Vista Hill Investments, LLC, Bobby A. Branch, Tax Matters Partner
P timely petitioned this Court challenging the IRS‘s adjustments in notices of final partnership administrative adjustment regarding charitable deductions related to syndicated conservation easement transactions listed under I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544. The parties filed Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment seeking summary adjudication as to the imposition of penalties in these consolidated cases1. P principally contends that
Served 11/09/22
Held, further, Notice 2017-10 will be set aside by the Court, and P‘s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted in part prohibiting the imposition of
Vivian D. Hoard, Kip D. Nelson, Richard A. Coughlin, Brian C. Bernhardt, and Elizabeth K. Blickley, for petitioner.
Emily J. Giometti, Kirsten E. Brimer, Clint J. Locke, Kimberly B. Tyson, Mary Helen Weber, Travis Vance, and Angela B. Reynolds, for respondent.
OPINION
WEILER, Judge: On December 3, 2021, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent) filed a third Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,2 seeking summary adjudication in each of these consolidated cases (third Motions for Partial Summary Judgment) on the issue of whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) complied with the requirements of
In the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment petitioner makes two arguments against the penalties asserted under
On January 7, 2022, petitioner filed a written objection to respondent‘s third Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Petitioner‘s principal argument is that respondent cannot assess penalties under
On February 11, 2022, respondent filed a written objection to petitioner‘s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. In the objection, and among other arguments not relevant to this report, respondent contends petitioner has failed to show and establish that
Background
The following facts are drawn from respondent‘s third Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, petitioner‘s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, declarations and exhibits thereto, and the parties’ respective written objections. These facts are stated solely for purposes of ruling on the parties’ Motions herein.
By deed recorded on December 31, 2014, Green Valley, Big Hill, and Tick Creek each granted a conservation easement to Triangle Land Conservancy (TLC). On December 3, 2015, Vista Hill did the same. Green Valley, Big Hill, and Tick Creek each timely filed Forms 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for tax year 2014, and Vista Hill timely filed Form 1065 for tax year 2015. On its Form 1065 Green Valley deducted $22,559,000 for its charitable easement contribution to TLC for the tax year 2014. Similarly, Big Hill and Tick Creek deducted contributions of charitable easements of $22,626,000 and $22,605,000, respectively. Vista Hill deducted $22,498,000 on its Form 1065 for its charitable easement contribution for tax year 2015.
On December 23, 2016, the IRS issued Notice 2017-10. Notice 2017-10 identified all syndicated conservation easement transactions beginning January 1, 2010, including all substantially similar transactions, as “listed transactions” for purposes of
The IRS conducted examinations of Green Valley‘s, Vista Hill‘s, Big Hill‘s, and Tick Creek‘s respective Forms 1065. By notices of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) issued to the LLCs on June 24, 2019, the IRS disallowed the claimed deductions for noncash charitable contributions because the LLCs (1) did not establish that the deductions met all requirements pursuant to
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment
A party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the legal issues in controversy. See Rule 121(a); Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 140, 145 (2014). We may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, stipulations and exhibits, and any other acceptable materials show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. See Rule 121(a) and (b); see also CGG Ams., Inc. v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 78, 82 (2016); Elec. Arts, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 226, 238 (2002). We construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether summary judgment is appropriate. Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff‘d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings but instead must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.” Rule 121(d); see Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520.
II. Application of Section 6662A Penalties
After the enactment of the AJCA, temporary regulations were issued, including
It is undisputed that Notice 2017-10 was issued after the LLCs filed the returns at issue. It is also undisputed that Notice 2017-10 identified certain syndicated conservation easement transactions as tax avoidance transactions classified as “listed transactions” for purposes of
Effective December 23, 2016, Notice 2017-10 identifies certain transactions for purposes of
We have previously upheld the retroactive application of penalties, even though the taxpayers became subject to the penalties after they had entered into the transactions or after their tax returns had been filed. See Soni v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-30, at *8–9; see also Kenna Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 322, 371–72 (2014), aff‘d sub nom. Sugarloaf Fund, LLC v. Commissioner, 911 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2018); Patin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1086, 1127 n.34 (1987), aff‘d without published opinion, 865 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1989), and aff‘d sub nom. Gomberg v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989), Skeen v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1989), and Hatheway v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); McGehee Family Clinic, P.A. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-202.
