Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе issue presented in this case is whether the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority’s trespass policy is facially invalid under the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine.
H-l
The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) owns and operates a housing development for low-income residents called Whitcomb Court. Until June 23, 1997, the city of Richmond owned the streets within Whit-comb Court. The city council decided, however, to “privatize” these streets in an effort to combat rampant crime and drug dealing in Whitcomb Court — much of it committed and conducted by nonresidents. The council enacted Ordinance No. 97-181-197, which provided, in part:
“‘§1. That Carmine Street, Bethel Street, Ambrose Street, Deforrest Street, the 2100-2300 Block of Sussex Street and the 2700-2800 Block of Magnоlia Street, in Whitcomb Court... be and are hereby closed to public*116 use and travel and abandoned as streets of the City of Richmond.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 93-94.
The city then conveyed these streets by a recorded deed to the RRHA (which is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia). This deed required the RRHA to “ ‘give the appearance that the closed street, particularly at the entrances, are no longer public streets and that they are in fact private streets.’” Id., at 95. To this end, the RRHA posted red-and-white signs on each apartment building — and every 100 feet along the streets — of Whitcomb Court, which state: ‘“NO TRESPASSING^ PRIVATE PROPERTY[.] YOU ARE NOW ENTERING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND STREETS OWNED BY RRHA. UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO ARREST AND PROSECUTION. UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLES WILL BE TOWED AT OWNERS EXPENSE.’” Pet. for Cert. 5. The RRHA also enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police
“‘to serve notice, eithеr orally or in writing, to any person who is found on Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority property when such person is not a resident, employee, or such person cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for being on the premises. Such notice shall forbid the person from returning to the property. Finally, Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority authorizes Richmond Police Department officers to arrest any person for trespassing after such person, having been duly notified, either stays upon or returns to Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority property.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 98-99 (emphasis added).
Persons who trespass after being notified not to return are subject to prosecution under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-119 (1996):
“If any person without authority оf law goes upon or remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of an*117 other, or any portion or area thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing, by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge thereof ... he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”
B
Respondent Kevin Hicks, a nonresident of Whitcomb Court, has been cоnvicted on two prior occasions of trespassing there and once of damaging property there. Those convictions are not at issue in this case. While the property-damage charge was pending, the RRHA gave Hicks written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, and Hicks signed this notice in the presence of a police officer.
At trial, Hicks maintained that the RRHA’s policy limiting access to Whitcomb Court was both unconstitutionally over-broad and void for vagueness. On appeal of his conviсtion, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia initially rejected Hicks’ contentions, but the en banc Court of Appeals reversed. That court held that the streets of Whit-comb Court were a “traditional public forum,” notwithstanding the city ordinance declaring them closed, and vacated Hicks’ conviction on the ground that RRHA’s policy violated the First Amendment.
II
A
Hicks does not contend that he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct when arrested; nor does he challenge the validity of the trespass statute under which he was convicted. Instead he claims that the RRHA policy barring him from Whitcomb Court is overbroad under the First Amendment, and cannot be applied to him — or anyone else.
We have provided this expansive remedy out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or “chill” constitutionally protected speech — especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
As we noted in Broadrick, however, there comes a point at which the chilling effect of an overbroad law, significant though it may be, cannot justify prohibiting all enforcement of that law — particularly a law that reflects “legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
B
Petitioner аsks this Court to impose restrictions on “the use of overbreadth standing,” limiting the availability of facial overbreadth challenges to those whose own conduct involved some sort of expressive activity. Brief for Petitioner 13, 24-31. The United States as amicus curiae makes the same proposal, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-17, and urges that Hicks’ facial challenge to the RRHA trespass policy “should not have been entertained,” id., at 10. The problem with these prоposals is that we are reviewing here the decision of a State Supreme Court; our standing rules limit only the federal courts’ jurisdiction over certain claims. “[S]tate courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law.” ASARCO Inc. v. Radish,
This Court may, however, review the Virginia Supreme Court’s holding that the RRHA policy violates the First Amendment. We may examine, in particular, whether the claimed overbreadth in the RRHA policy is sufficiently “substantial” to produce facial invalidity These questions involve not standing, but “the determination of [a] First Amendment challenge on the merits.” Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
C
The Virginia Supreme Court found that the RRHA policy allowed Gloria S. Rogers, the manager of Whitcomb Court, to exercisе “unfettered discretion” in determining who may use the RRHA’s property.
