NORA LYNNE VALENTINE v. JOEL ROBERT VALENTINE
(AC 35826)
Lavine, Keller and Borden, Js.
Argued February 7—officially released April 29, 2014
149 Conn. App. 799
Joel R. Valentine, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Opinion
The trial court entered financial orders for child support, alimony, and property division incident to its judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The plaintiff later filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of those orders. The next dаy, the court granted in part the plaintiff‘s motion and entered additional financial orders without holding a hearing. The defendant subsequently initiated this appeal challenging both the propriety of the court‘s financial orders entered incident to the judgment of dissolution, and the court‘s decision granting in part the plaintiff‘s motion fоr reconsideration and clarification. The plaintiff filed notice with this court, pursuant to
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review. The parties were married on July 8, 1990, and subsequently had two children. The parties’ relationship became increasingly contentious over the years and in October, 2011, the plaintiff filed this complaint for dissolution of marriage. On May 20, 2013, following a six day trial, the cоurt, Gould, J., issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and entering financial orders for child support, alimony, and property division.2
On June 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for reconsideration and clarification with respect to several of the financial orders set forth in the court‘s memorandum of dеcision. The defendant received a copy of this motion on that same date. The next day, June 11, 2013, the court granted in part the plaintiff‘s motion for reconsideration and clarification and entered several financial orders without holding a hearing. In relevant part, it ordered the parties to share equally in thеir minor children‘s educational expenses, specifically ordering them to divide the college expenses of their older son. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to provide health insurance coverage to the plaintiff for three years at his sole expense, and further, determined that the
The defendant thereafter moved for the court to clarify the difference between its orders of May 20, 2013, and June 11, 2013, with respect to the $200 weekly payment toward the mortgage arrearage.3 The court denied the defendant‘s motion for clarification with resрect to this inquiry. This appeal followed. Additional relevant facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
We first set forth the well established standard of review in domestic relations cases. An appellate court “will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the fаcts. . . . As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). “In dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion its financial orders in accordance with the criteria set forth in [General Statutes]
We next note that our review of financial orders entered by a trial court in a dissolution matter is governed by the “mosaic doctrine.” “Under the mosaic doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a collection of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as a seamless collection of interdependent elements. Consistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration of all financial orders even though the review process might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, prоperty distribution or child support awards.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 119 Conn. App. 120, 135–36, 988 A.2d 314, cert. granted on other grounds, 296 Conn. 908, 993 A.2d 467 (2010). Accordingly, because we conclude that at least two of the defendant‘s claims challenging the court‘s financial orders have merit, the entire set of them must fall, and a new hearing be held regarding them.
II
The defendant first claims that the court violated his right tо due process
It is a fundamental tenet of due process that “no court will proceed tо the adjudication of a matter involving conflicting rights and interests, until all persons directly concerned in the event have been actually or constructively notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and given reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard . . . in sufficient time to prepare their positions on the issues involved.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Styrcula v. Styrcula, 139 Conn. App. 735, 745, 57 A.3d 822 (2012). When a party moves for reconsideration of the court‘s financial orders, the court is constitutionally required to provide the nonmoving party with the opportunity “to contest the factual predicate on which the court apparently aсted or to overcome those facts with countervailing ones.” Bartley v. Bartley, 27 Conn. App. 195, 197, 604 A.2d 1343 (1992).
Here, the plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration and clarification on June 10, 2013. The defendant received a copy of the plaintiff‘s motion either by e-mail or fax on that same date, but he did not receive notice of a hearing on it.4 Thе next day, the court granted in part the motion and entered several additional financial orders without holding a hearing or providing any opportunity for oral argument.
In rendering its decision, the court significantly increased the defendant‘s financial obligations, ordering him (1) to pay for 50 percent of his minor son‘s college expenses, (2) to provide three years of health insurance coverage to the plaintiff, (3) to pay $200 per week toward the mortgage arrearage by way of immediate wage execution, and (4) to pay more than $70,000 in debts. Given the negligible time frame of less than twenty-four hours between the filing of the motion and entry оf the court‘s orders, the defendant did not have sufficient time to object to the motion or to request a hearing so as to “subject the factual determinations underlying the . . . court‘s [orders] . . . to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bartley v. Bartley, supra, 27 Conn. App. 198.
We conclude that the court failed to provide the defendant with adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the plaintiff‘s motion for reconsideration and clarification in violation of his constitutional right to due process. Hence, because the court‘s financial orders dated June 11, 2013, were entered in violation of the defendant‘s right to due process, they cannot stand. See Styrcula v. Styrcula, supra, 139 Conn. App. 748.
III
The defendant next claims that the court abused its discretion by entering financial orders that exceed his weekly income. We agree. The following additional
Following the six day trial, the court rendered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and entering financial ordеrs for child support, alimony, and property division. Prior to setting forth its financial orders, the court enumerated its findings with respect to the economic status of each party. On the basis of their financial affidavits, it determined that the plaintiff had a net weekly income of $927.96, which was comprised of alimony, child support, and payments from rental properties, and that the defendant earned a net weekly income of $957.52 from his employment as a Web content professional. It further found that the parties were co-owners of their marital home located in Woodstock and three apartments located on the premises, which the parties rented to third parties. It determined that the marital home had a value of $330,000 and was encumbered by a mortgage of $330,000. It also determined that “[t]he defendant, who was and is the sole wage earner in the home, has not paid the mortgage on the family home since October, 2011.”
On the basis of its findings, the court entered sеveral financial orders on May 20, 2013. First, it ordered the defendant to pay $300 per week in child support and $300 per week in periodic alimony for fourteen years. Second, it ordered him to transfer his rights, title, and interest in the marital home to the plaintiff by way of quitclaim deed, and further ordered that he assume all future mortgage payments, costs, and fees associated with the property. Third, it ordered the defendant to make several other payments to satisfy prior outstanding court orders: “$928 for child support; $16,200 for discovery noncompliance; $10,800 for parenting education noncompliance; $3250 for attorney‘s fees; $31,992 for mortgage аrrearage; and $2400 for outstanding utilities, for total payments due in the amount of $65,570. . . . The child support and attorney‘s fees shall be paid within [ninety] days of the entry of judgment. The other payments shall be satisfied at the rate of $200 per week by [way] of immediate wage execution. In addition, the defendant shall pay $10,000 toward the plaintiff‘s trial and trial preparation attorney‘s fees within 120 days of the entry of judgment.”
The court also ordered the defendant to continue to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy, and to provide health insurance for the plaintiff. With respect to uninsured medical expenses, it stated that the defendant shall be responsible fоr 62 percent and the plaintiff for 38 percent of any such costs, pursuant to the child support guidelines. Moreover, the court ordered the parties to divide equally, by way of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), any retirement accounts, 401(k) plans, and pensions owned by the defendant, and to share equally the cоsts of the QDRO preparation. It also ordered the parties to share equally in any expenses associated with their minor children‘s extracurricular activities. Finally, the court ordered that the parties be solely responsible for any payments associated with their respective motor vehicles, and, insofаr as it did not conflict with other orders within its decision, ordered the parties to pay their own attorney‘s fees, costs, and trial expenses.
Contrary to the court‘s claim that it considered the pertinent statutory provisions, we conclude that the court failed to consider the defendant‘s ability to comply with its financial orders. After determining that the defendant‘s net weekly income was $957.52, the court ordered him to make payments in excess of his financial capacity. It imposed a weekly obligation
In addition to those weekly payments, moreover, the court ordered that the defendant was responsible for $13,250 of the plaintiff‘s trial attorney‘s fees and $928 for outstanding child support. What is more, it ordered him to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy at his sole expense, to cover 62 percent of any uninsured medical expenses for the parties’ two minor children, and to cover 50 percent of costs associated with their minor children‘s extracurricular activities. All of these payments are in addition to the court‘s order requiring the defendant to pay his own attorney‘s fees, costs, and trial expenses—not to mention his personal living expenses. Moreover, the court did not identify any valuable assets that the defendаnt could use to comply with its financial orders.
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the defendant‘s claim that the court‘s financial orders were excessive, leaving him with little to no income to sustain his basic welfare. See Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 361, 880 A.2d 872 (2005) (support and financial orders that consume defendant‘s income offend “the long settled principle that the defendant‘s ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating financial awards“).
We conclude, therefore, that the court abused its discretion in fashioning its financial orders. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new hearing on all financial issues.
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the financial orders and the case is remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.