Petitioner also cites Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988), in which the Supreme Court struck down the retroactive application of a newly promulgated regulation by the Department of Health and Human Services.
On the basis of our findings infra Part III, we conclude that these cases do not require us to decide whether
III. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements
The APA provides a three-step procedure for “notice-and-comment rulemaking” whereby agencies are required to (1) issue a general notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) allow interested persons an opportunity to participate, and (3) include in the final rule a “concise general statement of [its] basis and purpose.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass‘n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (quoting
Notably, the Supreme Court has affirmed a material advisor‘s right to challenge an IRS notice as violative of the APA. See CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 141 S. Ct. 1582 (2021). Other federal courts have recently wrestled with the issue before this Court. In Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 3d 745 (E.D. Mich. 2021), the district court held that Congress authorized the IRS to promulgate Notice 2007-83, 2007-2 C.B. 960, without the requirement of having to first provide notice and comment under the APA; however, this decision was later reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2022). While in CIC Services, LLC v. IRS, No. 3:17-CV-110, 2021 WL 4481008 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2021), the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the taxpayer, finding the taxpayer was likely to prevail on its challenge of Notice 2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B. 745, on the basis of the IRS‘s failure to first comply with the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirements.7
Respondent makes two arguments identical to those made by the United States in Mann Construction; namely, that (1) Notice 2017-10 was an interpretative rather than legislative rule and (2) even if Notice 2017-10 were a legislative rule, Congress has authorized its issuance by procedure other than the notice-and-comment requirements under the APA.
A. Is Notice 2017-10 an Interpretative or Legislative Rule?
Legislative rules impose new rights or duties and change the legal status of regulated parties. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340 (4th Cir. 1995); see Tenn. Hosp. Ass‘n v. Azar, 908 F.3d 1029, 1042 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining that legislative rules impose new rights or
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed respondent‘s first argument, finding Notice 2007-83, entitled “Abusive Trust Arrangements Utilizing Cash Value Life Insurance Policies Purportedly to Provide Welfare Benefits,” to be a legislative rule requiring the IRS to comply with notice-and-comment requirements under the APA. Mann Constr., Inc., 27 F.4th at 1143–44. Like the Sixth Circuit, we find Notice 2017-10 to be a legislative rule.
Congress tasked the IRS with determining “by regulations” how taxpayers are to “make a return or statement” and the information they must provide therein to the IRS. See
This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that the transaction described in section 2 of this notice is a tax avoidance transaction and identifies this transaction, and substantially similar transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations (Regulations) and §§ 6111 and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).
The act of identifying a transaction as a listed transaction by the IRS, by its very nature, is the creation of a substantive (i.e., legislative) rule and not merely an interpretative rule.8 See
1. Reporting Obligations on Taxpayers
The IRS‘s act of identifying a transaction as a listed transaction imposes a reporting obligation on any taxpayer who participated in such a transaction. See
Once a transaction is identified by the IRS as a listed transaction, a taxpayer‘s reporting obligation is significant. Listed transactions are reported on Form 8886, Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement. Unlike most tax forms, which generally require information relating to calculation of a tax liability, Form 8886 requires narrative information unrelated to the computation of tax. For example, for the years in issue, Form 8886 asks the taxpayer to
describe the amount and nature of the expected tax treatment and expected tax benefits generated by the transaction for all affected years. Include facts of each step of the transaction that relate to the expected tax benefits including the amount and nature of your investment. Include in your description your participation in the
notice-and-comment procedures transactions that were already listed as of the enactment of the AJCA.
transaction and
all related transactions regardless of the year in which they were entered into. Also, include a description of any tax result protection with respect to the transaction.
Form 8886 further requires the taxpayer to
[i]dentify all individuals and entities involved in the transaction that are tax-exempt, foreign, or related. Check the appropriate box(es) (see instructions). Include their name(s), identifying number(s), address(es), and a brief description of their involvement. For each foreign entity, identify its country of incorporation or existence. For each individual or related entity, explain how the individual or entity is related.9
Taxpayers are not merely required to include Form 8886 with their tax returns. Form 8886 must be attached to each amended return and a copy sent to the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis at the same time Form 8886 is first filed by the taxpayer.
If a penalty is imposed on a taxpayer for failure to disclose a listed transaction, an additional reporting obligation may arise for some taxpayers. If the taxpayer is required to file periodic reports with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), listed or reportable transaction penalties must be disclosed as part of certain SEC filings. See
In addition to the
2. Reporting Obligations on Advisors
The identification of a transaction as a listed transaction does not merely impose new reporting obligations on taxpayers who participate in the transaction; it also imposes new reporting obligations on tax advisors. A material advisor13 with respect to a reportable transaction14 is required to make a return setting forth detailed information.
The reporting requirement imposed on a material advisor is significant. The IRS has adopted Form 8918, Material Advisor Disclosure Statement, as the form on which material advisor reporting must be made.
Describe the reportable transaction for which you provided material aid, assistance or advice, including but not limited to the following: the nature of the expected tax treatment and expected tax benefits generated by the transaction for all affected years, the years the tax benefits are expected to be claimed, the role of the entities or individuals mentioned in [Form 8918] lines 7a or 8a (if any) and the role of the financial instruments mentioned in [Form 8918] line 9 (if any). Explain how the Internal Revenue Code sections listed in [Form 8918] line 12 are applied and how they allow the taxpayer to obtain the desired tax treatment. Also, include a description of any tax result protection with respect to the transaction.
The IRS‘s identifying a listed transaction essentially obligates the taxpayer‘s advisor to become an unwilling advisor to the IRS. This obligation arises only because the IRS has identified the transaction as a listed transaction.
In addition to the obligation to disclose a listed transaction to the IRS, material advisors also become records repositories for the IRS. Material advisors are required to maintain lists identifying each person they advised.
[c]opies of any additional written materials, including tax analyses or opinions, relating to each reportable transaction that are material to an understanding of the purported tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction that have been shown or provided to any person who acquired or may acquire an interest in the transactions, or to their representatives, tax advisors, or agents, by the material advisor or any related party or agent of the material advisor.
A material advisor‘s failure to disclose a transaction under
In sum, by its issuance, Notice 2017-10 creates new substantive reporting obligations for taxpayers and material advisors, including petitioner and the LLCs, the violation of which prompts exposure to financial penalties and sanctions—the prototype of a legislative rule. See Mann Constr., Inc., 27 F.4th at 1144. We cannot see how Notice 2017-10 could be considered an interpretative rule; consequently, we find it to be a legislative rule. See Schwalbach v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 215, 220–21 (1998).
B. Is Notice 2017-10 Otherwise Exempt from the Notice-and-Comment Requirements Found Under the APA?
1. Legal Background
Having determined that Notice 2017-10 is a legislative rule, we are to assume that this IRS action—having the force and effect of law—must go through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA regime. See
We note how the APA also provides that an agency may depart from normal notice-and-comment procedures for good cause. See
As previously stated, the APA limits the ability of a subsequent statute to modify or supersede its procedures “except to the extent that it does so expressly.”
Our view on the APA‘s express-statement requirement is also consistent with the Supreme Court‘s “already-powerful presumption against implied repeals.” Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has also stated that, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals by implication are disfavored, id. (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion)), and implied repeals will be found only where provisions in two statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict” or where the latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and “is clearly
In Marcello the Supreme Court relied upon statutory text and legislative history to hold that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act displaced the hearing requirements of the APA. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained:
[W]e cannot ignore the background of the 1952 immigration legislation, its laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to the deportation process, the specific points at which deviations from the Administrative Procedure Act were made, the recognition in the legislative history of this adaptive technique and of the particular deviations, and the direction in the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceedings.
Id. That is not to say that Congress must “employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. However, what is needed is an “express[]” indication of congressional intent. Id. Accordingly, mere differences between a statutory scheme and the APA are insufficient to establish Congress’ intent to dispense with the standard APA procedures. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that the Federal Election Campaign Act and the APA could “readily coexist,” despite various distinct procedures and requirements in the former statutory scheme. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 993 F.3d at 892.
The Supreme Court has further described the necessary indicia of congressional intent by the terms “necessary implication,” “clear implication,” and “fair implication.” See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274–75 (2012). The Supreme Court has used these terms interchangeably. Id. at 274.16
Previously, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that terms in the Clean Water Act requiring states to create procedures for “public notice” and “public hearings” established congressional intent to displace the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirements. See Lake Carriers’ Ass‘n v. EPA, 652 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). For its part, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found unconvincing an agency‘s argument that Congress’ authorization of “interim final rules” in the Affordable Care Act context displayed an intention to displace the APA‘s presumed notice-and-comment rulemaking. See California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 579–80 (9th Cir. 2018).
In the light of the foregoing jurisprudence and in determining whether Congress expressly intended to exempt the IRS from the presumed APA procedures when issuing Notice 2017-10, an analysis of the “listed transaction regime” as created under the AJCA and its potential departure from the APA takes center stage.
2. Application
Respondent contends that Congress authorized the IRS to identify listed transactions without notice-and-comment rulemaking. Respondent points to the text of
Respondent also attempts to fill the void left by Congress in the foregoing statutory text with the IRS‘s own regulations. Specifically, respondent notes that, before the enactment of
Furthermore, Congress’ descriptive reference in
Respondent also emphasizes the phrase “as determined under regulations prescribed under section 6011,” contending that it refers solely to the manner of determination under
Considering the statutory text before us, we are unable to reasonably conclude that Congress demonstrated its express intention to deviate from normal APA procedures by implementing a reticulated scheme of the sort described in Marcello. To the contrary, we find respondent has failed to establish that Congress expressed any alternative procedures “so clearly different from those required by the APA that it must have intended to displace the norm.” See Asiana Airlines, 134 F.3d at 397; see also Mann Constr., Inc., 27 F.4th at 1146. Rather, the “listed transaction regime” procedures as created by Congress can be reconciled with the APA since the statutes merely establish a disclosure and penalty regime to be administered by the IRS. See Mann Constr., Inc., 27 F.4th at 1146; see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 993 F.3d at 892. Furthermore, the so-called fair implication standard of an express congressional intent to replace the
Even if we were to look to the congressional text “regulations prescribed under section 6011” in conjunction with Treasury Regulation
We acknowledge that Congress understood that the IRS had identified listed transactions before the enactment of the AJCA. We also recognize that Congress, through its enactment of the AJCA, was acknowledging the IRS‘s disclosure framework already in place, with the goal of strengthening its efficacy. See S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 90 (2003); see also H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 261 (2004).18 But, we cannot accept the enactment of the AJCA as Congress’ blanket approval of the IRS‘s method of identifying a syndicated conservation easement as a listed transaction in Notice 2017-10 without notice and comment.
Next, respondent contends that Congress is “presumed to [have been] aware” of the IRS‘s actions when it amended
We similarly find it inappropriate to assume Congress expected that any subsequent amendment or addition to the listed transaction regime by the IRS would be made without notice and comment under the APA. In these cases, Notice 2017-10 was not issued until 2016.19 Accordingly, we cannot subscribe to any alternative theory that prior notice and comment made at the time of promulgation of Treasury Regulation
Finally, we do not find a committee print from 2020 relating to continued congressional oversight of syndicated conservation easement transactions to be persuasive evidence that Congress intended to override the APA‘s applicability to the IRS‘s listing of transactions. See Staff of S. Comm. on Finance, 116th Cong., Syndicated Conservation-Easement Transactions Exhibits 1-133, S. Prt. 116-44 (Comm. Print 2020).20
We do not dispute the significance of congressional oversight of so-called “Syndicated Conservation-Easement Transactions” and the efforts to curtail these transactions. However, we do dispute a
After considering these additional arguments, we remain unconvinced that Congress expressly authorized the IRS to identify a syndicated conservation easement transaction as a listed transaction without the APA‘s notice-and-comment procedures, as it did in Notice 2017-10.
