CURTIS WOOD v. DEBORAH WOOD
(AC 36307)
Connecticut Appellate Court
Argued May 26—officially released October 27, 2015
Gruendel, Alvord and Dupont, Js.
(Aрpeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Shay, J.)
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the
All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the
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Campbell D. Barrett, with whom, on the brief, was John H. Van Lenten, for thе appellee (defendant).
DUPONT, J. The plaintiff, Curtis Wood, appeals from the court’s financial orders contained in the judgment of dissolution of his marriage to the defendant, Deborah Wood. The plaintiff’s claims are that the trial court improperly (1) calculated the value of the marital estate, (2) divided the marital estate, and (3) ordered him to make payments that exceeded the amount of funds available to him. We affirm the judgment.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The parties married on August 21, 2004. They have two surviving children of the marriage. On October 11, 2011, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the dissolution of his marriage to the defendant. The matter was tried to the сourt, Shay, J., on July 23, July 25, and August 13, 2013. Both parties were represented by counsel and a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the two minor children.
After marrying, the parties first resided at 51 Pound Ridge Road in Bedford, New York. The plaintiff inherited a one-third interest in the Pound Ridge Road property and purchased the remaining two-thirds interest from his aunts. The parties sold the Pound Ridge Road property and moved to 47 Lafayette Place, Unit 6A, a condominium unit in Greenwich. The plaintiff purchased Unit 6A with funds from the sale of the Pound Ridge Road property. A few months after moving to Unit 6A, the plaintiff inherited 8 Grove Lane in Greenwich and the parties moved to the Grove Lane property. At that time, the Grove Lane property was subject to a mortgage. The Grove Lane property was the family residence for the remainder of the marriage.
After the parties moved to the Grove Lane property, the plaintiff traded Unit 6A at 47 Lafayette Place for Unit 6B at 47 Lafayette Place. He then sold a one-half interest in Unit 6B to Dr. Halina Snowball. Snowball financed her purchase by giving the plaintiff a promissory note secured by a mortgage. Snowball paid the plaintiff $2000 per month on the note. The plaintiff and Snowball rented out Unit 6B and the plaintiff received approximately $550 in rental income per month.
In 2011, the plaintiff subdivided a residential lot from the 8 Grove Lane property. The subdivided lot became 15 Dearfield Lane. The plaintiff then entered into an agreement with Nicholas Barile to build a residence on the Dearfield Lane lot. The plaintiff and Barile created a limited liability company, Dearfield, LLC (LLC), of which they were co-managing owners. The plaintiff transferred the Dearfield Lane lot to the LLC for $850,000. The LLC then borrowed $1,685,000 to fund the development of the property. The terms of the loan required the plaintiff to pay off the remainder of the mortgage on the Grove Lane property. He paid off the remaining mortgage, approximately $350,000, with
On August 13, 2013, the final day of trial, the plaintiff testified that the LLC had received and accepted an offer for the Dearfield Lane property in the amount of $3,100,000. The plaintiff expected the sale of the Dearfield Lane property to close by the end of 2013, and that, after the closing, the plaintiff would receive $520,000 as the balance due for his original transfer of the lot to the LLC and an additional $58,000 in profits.
Additionally, the plaintiff received approximately $5000 in income per month from a family trust. He was not able to borrow against the trust or compel disbursements from it.
On November 8, 2013, the court issued its memorandum of decision. With respect to the three pieces of real estate, the court found that ‘‘the value of the [Grove Lane property] is $1,650,000; that the value of the [plain tiff’s] share of the condominium at 47 Lafayette Place, Unit B, Greenwich . . . is $304,250; the principal balance of the promissory note from . . . Snowball is $150,000; that as of the date of trial, the [plaintiff] and his partner [Barile] have accepted an offer for the property on Dearfield Lane, Greenwich, but that there is no contract of sale; that the [plaintiff] is entitled to a credit of $520,000 prior to the division of any net proceeds; that [the plaintiff] is entitled to 90 percent of any profit; and that the court is unable to determine the profit and/or net profit, if any, therefrom as of the date of trial.’’1 (Emphasis in original.) The court ordered that the plaintiff retain his interest in all three properties, ‘‘subject to any existing indebtedness, free and clear of any claims by the [defendant].’’ At the time of trial, neither the Grove Lane property nor Unit 6B at 47 Lafayette Place were subject to a mortgage.2
The court ordered the plaintiff to pay to the defendant ‘‘the sum of $750,000, as and for a lump sum property settlement, as follows: (a) Within sixty (60) days from the date of this Memorandum of Decision, the [plaintiff] shall pay to the [defendant] the sum of $350,000; and (b) within one (1) year from the date of this Order and annually thereafter, the sum [of] $100,000 until the lump sum property settlement is paid in full.’’ The court also ordered the plaintiff to ‘‘contribute the sum of $20,000 toward the attorney’s fees incurred by the [defendant] herein. Said fees shall be paid as follows: $10,000 within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum of Decision; and the balance within thirty (30) days thereafter.’’ Additionally, the court ordered the plaintiff
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly calculated the value of the marital estate. Specifically, he аrgues that the court’s finding that he was entitled to $520,000 from the sale of the Dearfield Lane property was clearly erroneous because the finding was based on ‘‘speculative profit from a nonexistent sale based on a nonexistent contract.’’ In arguing that the court erroneously included the $520,000 in the value of the marital estate, the plaintiff essentially claims that the court improperly characterized the plaintiff’s Dearfield Lane asset as distributable property for the purposes of
In order to resolve the question of whether the Dear field Lane asset constitutes marital property for the purposes of
The plaintiff entered into an agreement with Barile to build a residence on the Dearfield Lane lot. They created the LLC in which each of them was a managing owner. Under the terms of the agreement with Barile, the plaintiff transferred a subdivided portion of the Grove Lane property to the LLC for $850,000. That sub divided lot became the Dearfield Lane property. The plaintiff received partial payment for the transfer of the lot through funds from the LLC’s construction mortgage. The agreement provided that the plaintiff would receive the remaining balance of $520,000 after the Dearfield Lane lot was sold and all liens, mortgages, and costs were paid. The agreement also stated: ‘‘This Agreement is, and on the date of Closing, will be a valid, legal and binding obligation, enforceable against the other, in accordance with its terms.’’ The plaintiff’s interest in thе LLC is an asset. That interest is governed by the agreement with Barile, which provides the plaintiff with an enforceable right to the $520,000 credit. Accordingly, we conclude that the asset at issue is the plaintiff’s interest in the LLC.
A
We now turn to the question of whether the court
‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislaturе. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
The plaintiff’s claim requires us to examine the mean ing of the term ‘‘property’’ for the purposes of
‘‘[Section] 46b-81 applies only to presently existing property interests, not mere expectancies. . . . An expectancy is only the bare hope of succession to the property of another, such as may be entertained by an heir apparent. . . . [S]uch a hope is inchoate. It has no attribute of property, and the interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent and may never exist. . . . The term expectancy describes the interest of a
The plaintiff’s interest in the LLC was previously acquired during the term of the marriage and was presently existing at the time of trial. He possessed a con tractual, enforceable right to the funds owed to him by the LLC under the terms of the agreement with Barile. We recognize that his receipt of the funds was contingent upon future events, i.e., the sale of the Dearfield Lane property at such a price that there would be enough proceeds from the sale for the LLC to pay off the liens, mortgages, and costs and then to pay the plaintiff the funds owed to him. It is well settled, however, that ‘‘[t]he fact that a contractual right is contingent on future events does not degrade that right to an expectancy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We conclude, therefore, that the court properly characterized the plaintiff’s interest in the LLC as distributable property for the purposes of
B
We must next determine whether the court properly vаlued the plaintiff’s interest in the LLC at $520,000. The plaintiff argues that the court improperly valued his interest in the LLC at $520,000 because his ‘‘profit had not been established by any sales contract for the property: at the time of trial, there was a verbal offer only, but there was no firm sales contract. The [plaintiff’s] right to receive these funds, and indeed any profit from the sale of the Dearfield property, was completely speculative.’’ The defendant argues that the court properly valued the plaintiff’s interest in the LLC because it was entitled to rely on the plaintiff’s financial affidavit, which stated that he was entitled to receive $520,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the Dearfield Lane property. We agree with the defendant.
‘‘We begin our analysis by noting that a trial court has broad discretion in determining the value of property. In assessing the value of . . . property . . . the trier arrives at his own conclusions by weighing the opinions of the appraisers, the claims of the parties, and his own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value, and then employs the most appropriate method of determining valuation. . . . The trial court has the right to accept so much of the testimony of the experts and the recognized appraisal methods which they employed as he finds applicable; his determination is reviewable only if he misapplies, overlooks, or givеs a wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration which it was his duty to regard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn. App. 791, 799–800, 769 A.2d 725 (2001).
The plaintiff’s testimony on the final day of trial was consistent with his financial affidavit. He testified that an offer of $3,100,000 had been accepted for the Dearfield Lane property. Even though the offer was for $100,000 less than the estimated selling price in the affidavit, he would still receive the $520,000 payment from the LLC. The only difference was in the amount of profit he expected to receive—$58,000 instead of $148,950.
The court was entitled to rely on the plaintiff’s financial affidavit and his trial testimony in determining the value of his enforceable interest in the LLC. See Porter v. Porter, supra, 61 Conn. App. 799–800 (trial court may consider claims of parties in assessing value of property); Voloshin v. Voloshin, 12 Conn. App. 626, 628, 533 A.2d 573 (1987) (trial court entitled to rely on sworn financial statements filed in dissolution actions). Both the plaintiff’s financial affidavit and his testimony at trial indicated that he would receive at least $520,000 from the sale of the Dearfield Lane property. We therefore conclude that the court properly valued the plain tiff’s interest in the LLC at $520,000.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly divided the marital estate between the parties. Specifically, he argues that ‘‘[t]he evidence shows that the entire marital estate was the result of [his] premarital property and his inheritance’’ and therefore the court abused its discretion in awarding the defendant the lump sum property settlement of $750,000. He also argues that the court improperly failed to consider his liabilities and the tax debt on the real property when it divided the marital estate. In response, the defendant argues that the court properly divided the marital estate because it considered all the relevant factors set forth in
The plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in awarding the defendant a lump sum property settlement of $750,000 because ‘‘[t]he evidence shows that the entire marital estate was the result of the [plain tiff’s] premarital property and his inheritance.’’ According to the plaintiff, the court improperly awarded the defendant ‘‘more than her equitable share of the property.’’ We are not persuaded.
First we set forth our standard of review. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . This standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circum stances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such personal factors such as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties are so significant.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Quasius v. Quasius, 87 Conn. App. 206, 208, 866 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 901, 876 A.2d 12 (2005).
‘‘Importantly, [a] fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in . . . dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria. . . . While the trial court must consider the delineated statutory criteria [when allocаting property], no single criterion is preferred over others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of each case. . . . In dividing up property, the court must take many factors into account. . . . A trial court, however, need not give each factor equal weight . . . or recite the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make express findings as to each statutory factor.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App. 613, 617, 95 A.3d 569 (2014).
The plaintiff concedes, correctly, that assets acquired by inheritance are not automatically awarded to the party who inherited them. See Karen v. Parciak-Karen, 40 Conn. App. 697, 704, 673 A.2d 581 (1996) (rеjecting premise that trial court cannot assign one spouse’s inherited property to other spouse). Rather, he argues that, in light of the fact that the marital estate consisted mostly of his inheritance, the court should have awarded him the majority of the assets without also ordering him to pay a lump sum property settlement to the defendant. Phrased differently, the plaintiff
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the amount of weight to be placed on each of the statutory criteria set forth in
B
We next address the plaintiff’s argument that the court improperly failed to consider his liabilities and the tax debt on the real property when it divided the marital estate. Specifically, he argues that his financial affidavit showed $385,947 of liabilities that the court failed to take into account when making its financial orders. Additionally, he argues that the court ‘‘should have noted the true value of the marital estate by subtracting the tax liability from the value of the real prop erty.’’ We conclude that these arguments are without merit, as the court’s memorandum of decision clearly reflects that, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, the court did consider his liabilities and the tax debt on the real property.
In its memorandum of decision, the court acknowledged the plaintiff’s liabilities as described in his financial affidavit. The court stated: ‘‘Except as otherwise set forth herein, the parties shall each be responsible for the debts as shown on their respective financial affidavits . . . . In particular, the [plaintiff] shall be responsible for the outstanding state and federal tax liabilities.’’ With respect to the tax liability on the real property, the court awarded all three real property assets to the plaintiff ‘‘subject to any existing indebtedness.’’ We conclude, therefore, that the court did not fail to consider the plaintiff’s liabilities and the tax debt on the real property and, accordingly, properly divided the marital estate between the parties.
III
We now address the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly ordered him to make payments that
‘‘With respect to the financial awards in a dissolution action, great weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of its opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . Our function in reviewing such discretionary decisions is to determine whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record. . . . In other words, judicial review of a trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . In making those determinations, we allow every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 530–31, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).
The plaintiff relies on Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App. 799, 808, 90 A.3d 300 (2014), to support his position that the court abused its discretiоn in ordering him to make the disputed payments. In Valentine, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing ‘‘excessive’’ financial orders that left one party with ‘‘little to no income to sustain his basic welfare.’’ Id. This court explained: ‘‘After determining that the defendant’s net weekly income was $957.52, the court ordered him to make payments in excess of his financial capacity. It imposed a weekly obligation of $600 toward child support and alimony payments, and an additional $200 toward prior court orders until he satisfied the outstanding amount of $61,392. This $800 weekly sum alone constituted more than 80 percent of the defendant’s net weekly income, and left him with a mere $157.52 to satisfy his weekly living expenses. . . .
The plaintiff also relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 362–63, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). In Greco, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s financial orders in a dissolution proceeding constituted an abuse of discretion because, ‘‘[u]nder the trial court’s order, the defendant was forced to the brink of abject poverty by his obligations to pay the required alimony and insurance premiums, and then stripped of any means with which to pay them by the disproportionate division of the marital assets.’’ Id., 363.
In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff’s net weekly income was $1659, which included income from his employment as a realtor and also from his family trust. The plaintiff asserts that, after accounting for all of the court’s other financial orders, including alimony, child support, and health insurance and extra curricular activities for the children, his monthly income is $3887. This amount, he argues, is insufficient to allow him to comply with the disputed financial orders and meet all his personal expenses. The plaintiff’s income, however, is not his only source of funds. We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Valentine and Greco because, here, the court identified valuable assets from the marital estate and awarded them to the plaintiff, giving him the means both to comply with the disputed financial orders and sustain his basic welfare. See Valentine v. Valentine, supra, 149 Conn. App. 807–808.
The court ordered the plaintiff to make various pay ments to thе defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and the guardian ad litem in the total amount of approxi mately $790,000, and approximately $390,000 of that amount had to be paid within sixty days of the date of the memorandum of decision. In dividing the marital estate, the court awarded the plaintiff the marital home at 8 Grove Lane, which was valued at $1,650,000 and was not encumbered by a mortgage. The court also awarded the plaintiff his interest in Unit 6B at 47 Lafa yette Place, which was valued at $304,250 and was
The plaintiff argues in his brief that ‘‘[t]here is no finding or order that the [plaintiff] is to sell the 8 Grove Lane property; rather, the property is awarded to the [plaintiff], free and clear of any claim of the [defendant], and subject to any indebtedness. There is no finding that the [plaintiff] can sell his share of Unit 6B; indeed, he can’t, because he is a co-owner with Dr. Snowball . . . . There is no finding that the [plaintiff] can collect the remainder of the note from Dr. Snowball other than the monthly payments received.’’ Essentially, the plain tiff claims that, because the trial court did not specifi cally order him to sell or mortgage the assets awarded to him, or to take any other steps necessary to access the equity in them, those assets are somehow immune and this court cannot consider them in determining whether he is capable of making the disputed payments. We reject this claim.
The trial court is not required to establish a plan for the plaintiff that details the steps he must take in order to comply with the court’s financial orders. As long as the court provided the plaintiff with the means to com ply with its orders, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. Here, the court ordered the plaintiff to make payments of approximately $790,000 and awarded him in excess of $2,500,000 in assets. The fact that those assets were awarded to the plaintiff does not preclude the possibility that he will have to use a portion of them to comply with the court’s other financial orders.
The court provided the plaintiff with sufficient assets to enable him to make the disputed payments in a timely manner. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to determine how he will do so. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay the lump sum property settlement, a portion of the defen dant’s attorney’s fees, and a portion of the guardian ad litem’s fеes within the time frame established by the court.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
‘‘(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.’’