Joseph WATSON, Appellant v. SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dorina Varner; Superintendent Somerset SCI; Joseph, Assistant to the Superintendent at SCI Somerset; David Hunter, Unit Manager at SCI Somerset; David L. Onstead, Unit Manager at SCI Somerset; Jack Loughry, Business Manager at SCI Somerset; Susan Dorr, Mail Room Supervisor for SCI Sоmerset and SCI Laurel Highlands; Delores Chaney, Administrative for SCI Somerset and SCI Laurel Highlands.
No. 14-1170
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
May 28, 2014
567 Fed. Appx. 75
Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., Yana L. Warshafsky, Esq., Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Joseph Watson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court‘s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to
I.
Joseph Watson, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a complaint pursuant to
Watson also alleged that in June 2011, he attempted to file a post-conviction brief with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania but that the defendants tampered with and delayed the mailing of his brief. The final allegation of his complaint was that two officers searched his cell and damaged his radio in December 2011.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
II.
We exercise plenary review оver the District Court‘s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
Upon review, we conclude thаt the District Court‘s dismissal of Watson‘s
We also agree with the District Court‘s dismissal of Watson‘s claim that the prison‘s refusal to reinstate his prison job upon his return from Michigan or assign him to the GLP constituted a violation of his right to due process. Inmates do not have a liberty or property interest in their job assignments that would give rise to Due Process Clause protection. James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the defendants’ failure to reinstate him in his prison job did not violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials a duty to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). “For an alleged deprivation to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, it must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life‘s necessities.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Such a denial involves “the deprivation of a single identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise....” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Because a prison job is nоt one of life‘s necessities, this claim was properly dismissed.2
Watson‘s final claim arising out of his inability to obtain a prison job is that it constituted retaliation for his 2009 lawsuit against staff at SCI-Somerset. Upon review, we agree with the District Court‘s dismissal of this claim. Retaliating against a рrisoner for the exercise of his constitutional rights is unconstitutional. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of the prison officials;” and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision” to take that action. Id. at 333. “[P]rison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 334. Here, Watson failed to satisfy the third element of his retaliation claim because, in response to his grievance regarding his job situation, prison staff stated, “In June 2011 upon your return you informed staff that you would not participate in provisions of your prescriptive plan thus making you ineligible for GLP according to [Department of
Finally, we agree with the District Court‘s dismissal of Watson‘s claim regarding the damage done to his radio during a searсh of his cell. Any claims arising from this incident were litigated before the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and Watson is currently appealing that judgment in this Court, C.A. No. 13-3510. As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another suit in federal court. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (“As between federal district courts, ... though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.“); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (prohibiting a plaintiff from “maintain[ing] two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.“). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of this claim.
III.
The remainder of Watson‘s claims were terminated pursuant to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We review the District Court‘s order granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burns v. Pa. Dep‘t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if our review reveals that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Upon review, we agree with the District Court that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Watson‘s claim that he was deprived of hygiene products in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a plаintiff must demonstrate both an objective element—that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, and a subjective element—that the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. Prison conditions may objectively violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when inmates are deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life‘s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Courts have held that those minimal necessities include provision for basic hygiene. See, e.g., Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a refusal to provide toothpaste, leading to blеeding gums and tooth decay stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that requiring a prisoner to request permission to wash hands, receive toilet paper, or drink water stated an Eighth Amendment claim).
We agree with the District Court that Watson failed to establish either the objeсtive or subjective elements of his Eighth Amendment claim. He stated in his complaint that he brushes his teeth with a worn-down toothbrush and periodically receives toothpaste from other inmates, but sometimes goes days without toothpaste. He also indicated that he is аble to shave once a month and that he receives two small bars of soap once a week. Furthermore, he did not show any
Watson also failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the subjective element of this claim. Although Watson submitted seven written requests for а hygiene products package, he did not direct them to the proper entity. Inmates must be declared indigent by the Inmate Accounts Office in order to receive such a package. Watson‘s unit manager, Defendant Onstead, stated that he explained this procedure to Watson in May 2011, but Watson failed to follow it. Dkt. No. 45-1, at 2-3. Watson therefore could not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding deliberate indifference to his need for hygiene products. Any deprivation of personal hygiene items he may have suffered did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to this claim.
Furthermore, we agree with the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment regarding Watson‘s claim that he was deprived of hygiene products in retaliation for his 2009 lawsuit or his refusal to attend certain programs for sex offenders. The elements of a retaliation claim, detailed above, include causation, and a plaintiff must demonstrate that his conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse event. As discussed above, Defendant Onstead stated that it was Watson‘s failure to follow procedure that prevented him from being issued a hygiene product package. Watson could not establish the existence оf a genuine issue of material fact in this retaliation claim, and summary judgment in favor of defendants was therefore appropriate.
Finally, Watson appeals the denial of his motion for recusal of the Magistrate Judge and District Judge. He alleged that Judge Kim R. Gibson was a family member of Sylvia Gibson, who he claimed is a Deputy Superintendent at SCI-Somerset. He also alleged that the unfavorable rulings indicate bias and hostility toward him and other Somerset inmates. The District Court denied his motion for recusal on the basis that “there arе no grounds for either judge to recuse themselves from this matter.”
We review a judge‘s decision not to recuse, under either
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm.