National Pride at Work, Inc v. Governor

481 MICH 56 WORK, NATIONAL PRIDE AT INC v GOVERNOR (Calendar 133429, 133554. 3). Argued 6, Docket Nos. November No. 7,May Decided 2008. Work, Inc., National Pride at and numerous individuals who are employees public employers and the same-sex domestic employees brought those Ingham an action in the Circuit Court against Governor, seeking declaratory judgment the a that Const 1, (the 25,§ by Proposal art amendment), as added 04-2 does prohibit public employers not offering from health-care benefits to employees’ partners. plaintiffs same-sex domestic city The added the city of Kalamazoo as a defendant after the announced that it would not plaintiffs extend those benefits in future contracts. The moved for summary disposition. Attorney After the General a submitted motion seeking on the Governor’s plaintiffs’ claims, behalf dismissal of the separate the Governor obtained opposing counsel and filed a brief supporting plaintiffs. dismissal and Attorney The General then court, Joyce intervened as a Draganchuk, J., defendant. The granted plaintiffs summary disposition, concluding that the amendment prohibit public employers does not entering agreements from into provide domestic-partner benefits because health-care benefits are among statutory rights marriage or benefits of and the domestic-partner criteria for same-sex approach benefits do not legal marriage. Thus, status of public the court concluded that the employers recognizing marriage were not a or similar union in Attorney violation of the amendment. The appealed. General The Appeals, EJ., Court JJ., reversed, and Wilder and Zahra, Hoekstra, concluding prohibits the amendment employers from recognizing any purpose. same-sex unions for App 274 Mich (2007). plaintiffs separate Governor and the applications filed for appeal, Supreme leave granted. which the Court 478 Mich 862 opinion by joined In an Justice Chief Justice Markman, and Justices Taylor Supreme Corrigan, Young, Weaver, held,-. Court prohibits public employers The amendment recognizing a partnership same-sex domestic as a union similar to for any purpose, including purpose health- insurance benefits. Pride At Inc Governor Nat’l recognition prohibits of a domestic 1. The amendment marriage. partnership or as a union that is similar as public employer not refer to or characterize a that a does The fact to a partnership or a union similar recognizing employer not marriage mean that the is does not marriage. marriage to a partnership a or a union similar as legal rights and not result in all the same 2. A union need marriage a responsibilities in order to constitute that result from a marriage marriage. a similar to a The dissimilarities between union legal pertain partnership to the effects these relation- and a domestic ships of the marital and domestic- have rather than to the nature partnerships partnership Domestic are unions unions themselves. marriages partnerships are because domestic similar gender Michigan only relationships in terms of both defined in a connection. and the lack of dose blood employers provide domestic health- 3. When partnership, on the basis of the domestic insurance benefits thus, and, significance partnership, providing legal are recognizing partnership. recognized single agreement the state of 4. A can be within any purpose, Michigan and that as a or similar union for agreement A single the union of one man and one woman. is recognizable partnership does not constitute such domestic and, thus, recognized any purpose, agreement, for cannot be including purpose providing health-insurance benefits. for the be used to contradict a constitu- 5. Extrinsic evidence cannot unambiguous language. tional amendment’s Affirmed. joined dissenting, by Justice stated Justice Kelly, Cavanagh, nothing prohibits of the amendment itself more

that the marriages recognition of same-sex or similar unions. than surrounding adoption Additionally, the circumstances amendment, propo- including statements the amendment’s marriage and the amendment was about would nents benefits, Michigan strongly suggest did not voters affect offering prohibit public employers from health-care intend to partners. pro- employees’ The benefit to their same-sex benefits recognize marriages or grams same-sex at issue in this case do not couples marriage, they grant same-sex unions similar to nor do marriage. responsibilities, Health-insurance rights, or benefits of marriage, coverage employment rather than and the a benefit of prohibit public employers providing the from does not employment. benefits of 481 Mich 56 — — — Employment Constitutional Law Same-Sex Domestic Partners Marriage Colleges — Health Insurance Benefits — and Universities — — Municipal Corporations State. prohibits public employers recog- Constitution nizing partnership a same-sex union similar purpose, including purpose for the (Const 25). 1, § health-insurance benefits art Granzotto, Granzotto), (by Mark PC. Mark Deborah Labette, Jay A. D. Kaplan, Kary Michael J. L. Steinberg, Moss, Pepper (by Gorland, Hamilton LLP Scott L. Wilczak, Shelton, Thomas P. Amanda J. Kurt A Kissling), S. Katz for Pride Nancy National Work, Inc., and others. Pascoe,

Susan I. Leffler, Dietzel, D. J. and Robert A. General, Assistant Attorneys for the Governor. Cox, Michael Attorney General, A. Henry Boynton, J. General, Assistant Solicitor and Eric Restuccia and Potchen, E. Joseph Attorneys General, Assistant for the Attorney General.

Amici Curiae:

Stephen Postema, K. City Attorney, for the Ann city of Arbor.

Gloria A. Hage, Lessem, Dehlin, Louis A. Catherine Tomasi, Eileen K. Paul J. Jennings, Collins, William C. and Kenneth A McKanders for the University Michi- gan Regents, Wayne State University Board of Governors, the Central Michigan University Board of Trustees, Michigan Northern University Board of Control, Michigan Technological University, Saginaw Valley University, State Michigan the Eastern Uni- versity Board Regents.

Dan Sherrick and Georgi-Ann for Bargamian Inter- Union, UAW; national and UAW Local 6000. Work, Pride At Nat’l Moore, Jeakle, Brooks, Heinen Gregory, (by & EC. Brooks), Gregory Gordon A. Scott A. Robert A. Sedler, and Michigan Rachel Levinson for the Confer- the American of University ence of Association Profes- sors.

Stephen Crompton M. and Law LaRae G. Office of Munk, Munk), (by PC LaRae G. for the American Family Association of Michigan. (by

David & P.C. James Wierenga, Wierenga), R. Bull, Raum, and Benjamin Schoweng- W. Brian Dale Michigan Family erdt for the Forum. Gillen) (by

Thomas More Law Center Patrick T. Citizens for the Protection of Marriage. Sanders) LLP

Mayer (by Brown Stephen for various professors Michigan law public universities. Kelly Michigan

Theresa and Robert A. Noto for State University.

Cynthia Ann Paul for Michigan Pride at Ser- Employees vice International Union 517M, Local AFL-CIO, chapter of the Office and Profes- Employees sional International Union Local Lansing Association of Human Rights. Kerr, Weber, Russell and (by PLC Joanne Geha Swan- Schulte), son and Daniel J. for the Michigan State Society. Medical Alderman,

Theresa J. Arthur R. Przybylowicz, and White, Scheider, Chiodini, (by & P.C. Young Michael M. and Dena Shoudy Lampinen), Michigan M. for the Education Association. 481 Mich 56

Opinion of the Court Grix), (by Henry PLLC M. James P. Wright Dickinson Jr., Bucket, David and Kenneth D. Madigan, Upton, S. Fund, Defense and Education Legal for the Lambda Inc., Human Rights Campaign, Rights the Human Foundation, Campaign Triangle Foundation, Michi- gan Equality, Lawyers Women Association of Michi- Parents, & & gan, Families Friends of Lesbians Inc. Gays, granted J. We leave to to consider appeal MARKMAN, amendment, 1963, 1, the marriage

whether Const art 25,§ which states that “the union of one man and one woman in shall be the only agreement recog- nized as a or similar any purpose,” union for prohibits public employers health- providing insurance benefits to their same- employees’ qualified sex domestic partners. agree Because we with the Court Appeals such benefits does violate the marriage amendment, we affirm its judgment.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY amendment, 1963, The marriage 1, 25,§ Const art approved by was a majority of the voters on November 2, 2004, and took effect as provision of the Constitution on December time, 2004. At that several public employers, including state universities city and various and county governments, policies had agreements in effect that extended health-insurance benefits to their employees’ qualified same-sex domes- addition, tic In partners. Em- Office State (OSE) and the United ployer Auto Workers Local 6000 (UAW) agreement had reached a tentative to include domestic-partner same-sex health-insurance benefits in package employee benefit state members of the However, 2, 2004, union. on December the OSE and the Pride At Inc v 2008] Nat’l Governor Opinion of the Court agreed UAW not to submit the contract to the proposed Civil Service Commission until after there had been a court determination that the of the proposed marriage contract did not violate the amendment. March in response represen- On to a state 16, 2005, request regarding tative’s for an the opinion on the city ability amendment’s effect of Kalamazoo’s provide domestic-partner same-sex health-insurance employees, Attorney benefits to its the General issued a formal opinion, concluding city’s that the did policy violate the amendment. The Attorney General asserted 1, § that “Const art 25 prohibits state and local 1963, governmental entities conferring from benefits on their on employees the basis of a ‘domestic partnership’ agreement characterized reference to the marriage.” OAG, 2005-2006, attributes of a p No 7,171, (March 2005). On March 21, 2005, plaintiffs1 declaratory filed this judgment action against Governor, the a decla- seeking ration that amendment does not bar public employers health-insurance ben- efits to their employees’ qualified same-sex domestic partners. city After the of Kalamazoo announced its intention provide not domestic-partner same-sex health-insurance employees benefits to its for contracts Work, Inc., nonprofit organization Plaintiff National Pride at is a Organizations. the American Federation of Labor-Council of Industrial remaining plaintiffs employees city Kalamazoo, The are University Michigan, Michigan University, Michigan State Eastern University, Wayne University, Clinton/Eaton/Ingham County State Community Board, Michigan Mental Health or the state of and those employees’ partners. plans same-sex Because the benefit of Eastern University, Wayne University, State Eaton/Clinton/Ingham Community part Mental Health Board record, they Likewise, opinion are not discussed. does not address private employers provide whether can health-insurance benefits to their employees’ partners. same-sex domestic 481 Mich 56 Opinion op the Court ruling absent a court January

