Defendant in this case. There can be no recovery for a particular Plaintiff for any injury or disability that was not proximally caused by the incident in question. If you should find that at the time of the incident April S. Clark had any physical condition, ailment, or disease that was becoming apparent or was dormant and if you should find that Ms. Clark received an injury and/or dies as a result of the negligence of one or more of the Defendants and that her injury and/or death resulted from an aggravation of a condition already pending, then Plaintiffs could recover damages against the
negligent Defendant or Defendants for aggravation of Ms. Clark‘s preexisting condition.
The doctors renewed their objection to the charge as given.
“A judge presiding over a civil trial should charge the jury on only the legal issues raised by the complaint and answer, adjusted to the evidence introduced at trial.” Se. Pain Specialists, P.C. v. Brown, 303 Ga. 265, 270 (2018). “It is a question of law whether the evidence presented is sufficient to authorize the giving of a particular charge.” Morris v. State, 301 Ga. 702, 705 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). See also Brown, 303 Ga. at 270–71 (same). And “[t]here need be only slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge to authorize a requested jury instruction.” Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 833 (2020). See also Brown, 303 Ga. at 270–71. “In reviewing a challenge to the trial court‘s jury instruction, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed on the law of the case.” Morris, 301 Ga. at 705 (quotation marks omitted).
“In the tort context, proximate causation includes all of the natural and probable consequences of the tortfeasor‘s negligence, unless there is a sufficient and independent intervening cause. Moreover, tortfeasors take their victims as they find them.” Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 627–28 (2010) (citations omitted). “A negligent actor must bear the risk that his liability will be increased by reason of the actual physical condition of the other toward whom his act is negligent.” Geary v. Estate of Tapley, 373 Ga. App. 561, 566 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals has held that preexisting condition charges were authorized in two recent cases with similar facts to this case. See United Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Robinson,
Here, the trial court‘s instruction was a correct statement of the law, because the bowel perforation can serve as a preexisting injury that the doctors aggravated in their post-surgery negligence. Contrary to the doctors’ assertion, such a charge in this case is not inconsistent with our precedent.
The doctors rely on Bray v. Latham, 81 Ga. 640 (1888), and City of Atlanta v. Hampton, 139 Ga. 389 (1913), for their argument that a preexisting condition must be “some other infirmity which predated the tort.” Bray involved a suit by a tenant and his wife against their landlord following a fire; the plaintiffs alleged that the landlord had caused the fire and that the “fright and exertion” from the fire caused the wife to be “permanently injured in health and strength.” 81 Ga. at 641. The Court criticized a jury instruction given by the trial court that the plaintiffs could not recover “to the extent that [prior] sickness or
Similarly, Hampton involved a suit against the City of Atlanta in which the plaintiff alleged that she fell and was injured after stepping on a broken water meter cap on a sidewalk in the city. See 139 Ga. at 390. The trial court instructed the jury that if they find that the plaintiff “was laboring under an infirmity of which she was ignorant,” and if the injury she received from falling “aggravated the existing infirmity, ... the recovery in that case would be to the extent you find the infirmity was aggravated by the injury.” Id. at 393. The Court held that “[t]he evidence authorized the charge, and it was not error to give it[,]” explaining that “[a]lthough a plaintiff may contend that the bad condition of her health after an injury is entirely due to the tort causing such injury, this would not preclude her from recovering if the jury should believe from the evidence that her subsequent condition was not entirely due to the injury, but that such injury aggravated some preexisting infirmity.” Id.
Contrary to the doctors’ assertion, Bray and Hampton simply affirmed the idea that a plaintiff can recover for the aggravation of a preexisting injury. Nothing in those cases requires a preexisting condition to be entirely unrelated to the negligence at issue. As such, the doctors’ reliance on Bray and Hampton is misplaced.
The doctors also point to a number of Court of Appeals
Thus, Clark‘s bowel perforation could serve as a
C. The trial court did not err by denying the doctors’ motion for new trial on the general grounds.
Finally, the doctors contend that the trial court erred in denying the doctors’ motion for new trial on the general grounds by refusing to exercise discretion and weigh the evidence. But the trial court‘s order denying the doctors’ motion for new trial shows that the trial court properly exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror, so this claim fails.
