WILLIAMS et al. v. POWELL et al.
S24A0591
Supreme Court of Georgia
320 Ga. 221
ELLINGTON, Justice.
FINAL COPY
After being arrested and charged with violating
According to the complaint, the appellants were each “charged with a single count of ‘preventing or disrupting General Assembly sessions or other meetings of members,’ in violation of
The complaint names as defendants multiple law enforcement officers in their personal capacities.5 The appellants allege that the officers personally arrested one or more of them or made decisions for the Department of Public Safety regarding the enforcement of
The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in part, distinguishing Fielden and arguing that
1. The appellants contend that
Duly enаcted statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. A trial court must uphold a statute unless the party seeking to nullify it shows that it manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people. The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law. Accordingly, we review a trial court‘s holding regarding the constitutionality of a statute de novo.
Rhodes v. State, 283 Ga. 361, 362 (659 SE2d 370) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The statute we declared to be unconstitutionally overbroad and thus void in Fielden,
We then considered the appellees’ overbreadth challenge. We explained that
[a] statute that is clear about what it prohibits can nevertheless be unconstitutionally overbroad if it stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the Constitution. The doctrine of overbreadth is particularly applicable where a statute infringes upon behavior protected by the First Amendment.
Fielden, 280 Ga. at 445 (citing Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611-612 (93 SCt 2908, 37 LE2d 830) (1973)). We further explained that conduct that has “some communicative element ... may be regulated by the government only if the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, we explained that where expressive conduct is regulated, a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad only if the overbreadth is both “real” and “substantial[,] . . . judged in relation to the statute‘s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 447 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U. S. at 615). See also Scott, 299 Ga. at 577 (3) (“Invalidation for overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be
In Fielden, we concluded that “the literal language” of
[a]ny recklessly or knowingly committed act that could reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt [any] lawful meeting, gathering or procession ..., regardless where it is committed, how trivial the act, its impact, or the intent of the actor other than the intent to commit the act itself.
Fielden, 280 Ga. at 447. We reasoned that, with this scope, the Code section “reaches conduct that is at once innocent and protected by the guarantees of free speech, thereby affecting and chilling constitutionally prоtected activity.” Id. We concluded that
Turning to the Code section at issue in this case,
It shall be unlawful for any person recklessly or knowingly to commit any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a session or meeting of the Senate or House of Representatives, a joint session thereof, or any meeting of any standing or interim committee, commission, or caucus of members thereof.
The trial court determined that
We agree with the trial court that Fielden does not require facial invalidation of
2. The appellants contend that subsections (f) and (g) of
for any person willfully and knowingly to enter or to remain in any room, chamber, office, or hallway within the state caрitol building or any building housing committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of members, officials, or employees of the General Assembly or either house thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business or to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct in such buildings or areas.
In very similar terms,
“When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way.” State v. Harris, 319 Ga. 665, 667 (906 SE2d 402) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 150 (1) (800 SE2d 348) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). In the context of
3. The appellants contend that
For a statute to withstand a challenge that it is unconstitutionally vague under
(2004) (citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, “the fact that application of the statute‘s standards sometimes requires an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the statute is violated does not render it unconstitutional.” Banta, 281 Ga. at 617 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted).
The uncertainty in a statute which will amount to a denial of due process of law is not the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases fall within or without the prohibition of the statute, but whether the standаrd established by the statute is so uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable definiteness that any particular act is disapproved[.]
Mixon, 226 Ga. at 870 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Freeman, 302 Ga. at 183 (1) (In interpreting the language of a criminal statute, “to determine whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe the statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
The appellants have not shown that, taking the allegations of the complaint as true,
court did not err in dismissing the appellants’ facial vagueness challenge. See In re D. H., 283 Ga. 556, 557 (2) (663 SE2d 139) (2008) (holding that a statute making it unlawful for any person to disrupt or interfere with the operation of any public school contains words of ordinary meaning that give constitutionally sufficient notice as to the statute‘s application); Fielden, 280 Ga. at 444-445.
4. The appellants contend that subsections (f) and (g) of
criminal arrests — in an arbitrary and potentially discriminatory manner.” They also argue that loud volume of speech alone, “without additional disruptive conduct, is not a sufficient reason to arrest a person for their speech, especially where, as here, there are no standards to determine what speech is loud enough to be criminal and no requirement that anything be disrupted[,]” citing Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81, 82 (526 SE2d 60) (2000).16
As referenced in Division 3, supra, to satisfy due process requirements, a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is forbidden and to provide standards that prevent arbitrary
enforcement. See Poole, 262 Ga. at 719; Banta, 281 Ga. at 616-617 (1); Lindsey, 277 Ga. at 773 (1); Mixon, 226 Ga. at 870 (1).