beginning amendment, such benefits do not violate city of Kalamazoo as a defendant. added the plaintiffs General, Governor, acting on behalf of the Attorney The suit. The Governor ob- plaintiffs’ moved to dismiss counsel, withdrew the motion to separate tained who filed supporting plaintiffs. dismiss and a brief right then intervened his own Attorney General initially that he had filed on the adopted brief behalf as his own. Governor’s granted plaintiffs’ The trial court motion for sum- mary disposition and declared that the public employers provid- amendment does not bar from ing quali- health-insurance benefits to their employees’ partners. fied same-sex domestic The court held that do not one of health-insurance benefits constitute the marriage.” Unpublished opinion “benefits of Court, Ingham September Circuit issued (Docket 05-368-CZ), court further p No. 7. The held “criteria by public employers] [used that the also do ” union recognize marriage’ ‘similar to because “criteria, together, even when taken com- pale myriad to the and parison legal rights responsibilities to marital accorded those with status.” Id. at 9. Attorney for a appealed stay. General moved of Appeals granted stay The Court the motion for a court, declaring reversed the trial does bar public employers health-insurance benefits to their employees’ qualified Work, partners. same-sex domestic Nat'l Pride at Inc v (2007). Governor, 147; Mich App 732 NW2d 139 Appeals publicly recognized The Court of held that “a need not partnership domestic mirror a 1, § in order to afoul of every respect run article the amendment plainly precludes recognition because Nat’l Pride At Opinion of the Court ” of a ‘similar union for any purpose.’ Id. at “All 163. plans listed establish criteria for eligibility are similar to those for marriage.” Id. at 164. agreement “[T]he employee between the and the dependent constitutes a (as similar union to marriage, because with the agreement marriage), with a the employer legal has a obligation to recognize the union and provide benefits to the eligible (as dependent with a spouse).” Finally, Id. requirement

[t]he employee prove that an the existence either of a domestic-partnership agreement written or an agreement employee between the dependent and the to be jointly responsible living for expenses, basic and household in order to eligibility by partner establish dependent coverage, recognition insurance constitutes public employer any purpose,’ i.e., of a ‘similar union for purpose extending depen- dents the benefit of coverage equivalent insurance coverage that spouses. is extended to [Id. 165.] Plaintiffs and the Governor appealed, and this Court granted the applications for leave appeal. 478 Mich

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial grant court’s decision to a motion for sum- mary disposition is reviewed de novo. Goldstone v Pub Twp Library, 554, 558; 479 Mich Bloomfield (2007). Questions NW2d 476 interpre- constitutional tation are also reviewed de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS A. DOMESTIC-PARTNERSHIP POLICIES The agreement tentative reached by the OSE and the UAW would require domestic partners to meet the follow- ing criteria in order to receive health-insurance benefits: Mich 56 Opinion Court years age. Be least 18

1. em- personal relationship with the close 2. Share a each other’s common welfare. ployee responsible be any per- relationship other with 3. have a similar Not relationship other son, similar with not have had a prior six months. person for family employee’s immediate be a member of 4. Not children, parents, grand- employee’s spouse, defined as parents-in-law, parents, grandchildren, parents or foster brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles or cousins. gender. Be

5. of the same regular permanent jointly Have shared the same 6. months, intent to six and have an residence for at least doing indefinitely. continue so living expenses, in- jointly responsible Be for basic 7. food, cluding shelter and other common ex- the cost of joint responsibil- maintaining This penses of a household. persons equally contribute or in ity need not mean that the ratio, agree persons any particular but rather that jointly responsible. they are “In order to provides: also agreement The tentative met, em- the criteria have been establish whether an employee sign Affidavit ployer may require consti- the facts and circumstances which setting forth requirements.” tute with those compliance of Kalamazoo’s “Domestic Partner Benefits city agree- collective-bargaining its Policy,” incorporated benefits to the do- ments, health-insurance provided met the city’s employees who mestic following criteria: City program, purposes of the of Kalamazoo’s

For the partner shall and use of the term domestic the definition couples To be considered as include same sex. partners, the individuals must: Nat’l Pride At Opinion of the Court mentally A. Be competent at least 18 and to enter into a contract;

B. Share a common residence and have done so for at (6) months; least six

C. Be by unmarried and not related blood closer than prevent marriage; would

D. arrangements daily Share financial living ex- penses welfare; related to their common

E. File a statement previous of termination of domestic (6) partnership prior at least six signing months to another Certification Partnership. of Domestic [Emphasis in the original.]

The city also required the employee arid his or her partner to sign a notarized certification of do- mestic partnership that affirmed these In criteria. addi- tion, they were required provide evidence of “mutual economic dependence,” such joint as a lease or mortgage, and evidence of a “common legal residence,” such as driver’s licenses or voter’s registrations. Finally, the city’s policy provided: “It is the intent of this program provide insurance coverage and other benefits to domestic part- ners of the City of Kalamazoo identical to those provided to spouses of City employees.”

For a domestic partner eligible be for health- insurance benefits under the University Michigan’s “Same-Sex Domestic Partner Policy,” the employee and his or her partner must:

* sex; Be of the same * legally Not be individual; married to another * registered Have or declared the Partnership Domestic in the manner authorized municipality or other government entity;[2] and city of Ann Arbor’s Partnership” “Declaration of Domestic requires following to “declare the to be true”: Mich 56 Opinion of the Court

* pass since the months to at least six Have allowed in partnership same-sex domestic previous of a dissolution govern- by municipality or other authorized the manner entity. ment health-insurance University provided

Michigan State if the employees’ its benefits to partner: and the domestic employee are unable to and for this reason [the] 1. are same-sex law, marry under each other relationship, been have long-term committed 2. are in a months, and intend to relationship at least 6 in the for indefinitely, together remain legally others and neither has married to 3. are not partner, another domestic capacity years age and have

4. are at least contract, enter into a closely enough to bar related to one another

5. are not Michigan, marriage in have done so for more than

6. share a residence and months, responsible other for the necessi- jointly to each

7. are life, ties of and agreement” signed “partnership provide

8. support for one parties provide obligates each of the division, another, substantially equal provides for support, caring relationship in a of mutual 1. We are commitment. of life. the common necessities

2. We share that would bar blood in a manner 3. We are not related Michigan. marriage in the State of partnership. any other domestic are not married or 4. We years age competent to and otherwise 5. We are at least a contract. enter into Nat’l Pride At Opinion of the Court upon relationship, earnings during termination relationship any property acquired those with earnings.[3]

B. MARRIAGEAMENDMENT marriage amendment, 1, 25,§ The Const art provides: “To and preserve secure the benefits of mar- riage society for our and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement as a recognized or similar union purpose.” objective primary interpreting a constitu- provision tional is to determine the original meaning of provision ratifiers, “we the at the people,” time of ratification. Justice COOLEY has this described rule of in understanding” “common this way:

For as the Constitution does not derive its force framed, people convention which but from the who ratified it, the be people, intent to arrived at is that of the and it is supposed they any not to be that have looked for dark or meaning employed, abstruse in the words but rather that accepted have them in sense most obvious to the understanding, common and ratified the instrument in the designed belief conveyed. that was the sense to be (1st [Cooley, ed), p 66.] Constitutional Limitations Thus, primary objective interpre- of constitutional tation, judicial not dissimilar to other exercise interpretation, faithfully is to give meaning to the intent of those who enacted the law. This Court typi- cally understanding discerns the common of constitu- tional text by applying plain meaning each term’s at the opinion, partnership” When term we use the “domestic we partnership to a refer that satisfies the criteria in one of the contained policies opinion. domestic-partnership in this described [May- Mich 56 Opinion the Court Hathcock, 471 Mich Co v Wayne of ratification.

time 468-469; 684 NW2d UNION” C. “SIMILAR is prohib- only thing “the argue that Plaintiffs recognition [marriage] amendment by the ited marriage” as a and that relationship a same-sex a domestic recognizing here are not employers public appeal on Plaintiffs brief marriage.” a “as partnership (Docket original). in the 133554), 23p (emphasis No. First, prohib- the amendment disagree. respectfully We “as a partnership a domestic recognition its the is, union . . prohibits ..” That it marriage or similar or marriage as a partnership of a domestic recognition Second, just marriage. ato a union that is similar to, or other- does not refer public employer a because as a characterize, partnership a domestic wise that the not mean does a union similar to or as a partnership a domestic recognizing is not employer marriage. Cf. id. at 26 similar to a marriage or a union (“In of their the same-sex benefits to have not declared employers these employees, anything to be partnership same-sex added).4 (emphasis marriage.”) similar public employ- is not whether pertinent question as a mar- partnership a domestic recognizing ers are employer provided had argue that if a seem to Plaintiffs “spouses” to spouses, had defined health-insurance benefits amendment, but partners, this would violate the include domestic partners in public employers here did not refer to domestic the because (Docket appeal manner, plaintiffs’ brief on is no violation. See there 133554), agree the amendment is pp that whether 27-29. We do No. employer place public to on a chooses is a function of what label violated Instead, question pertinent is the of the benefits. the beneficiaries partnership recognizing as a public employer is a domestic the whether any purpose. to for union similar At Nat’l Pride Opinion op the Court riage part or have declared a whether domestic be a nership something similar to rather, it is the marriage; public employers whether recognizing a as union partnership domestic a similar to A a is marriage. “something by uniting “union” formed combination;... two or more a things; number of states, etc., persons, joined for together or associated some purpose.” common Random Col House Webster’s (1991). lege Dictionary Certainly, join when two people together for a purpose common and legal consequences i.e., arise from that a relationship, entity accords legal significance may to this union relationship, a be said to be formed. When two people enter domestic partnership, they join or together associate for a com mon and, purpose, poli under the domestic-partnership here, cies at legal consequences issue arise relationship in the form of health-insurance benefits. Therefore, a domestic is most partnership certainly a union. is question next whether a partnership marriage. similar to a Plaintiffs and argue the dissent