We have described the trial court‘s discretion to grant a new trial on the general grounds as follows:
A trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury is “contrary to ... the principles of justice and equity,”
OCGA § 5-5-20 , or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence.”OCGA § 5-5-21 . When properly raised in a timely motion, these grounds for a new trial — commonly known as the “general grounds” — require the trial judge to exercise a “broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.‘” Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 (2013). In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must consider some of the things that she cannot when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. See Choisnet v. State, 292Ga. 860, 861 (2013). Although the discretion of a trial judge to award a new trial on the general grounds is not boundless — it is, after all, a discretion that “should be exercised with caution [and] invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict,” Alvelo v. State, 288 Ga. 437, 438 (2011) — it nevertheless is, generally speaking, a substantial discretion.
White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524-25 (2013) (cleaned up). See also Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 765-66 (1989) (discussing
Here, in addition to challenging the verdict form, the doctors argued in their motion for new trial that the court should exercise its powers as the thirteenth juror. In denying the doctors’ motion for new trial on the general grounds, the trial court cited the general grounds statutes,
Although some of the trial court‘s language referencing deference to the jury or sufficiency of the evidence might be problematic if viewed in isolation, the trial court‘s order as a
The doctors point to three cases in support of their contention that the trial court improperly exercised its thirteenth-juror discretion in this case. See White, 293 Ga. 523; Choisnet, 292 Ga. 860; Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383 (2011). But none of these cases apply here. White vacated and remanded a case for a trial court to revisit the general grounds motion where the trial court repeatedly articulated an incorrect standard and did not articulate anything consistent with the proper standard. See White, 293 Ga. at 525. Similarly, Choisnet vacated and remanded where the trial court in considering the general grounds had cited Jackson and stated that conflicts in testimony were matters of credibility for resolution by the jury. See 292 Ga. at 861. And Manuel vacated and remanded where the trial court in rejecting the general grounds argument used the phrase “sufficient evidence,” cited Jackson, and stated that it “personally disagreed with the jury‘s verdict.” 289 Ga. at 386. Here, unlike White, Choisnet, and Manuel, the trial court in this case cited the correct standard and demonstrated that it evaluated the evidence itself, and the trial court did not state that it personally disagreed with the jury‘s verdict. The trial court here also did not cite Jackson, and although the trial court did reference the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and state that it “should interpret the evidence and verdict in favor of upholding the jury‘s decision,” the trial court‘s order viewed as a whole shows that it exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror under the correct standard — a discretion which, as we have advised and as the trial court recognized in its order, “should be exercised with
As such, we will not disturb the trial court‘s decision denying the doctors’ motion for new trial on the general grounds.
D. Our holding that the trial court erred in applying the cap statute means that the trial court now needs to resolve on remand the doctors’ excessiveness claim as to the jury‘s award for wrongful death.
The doctors also raised an excessiveness claim in their motion for new trial. In its order denying the doctors’ motion for new trial, the trial court rejected the excessiveness claim as to the jury‘s award for pain and suffering, and declined to rule on the merits of the doctors’ excessiveness claim as to the wrongful death award, concluding that the trial court‘s grant of the motion to remit and amend the judgment mooted that claim. Our holding that the trial court erred in applying the cap statute means that the trial court now needs to resolve on remand the doctors’ excessiveness claim as to the jury‘s award for wrongful death. Thus, we vacate the trial court‘s grant of the doctors’ motion to remit and amend the judgment applying the cap statute to limit the wrongful death award, and we remand for the trial court to decide the doctors’ excessiveness claim as to the wrongful death award raised in their motion for new trial and to enter judgment accordingly.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
BETHEL, JUSTICE, CONCURRING.
I join the opinion and the judgment of the Court which, in the portion relevant to this separate writing, adheres to the framework and holding of Nestlehutt. In doing so, I wish to note that there is, in my view, reason to doubt that the Nestlehutt framework accurately captures the correct understanding of the right to trial by jury secured in our Constitution. It seems to me that Nestlehutt and some of our other precedent may not have properly construed the bounds of that right as it was originally understood when it was included in our Constitution.23 It is tough to tell, and, for me, that is an excellent basis upon which to rely on the principles of stare decisis to leave decided that which has been decided.
It may well be that the jury trial right secured in our Constitution was generally understood to be a procedural right. Indeed, the opinion of the Court convincingly articulates the
Meanwhile, there seems to be a reasonable possibility that the right ought to be considered even more robust than our precedent suggests. After all, we have indicated that “to determine whether a party has a right to a jury trial for a particular claim, we must determine whether such a claim existed and was decided by a jury in Georgia in 1798.” Taylor v. Devereux Foundation, Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 58-59 (2023). This understanding feels clear and firm, and I read it to mean that, if a litigant has the sort of claim that was entrusted to a jury before 1798, then the legislature cannot deprive the litigant of the right to a jury on that claim. So I am at a loss for how that rule squares with our precedent in other contexts.