Hicks, of course, was not arrested for leafleting or demonstrating without permission. He violated the RRHA’s written rule that persons who receive a barment notice must not return to RRHA property. The Virginia Supreme Court, based on its objection to the “unwritten” requirement that demonstrators and leafleters obtain advance permission, declared the entire RRHA trespass pоlicy overbroad and void — including the written rule that those who return after receiving a barment notice are subject to arrest. Whether these provisions are severable is of course a matter of state law, see Leavitt v. Jane L.,
Hicks has not made such a showing with regard to the RRHA policy taken as a whole — even assuming, arguendo, the unlawfulness of the policy’s, “unwritten” rule that demonstrating and leafleting at Whitcomb Court require permission from Gloria Rogers. Consider the “no-return” notice served on nonresidents who have no “legitimate business or social purpose” in Whitcomb Court: Hicks has failed to demonstrate that this notice would even be given to anyone engаged in constitutionally protected speech. Gloria Rogers testified that leafleting and demonstrations are permitted at Whitcomb Court, so long as permission is obtained in advance. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100-102. Thus, “legitimate business or social purpose” evidently includes leafleting and demonstrating; otherwise, Rogers would lack authority to permit those activities on RRHA рroperty. Hicks has failed to demonstrate that any First Amendment activity falls outside the “legitimate business or social purpose[s]” that permit entry. As far as appears, until one receives a barment
As for the written provision authorizing the police to arrest those who return to Whitcomb Court after receiving a barment notice: That certainly does not violate the First Amendment as applied to persons whose postnotice entry is not for the purpose of engaging in constitutionally protected speech. And Hicks has not even established that it would violate the First Amendment as applied to persons whose postnotice entry is for that purpose. Even assuming the streets of Whitcomb Court are a public forum, the notice-barment rule subjects to arrest those who reenter after trespassing and after being warned not to return — regardless of whether, upon their return, they seek to engage in speech. Neither the basis for the barment sanction (the prior trespass) nor its purpose (preventing future trespasses) has anything to do with the First Amendment. Punishing its violation by a person who wishes to engage in free speech no more implicates the First Amendment than would the punishment of a person who has (pursuant to lawful regulation) been banned from a public park after vandalizing it, and who ignores the ban in order to take part in a political demonstration. Here, as there, it is Hicks’ nonexpressive conduct— his entry in violation of the notice-barment rule — not his speech, for which he is punished as a trespasser.
Most importantly, both the notice-barment rule and the “legitimate business or social purpose” rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression. The rules apply to strollers, loiterers, drug dealers, roller skaters, bird watchers, soccer playérs, and others not engaged in constitutionally protected conduct — a group that would seemingly far outnumber First Amendment speakers. Even assuming invalidity of the “unwritten” rule that requires leafleters and demonstrators to obtain advance permission from Gloria Rogers, Hicks has not shown, based on the record in this
* * *
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
The letter stated, in part: ‘“This letter serves to inform you that effective immediately you are not welcome on Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority’s Whitcomb Court or any Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority property. This letter is an official notice informing you that you are not to trespass on RRHA property. If you are seen or caught on the premises, you will be subject to arrest by the police.’ ”
As noted, the Virginia Supreme Court held that invalidity of the RRHA policy entitled Hicks to vacatur of his conviction under the unquestionably valid trespass statute, which Hicks unquestionably violated. We do not reach the question whether federal law compels this result.
Contrary to Justice Souter's suggestion, post, at 124 (concurring opinion), the Supreme Court of Virginia did not focus solely on the “unwritten” element of the RRHA trespass policy “[i]n comparing invalid applications against valid ones for purposes of the First Amendment over-breadth doctrine.” The fact is that its opinion contains no “comparing” of valid and invalid applications whatever; the proportionality aspect of our overbreadth doctrine is simply ignored. Since, however, the Virginia Supreme Court struck down the entire RRHA trespass policy, the question presented here is whether the entire policy is substantially overbroad.
Concurrence Opinion
with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and add this afterword to flag an issue of no consequence here, but one on which a future casе might turn. In comparing invalid applications against valid ones for purposes of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court of Virginia apparently assumed that the appropriate focus of the analysis was the “unwritten” element of the housing authority’s trespass policy, that is, the requirement that nonresidents distributing literature or demonstrating on the prоperty obtain prior authorization.