CITY ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY vs. ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY.
SJC-12561
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
March 29, 2019
Nоrfolk. November 8, 2018. - March 29, 2019. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
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Mechanic‘s Lien. Bond. Practice, Civil, Enforcement of liability on bond. Statute, Construction.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 17, 2016.
The case was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., on a motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.
Thomas E. Day for the plaintiff.
John W. DiNicola, II, for the defendant.
GAZIANO, J. In this case, we consider whether a claimant seeking to enforce a target lien bond by commencing a civil action pursuant to the mechanic‘s lien statute,
On July 14, 2016, general contractor Tocci Building Corporation (Tocсi) issued and recorded a “target lien bond,”2 pursuant to
the amount of the mechanic‘s lien that CES had created. The target lien bond listed the defendant, Arch Insurance Company (Arch), as surety, and was recorded in the Norfolk County registry of deeds.
In August, 2016, CES sought to enforce the target lien bond by filing a timely action against Franciosi and Arch in the Superior Court, pursuant to
In March, 2017, Arch moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Following a hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed Arch‘s
2. Statutory scheme. General Laws c. 254 “governs the creation, perfection, and dissolution of a mechаnic‘s lien.” National Lumber Co. v. United Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 723, 726 (2004) (National Lumber II). Because a perfected lien encumbers the property upon which it is placed, one purpose of
General Laws. c. 254 also “provides for prevention of future liens and dissolution of existing liens by the giving of a [lien] bond, which benefits . . . anyone possessing an interest in that land . . . by furnishing means to keep his title free from liens and preventing the sale of the land to satisfy a lien” (quotation omitted). NES Rentals v. Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc., 465 Mass. 856, 860 (2013), citing
A mechanic‘s lien is created when a notice of contract is filed in the registry of deeds. See
At the same time, statutory dissolution of a lien under
3. Discussion. As stated, this case concerns CES‘s efforts to enforce a target lien bond. As it did in the Superior Court, CES argues that it was not required, pursuant to
a. Standard of review. We review the allowance of a motion for summary judgment de novo. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 (2014), citing Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991);
b. Statutory interpretation. “The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute, ‘the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose.‘” Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 720 (1984). “Where the language [of a statute] is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive of the Legislature‘s purpose.” National Lumber II, 440 Mass. at 727, citing Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996).
i. Statutory language. The plain language of
When interpreting the absence of language in an otherwise “detailed and precise [statute], we regard [an] omission as purposeful.” Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 421 Mass. 344, 348 (1995). General Laws c. 254 is dеtailed and precise; it sets forth a “comprehensive scheme” to govern mechanic‘s liens and lien bonds (citation omitted). See Ng Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Cranney, 436 Mass. 638, 642 (2002) (“Individual sections of the statute delineate time requirements for creating, maintaining, and enforcing a lien“). General Laws
By contrast, with regard to blanket lien bonds,
Arch argues that, in light of this court‘s obligation tо read
To be sure, “[w]hen the meaning of a statute is brought into question, a court properly should read other sections and should construe them together” (citation omitted). LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 333 (1999). As Arch correctly notes, we previously have indicated that, as with the provisions of any statute,
General Laws c. 254, § 5, provides that dissolution of a lien is a consequence of a plaintiff‘s failure to record a complaint to enforce the lien. In an action to enforce a target lien bond, however, the underlying lien alrеady has been dissolved. Therefore, to ascribe to Arch‘s interpretation would be to render the phrase “or such lien shall be dissolved,”
The Legislature previously has considered and rejected language suggesting that
“Section 14 of said chapter 254, as appearing in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended by striking out the first sentence and inserting in place thereof the following sentence: In a civil action under section five, the court may, in its discretion, accept a bond, with sufficient surety or sureties, to dissolve the lien of any creditor or all liens, as to the whole or any part of the property, or any interest therein.”
1973 Senate Doс. No. 11, at 190. The proposed language referenced an outdated version of the mechanic‘s lien statute, and was dropped from the final act as adopted, thereby rejecting any reference to
Arch‘s reliance on Valentine Lumber & Supply Co. v. Thibeault, 336 Mass. 411 (1957) (Valentine Lumber), in support of its argument that recording of the complaint was required is misplaced.5 In Valentine Lumber, supra at 412-413, this court concluded that a claimant‘s failure to record a complaint (called a “subpoena“) to enforce a target lien bond precluded the claimant from rеcovering under the mechanic‘s lien statute. Under the statutory scheme in existence when Valentine Lumber was decided,
Under the terms of the mechanic‘s lien statute in effect since 1972, “[o]nce a bond is recorded in accоrdance with § 14, the lien is dissolved on the record, and any concern about uncertainty of title arising from that lien is eliminated.” NES Rentals, 465 Mass. at 869. Thus, recording a complaint to enforce a target lien bond would not support the goal of “ensur[ing] that a person searching the land records in a registry of deeds can determine with certainty whether or not title to a particular parcel of land is encumbered
4. Conclusion. The order allowing summary judgment is vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
So ordered.