IV. Conclusion
We determine summary adjudication to be appropriate in petitioner‘s favor as to prohibiting the imposition of
An appropriate order will be issued.
Reviewed by the Court.
FOLEY, GUSTAFSON, MORRISON, BUCH, ASHFORD, URDA, COPELAND, JONES, GREAVES, and MARSHALL, JJ., agree with this opinion of the Court.
KERRIGAN, PARIS, PUGH, and TORO, JJ., concur in the result, and TORO, J., agrees with Part III.A.
GALE and NEGA, JJ., dissent.
Pursuant to this authority, the IRS identified syndicated conservation easement transactions as listed transactions in I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544.1 They joined a list first issued in 2000 that originally included 7 transactions, added 23 more transactions by the time the AJCA was enacted, and added 5 more by the time Notice 2017-10 was issued (making syndicated conservation easement transactions the 36th). See Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/listed-transactions (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).2
I agree with the opinion of the Court that Notice 2017-10 is a legislative rule. “[A] substantive or legislative rule, pursuant to properly delegated authority, has the force of law, and creates new law or imposes new rights or duties.” Jerri‘s Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm‘n, 874 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989). By identifying syndicated conservation easement transactions as listed transactions, Notice 2017-10 exposed taxpayers and representatives required to disclose these transactions under Treasury Regulation
And the IRS used authority delegated to it under
In general a legislative rule is subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) under
The APA enumerates exceptions to its general rule of notice-and-comment rulemaking, including “when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”
Another exception to the notice-and-comment requirement is a necessary consequence of courts’ applying a basic precept of statutory
Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legislature cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate—including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), we interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act [(INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952),] as impliedly exempting deportation hearings from the procedures of the [APA], despite the requirement in § 12 of the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly,” 60 Stat. 244. The Court refused “to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.” 349 U.S., at 310. We have made clear in other cases as well, that an express-reference or express-statement provision cannot nullify the unambiguous import of a subsequent statute. In Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908), we said of an express-statement requirement that “[a]s the section in question has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment.” (Emphasis added.) A subsequent Congress, we have said, may exempt itself from such requirements by “fair implication“—that is, without an express statement. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659-660, n. 10 (1974). See also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 218 (1910).
The opinion of the Court cites Justice Scalia‘s concurrence in Lockhart for the proposition that the APA‘s express-statement requirement is consistent with the presumption against implied repeals. See op. Ct. p. 16. And Justice Scalia acknowledges the Supreme Court‘s admonition in Marcello that exemptions from the APA are “not lightly to be presumed” in the light of the APA‘s express-statement
Our task, then, is to read the later statute (
This analysis will produce a range of results. Some procedures will fall on the “irreconcilable-with-the-APA” side of the line. See, e.g., Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309 (holding that INA procedures superseded the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirement because, among other reasons, Congress mandated that the INA procedures “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section” (quoting INA § 242(b), 66 Stat. at 210)); Asiana Airlines, 134 F.3d at 398 (holding statute mandating that the FAA “publish in the Federal Register an initial fee schedule and associated collection process as an interim final rule, pursuant to which public comment will be sought and a final rule issued” superseded the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirement because it required the FAA to follow procedures
There is little doubt that in enacting
Specifically, the procedure invoked by
Because we are to presume Congress is aware of existing law, including existing regulations, I am more confident than the majority, see op. Ct. p. 19, that Congress understood that the IRS had already identified and would continue to identify transactions as listed, perhaps even by issuing notices. But, as I explain below, I do not believe that this presumption that Congress knew about the IRS procedure for listing transactions by notice wins the day for the IRS. And on this point, the majority and I do agree.