that because the public employers here do not bestow upon a domestic all legal partnership rights responsibilities marriage,5 associated with the partner- ship marriage. is not similar to a Again, respectfully we disagree. “Similar” likeness means “having or resem- blance, in a [especially] general way; having qualities common[.]” Random House College Webster’s Dictio- (1991); nary see City Arbor, also White v Ann 554, 572-574; Mich 281 NW2d 283 A union does example, right For property entirety, to hold as tenants 557.71; equal MCL an property every acquired during interest kind 557.204; marriage, right pension MCL and retirement benefits during marriage, 552.18; right exemp accrued MCL to claim an spousal inheritance, 205.202; tion right on taxes MCL and the spousal benefits, veterans’ MCL 32.49d and MCL 36.31.

70 Mich Opinion of the Court respon- and legal rights same possess to all the have not to constitute marriage a in order that result from sibilities marriage If the marriage. that of union “similar” to recogni- the prohibit only to were construed amendment responsi- legal and rights a union that possesses tion of marriage, that result the identical those bilities to meaning- rendered “or union” would be similar language mean- less, an that renders interpretation and Corrections, must be Sweatt ingless Dep’t avoided. (2003) 172, (opinion by 183; Mich 661 NW2d J.). Further, by identified the dissimilarities MAEKMAN, the nature pertaining not to are dissimilarities plaintiffs themselves, and unions domestic-partnership the marital the merely pertaining legal to are dissimilarities but However, relationships. are these that accorded effects the recog- amendment given marriage prohibits that the marriage any the purpose,” of unions similar to “for nition give rise question is not whether these unions to pertinent rather, effects; it is these unions legal all the same whether recognized marriage as unions similar to “for being are any purpose.”6 with reasons, respectfully disagree these the

For we [used that the “criteria the trial court’s conclusion 6 Indeed, agree marriages plaintiffs we and dissent that and with Marriages give many respects. partnerships in are dissimilar legal rights many responsibilities partnerships that domestic rise to However, question pertinent purposes we for of the do not. believe the relationships give these rise is not whether identical, similar, rights legal responsibilities, but or even whether relationships in nature the context of these are similar 50, dissent, recognize post n at 99-100 fails to amendment. marriages partner pertinent question and domestic here is not whether abstract, relationships ships similar in but whether these are i.e., purpose marriage amendment, purposes for the similar provision prohibits recognition of unions similar a constitutional are, legal purpose.” can be no “for If then there relationship. cognizance given to the similar At Nat’l Pride Inc v Governor Opinion of the Court employers]... do recognize a union ‘similar ” marriage’ “criteria, because even when taken together, pale comparison legal to the myriad of rights responsibilities accorded to those with mari- tal Unpublished opinion Ingham status.” Circuit (Docket Court, September issued No. 05-368- CZ), Instead, agree 9. we the of p Appeals with Court recognized that “a publicly partnership domestic need marriage not mirror a in every respect in order run afoul 25§ of article because the amendment plainly precludes of a recognition ‘similar union for pur- ” Pride, Nat’l pose.’ 274 Mich App 163.7

All domestic-partnership policies the at issue here partners i.e., the require sex, be of a certain the same sex Similarly, as the other partner.8 Michigan re- law quires married of persons sex, i.e., to be a a certain different sex the other. MCL 551.1 is (“Marriage inherently a unique relationship between a man a and 7 argue marriage adopted response Plaintiffs that the amendment was in State, 194; (1999), to Baker v 170 Vt 744 A2d 864 in which the Vermont Supreme constitutionally required Court held that that state is to extend to couples protections same-sex in union a civil all the same benefits and that Thus, provided couples. plaintiffs to married contend that the amend only prohibits ment the “civil establishment of unions” that confer the same rights obligations However, earlier, marriage. explained a as does as a rights obligations union not have to all does confer the same a as does Moreover, marriage. in order “similar” to be to a it is no less plausible adopted response judicial the in that amendment was a series of holding public employers that can decisions extend health-insurance ben employees’ partners. See, e.g., Tyma Co, Montgomery efits to v 369 497; (2002); City of Vancouver, 556; Md 801 A2d 148 Heinsma v 144 Wash 2d (Fla (2001); Co, 2000); App, v P3d 709 Lowe Broward 766 So 2d 1199 Chicago, App 818; (1999);Slattery v 304 Ill 3d NE2d 91 vNew Crawford York (1999); Denver, City, 24; City 266 AD2d 697 NYS2d 603 Schaefer of (Colo 1998). App, 973 P2d 717 8 Indeed, University Michigan policy specifically State states that partners must be of the “same-sex and this reason are unable to marry Michigan [Emphasis added.] other law[J” each under 481 MICH Opinion of Court

woman.”).9 addition, In each domestic- of requires in that at issue this case policies partnership Similarly, related blood.10 closely not be that not be persons law married Michigan requires 11 MCL 551.4.12 related MCL 551.3 and closely by blood. course, are, types different many there Although legal are accorded relationships in debtor-creditor, parent-child, land significance e.g.,— lord-tenant, attorney-client, employer-employee— to be partnerships appear and domestic marriages both such that are defined terms relationships (“A marriage also MCL 551.1 contracted between individuals of See state.”); (“Marriage is sex is MCL a civil the same invalid 551.2 (“A .”); a a ... 551.3 man shall contract between man and woman MCL (“A man.”); many marry not ... another MCL 551.4 woman shall ... (“This woman.”); recognizes marriage another 551.272 state MCL woman,... inherently unique relationship between a man and a is therefore a that is not between man and a woman invalid regardless according contracted in this state of whether jurisdiction.”). to the laws of another policies relationships specifically Three of these refer to blood prevent “marriage.” city policy provides would Kalamazoo’s that the partners by prevent marriageL]” cannot be blood closer “related than would University Michigan’s policy provides partners of that the cannot be marriage[.]” “related to each other blood in a manner that would bar Michigan University’s plan provides partners State cannot be closely enough marriage Michigan[.]” bar in “related to one another to provides: 551.3 MCL marry mother, sister, grandmother, man “A shall not his wife, stepmother, daughter, granddaughter, grandfather’s son’s wife, wife, mother, grandson’s grandmother, wife’s wife’s wife’s daughter, daughter, granddaughter, wife’s brother’s sister’s sister, sister, daughter, mother’s or cousin of the father’s first degree, or another man.” provides: MCL 551.4 father, marry brother, son, grandfather, “A woman shall not her husband, husband,

grandson, stepfather, grandmother’s daughter’s husband, granddaughter’s father, grandfather, husband’s husband’s son, son, son, grandson, sister’s husband’s husband’s brother’s brother, brother, degree, father’s mother’s or cousin of the first or woman.” another Nat’l Pride At Opinion of the Court gender and the a lack of close blood connection.13 As earlier, discussed “similar” means a “having likeness or resemblance, in [especially] general way; having qualities in common!.]” Random House Webster’s Col lege Dictionary and Marriages domestic partner ships obviously share two important, and apparently (at unique combination), least in in qualities common.14 arguments, despite being At oral provide asked several times to an example relationship Michigan of another in defined in terms of both gender connection, and plaintiffs’ the lack of a close blood counsel was unable to do so. 14Although qualities we believe that these are the core that make marriages partnerships similar, and domestic relationships these are similar respects instance, marriages other as well. For partnerships and domestic relationships (“No people may two enter into. See MCL 551.5 marriage shall parties be contracted whilst either of the has a former wife or living, husband husband, unless the with such former wife or shall (domestic dissolved.”); have policy partners been OSE “[n]ot must have a relationship any person, similar with other and not have had a similar relationship person with prior months”); other City for the six of (domestic policy partners Kalamazoo “[f]ile must a statement of termination previous (6) partnership of prior signing least six months another Partnership”); Certification University of Domestic Michigan (domestic policy partners “[h]ave must pass allowed at least six months to previous since the dissolution of a partnership same-sex domestic in the by municipality government manner authorized entity”); or other Michi (domestic gan University policy State partners “legally must not be married partner”). [or have] to others another domestic addition, persons In involved either domestic-partnership marital or relationships obligations must undertake support. of mutual See MCL 750.161(1) (“[A] person being ability fails, who neglects, of sufficient provide necessary proper shelter, food, care, refuses to clothing spouse... (domestic guilty felony----”); his or her policy of a OSE partners jointly responsible “[b]e must living expenses”); City for basic (domestic policy partners Kalamazoo arrangements “[s]hare must financial daily living expenses welfare”); related to their common State (domestic University policy partners “jointly responsible must be to each life”). Although other for the University necessities of Michigan policy doqs mutual-support obligation, require does not include a it registered “[h]ave Partnership,” city or declared the Domestic and the Ann Partnership” requires Arbor’s parties “Declaration of Domestic relationship declare that support” “we are in a of mutual and that “we sharethe common necessities of life.” 481 Mich Opinion of Court share partnerships marriages and domestic

