Catherine Puetz Md v. Spectrum Health HospitalsCatherine Puetz Md v. Spectrum Health Hospitals
Plaintiff, Catherine Puetz, M.D., appeals by right the trial court order dismissing her complaint under
I. BASIC FACTS
In 1999, Puetz took a job with Emergency Care Specialists (ECS), a physicians’ group representing about 150 physicians and about 70 physician’s assistants. ECS exclusively staffs its physicians at hospitals run by defendant, Spectrum Health Hospitals (Spectrum). Through her relationship with ECS, Puetz had admission privileges in emergency services and observation medicine at Spectrum. In addition, Puetz was appointed to serve as the associate medical director of observation medicine, the associate medical director for ED cardiovascular medicine, and the clinical advisor for pediatrics at Spectrum. In connection with her role at Spectrum, Puetz developed certain observation protocols, which she admitted were created for Spectrum’s use and placed on Spectrum’s intranet.
Because the observation program at Spectrum was considered a success, individuals and organizations outside of Spectrum and ECS were interested in it. As a result, in the summer of 2013, ECS and Puetz decided to prepare a pamphlet on observation medicine in an effort to start consulting on the subject. When Spectrum learned about the pamphlet, it instructed ECS that it had to work with Spectrum on any consulting or observation work. Further, a meeting was held on the pamphlet/consulting work in July 2013. At the meeting, Spectrum claimed ownership of the observation materials. A follow-up meeting was scheduled, but did not occur before Puetz
The record reflects that on August 5, 2013, a Spectrum nurse posted on a public Facebook page a photograph of the backside of an overweight woman and the caption: “Don’t judge me. I like what I like.” In response to the post, 12 Spectrum employees and 3 ECS employees commented on the photograph on Facebook. Relevant to this appeal, Puetz was the sixth person to comment, and she stated “OMG is that [patient’s initials]? You are soo naughty.”
A Spectrum staff member saw the post on Facebоok, was uncomfortable with the dialogue, and reported it to Spectrum. Kevin Splaine, Spectrum’s president, testified that the decision was made to discipline those involved. Initially, Spectrum decided to remove Puetz from her administrative roles at the hospital. However, Splaine testified that as the investigation into the incident continued, he decided that additional discipline was warranted. According to Splaine, “anyone with whom we could prove was part of this dialogue knew that this was a patient, if they were an employee of Spectrum Health, they would be terminated. If they were contracting with Spectrum Health, the contract would be terminated. And if they were privileged at Spectrum Health, we would not allow them to practice at Spectrum Health Hospitals.” The other individuals involved received a written reprimand. By August 19, 2013, Puetz was informed that she was being removed from both her “administrative leadership position and clinical” because of the Facebook incident.
On August 21, 2013, after making that decision, Splaine spoke at an ECS meeting. Ostensibly, Splaine spoke at the meeting because there was “a lot of angst and concern” about the decision to remove Puetz, and ECS wanted to hear Spectrum’s side of it. Splaine apparently did not refer to Puetz by name at the meeting; however, he allegedly told everyone at the meeting that Puetz’s comments on Facebook violated HIPAA.1 In addition, Splaine sent ECS a letter demanding that Puetz and another employee of ECS not be scheduled at any hospital owned by Spectrum. In the letter, Splainе referred to Puetz and the other employee’s conduct as reprehensible, unprofessional, and disturbing.
On March 14, 2014, Puetz filed a complaint in the United Stated District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, intellectual property ownership, and two counts of tortious interference with a business expectancy. Only count IV, the intellectual property ownership claim, arguably fell within the federal court’s original jurisdiction. After discovery closed, the federal district court sua sponte issued a show-cause order regarding subject-matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the intellectual property claim and dismissed the entire complaint without prejudicе.
Within 30 days of her federal complaint being dismissed, Puetz filed a claim in the Kent County Circuit Court. In response, Spectrum moved for summary disposition under
II. DISMISSAL UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(7)
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Puetz first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her defamation claim under
B. ANALYSIS
In Michigan, the period of limitations for a defamation claim is one year.