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (citations omitted). “So too, where . . . Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.” Id. at 581. We thus presume that Congress knew of Treasury‘s (and the IRS‘s) interpretation of
The opinion of the Court discounts these principles of statutory construction and the history of
The remaining question then is whether, in adopting this procedure by reference, Congress “must have intended to displace the norm” of APA notice and comment because the adopted procedure is “so clearly different from” it. Asiana Airlines, 134 F.3d at 397.
The procedures at issue in Marcello and Asiana Airlines set a high bar for “displacing the norm” of APA notice and comment. In both Congress mandated that the agency use a procedure different from or in direct conflict with the one in the APA. The statute in Marcello provided an alternate procedure and stated that it “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure.” 349 U.S. at 309 (quoting INA § 242(b)). The statute in Asiana Airlines required the use of a procedure that, by its terms, “cannot be reconciled with the notice and comment requirements of [the APA].” 134 F.3d at 398 (“[T]he agency was to issue not a proposed rule, but an ‘interim final rule,’ and comment was to be sought ‘pursuant to,’ not in anticipation of, that rule.” (quoting
Here, Congress did not mandate a specific alternative rulemaking procedure different from or in direct conflict with the APA. Rather,
Any argument to the contrary puts a great deal of weight on the contention that identification “by notice” is irreconcilable with the APA. And the weight that the phrase “by notice” can bear is circumscribed by the adoption of penalties in
I would be loath to supplant the APA requirements even if I could come up with my own policy justification for their nonapplication; that is not our place, but Congress‘. Congress also is presumed to be aware that to supersede APA notice and comment, it must do so “expressly,” see
Finally, it is worth noting that if notice-and-comment rulemaking impedes the IRS‘s ability to identify transactions with the potential for tax avoidance or evasion, the APA and the Internal Revenue Code already provide options. Under the APA, the IRS could invoke the good cause exception, as it did when issuing regulations targeting another listed transaction, the so-called Son-of-Boss transaction, for example. See T.D. 9062, 2003-2 C.B. 46, 48 (“These temporary regulations are necessary to prevent abusive transactions of the type described in the Notice 2000-44. Accordingly, good cause is found for dispensing with notice and public procedure pursuant to
In sum, I concur in the result because the procedure referenced by
KERRIGAN, PARIS, ASHFORD, and COPELAND, JJ., agree with this opinion concurring in the result.
The parties’ dispute focuses on
Specifically, contrary to the Commissioner‘s position, the statement in the 2003 regulation that the IRS may identify listed transactions “by notice,” see Treas. Reg.
Absent conflict in the instructions Congress provided in the AJCA and the instructions Congress provided in the APA, the Commissioner had an obligation to follow both. See Posadas v. Nat‘l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.“); see also Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274 (2012) (discussing the standard for departures from the APA); Nat‘l City Bank, 296 U.S. at 503 (discussing the standard for implied repeals); Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the standard for implied repeals). As all agree, this the Commissioner did not do. Accordingly, the
I write separately to offer a few observations on the extent to which
AJCA Background
To begin with, I agree with Judge Pugh and the Commissioner that the context in which Congress enacted
When it adopted the AJCA in 2004, Congress established new penalties and other rules that hinged on the terms “reportable transaction” and “listed transaction.” See, e.g., AJCA §§ 811 and 812, 814-816, 118 Stat. at 1575-84.3 Congress appears to have drawn on the regulatory definitions of those terms to craft the statutory definitions. See
But this general observation is insufficient to determine with precision what Congress incorporated when it enacted
Section 6662A Penalty and Section 6707A(c) Definitions
The question ultimately before the Court is whether petitioner may be held liable for the penalty imposed by
The term “reportable transaction” is also a defined term. It means “any transaction with respect to which information is required to be included with a return or statement because, as determined under regulations prescribed under
Analysis
Several observations relevant to the APA analysis follow from the statutory text. First, neither
Nothing in the statutory text thus expressly turns off the APA requirements that would otherwise govern the Secretary‘s designation of a listed transaction under
The Commissioner, however, contends that Congress‘s use of the clause “as determined under regulations prescribed under
To begin, it is worth noting that the “as determined” clause (with its reference to regulations under
Furthermore, the 2003 regulation was focused on the characteristics of reportable transactions and not on processes for identifying them. Indeed, it did not contain any overall provisions prescribing any process the Secretary would follow in identifying reportable transactions. Rather, it simply provided that “[a] reportable transaction is a transaction described in any of the paragraphs (b)(2) through (7) of this section.” Treas. Reg.
Of course, as the Commissioner would surely point out, we are concerned specifically with listed transactions in this case. And in
A listed transaction is a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction.
Treas. Reg.
This argument, however, overlooks a critical fact: When it enacted the AJCA, Congress adopted its own statutory definition of “listed transaction” at
The term “listed transaction” means a reportable5 transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of
section 6011 .
Comparing the two definitions, one can see that the statute essentially paraphrases the regulatory definition with one key difference: It omits the nine procedural words italicized above. The Commissioner‘s entire case rests on those nine words, and their omission in the statute is notable in light of the otherwise parallel definitions.
To put this point in another way, if Congress had intended to adopt a specific process for the Secretary to use in identifying listed transactions, Treasury Regulation
To summarize then, the Commissioner argues that
All of this suggests that the “as determined” clause in
With these observations, I agree with the opinion of the Court‘s disposition of the
COPELAND, J., agrees with this opinion concurring in the result.
And, as Judge Pugh notes, the procedure in the
Regulations under
I agree with Judge Pugh that this is the appropriate test in the circumstances. I part ways, however, with her application of the test. Plainly put, identification of a listed transaction “by notice” cannot be reconciled with APA notice-and-comment procedures. See
I find further support for this interpretation of
A listed transaction means a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of
section 6011 . . . and identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction.
H.R. Rep. No. 109-455, at 125 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234, 321 (emphasis added). Thus, a subsequent Congress understood and reconfirmed the authority of the Secretary (and the Service as his or her designee) to identify a transaction as “listed” merely “by notice.” The views of a subsequent Congress in a committee report concerning the interpretation of a prior enactment are entitled to significant weight. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980); Sykes v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 117 F.3d 287, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 178 n.7 (5th Cir. 1989); Sorrell v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 484, 489-90 (11th Cir. 1989), rev‘g T.C. Memo. 1987-351; Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th Cir. 1986), rev‘g 83 T.C. 103 (1984).
Because I conclude that Congress intended in
Further, I am not aware of any debate over whether the AJCA was intended to allow the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to improve the administration of the tax law and enhance general compliance. In my view, the legislation does exactly that by limiting the application of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
Under one basic rule of statutory interpretation, “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978). We can also take judicial notice that Congress would be aware of the inherent delays were the APA fully applicable. Congress could easily have decided that the delays inherent in the APA were outweighed by faster application of the AJCA to tax returns reflecting such transactions. I believe this to be true.
The issue is whether, in adopting the IRS‘s existing regulations into the statutory scheme, Congress “must have intended to displace the norm” of APA notice and comment because the adopted procedure is “so clearly different from” it. Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1998). I find that to be the case.
I believe that the majority‘s holding is worryingly close to a standard requiring “magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.” Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955). In that case, after exhaustive analysis, the Supreme Court found that there was enough evidence to find that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act did not violate the APA.
Congress was aware of the IRS‘s rulemaking in this area when it enacted the AJCA to bolster the IRS‘s efforts by adding a penalty to the existing regime. Congress ratified the existing procedures for identifying
I disagree that Congress failed to “expressly” override the application of the APA to the IRS process incorporated into law by the AJCA. The nature of the legislation as well as the legislative history associated with it that the opinion of the Court finds unpersuasive leads me to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact the AJCA penalty regime subject to the time-consuming notice-and-comment procedures of the APA. In the light of congressional knowledge of the existence of the APA when enacting the AJCA, I cannot agree that Congress added a penalty regime to enforce the existing IRS rulemaking without addressing an obvious APA vulnerability, at least, to the then-listed transactions.
For these reasons, I dissent.