Because Further, domestic-partnership relationships require marital and both (“Marriage precondition. is a agreements See MCL 551.2 or contracts as a woman, parties and a to which the consent of contract between a man civil (domestic essential.”); partners contracting policy capable in law of OSE living expenses”); jointly responsible” “agree “for basic are must (domestic “mentally partners competent City policy must be Kalamazoo of sign domestic-partnership agreement); a into a contract” and must to enter (domestic sign University Michigan partners policy must a domestic- of (domestic University Policy part- agreement); Michigan partnership State 111(E) ”). ‘partnership agreement’ part “provide signed See of must ners opinion. relationships Additionally, domestic-partnership have a both marital and (“A age requirement. marriage in this state shall minimum See MCL 551.51 years age....”); policy by person who is under 16 of OSE not be contracted (domestic years age”); City partners of “[b]e must at least 18 of Kalamazoo (domestic 18”); Michigan policy partners “[b]e must at least State Univer- (domestic years age”). Although sity policy partners must be “at least 18 University Michigan’s policy age requirement, not include an it does partners registered require “[h]ave declared the Domestic does Partnership,” city of Ann Arbor’s “Declaration of Domestic Part- and the years age____” nership” requires parties to be “at least 18 Further, marriages partnerships relationships and domestic both is, they ongoing relationships indefinite duration. That are both of an parties to termi- that continue until one of the takes affirmative action (one relationship. complaint must file a nate the See MCL 552.6 (domestic marriage); policy partners divorce in order to dissolve a OSE “jointly share[] the same ... residence ... and have an intent must (domestic doing indefinitely”); City policy of Kalamazoo continue so “[fjile previous partners must a statement of termination of signing partnership prior ... another Certification of Domestic Part- (domestic nership”); University Michigan policy, partners “[h]ave must pass previous since the of a allowed at least six months to dissolution partnership in the a munici- same-sex domestic manner authorized entity”); University pality government policy or other State (domestic partners long-term relationship, “in a have must be committed months, relationship in the for at least 6 and intend to remain been together indefinitely”). Finally, domestic-partnership it seems relevant that all but one of residence, policies require partners issue here to share a common defining relationship typically a circumstance marital well. See (domestic regular policy “share[] must the same OSE Nat’l Pride At Inc Governor Opinion of the Court these “similar” qualities, fairly we believe that it can be said that they “resembl[e]” one another “in a general Therefore, way.” although marriages and part- domestic nerships identical, are no means they are similar. marriages Because partnerships domestic are the relationships Michigan defined in terms of both gender connection, and, thus, and lack of a close blood common,” have these core “qualities we conclude that partnerships domestic are unions marriage.15 similar to

D. “RECOGNIZED” The next question concerns public employ- whether ers truly recognizing partnership domestic as a union marriage similar to they provide when health- insurance benefits to partners domestic on the basis of the partnership. “Recognize” perceive defined as “to true, or acknowledge existing, or valid[.]” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary When a public employer legal attaches to a consequence rela- tionship, that employer is clearly “recognizing” relationship. is, That by providing legal significance to a relationship, the public employer is acknowledging validity of that relationship. When public employers provide partners health-insurance benefits on (domestic permanent residence”); City policy, partners of Kalamazoo residence”); Michigan “[s]hare University policy must a common State (domestic residence”). partners must “share a noteworthy regard city policy It is in this of Kalamazoo’s specifically program provide “[i]t states that is the intent of this to coverage City insurance and other benefits to domestic spouses provided City employees.” Kalamazoo identical to those added.) Indeed, (Emphasis policies each of the four issue here specifically spouses, Michigan refers or and the State University policy specifically provi refers to in three different partnerships marriage, why sions. If domestic are not similar to would agreements there be the need in each of these to invoke as an apparently analogous comparable institution? 481 MICH 56 op Opinion the Court they are without partnership, the domestic the basis of partnership.16 recognizing a doubt “ONLYAGREEMENT” E. employ- concerns whether question The next they provide when “agreement” an recognizing ers are An partners. benefits to domestic health-insurance to a coming or of agreeing is “the act of “agreement” Kalamazoo’s, the city Id. The arrangement.” mutual State Universi- Michigan’s, University sign putative partners ty’s policies require re- agreement. policy OSE’s domestic-partnership jointly respon- “agree they that quires partners if living Obviously, . . . .” two expenses sible” “for basic a sign domestic-partnership have decided to people jointly responsible for agreement agreed or have to be come to a mutual living expenses, they basic have Therefore, employers recognize arrangement.17 public health-insurance ben- agreement provide an when a on the basis of domestic partners efits to domestic partnership.

However, states marriage specifically recognized can be as a “only” agreement that the that or union is the union of one man and marriage similar employers recognize acknowledge a Plaintiffs themselves that by providing partnership health-insurance benefits to their domestic partners partnership. employees’ of the See on basis (“What (Docket 133554), p plaintiffs’ appeal these on No. brief recognized relationship employers that a exists between one of have ... individual.”; recognizing employees the existence of their and another “in relationship employ relationship making that the basis for the issue”; may “[T]hese be which are at institutions ment related benefits employees giving recognition relationship that exists between their to the omitted). partners.”) (emphasis and their added and addition, University Michigan’s policies except In all the together, together. people require five When two decide to live clearly arrangement.” they have reached a “mutual Pride At Nat’l Opinion of the Court “Only” single one woman. means “the one...

kind; lone; sole[.]” Random House Webster’s College (1991). Therefore, a Dictionary single agreement can be recognized within the state union, and that single agreement similar is the union

of one man and one woman. A domestic partnership recognizable does not constitute such a agreement. F. “FOR ANY PURPOSE” Furthermore, amendment specifically prohibits recognizing any “for purpose” a union that is similar to but marriage. “Any” is not means Therefore, Id. if “every; all[.]” there were any residual doubt regarding whether the marriage amendment prohibits recognition of a domestic partnership for here, at issue purpose makes it clear a recognition such is indeed prohibited “for purpose,” which obviously includes for the purpose providing health-insurance benefits. Whether the lan- “for guage any purpose” is essential to reach the conclusion that health-insurance benefits cannot be provided under the instant circumstances, or merely punctuates what is otherwise made clear in the amend- ment, the people of this hardly state could have made their intentions clearer.

G. “BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE” marriage The amendment begins with a statement of its that purpose effectively preamble: a “To secure and preserve marriage the benefits of for society our generations for future children of .. . .” Plaintiffs argue that the marriage amendment does not prohibit employers providing health-insurance ben- efits to their employees’ qualified same-sex domestic partners because health-insurance benefits do not con- Mich 56 Opinion of the Court However, marriage the marriage.18 of

stitute a benefit of just more than statement amendment contains the full, preserve “To secure and In it states: purpose. society and for future marriage of for our benefits one children, union of one man and of the generations only agreement recog- shall be the marriage in woman any purpose.” similar union for nized as a this sets operative part provision of latter —the — go achieving intended to about how the ratifiers forth “securing] in part, the set forth the first purposes opera- of ....” This the benefits preserving] must not public employers part specifies tive That any purpose. for recognize partnerships is, the amendment states its part purpose, the first of by states the means which this part and the second Doubtless, those to be achieved. there are purpose is efficacy achieving of disagree who would about However, it is not by former the latter means. purpose superior for this Court to decide whether there the benefits of “securing] preserving] means for the means chosen marriage,” or indeed whether disagree people doubtlessly regarding can whether Reasonable marriage. On the health-insurance benefits are or are not a benefit one hand, argue benefits are not a benefit of one can that health-insurance relationship they employer-employee because arise out of the relationship, by fact that not rather than the marital as demonstrated hand, couples all married have health-insurance benefits. On the other argue they marriage, are a as demonstrated one can benefit significant people obtain from their fact that a number of such benefits spouses’ employers they if while would be unable to obtain such benefits disagreement depends, part, not married. Resolution of this were marriage” implies whether the an exclusivebenefit or on term “benefit Nonetheless, merely typical for the reasons set forth in this benefit. people part opinion, of our we believe that have resolved moot, disagreement, operative part or at least rendered it in the There, partnerships it is made clear that domestic will not amendment. any purpose,” including presumably given legal cognizance be “for purpose health-insurance benefits. Nat’l Pride At 79 Opinion of the Court amendment are ineffectual or even counterproductive. The of this people already state have on spoken this by issue adopting They amendment.19 have decided to “secure and preserve benefits of marriage” by ensuring unions similar to marriage recog- are not nized in way the same as a marriage any for purpose.20 19 preamble concerning It is also of some interest that the the benefits of was not even on the ballot when the amendment was ratified. only language operative part on the ballot was the of the amend Although people ment. we cannot conclude from this fact that the did not adopt amendment, presentation the entire such a ballot seems to preamble provisions. underscore the traditional view of See n 20 infra. 20 preamble This view of the is consistent with the well-established rule preamble part act, enlarge that “the is no of the and cannot or confer powers, act, nor control the words of the unless are doubtful or ambiguous Thomas, 174, 188; ... .” Yazoo& M V R Co v 132 US 10 S Ct (1889); 68; Carolina, Mining 33 L Ed 302 see also Coosaw Co v South (“While (1892) 550, 563; 689; express provisions US 12 S Ct L36 Ed 537 body in the an of act cannot be controlled or restrained the ... preamble, may ascertaining meaning [it] be referred to when of a constructions.”). [provision] susceptible is, which is of different That “ ‘preamble general no understanding doubt contributes to a of a ” [provision], operative part it [provision],’ but is not an of the “ enacting operative parts [provision] ‘[w]here the unambigu aof ous, meaning [provision] by language of the cannot be controlled ” EPA, preamble.’ App 42, Nat’l Federation v 351 US DC Wildlife (2002) (citations 57-58; omitted); 286 F3d 554 see also United States v (CA 2001) (“ Emerson, 203, 5, ‘[T]hough preamble 270 F3d 233 n 32 enacting part [provision], cannot expressed control the of a which is terms, unambiguous yet, clear and if doubt arise on the words of the ”) (citation enacting part, preamble to, may explain be resorted it.’ omitted); Minnesota, 479, Planned Parenthood Minnesota v 910 F2d of (CA 8, 1990); Mgt Corp, 1036, 482-483 White v Investors 888 F2d (CA (Fed 4, 1989); States, 837, 840 Atlantic Co v United 764 F2d Richfield (CA 1973). Cir, 1985); Meier, Hughes 10, Tool Co v 486 F2d Columbia, Similarly, 140, 159-160; App see Parker v Dist 375 US DC (2007) (reasoning preamble 478 F3d 370 that the of the Second Amend Militia, regulated being necessary security [“[a] ment well to the of a free State,”] guarantee could not override the clear substantive of the Second right Arms, people keep [“the Amendment and bear shall not be infringed”]), gtd Heller, _ US _; cert sub nom Dist Columbia v (2007); Massachusetts, 11, 22; S Ct 645 see also Jacobson 197 US 25 S Mich 56 [May- Opinion Court EVIDENCE

