Thе appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of Geоrgia (Ga. L. 1958, p. 34) on the ground that it violates Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia (Code Am. § 2-5101) which provides in part that trial by “jury . . . shall remain inviolatе” in that said Act does not provide for a jury trial.
The record discloses that the appellant, Bennett Strange, and the appellee, Sarah Strange, were divorced by a decree of Spalding Superior Court in 1964, whereby the three minor children were аwarded to the mother, but no provision was made by the verdict and decree for their support by the father. The mother and the three children moved to the State of Florida. In March, 1965, the mother filed her petition in the Circuit Court of Polk County, Florida, in which she sought under the Florida Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act to require the father, a resident of Spalding County, Georgia, tо contribute a stated sum of money for the support of the children.
The Florida proceedings were duly transmitted to the Superiоr Court of Spalding County. The judge of said court issued an order (as provided under the Georgia Act) requiring the father to show cause why thе court should not pass an order “directing *45 defendant (the father) to support the plaintiff and his dependents.” The father respоnded with his answer to the rule and demurred generally and specially. These demurrers were overruled. After a hearing, the court, without thе intervention of a jury, entered a judgment directing the father to pay for the support of his three minor children to their mother the sum of $5.00 per week for each child until they or each one reaches the age of 18 years, marries or becomes self-supporting.
The father has appealed from these orders, and errors are enumerated on (a) the order overruling the general demurrer which attacked the constitutionality of the Georgia Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, and (b) the order of support.
The Georgia Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act does not expressly provide the right of trial by jury as to support by the father of his minor children who are in the custody of their mother in another state. The aрpellant (the father) asserts that under Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-5101) he was entitled to a jury trial, and since the Act of 1958 does not provide for a jury trial or give to him the right to a trial by jury, the Act of 1958 is void.
Art. IV, Sec. Ill of the Georgia Constitution of 1789, provided that “Freedom of the press and trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” The provision in the Constitution of 1945 as to the right of trial by jury is the same as it was in the Constitution of 1877, Art. VI, Sec. XVIII, Par. I
(Code
§ 2-4501) which is that “the right of triаl by jury, except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall remain inviolate.” This court in construing this provision in the Constitution of 1877 in an unbroken linе of decisions has held that in civil actions the right of a jury trial exists only in those cases where the right existed prior to the first Georgia Cоnstitution, and the Constitution guarantees the continuance of this right unchanged as it existed at common law.
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn,
*46
The appellant’s contention that at common law, prior to the first Constitution of Georgia, there was a duty imposed upon the father of а minor child to support it either during coverture or subsequent to a divorce of the parents is correct
(Brown v. Brown,
The English authorities seem to be agreed that the mother or a third person could by action compel the father to pay for necessaries expended fоr the support of the minor children, but we have found no authority that any court at common law could compel the father, аfter a divorce of the parties, to contribute to their future support. See Stat. 43 Eliz. Ch. 2; 24 Am. Jur. 2d 940, Divorce & Separation, § 829. From the textbook writers it appears that the divorced mother’s only remedy was to bring an action to recover from the father expenses she had incurred in support of the minor child or children. This common law right and remedy was recognized and approved in
Brown v. Brown,
These prior decisions constitute a ruling that at the time they were decidеd, the divorced mother, under the factual situation of this case, could not bring a common law action against the father of the minor children. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act for the support of the dependent children and others is wholly of statutory origin and unknown to the common or statutory law of England prior to our first Constitution, and therefore, in a proceeding under this Act, the father of the minor children is not entitled to a jury trial as a constitutional right. The Act of 1958 is not unconstitutional for the reason argued.
Aрpellant’s special demurrers based on the grounds that appellee’s petition did not set out copies of the pеtition, the answer and the decree in the divorce proceeding between the parties in Spalding Superior Court were рroperly overruled.
The order of the court directing the appellant to pay to the appellee the sum of $15 per week for the support of his three children was not erroneous.
Judgment affirmed.