In order to bring a state-law claim in federal court, a plaintiff must assert his or her claim under the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. [
28 USC 1367(a) (emphasis added).]
The supplemental jurisdiction statute does not contain a provision expressly addressing what happens when a state-law claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1367(a). Instead, “[s]ubsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction . . . .” Raygor v Regents of Univ of Minnesota, 534 US 533, 540; 122 S Ct 999; 152 L Ed 2d 27 (2002). “Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations” that are not applicable under the facts in this case. Id. In addition, subsection (d) appears to toll the limitations period for any claim asserted under subsection (a) regardless of whether the plaintiff was successful in asserting that claim. See Raygor v, 534 US at 542. Section 1367(d) provides:
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
In the absence of binding authority interpreting
Turning to the statutory language, the Raygor Court noted that there was a lack of clarity on whether there was a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting defendants that were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment Grounds. Id. at 544. As a result, although the language “any claim asserted” was broad enough to cover the situation in Raygor, it was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” because it did not reflect any “specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States.” Id. at 544-545. Moreover, although the statute could be read to authorize tolling of claims dismissed against nonconsenting State defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds, in context
The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a clаim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will
be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “inconsistent” with 28 USC § 1332 . Finally, § 1367(c) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not rеad § 1367(d) to apply to dismissal of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. [Id. at 545-546 (citations omitted).]
Overall, Raygor contains language suggesting that § 1367(d) may apply only to dismissals contemplated by § 1367(a), (b), and (c), but it also contains language making clear that the interpretation of § 1367(d) was driven by constitutional concerns that are not relevant to the issue in the case sub judicie.
Relying on the Raygor decision, the Arizona court of appeals held that if a federal court dismissed a state-law claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction premised on a lack of original jurisdiction, then the tolling provision in § 1367(d) does not apply to a plaintiff’s claims when they are refiled in state court. Morris v Giovan, 225 Ariz 582; 242 P3d 181 (Ariz App, 2010). The Morris court concluded that there was no real distinction between a claim dismissed against nonconsenting defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds and a clаim dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 584. Further, the court believed that holding otherwise would “affect the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government, and Congress has not expressed this intent in the language of the statute.” Id. at 585, citing Raygor, 534 US at 543.
The trial court in this case found Morris persuasive and applied it to bar Puetz’s defamation claim. We conclude, however, that the court’s reliance on Morris was misplaced. The Morris court did not independently evaluate the statutory language. Instead, it relied on the Raygor Court’s interpretation of § 1367(d), which was an interpretation of the statute in light of the dismissal of a claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Morris, 225 Ariz at 584; Raygor, 534 US at 542. Then, without citation to legal authority, the Morris court presumed that the same constitutional concerns that existed in Raygor were present when a case is dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Morris, 225 Ariz at 585. Finally, the Morris court did not acknowledge that, in Jinks v Richland Co, SC, 538 US 456, 466; 123 S Ct 1667; 155 L Ed 2d 631 (2003), the United States Supreme Court declined to extend the holding in Raygor in the absence of Eleventh Amendment concerns. For these reasons, we do not find Morris persuasive.
Instead, we turn to the language used in
when interpreting a federal statute our task is to give effect to the will of Congress. To do so, we start, of course, with the statutory text, and unless
otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete. [Id. at 381-382 (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).]
Applying the statute as written is also in line with Congress’s intent when enaсting the statute. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Jinks, § 1367(d) was enacted “[t]o prevent the limitations period on [dismissed] claims from expiring while the plaintiff was fruitlessly pursuing them in federal court.” The Jinks Court further stated:
Prior to enactment of § 1367(d), [plaintiffs] had the following unattractive options: (1) They could file a single federal-court action, which would run the risk that the federal court would dismiss the state-law claims after the limitations period had expired; (2) they could file a single state-law action, which would abandon their right to a federal forum; (3) they could file separate, timely actions in federal and state court and ask that the state-court litigation be stayed pending resolution of the federal case, which would increase litigation costs with no guarantee that the state court would oblige. Section 1367(d) replaces this selection of inadequate choices with the assurance that state-law claims asserted under § 1367(a) will not become time barred while pending in federal court. [Id. at 463-464.]
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court recently explained that the supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted because “Congress sought to clarify the scope of federal courts’ authority to hear claims, appreciating that supplemental jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants to . . . deal economically—in a single rather than multiple litigation—with related matters.” Artis v District of Columbia, 583 US ___, ___; 138 S Ct 594, 598; 199 L Ed 2d 473 (2018) (quotation and citation marks omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
III. DISMISSAL UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(10)
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Puetz also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims for false light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and tortious interference with a business expectancy. In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under
B. ANALYSIS
1. FALSE LIGHT—INVASION OF PRIVACY
An invasion of privaсy claim protects against four types of invasion of privacy: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false
Puetz’s complaint does not clearly identify the statements that she contends placed her in a false light. Her complaint provides:
77. The statements of Spectrum placed [Puetz] in a false light to her peers within the hospital, outside hospital as well as with other staff within Spectrum.