H. EXTRINSIC for the argue that Citizens Plaintiffs and the dissent Marriage, organization responsible an Protection the amendment on the ballot placing during of this initiative the ensu- primary supporter indicated that a brochure that ing campaign, published public employers not from proposal preclude the would employees’ health-insurance benefits to their offering However, such extrinsic evidence partners. domestic unambiguous the hardly can be used to contradict Axle & Inc Mfg, of the constitution. American language Hamtramck, (2000) 352, 362; 461 Mich 604 NW2d 330 (“[R]eliance inappropriate on extrinsic evidence was clear.”). is As Jus- language because the constitutional tice COOLEY explained: construction, object applied to a written constitution, give people the in is to the intent of effect laws,

adopting it. In the case of all written it is the intent lawgiver intent is of the that is to be enforced. But this plain is be found in the instrument itself.... “Where a law unambiguous, expressed general whether it be in terms, [lawgiver] intended limited should be to mean consequently plainly expressed, have no what [Cooley, room is left for construction.” Constitutional Limi- (1st ed), p (emphasis original), quoted in tations Axle, 362.] American 461 Mich at language provision When the of a constitutional is unambiguous, prohibited, resort to extrinsic evidence is and, earlier, of the language as discussed is unambiguous.21 (1905) 358; (holding preamble L of the United Ct Ed 643 power). governmental States Constitution is not a source of post contention, 34, Contrary dissent’s at 95 n the fact that the to the explicitly public employers prohibited amendment does not state that employees’ health benefits to their is, “ambiguous.” does not mean that the amendment is That the fact that Nat’l Pride At Opinion of the Court Michigan Rights Civil Initiative v Bd State In Canvassers, (MArkman, J., (2006) 475 Mich concurring), alleged which it was that numerous peti- signatures tion had been obtained in support placing (MCRI) Civil Rights Initiative on the ballot MCRI, circulators who it by misrepresented was that “the did emphasized signers petitions these circulators; the oral made sign representations to them rather, they signed petitions written that contained the of the language Similarly, actual MCRI.” the voters here against any did not vote for or brochure produced by Marriage; rather, Citizens for the Protection of they voted against proposal for or a ballot that contained the actual amendment.22 provision explicitly every specific a constitutional does not set forth prohibited provision is action does not mean that such a case, ambiguous. provisions If that were all almost constitutional ambiguous. Rather, explained be rendered would as this Court Lansing Mayor Comm, 154, 166; v Pub Service 470 Mich 840 NW2d (2004): provision ambiguous only “irreconcilably [A] of the law is if it provision equally susceptible conflict[s]”with another or when it is single meaning. approach to more than a In lieu the traditional discerning “ambiguity” provisions to in which a few —one truly ambiguous diligent application and in which a of the rules of interpretation normally yield “better,” perhaps imper- will albeit fect, interpretation judicial of the law—the dissent would create a regime quick ambiguity in which courts be would declare and quick therefore to resolve cases and controversies on the basis of something omitted; [Citation other than the words of the law. emphasis original.] in the aside, As an this brochure did not render a on the verdict instant controversy. Rather, it stated: Marriage Proposal 2 is a union between a husband and wife. keep way. rights will it that This is not about or or how benefits people family, their choose five life. This has to do with children way people merely question and the are. It settles the once and for today generations. all what is—for families and future 481 Mich 56 Opinion Court

Moreover, like the Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, Michigan Rights Civil Commission issued asserting: a statement passed, Proposal rights

If 2 would result in fewer couples, benefits for unmarried both same-sex and hetero sexual, by banning overturning existing civil unions and partnerships. Banning partnerships domestic domestic many Michigan would cause families lose benefits such insurance, pensions as and life hospital health visitation rig hts.[23] language resolving We do read not that the prohibit obtaining would not from health-insurance Moreover, by supporters benefits. statements made other of the amend- partnership would, fact, prohibited by ment stated that benefits be Family amendment. See amicus curiae brief of the American Association Michigan, pp 6-8. brochure, plaintiffs rely In addition to the and the dissent on statements Marriage made counsel for Citizens for the Protection of to the Board of apparently State Canvassers in which he asserted that the amendment prohibit public employers would health-insurance ben- 92-93, partners. quoting transcript August efits to domestic Post at 23, 2004, hearing board, reproduced appendix before the in the Governor’s (Docket 133429),p accuracy characterization, No. 68a. Whatever the of this Family cf. Michigan, p amicus curiae brief of the American Association of 2, repeating people ultimately n it should bear little that the did not cast counsel’s, approve disapprove person’s, their votes to or or other concerning amendment; they approve statements disapprove voted to of the amendment itself. Moreover, given that the “Board of State Canvassers... has the authority only petitions signed by to ‘ascertain if the have been ” requisite qualified registered electors,’ Michigan number of Civil Rights Initiative, (Markman, J., concurring), 475 Mich at quoting 168.476(1), why places MCL particular we are not sure the dissent emphasis,post at 92 n on the fact that this statement was made before the Board of State Canvassers. opponents concerning Other made similar statements the adverse consequences See, generally, of the amendment. amicus curiae brief of Family Michigan, pp the American Association 9-12. The dissent “[i]t public heavily contends that is reasonable to assume that the relied proponents explain meaning scope.” on the of the to its and At Nat’l Pride Opinion op the Court Therefore, reasonably all that can he discerned from the is this: before the of the adoption extrinsic evidence amendment, public regarding there was debate effect, part and this debate focused in on whether the its domestic-partnership amendment would affect benefits. polls, they of this state then to the people proceeded language the actual of the amend- presumably assessed debate, majority of this and a light proceeded ment in favor.24The role of this Court is not to determine vote argument. Contrary Post at 96 n 35. We see no basis for this to the dissent, likely proponents’ relied on views it no more the voters Indeed, opponents’ might rather than views of the amendment. one conceivably people significantly think that at least some of the would be likely rely more on an assessment of the amendment from an official agency government private organization than from a with an passage Similarly, might stake in the of the amendment. it be obvious ejected might that at least some be influenced the characterizations of Press, newspapers political such as the Detroit Free in which its columnist question-answer 13, September stated in a format on 2004: employee What about benefits accorded to domestic Q. dependents by municipalities and their some universi- ties? Proponents opponents say they A. of the amendment prohibited they would be to the extent mimic benefits for married employees. Because we cannot read voters’ minds to determine whose views they ignored relied on and whose because in the end this would not —and be relevant —we must look to the actual of the amendment. The inadvertently principal infirmity upon dissent illustrates the of reliance legislative history, namely judge essentially it affords unchecked pick among competing and choose in order discretion histories to select support predilections. relying his In those that best own on what she available,” post describes as the “wealth of extrinsic information at 95 n justice dissenting supporting refers to information her own viewpoint, disregarding while the abundant of extrinsic infor- “wealth mation” that does not. perhaps supporters legislative It can be discerned that also downplay initiatives often tend to the effect of such initiatives constitutional debate, during public opponents while tend to overstate their effect. 481 MICH 56 Opinion of the Court it about the amendment before was who said what ratified, these speculate or to about how statements Instead, our may responsibility have influenced voters. in is, always as it has been matters of constitutional meaning to determine the of the amend- interpretation, language.25 ment’s actual majority the dissent accuses the of “condon- When ing] encouraging] misleading and even the use of campaigns,” 102, tactics in ballot can post we surmise from this that the dissent believes that this must defer in its constitutional interpretations, Court constitution, language myriad not to the but to statements from private organizations, individuals may some of which have ascribed to the meanings utterly language. constitution at odds with its actual We people do not believe the of this state have in acquiesced delegation judicial responsibility from the courts private groups. interest