I say this not to sow doubt about the state of workers’
Having completed my detour, I restate my agreement with the Court that Nestlehutt ought not be disturbed.27 It finds support as laid out by the Court and neither the parties or amici, nor my own review, have produced compelling evidence that a different understanding is more likely correct.
Notes
(a) As used in this Code section, the term:
(1) “Claimant” means a person, including a decedent‘s estate, who seeks or has sought recovery of damages in a medical malpractice action. All persons claiming to have sustained damages as the result of the bodily injury or death of a single person are considered a single claimant.
...
(4) “Noneconomic damages” means damages for physical and emotional pain, discomfort, anxiety, hardship, distress, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature. This term does not include past or future:
(A) Medical expenses, including rehabilitation and therapy;
(B) Wages or earnings capacity;
(C) Income;
(D) Funeral and burial expenses;
(E) The value of services performed by the injured in the absence of the injury or death including those domestic and other necessary services performed without compensation; or
(F) Other monetary expenses.
(b) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care providers, the total amount
(c) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against a single medical facility, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may apply, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
(d) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against more than one medical facility, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may apply, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00 from any single medical facility and $700,000.00 from all medical facilities, regardless of the number of defendant medical facilities against whom the claim is asserted or the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
(e) In applying subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this Code section, the aggregate amount of noneconomic damages recoverable under such subsections shall in no event exceed $1,050,000.00.
....
Although Nestlehutt referred to an “attendant right,” that reference does not necessarily suggest a division of procedure and substance. In referring to an “attendant right,” this Court concluded that there existed a “common law right to a jury trial for claims involving the negligence of a health care provider, with an attendant right” to have a jury determine the “the full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages.” 286 Ga. at 735. In context, this usage should be understood to mean that the common law right to have a jury decide damages accompanied or was a part of the right to have a jury decide liability. See Kinslow v. State, 311 Ga. 768, 773 (2021) (“[W]ords, like people, are judged by the company they keep.“); 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *397 (in describing “interlocutory” or “incomplete” judgments, where the right of the plaintiff had been established, but the “quantum of damages sustained by him is not,” Blackstone explained that the determination of amount of damages “cannot be done without the intervention of a jury,” so “where damages are to be recovered, a jury must be called in to assess them; unless the defendant, to save charges, will confess the whole damages laid in the declaration“).
Even if we could draw precise lines between procedural and substantive components of the right, our case law, as recognized by Nestlehutt, suggests that both were preserved in the constitutional provision:
The constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to trial by jury preserved not merely the form or mode of trial, but the right of trial by jury in all its essential elements as it existed at common law and as it obtained in this State at the date of the adoption of our earliest constitution.
Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 735 (cleaned up; quoting Pollard v. State, 148 Ga. 447, 454 (1918) (emphasis added)). Thus, our use of this procedural-substantive framing here should not be misunderstood as an acceptance of it as the only correct way to understand Nestlehutt‘s holding. It may be that a better framing
Unlike judicial remittitur, which involves judges weighing evidence and is authorized only where the “‘jury‘s award of damages is clearly so ... excessive as to any party as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence,‘” damages caps “are automatically triggered when a damages award exceeds the threshold amount.” Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 737–38
R.C. Acres involved “the location and extent of an easement of access to real property[] and alleged damages as a result of interference with the easement.” 331 Ga. App. at 762. The special verdict form submitted to the jury addressed the original and ultimate locations of the easement but did not address any intermediate locations of the easement. Id. at 763–64. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he trial court, in formulating the special verdict form, in essence removed from the jury‘s consideration the issue of any intermediate locations of the easement.” Id. at 766. And the Court of Appeals held that “[b]ecause some evidence was presented at trial that the easement was relocated by agreement of the parties to several different routes during the period in question, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit this disputed question of fact to the jury[.]” Id. at 764. So like Glisson (and unlike this case), R.C. Acres involved a special verdict form that was missing a key issue under the facts of the case. See id. (“A major issue at trial was whether the easement was relocated by agreement between the parties or their predecessors in title.“).
Hartman held that the use of a verdict form that “did not provide for recovery of general pain and suffering damages” in a medical malpractice action “constituted substantial and harmful error as a matter of law.” 219 Ga. App. at 499–500. But in Hartman, the verdict form fully prevented the jury from awarding general pain and suffering damages — a key issue in the case. See id. at 498–500. Whereas here, no key issue was missing from the verdict form.