78. Spectrum set in motion communications to the media that a physician was fired for a HIPAA violation and encouraged invasion of her privacy.
79. This cause of action protects [Puetz’s] right to be left alone and not have private facts shared about her to third parties who have no duty to know.
80. Statements by Spectrum that placed [Puetz] in a false light would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.
81. [Puetz] was injured and suffered shame, embarrassment and humiliation by the actions of Spectrum. Her injuries are ongoing because the websites for the media are disseminated continuously on the Internet.
82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Spectrum’s conduct, [Puetz] has suffered loss of privacy, loss of reputation, emotional distress, embarrassment, ridicule and humiliation.
Wholly missing from Puetz’s pleading is an identification of who disseminated information about her, when that information was given, and what was actually said about her that placed her in a false light. Based solely on the pleadings, it is likely that a motion for summary disposition under
Puetz contends that her false light claim is based on statements that Splaine made to ECS on August 21, 2013 and on August 22, 2013. The trial court concluded that these statements were not actionable as a matter of law because any information Splaine provided at the meeting was not “publicized.” A claim for false light invasion of privacy requires that the plaintiff
With regard to the comments made by Splaine in the August 22, 2013 letter, Puetz has provided no evidence that the information in it was distributed to a large number of people or the public in general. The letter was addressed to ECS “Attn: Kenneth S. Johnson, MD” and was copied to ECS’s lawyer, and three employees at Spectrum. Therefore, it appears that Spectrum “broadcast” the letter to only 5 people who were involved in the incident management.7 Like the plaintiff in Derderian, 263 Mich App at 387, Puetz simply has failed to demonstrate a sufficient level of publicity with regard to the letter. Instead, she merely speculates that the letter could have been widely disseminated because it was not marked “confidential.” Without proof that it was disseminated further, however, the trial court did not err by dismissing her false light claims based upon the letter.
The next component of the false light claim is premised оn Splaine’s comments at the August 21, 2013 meeting. Puetz asserts that at the meeting, Splaine told ECS’s members that she violated HIPAA and that Splaine called her conduct reprehensible, egregious, unprofessional, and lacking in integrity. At the meeting Splaine allegedly disclosed false information about Puetz to a group of 50 to 60 people. Despite the large size of the group, the trial court relied on Derderian for the proposition that disclosure to a “medical executive committee/team” does not satisfy the publicity element of a false light claim. See id. at 388. In Derderian, however, unlike the present case, the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate factual support for their claim that any “publication was made to a sufficiently large group of people.”
The second element of a false light claim is that the comments must be “unreasonable and highly objectionable” because they attributed to the plaintiff “characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that were false and placed the plaintiff in a false position.” See Duran, 200 Mich App at 632. The trial court did not reach this element because it granted summary disposition based on a lack оf publicity. Puetz contends there is a factual dispute on this point because Splaine stated at the ECS meeting that she violated HIPAA. Spectrum argues, however, that Splaine never referred to Puetz by name at the meeting, so Puetz cannot prove that Splaine attributed a HIPAA violation to her at the meeting. We disagree. The record reflects that the attendees of the ECS meeting were aware of the Facebook incident, those involved, and the discipline imposed, it is reasonable to infer that they knew Splaine was referring to Puetz when he spoke at the meeting. Consequently, we conclude that there are fact questions about whether Splaine told ECS that Puetz violated HIPAA.
The next question is whether there is a fact question regarding whether the communication of that information, i.e. the attribution of a HIPAA violation to Puetz, was false and placed her in a false light. We note that whether Puetz’s comments violated HIPAA could be determined as a matter of law. However, it is not necessary to take that step because in order to establish a false light claim, a plaintiff must establish that when the defendant disseminated the information, it was done with actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the publicized matter. Detroit Free Press, Inc, 164 Mich App at 666. Here, the record reflects that before Splaine spoke at the ECS meeting, he had ongoing discussions with Spectrum’s lawyers and others involved in the decision making process about whether the Facebook incident was a violation of HIPAA. Further, he testified that based on his own compliance training, he was aware that identifying a patient by his оr her initials is part of what constitutes a patient identifier for HIPAA purposes. In addition, several witnesses testified at length about the rationale behind the discipline imposed. Specifically, if the Facebook post demonstrated knowledge that the individual commenting knew the woman depicted was a patient, then the person making that comment was terminated or prohibited from practicing at Spectrum. Therefore, Puetz has directed this Court to no evidence showing that when Splaine made his comments, he either knew his comments were false or he recklessly disregarded the possibility that they were false. Stated differently, even if Puetz could establish that unreasonable and highly objectionable information was publicized to a large group of people, she cannot еstablish that when he spoke at the ECS meeting, Splaine “must have known of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed.” Id. As a result, although the court’s reasoning was flawed, the trial court did not err by dismissing Puetz’s false light claim to the extent that it was based upon Splaine’s comments at the August 21, 2013 meeting.