I. OTHER STATES Finally, none of the decisions from other states on plaintiffs rely which is helpful because none involves failing evidence, given The dissent chastises us for to consider extrinsic Nutt, 565, 588-592; People that we considered such evidence in v 469 Mich (2004), Court, Lapeer Lapeer 677 NW2d 1 Co Clerk v Circuit 469 Mich 146, 156-160; cases, 665 NW2d 452 Post at 95 n 34. In those we considered the Official Record of the Constitutional Convention and the People. hardly comparable campaign Address to These statements by private organizations. Further, recognized made we in those cases that People “constitutional and the convention debates Address to the ... are... controlling.” Clerk, least, Lapeer say Co 469 Mich at 156. To neither apparent proposition any stray case stands for the dissent’s bit of jetsam guidance giving meaning historical flotsam or can serve as in to the vein, trump constitution. In a similar the dissent would the actual by relying telephone survey of the constitution on a conducted three months majority surveyed before the election that indicated that a of those were not opposed domestic-partnership benefits. Nat’l Pride At Inc v Governor Opinion op the Court specific language Michigan’s marriage contained Carswell, See, e.g., amendment. State v Ohio St 3d (2007) (constitutional 210; provision, 871 NE2d 547 11, § providing: “Only Ohio Const art union man and may between one one woman be recognized by political valid this state and its subdivisions.”); Knight Superior Court Sacramento (2005) Co, 14; App Rptr 128 Cal 4th 26 Cal 3d 687 308.5, (statute, “[o]nly Cal Fam Code a man and a or marriage between woman is valid California”); recognized in Devlin v 580 Philadelphia, (2004) 564; (statute, Pa 862 A2d 1234 Pa Stat 23 Cons 1704, “marriage that shall be one providing between woman”); Co, man and one v 369 Md Tyma Montgomery (2002) 497; (statute, 801 A2d 148 Md Ann Code Fam 2-201, providing “[o]nly marriage Law that a between a State”); man and a is valid in this v woman Heinsma (2001) Vancouver, 556; 2d City Wash 29 P3d 709 (statute, 26.04.010(1), Wash Rev Code providing “[m]arriage is civil contract between a male and a (Fla female”); Co, Lowe v Broward 766 So 2d 1199 App, 2000) (statute, 741.212[1], Fla Stat providing that “[m]arriages persons between of the same sex entered any jurisdiction into in ... recognized any are not state”); purpose v 304 Ill Chicago, App Crawford (1999) 818; (statute, 3d Ill Comp NE2d Stat 5/201, providing marriage is valid if it is “between woman”); a man and a v York Slattery City, New (1999) 24; AD2d (statute, 697 NYS2d 603 Dorn Rel NY 12, that “the must providing parties solemnly Law clergyman magistrate declare in the of a or presence and the attending witness witnesses that take wife”); City each other as husband and Schaefer (Colo 1998) Denver, (statute, App, 973 P2d 717 Colo Rev 14-2-104[l][b], if Stat that a is valid woman”). man As “only it is between one and one 481 Mich 56 Opinion op the Court Washington Appeals explained, “Michigan’s Court unique jurisdictions from other prohibits recognition because it of not only same- ” marriages, sex but also ‘similar unions.’ Leskovar v Nickels, App 780; 140 Wash 166 P3d 1251 “Washington’s marriage prohibits statute marriage by ‘persons other than a male and a female.’ It is distinct Michigan’s amendment, and does not prohibit recognition of ‘similar unions for ” purpose.’ Id.

The same is true of all the cases cited plaintiffs— interpreting each is a provision of law that is simply too different from Michigan’s marriage amendment to be of persuasive value in determining how this state’s amendment should be interpreted.

IV CONCLUSION The trial court held that providing health-insurance benefits to domestic partners does not violate the mar- riage amendment because public employers are not recognizing domestic partnerships as unions similar to marriage, given significant distinctions between the legal effects accorded to these two unions. However, given that the marriage prohibits amendment the rec- ognition of unions similar to marriage any “for pur- pose,” the pertinent question is not whether these unions give rise to all of the legal effects; rather, same it is whether these unions are being recognized as unions similar to marriage “for any purpose.” Recognizing this and concluding these unions are indeed being recognized as similar unions “for purpose,” the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm its judgment.26 by Appeals Because the other issues addressed the Court of were not appealed Court, in this we do not address them. Pride At Nat’l by Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. marriage amendment, is, conclude that That we 25, that “the 1963, 1, § art which states union Const one shall be the one man and woman as a or similar union recognized agreement prohibits employers pro- from any purpose,” to their employees’ health-insurance benefits viding partners. same-sex domestic qualified Young, JJ., Taylor, C.J., Weaver, Corrigan, MARKMAN, J. concurred with decide (dissenting). J. The issue we is whether

KELLY, of the “marriage Michigan amendment”1 the so-called from voluntar- prevents public employers Constitution their same- ily employees’ health benefits to has partners. majority The determined sex disagree. I that it does.

First, language prohib- of the amendment itself nothing recognition its more than the same-sex marriages perversion or similar unions. It is that, amendment’s to conclude voluntar- issue, ily offering public employer the benefits at Second, recognizes marriage. a union similar surrounding adoption circumstances strongly suggest voters prohibit public employers did not intend to employees’ health-care benefits to their offering majority decision does not partners. same-sex made, people [but “the law which the have represent some other law which the words of the rather] made to Ac- may possibly express.”2 constitution be I dissent. cordingly, 1, § art 25. Const 481, 485; Harding, People v 53 Mich 19 NW 155

88 481 Mich 56 Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly, THE UNDERLYING FACTS 2, 2004, On of majority Michigan November voters § chose to amend the Michigan Constitution to add 25 article l.3 This amendment is sometimes termed the “marriage amendment.” It provides: preserve

To secure and the benefits of for our society generations children, future of the union of one man and one woman in shall be the agreement recognized as a or similar union for any purpose.

At the time the adopted, amendment was several employers policies the state had that extended health-care benefits to their employees’ same-sex do- Also, mestic partners. the Office of the Employer State had negotiated agreement an that was to provide domestic-partner benefits to some state employees.4 2005,

In March in response to an inquiry, the Attor- ney General issued a opinion formal that concluded that the amendment prohibited public employers from granting employees’ benefits to their part- same-sex days ners.5 Five after Attorney General issued the National opinion, Work, Inc., Pride At which is a constituency AFL-CIO, group and 41 individuals6 filed the instant against lawsuit Governor Granholm. sought declaratory lawsuit judgment 18, The amendment became effective December 2004. passed, After the parties amendment was the interested entered into agreement proposed an not to submit the contract to the Civil Service Commission until a court determined whether the benefits were lawful. (March 2005). OAG, 2005-2006, 7,171, p No (1) (2) employees Michigan, Plaintiffs include city the state of (3) Kalamazoo, (4) University Michigan, State Uni (5) (6) versity, Michigan University, Wayne Eastern University, State (7) Eaton/Clinton/Ingham Community Mental Health Board. Pride At Inc v Nat’l Governor Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, J. prohibit public employers amendment does not the benefits.7 providing General, acting

The on the Governor’s Attorney behalf, to dismiss the suit on the basis that moved standing. lacked The Governor then obtained plaintiffs pro- counsel and withdrew the motion. She separate position. file a This supporting plaintiffs’ ceeded to brief Attorney General to intervene as a defen- prompted dant. for summary disposition, arguing

Plaintiffs moved that the amendment does not prohibit public employers voluntarily providing from the benefits at issue. The trial court the motion. The court agreed granted prohibit found does not the ben- voluntarily efits because “[b]y part- employer-defined group ner health care benefits to an people, employers ‘recognizing the Plaintiffs’ are not ”8 marriage or similar union.’ Attorney appealed General the trial court’s in Appeals stay. decision the Court of and moved for a and, Appeals granted stay The Court of published opinion, unanimous reversed the trial court’s panel decision. The concluded that the amendment prohibited public employers granting health ben- employees’ partners.9 efits to their same-sex domestic 7 suit, city Shortly plaintiffs after filed the of Kalamazoo indicated provide partners begin that it would not benefits to same-sex domestic ning response, in 2006 unless a court ruled them lawful. In Kalamazoo was added to the instant lawsuit as a defendant. 8 Work, Governor, unpublished opinion Nat’l Pride at Inc (Case 05-368-CZ). Court, Ingham September Circuit issued No. standing Attorney The trial court did not consider the issue because the General did not raise the issue after the Governor withdrew her motion. Governor, 147; App Nat’l Pride at Inc v 274 Mich 732 NW2d MICH56

Dissenting Opinion J. Kelly, granted This Court leave to to consider appeal issue.10

TWO KEY CONSIDERATIONS always, As when interpreting Michigan Constitu tion, “duty this Court’s is to enforce the law which the made, have people not some other law which the may words of the constitution possibly be made to express.” step The initial in determining what law the people have made is to specific examine the “ ‘ doing, used. In so “it is supposed not to be that [the people] have looked for dark or meaning abstruse employed, words but rather that accepted have them in the sense most obvious to the common under standing, ratified the instrument in the belief that ’ ”12 that was the designed conveyed.” And, sense to be intent, since our task is a search for it is often necessary to “consider the surrounding circumstances adop tion of the and the provision purpose it is designed to accomplish.”13

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ADOPTION THE OF AMENDMENT in Beginning 1993 with the Supreme Hawaii Court Lewin,14 case of Baehr v a number of state courts and state legislatures joined in a national discussion on the constitutionality barring of same-sex marriages. In Baehr, the court held that Hawaii’s limiting statute

10 (2007). 478 Mich 862 11 Harding, 53 Mich at 485. 12 City Attorney General, Traverse School Dist v 384 Mich 390, 405; (1971) (citations omitted). NW2d 9 Publications, Michigan Trustees, Federated Inc v Univ State Bd of (1999). 460 Mich 594 NW2d 491 75, 85; Lewin, (1993). Baehr v 74 Hawaii 852 P2d 44 530; Pride At Nat’l Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. presumptively to one man and one woman was It held under the Hawaii Constitution. unconstitutional showing compelling the state had the burden that in Hmiting interest state male/female Baehr, Supreme the Vermont Court Following unions.15 legislature the state ordering issued a decision in 1999 legal form that would afford same-sex to create to that of married couples couples.16 a status similar 2003, v Then, Goodridge Dep’t the famous case Health,17 Supreme Pub the Massachusetts Judicial barring people Court held that two of the same sex from protection guarantees violated the marrying equal year, That same the Massachusetts Constitution.18 Legislature granted registered California and benefits ... rights, protections, “the same granted upon spouses.”19 as are to and imposed against background Michigan It was Citizens Alliance commenced an initiative to Christian amend the Constitution to bar same-sex mar- Michigan riage. The alliance formed the Citizens for the Protec- (CPM) tion of committee “in Marriage response to the taking place country debate across the the defini- over marriage.”20 goal tion of committee’s stated was to place the issue of same-sex on the ballot so say voters would have the ultimate in the matter.21 Id. 580. State, 194, 197-198; Baker 170 Vt 744 A2d 864 17 Health, Goodridge Dep’t 309; Pub 440 Mass 798 NE2d 941 18 Id. 342. 19 297.5(a). Cal Fam Code 20 (Docket 133554), 95c, p reproducing appendix Plaintiffs No. CPM

webpage longer no available online. 21 Id. Mich Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J.

During campaign, regarding CPM’s concerns arose exactly prohibit. what the amendment CPM would August to address these concerns at an attempted the Board hearing certification before of State Canvassers.22 CPM addressed whether the Specifically, amendment, petitioned it had on the place which ballot, would bar from ben- public employers efits to their same-sex domestic employees’ partners. representative, attorney Doster, CPM’s Eric E. assured the board that it would not. Mr. Doster stated: certainly nothing preclude

[T]here would be [a] public employer extending benefits, [health-care] if chose, employer so as a matter of contract between employee, say dependent domestic [to benefits ... any] person, your they certainly and it could be cat. So could extend it as a matter of contract. employer,

[A]n as a matter of contract between em ployer employee, can offer benefits to whomever the employer my if spouse, wants to. And it wants to be if it my partner wants to be that’s defined —however cat, your my under employer the terms of contract or .[23] can do that... Mr. Doster reiterated this point through- several times out the proceedings. repetitive, again,

I’d hate to be but that’s a matter of employer employee. contract an between And if the that, employer benefits, wanted to do offer those I don’t see language just how this affects that. If the said “marriage” “spouse,” agree you. I then would with But ballot, proposal placed In order for a to be on the the Board of State certify Thus, hearing must Canvassers it. MCL 168.476. the certification very important step was a for CPM. (Docket appendix 133429), p 67a-68a, reproduc The Governor’s No. ing 23, 2004, transcript August hearing. Nat’l Pride At 93 Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, J. nothing there’s in this I interpret that would that that.[24] say go beyond would that that somehow would In its campaign voters, to win over CPM made a number of additional public statements that were con- sistent with Mr. testimony Doster’s before the Board of State example, Canvassers. For Elwell, Marlene campaign CPM, director for was quoted USA Today stating as that nothing “[t]his has to do with taking benefits away. This is about marriage between a man and a woman.”25Similarly, CPM communications direc- tor Kristina Hemphill quoted was as stating “[t]his Amendment has nothing do with benefits.... It’s just a diversion from the real issue.”26

CPM also made clear on its webpage that it was “not against anyone, defining [CPM is] for marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Period.”27 Instead, CPM contended that its reason for proposing the amendment its belief “[n]o was one has the right to redefine marriage, it change everyone else. 2 Proposal will keep things are and as they’ve been. And by amending Michigan’s constitu- tion, we can settle this question once and for all.”28

CPM even distributed a brochure that asserted that the amendment would not affect employer health- benefit plan already in place. The brochure stated:

Proposal Only 2 Marriage about 24 Id. at 69a. Jones, Gay marriage states, on ballot in 11 Today, Charisese USA 15, 2004, p October A.3. Burdick, Marriage splits voters, issue Sentinel, John Holland Octo

ber 2004. (Docket 133554), appendix reproducing Plaintiffs’ No. a CPM webpage longer no available online. brochure, Marriage, reproduced CPM’s Protect in the Governor’s (Docket 133429), appendix p No. 30a. [May- 481 Mich 56 Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. Proposal

Marriage is union between a husband and wife. way. rights keep it that This is not about or benefits will people to live their life. This has to do with how choose family, way people merely are. It children and settles question once and for all what is—for families today generations.[29] future It can be assumed that the clarifications offered CPM, organization successfully to petitioned ballot, on the carried place proposal considerable weight public. certainly with the Its statements encour- aged voters who did not ban wide-ranging favor to very vote for were promised specific what was marriage. ban on same-sex shortly And a conducted poll before the election public indicates that CPM’s in line position was with public opinion. poll that, The results indicated whereas public banning was in favor of marriage, same-sex it opposed was not to employer programs granting ben- partners. efits to same-sex domestic In an August poll likely voters,30 2004 of 705 of percent respondents favored the amendment while planned to percent against vote it. But 70 percent of specifically disapproved making domestic partnerships unions illegal.31 Sixty-five per- civil cent of disapproved barring cities and counties from providing domestic-partner benefits.32 And percent

29Id. results, 3, poll August For full see the letter from Lake Snell Perry Associates, Inc., parties, reproduced & to interested as exhibit 10 of appeal professors the amici curiae brief on of various law public universities. 31 Twenty-four percent approved making partnerships illegal. civil unions 32 Twenty-seven percent approved barring cities and counties from providing domestic-partner benefits. Nat’l Pride At Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, J. disapproved prohibiting state universities from offer- ing domestic-partner benefits.33

Accordingly, the circumstances surrounding of the amendment adoption indicate that the lead proponents of the amendment worked hard to convince voters to it.34CPM adopt told voters that the “marriage amendment” would bar same-sex marriage but would prohibit public employers from providing the ben- 33 Twenty-nine percent approved prohibiting state universities from offering domestic-partner benefits. majority rely The trump claims that I on extrinsic sources to language. detail, explain my amendment’s I will interpreta As in more tion is language, consistent with the trump amendment’s not a card. majority attempts justify disregard its of the extrinsic sources by concluding “marriage available unambiguous. that the amendment” is As by any amendment, can be vague discerned reader of the used ambiguous regard question presented by the resolution of the Clearly, unambiguously case. amendment does not state whether employers are barred from health employees’ benefits to their partners. says nothing same-sex It Accordingly, about these benefits. it is necessary engage injudicial question. construction to resolve that ambiguous regard Since the proper amendment is in to the resolution of presented, disagree majorify’s the issue I ignore with the choice to the goal extrinsic sources available. Because our is to discern the law that the made, people have light intent, when extrinsic sources exist that shed on this I believe it given every is essential to consider them. And that United States justice Supreme today sitting Court language considers sources outside the ascertaining interpretation in the provision, my correct aof constitutional hardly Accordingly,contrary majorify’s methods are unusual. allega- to the tions, “delegation judicial responsibility it is not a from the courts to private groups” interest to consider these extrinsic sources. Ante at 84. It is widely accepted interpretation. means of But, my personal disagreement majorify’s methodology aside, with the I find eye remarkable its decision to turn a blind to the wealth of extrinsic majority’s forays information available. Consider the recent into constitu- interpretation: majority tional The did not hesitate to consult outside interpreting provision People Nutt, sources when a constitutional in 565, 588-592; (2004), Lapeer Mich Lapeer 677 NW2d 1 and in Co Clerk v Court, 146, 156-160; Though Circuit 469 Mich 665 NW2d 452 the majority protests my cases, simple characterization of its actions in these the 481 MICH 56 Opinion by Dissenting Kelly, J. that these issue. It is reasonable to conclude

efits at that the amend- led the ratifiers to understand statements limited to the traditional purpose preserving ment’s was majority And it seems that a marriage.35 definition of an that would bar likely voters favored amendment Therefore, go but would no further. same-sex majority by holding errs that the amend- this Court’s marriage but also prohib- ment not bars same-sex majority The error of the its the benefits issue. by examining confirmed the amendment’s decision is language.

THE LANGUAGEOF THE “MARRIAGEAMENDMENT” “marriage The amendment” provides: operandi fact that is to extrinsic in remains its modus consider sources some seemingly approaches but not in others. The inconsistent of the cases majority baffling. that, election, pointed opponents the It has been out before suggested prohibit that the amendment would the benefits at issue. These statements are relevant. But it does not follow that opponents’ suggestion coupled the election results shows that with people actually prohibit First, determining intended to the benefits. meaning, logically law’s one assumes that the statements of its drafters and carry weight supporters more than lead the concerns of those who voted against Second, suggestion opponents’ prompted it. it was the that proponents publicly state that the amendment would not bar the benefits proponents’ response at issue. Because the statements were in to the suggestion, opponents’ stronger the statements become even indicators of opponents’ suggestion voter intent. The indicates that there was confusion regarding prohibit. what the amendment would It is reasonable to assume heavily proponents explain that the relied on the ofthe amendment to meaning scope. its my majority “perplexed” by conclusion that it is reasonable to weight proponents afford the statements of the more than the statements of that, opponents. appears agree It do not with me if one wishes words, meaning an to understand author’s the best source is the Similarly, author himseE The best source is not the author’s critics. I believe that, deciding to conclude it reasonable what amendment’s meant, people organization proposed turned to the the amendment. They organizations opposed approval. did not turn to were its Nat’l Pride At Opinion by Dissenting Kelly, J. preserve marriage To secure and the benefits of for our society generations children, and for future the union of marriage only one man and one woman in be the shall recognized marriage agreement or union for similar purpose.[36] has The parts.

It two first lists the amendment’s purpose: preserve “[t]o secure the benefits of mar- for our riage society generations for future children ....” The that purpose second discusses how is accomplished. to be Both are in relevant determining public whether employers prohibited provid- ing the benefits at in issue this case. “marriage amendment” undertakes to accom- its

plish purpose protecting of marriage benefits by providing that “the union man of one and one agreement woman shall be the recog- as a marriage nized or similar for any purpose.” union Through this language, prohibits the amendment recognition “[1] same-sex [2] similar union[s].”

It clear that the employee-benefit programs at do issue not recognize marriage. Therefore, same-sex if amendment, programs violate the it must be recognizing a union similar For a marriage. union to marriage, be “similar” to it must share the same basic qualities marriage.37 Thus, characteristics or of a deciding whether employers violate the by providing issue, the benefits at we must first consider what a entails.

Marriage has been called “the important most rela- tion in life .. . .”38 “is a coming together It for better or 1963, 1, § art Const 25. (March 2005). OAG, 2005-2006, 7,171, pp See No 14-15 Maynard Hill, 190, 205; 723; 31 L US S Ct Ed 654 56Mich 481

98 by Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. the degree and intimate to worse, hopefully enduring, for a promotes way sacred. It is an association being faiths; causes; living, political a life, harmony a not or loyalty, not commercial social bilateral projects.”39 pure a contract. It is private is not [marriage] “[B]ut by public interest and a affected with policy.”40 and Therefore, regu- the control to define state retains defining does who is by union. It so late the must for a marriage to what be done qualified marry,41 methods the solemnification to take and the place,42 and dissolution of marriage.43 benefits, many and rights, And the state confers As marriage. the result of a solely as responsibilities said, relation “[t]he United States Court has Supreme formed, parties in and to steps once the law holds obligations and It would take various liabilities.”44 name legal to list each of the state statutes that pages responsibilities marriage. that stem from rights spouse equal right of a are: Each has an Examples few during Each acquired to property marriage.45 has the to and retirement benefits spouse right pension during has the spouse accrued Each marriage.46 immunity to invoke the other right spousal prevent And each spouse’s right damages has the testimony.47 39 Connecticut, 1678; 486; 14 L Griswold 381 US 85 S Ct Ed 2d (1965). 510 40 Pettigrew, 618, 621; Hess v 261 Mich 247 NW 90 551.1; 551.3; 551.5; 555.4; See MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL 551.51. through See MCL 551.101 551.103. 551.7; 551.9; 552.104; 551.15; MCL MCL MCL 552.6 See MCL MCL seq. et 44 Maynard, 125 US at 211. 557.204. MCL 552.18. MCL 47 MCL 600.2162. At Nat’l Pride Inc v Governor by Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. wrongful for the death of her In spouse.48 his addi- tion, 1,000 are than conferring there more federal laws even privileges couples.49 more benefits and on married

Accordingly, it is obvious there separate are two There marriage: private elements bond between two state people, recognizes by which the solemnifying benefits, And marriage. there rights, respon- on sibilities that the state confers solely individuals virtue of their of being status married. Both elements are Hence, necessary important components marriage. marriage, for a union to be similar to it must mirror more than the manner in private recognized. which the bond is It carry benefits, must also with it comparable rights, responsibilities.50 600.2922(3)(a). MCL (Docket plaintiffs’ 133554), appendix 16c-17c, See pp reproduc No. ing January 31,1997, Barry Bedrick, a letter from R. Associate General Counsel, Accounting Office, Hyde, Henry General to the Honorable Judiciary Committee, pp Chairman the of United States House 1-2. by relying exclusively personal It is expressed on the commitments in agreements domestic-partnership majority the that the determines that programs the majority benefit issue violate the The amendment. attempts justify disregard legal its incidents that flow the from by relying language any marital purpose.” status on the “for It concludes that, language, marriage of a because union can be if similar to even benefits, rights, responsibilities it carries with it none the of or of marriage. preposterous. language any purpose” This is The “for not does modify “recognize”: the word “similar.” It modifies the word “the union marriage of only agreement one man and one woman shall be the recognized any a purpose." (Emphasis as or similar union for added.) Thus, phrase any it is purpose” error to conclude that the “for any event, already discussed, alters In the word “similar.” as the word requires comparison “similar” aspects a of essentials. Essential of a legal Therefore, include the incidents that flowfrom it. not it is meaning I majority. who the of misreads the word “similar” the It but language that, deciding it distorts the amendment’s when concludes marriage, whether a union is similar the framers intended we consider solely personal expressed by majori the commitments individuals. The

ty’s holding express purpose: contradicts the amendment’s “To secure preserve society of the benefits for our and for future generations of children ....” This indicates the amend- Mich Kelly, J. Dissenting Opinion grant issue do not programs at employer benefit responsibilities, or benefits couples rights,

same-sex programs can be is that the The most that said marriage. partners. to same-sex provide coverage health-insurance Although coverage marriage. not a benefit of But health is on basis of the status many conferred benefits married, not them. No- being among health benefits are granting law health tably is state or federal absent Instead, coverage the health couples. benefits to married And the that the fact employment. at issue is a benefit of significant other employee’s is conferred on coverage marriage; does transform it into benefit of not dependents, also conferred on other such coverage is children. coverage if a benefit of mar-

But even health were benefit to the same-sex riage, only it is afforded couples are not couples in this case. The same-sex rights, or granted any responsibilities, the other It is an odd notion to find that a marriage. benefits of union shares one of the hundreds of benefits marriage provides marriage. that a is union similar to It not because follows that violated recog- do not constitute employee-benefit programs “marriage nition same-sex similar union.”51 [a] amendment does Determining prohibit that the health public employers benefits pur- is consistent with the partners same-sex ignore important perhaps more ment’s drafters and ratifiers did not — benefits, responsibilities important rights, of marital status. Nor — equate did the sacred of with the intend benefits employment. of mundane benefits 51 is of consistent with the decisions other state courts This conclusion that to same-sex have considered whether benefits City, Slattery v regulating marriage. New York E.g., 266 violates state laws Co, (1999); Tyma Montgomery 497; 24; AD2d NYS2d Md 801 369 (Fla 2000). Co, (2002); Lowe v App, Broward A2d So 2d Nat’l Pride At Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, J. pose explicitly in the expressed amendment. The amend- ment’s stated purpose “[t]o is secure and preserve the of marriage benefits for our society genera- and for future earlier, tions of As children[.]” discussed the state is required provide health spouses. Therefore, benefits to it makes no to find sense that health benefits benefits marriage just because some employers voluntar- ily provide spouses. Instead, those benefits to the health benefits issue are benefits of The employment. amend- ment’s stated purpose protect does not or restrict employ- Therefore, ment benefits. barring public employers from providing the benefits at nothing issue does to further the purpose the amendment. is This another fact that weighs my interpretation. favor of The Attorney General makes much of the fact that the amendment uses phrase any “for purpose.” The Attorney that, General long contends as one benefit is provided to couples same-sex way the same it is provided to married couples, the amendment is violated. The majority accepts argument. this The ma- jority’s interpretation of the problematic is it essentially because reads the word “similar” out It amendment. construes the amendment to read: “the union of man one and one in marriage woman shall be the agreement recognized as a any union for purpose.”

The prohibit amendment does not the state from recognizing the validity same-sex unions for purpose. prohibits It recognizing the state from a same- sex marriage or a same-sex union that a similar to any purpose. Accordingly, unless the state recognizes same-sex marriage or same-sex union is similar a marriage, “for any 'purpose” has no application. majority fails to recognize point. Mich by Opinion Dissenting Kelly, J.

conclusion “marriage amend- the decides majority voluntarily en- from employers public prevents ment” health provide to agreements into contractual tering part- domestic same-sex employees’ their benefits as intent people’s to the contrary is ners. Its decision surrounding the the circumstances demonstrated the expressed of the adoption reasons, I must dis- those For language. amendment’s sent. does, majority the as it

Furthermore, by proceeding misleading the use of encourages and even condones the extrinsic by ignoring campaigns in ballot tactics place petitioned it. CPM evidence available ballot, telling public on amendment” “marriage public employ- prohibit would that the amendment employees’ to their benefits offering health ers from argued to this Yet CPM partners. same-sex Marriage Michigan’s language of “plain Court that granting employers prohibits Amendment” misrepresented Either CPM at issue.52 the benefits Board of to the State of the amendment meaning election or it before the people and to Canvassers is to us now. Whichever meaning misrepresents using to succeed allow CPM should not true, this Court disregard majority’s The result such antics. future, that, in the statements preelection CPM’s decep- to use lies and encouraged may be organizations abe This should or the Court. over voters tion to win us all. thought for discomforting J. with concurred KELLY, CAVANAGH, J., Protection appeal for the of Citizens curiae brief on Amicus Marriage, p 1.

Case Details

Case Name: National Pride at Work, Inc v. Governor

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: May 7, 2008

Citation: 748 N.W.2d 524

Docket Number: Docket 133429, 133554

Court Abbreviation: Mich.