As discussed in Division 2, supra, the most natural reading of subsections (f) and (g), viewed in the context of
sufficient notice to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct and does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague); Fielden, 280 Ga. at 444-445 (holding that
5. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing Cannon‘s as-applied claim for a violation of her right to free speech under the Georgia Constitution, which was based on the
trial court‘s determination that the allegations of the complaint “do not plausibly show” that “Cannon was engaged in any protected expression in connection with her arrest.” The appellants argue that in the context of this case Cannon‘s act of knocking on a door to the governor‘s office was “inherently expressive” and was protected under the Georgia Constitution.
We do not reach the merits of Cannon‘s as-applied claim, however, because the complaint does not allege that Cannon engaged in any conduct that is prohibited by
have been expected to prevent or disrupt a legislative session or a meeting of members of the General Assembly in violation of
See Major, 301 Ga. at 152 (3) (“An as-applied challenge addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 67-68 (2) (c) (751 SE2d 90) (2013) (determining that the statute at issue regulated the petitioner‘s conduct and reviewing on the merits an as-applied challenge to the statute).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
I concur fully in the Court‘s opinion affirming the trial court‘s rejection of the appellants’ state constitutional challenge to a Georgia statute regulating conduct at the Georgia State Capitol and related locations. The appellants are limited on appeal to only thоse arguments that they chose to make below, and they cannot succeed on those arguments. But the State should not confuse this limited victory with a clean bill of health for the statute. The statute is seriously flawed. Those charged with its enforcement should take
care to avoid those flaws, and the General Assembly should seriously consider revising it.
1. The statute is seriously flawed.
I concur fully in the Court‘s decision today that
may be prosecuted even where they had not been asked to leave a meeting and refused.19
The absence of such guardrails is particularly problematic given the nature of the locations covered by the statute, both in their significance and their potential breadth. The statute‘s principal focus is on conduct at the Georgia State Capitol, the primary home of two of the three branches of Georgia state government and a center of free speech. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (describing the rotunda of the Georgia State Capitol as “a public forum located in a core government building“). The Capitol is a busy (and noisy) place, home to debates on many of the most contentious issues of the day. It hosts a range of visitors who may lack knowledge of the building‘s layout, schedule, and conventions. At the same time, thе statute covers a
wide-ranging scope of meetings far from the Capitol, as legislative study committees meet throughout the state. And it also reaches meetings of “caucus[es] of members,” some of which are public and clearly defined, such as the majority and minority caucuses, while others may be less obvious to outsiders.20
By not requiring disruptive intent or actual disruption in a statute aimed at government meetings in general and at a frequently visited government building in particular, the statute potentially subjects a host of activity to prosecution. Some of that activity may not involve core protected speech but still would be considered innocent in nature by most people, such as a visiting group of school children causing noise outside of a legislative meeting, or an audible cell phone ringer or persistent coughing
during a meeting. But it also may include core political speech that might be considerеd disruptive merely by
These problems will remain until the General Assembly corrects subsections (a), (f), and (g).21 And until such amendments occur, law enforcement charged with the security of the covered locations and the people within them will be in a very difficult position with respect to enforcement decisions under these flawed statutes. These statutes can be enforced in a constitutional manner on a lot of occasions, which is why the Court‘s decision today is correct. But the statutes also extend beyond those permissible occasions, and Georgia owes it to law enforcement — and the People seeking to exercise their constitutional rights — to correct that.
2. Overbreadth may not be a cognizable claim under the Georgia Constitution.
My main point in writing is to ensure that the State doesn‘t misinterpret the Court‘s decision. But it‘s also imрortant that the appellants don‘t misinterpret this concurrence: it‘s not a roadmap for a future overbreadth lawsuit under the Georgia Constitution. I am skeptical that Georgia courts have the power to entertain such claims.
The federal overbreadth doctrine has both a substantive First Amendment component and a standing component. That standing component operates as a doctrine permitting plaintiffs to assert the claims of others in federal court. As such, it‘s not a doctrine that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply even for First Amendment claims. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (123 SCt 2191, 156 LE2d 148) (2003) (“[O]ur standing rules limit only the federal courts’ jurisdiction over certain claims. . . . Whether Virginia‘s courts should have entertained this overbreadth challenge is entirely a matter of state law.” (emphasis in original)). And if
we‘re not required to apply overbreadth standing even to First Amendment claims, we certainly aren‘t required to apply such a relaxed standing doctrine to claims аrising under the Georgia Constitution unless Georgia‘s law of standing permits it.
I readily acknowledge that this Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine to federal and state constitutional claims. See, e.g., West v. State, 300 Ga. 39, 40-41 (793 SE2d 57) (2016); Fielden, 280 Ga. at 445; Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 402 (5) (467 SE2d 875) (1996); Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 831-832 (2) (400 SE2d 916) (1991); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673-674 (2) (398 SE2d 547) (1990). We appear to have imported this doctrine uncritically from federal caselaw without consideration of the text, history, and context of the Georgia Constitution. See Breaux v. State, 230 Ga. 506, 507-508 (1) (197 SE2d 695) (1973). As the appellants have acknowledged here, “[p]rior decisions of this Court have not fully explained why the federal rule of overbreadth standing has historically applied equally to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts and
to free speech violations of the Georgia Constitution in light of [Hicks].” But as this Court has explained in detail, “we should not simply recite holdings of the United States Supreme Court . . . and uncritically import them into our interpretation of” the Georgia Constitution. Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). And the power of Georgia courts to decide cases is determined independently of federal standing doctrine. See Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Commrs., 315 Ga. 39, 45 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (”SCV“).