Finally, Puetz argues that her false light claim should be allowed to proceed because Spectrum, ECS, and “some doctors” knew who Puetz was, and then, one day she opened her door and a reporter was there asking if she was terminated for a Facebook comment. Puetz’s
In sum, Puetz’s false light claim was premised on three separate incidents: the letter to ECS, the statements made at the ECS meeting, and statements made to the media about Puetz. The letter, however, is not actionable because there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether it was publicized. The statements to the media are not actionable because there is, in fact, no evidence that Spectrum made any false statement to the media about Puetz. Finally, although the trial court erred by finding no genuine issue of fact with regard to whether the statements at the ECS meeting were publicized, Puetz cannot establish that Splaine made the statements with actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the publicized matter. Detroit Free Press, Inc, 164 Mich App at 666. Thus, despite there being a fact question on some of the elements of the false light claim, Puetz’s failure to establish the final element is fatal to her claim, and the trial court did not err by dismissing it.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by dismissing this claim under
2. BREACH OF CONTRACT
The trial court also еrred by dismissing Puetz’s intellectual property ownership claim, which was based on a breach-of-contract theory. The trial court held that as a matter of law all of the agreements Puetz signed bound her to follow Spectrum’s policies and procedures, including Spectrum’s intellectual property policy. The court further found that under the broad language of the intellectual property policy, Spectrum owned the disputed observation materials. On appeal, Puetz contends that the trial court erred by finding she was bound by the intellectual property policy.
“In Michigan, the essential elements of a valid contract are (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of оbligation.” Thomas v Leja, 187 Mich App 418, 422; 468 NW2d 58 (1991). Here, the trial court relied upon three contracts: a 2008 clinical services agreement, a 2009 medical director services agreement, and a 2012 pediatric clinical services agreement. However, the language of the contracts makes it apparent that Puetz was not a party to the contracts and her signature on the agreements did not represent her intent to be bound by the terms set forth in them. Instead, the parties were Spectrum and ECS, who were named parties, signed as parties, and referred to as parties throughout the contracts. Because Puetz was not a party to the contracts and because there is no evidence before this Court that she separately agreed to be bound by the agreements, the trial court erred by сoncluding she was bound by the 2008, 2009, and 2012 provisions providing that she would conform with Spectrum’s IP policy.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred by dismissing this claim under
3. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS EXPECTANCY
In order to succeed on a claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy, a plaintiff must establish “the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the defendant, an intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Dalley v Dykema Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich App 296, 323; 788 NW2d 679 (2010). Further, in order to satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant “acted both intentionally and either improperly or without justification.” Id. If the defendant’s act was motivated by legitimate business reasons, then the act does not “constitute improper motive or interference.” Id. at 324. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “did something illegal, unethical, or fraudulent.” Id.
The record reflects that multiple individuals who commented on the Facebook post were disciplined. In addition, although not everyone who posted on the Facebook page were terminated or prohibited from working at Spectrum, the record reflects that Puetz and three or four others were either terminated or prohibited from wоrking at Spectrum Hospitals. Thus,
Moreover, although Puetz speculates that Spectrum had an improper motive when it interfered with her relationship with ECS, she cannot direct this Court to anything other than her own suspicions. Splaine testified that he did not know about Puetz’s intellectual property dispute before he reached the decision to prohibit her from working at Spectrum. Puetz offered no evidence to counter that testimony, other than speculation that his direct supervisor probably knew about the dispute and may have influenced him. Further, Puetz has offered no evidence to contradict Splaine’s testimony that the rationale behind the discipline imposed was based on whether or not the individual who commented on the Facebook post was aware or unaware that the woman depicted was a patient. Consequently, Puetz has failed to support this claim, and the trial court did not err by dismissing it under
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss Puetz’s defamation claim because under the language in
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs, neither party having prevailed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron