United States v. Titus Bates
960 F.3d 1278
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- Federal and state officers executed a warrant at Titus Bates’s home (Nov. 21, 2013); officers announced themselves and began to force entry. Bates fired two shots through a door, wounding one federal officer.
- During and after the incident Bates called 9‑1‑1 saying “the police at my door,” that he thought he was being robbed, and later told an ATF agent he didn’t know they were police.
- Search of Bates’s home recovered ~7 pounds of marijuana, two shell casings, and his firearm; Bates was indicted on five counts (assault on a federal officer §111(b); two §924(c) counts; drug possession with intent to distribute; felon-in-possession §922(g)).
- Bates pled guilty to the possession counts, tried on the remaining counts, and was convicted of §111(b) and the §924(c) offense (jury acquitted on the drug‑related §924(c) count).
- The district court excluded psychiatric testimony, 2002 hospital records, and a later statement to an ATF agent; sentenced Bates to 360 months. Bates appealed raising challenges to the crime‑of‑violence designation, evidentiary exclusions, sufficiency of evidence (self‑defense), sentencing (predicate convictions, acceptance reduction, substantive reasonableness), and a Rehaif claim to his felon‑in‑possession plea.
Issues
| Issue | Bates' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c) | §111(b) does not categorically satisfy the elements‑clause because simple assault lacks the required "use of physical force" element | §111 is divisible; §111(b)’s use of a deadly weapon or infliction of bodily injury transforms the forcible assault element into violent force and thus meets the elements clause | Affirmed: §111(b) categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) |
| Exclusion of psychiatric testimony, 2002 hospital records, and Agent Underwood’s testimony | Psychiatric evidence and hospital records were relevant to self‑defense/knowledge; agent’s testimony would show Bates said he thought he was being robbed | Psychiatric evidence would improperly excuse conduct (IDRA), hospital records lack connection to Bates’s state of mind here without a witness, and the later agent statement is hearsay not within excited utterance or present sense exceptions | Affirmed: exclusion not an abuse of discretion; psychiatric evidence lacked the required link, records irrelevant without witness, agent statement inadmissible hearsay |
| Sufficiency of evidence / denial of acquittal on §111 and §924(c) (self‑defense) | Evidence insufficient to disprove self‑defense; Bates reasonably believed he was being robbed | Multiple warnings of "police," visible flashing lights, movement observed inside, 9‑1‑1 recording and other evidence permitted inference Bates knew they were officers | Affirmed: a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt Bates knew victims were officers and did not act in self‑defense |
| Sentencing: (a) predicate Georgia drug convictions; (b) denial of 2‑level acceptance reduction; (c) substantive reasonableness of 360‑month sentence | (a) Georgia statute broader than federal definition so convictions are not ACCA/Guidelines predicates; (b) he accepted responsibility by pleading to two counts; (c) sentence excessive, court over‑weighted criminal history and ignored trauma/self‑defense | (a) Shular controls—state offense need only involve conduct specified in federal statute; (b) defendant did not accept responsibility for all charged crimes and pleas were strategic; (c) within Guideline range and district court adequately weighed §3553(a) factors | Affirmed: prior Georgia convictions qualify as predicates; denial of acceptance reduction not clearly erroneous; 360‑month sentence not substantively unreasonable |
| Rehaif challenge to felon‑in‑possession plea (§922(g)) | Rehaif requires proof that defendant knew his prohibited status; plea and indictment omitted mens rea so conviction must be vacated | Rehaif error is non‑jurisdictional; plea was knowing and voluntary and overwhelming evidence would have shown Bates knew he was a felon—no reasonable probability he would not have pleaded | Affirmed: Rehaif does not require vacatur; plain‑error review fails because Bates cannot show he would not have pleaded guilty |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (definition of "use" as active employment of force)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (invalidating residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (knowledge of prohibited status required under §922(g))
- Feola v. United States, 420 U.S. 671 (discussing relevance of defendant's knowledge of victim's federal status in §111 cases)
- United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (IDRA bars non‑insanity psychiatric excuses; limited admissibility to negate specific intent)
- United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149 (§111 is a general‑intent crime)
- United States v. Siler, 734 F.3d 1290 (§111 divides into separate crimes; §111(b) is the enhanced penalty provision)
- United States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476 (forcible act causing injury constitutes violent force)
- United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437 (§111(b) qualifies as a crime of violence under elements clause)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (ACCA's serious drug offense requires only that state offense involve conduct specified in federal statute)
- United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322 (Rehaif omission is non‑jurisdictional where indictment still charges a federal offense)