Georgia‘s law of standing has long had a requirement that a plaintiff generally is limited to assertions of a violation of his or her own legal rights. See, e.g., SCV, 315 Ga. at 50 (2) (b) (to have standing, “a party must have some right at stake that requires adjudication to protect it“); Mitchell v. Ga. & Ala. R. Co., 111 Ga. 760, 771 (2) (36 SE 971) (1900) (A Georgia plaintiff “can not
plaintiffs to assert a claim based on the violation of someone else‘s legal rights.
And this general principle looks more like a bright-line rule when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a state statute. See, e.g., Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 92 (1) (901 SE2d 512) (2024) (it is “well settled that a court ‘will not listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and who has, therefore, no interest in defeating it.‘“) (quoting Reid v. Mayor, etc. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755, 757 (1) (6 SE 602) (1888)); SCV, 315 Ga. at 54 (2) (c) n.13 (citing cases); Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 (1) (622 SE2d 346) (2005) (“‘A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the statute adversely impacts that party‘s rights.‘“) (quoting Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1) (533 SE2d 60) (2000)); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 692 (30 SE 759) (1898) (“Before a law can be attacked by any citizen on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his rights of person or
property.“).22 Indeed, one case applying this rule articulated it as applying to all cases except First Amendment overbreadth claims. See Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987) (stating that “except where First Amendment rights are involved, a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights,” and citing for this proposition a case citing only federal overbreadth caselaw (citation and punctuation omitted)).23 This longstanding rule seems
wholly incompatible with a doctrine permitting parties to assert a claim based on the violation of someone else‘s legal rights. The appellants argue that the Georgia Constitution‘s speech protections are broader than the First Amendment and so necessarily include overbreadth. But whether or not the Georgia Constitution protects more speech than the First Amendment is a question wholly separate from the scope of the judicial power the Georgia Constitution grants Georgia courts to decide claims brought under the Georgia Constitution‘s speech provisions.
If, as it seems to me likely, the judicial power conferred by the Georgia Constitution does not permit a party to assert a claim based on the violation of someone else‘s legal rights, then the Georgia Constitution likely would not include an overbreadth doctrine.
There may be good policy reasons for certain relaxations on standing limits. But it is not within the judicial power to disregard limitations on that power just because we think it would be good policy.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justicе Boggs, and Justice Warren, Justice Bethel,
Decided October 31, 2024.
Gerald R. Weber, Jr.; Washington Dreyer & Associates, Quinton G. Washington, David N. Dreyer, Deana H. Ingraham; Ebony J. Brown, Megan Toomer; Mitchell Shapiro Greenamyre & Funt, Zack Greenamyre, for appellants.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Deborah N. Gore, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zachary A. Mullinax, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W. Bergethon, Justin T. Golart, Deputy Solicitors-General, for appellees.
Notes
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person recklessly or knowingly to commit any act which mаy reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a session or meeting of the Senate or House of Representatives, a joint session thereof, or any meeting of any standing or interim committee, commission, or caucus of members thereof.
...
(f) It shall be unlawful for any person willfully and knowingly to enter or to remain in any room, chamber, office, or hallway within the state capitol building or any building housing committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of members, officials, or employees of the General Assembly or either house thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business or to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct in such buildings or areas.
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person to parade, demonstrate, or picket within the state capitol building or any building housing committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of members, officials, or employees of the General Assembly or either house thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business or to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct in such buildings or areas.
Thelen, 272 Ga. at 82-83 (citation and punctuation omitted).[b]y prohibiting “any unnecessary or unusual sound or noise which annoys others,” the ordinance [at issue failed] to provide the requisite clear notice and sufficiently definite warning of the conduct that is prohibited. . . . Whether the nоise of a helicopter takeoff or landing is unnecessary, unusual, or annoying to a neighbor more than 50 feet away certainly depends upon the ear of the listener. A statute is unconstitutionally vague when the standard of conduct it specifies is dependent upon the individualized sensitivity of each complainant.
Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886).The courts will never blot out of existence a great police and moral enactment on the ground that parts of it are attacked as unconstitutional, in a general onslaught upon it all. On the contrary, they will preserve it all, if possible, giving the benefit of doubts to the co-ordinate branches of government, even when a legitimate case of individual suffering in person or property is brought before them; and will never decide laws unconstitutional, if cases can be otherwise adjudicated. They will always wait until the law is аttempted to be put in operation, and then act against the officer who executes or attempts to execute it, and not against the law-making branch of government in the general scope of its power.