MARCELLO v. BONDS, OFFICER IN CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.
No. 145
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 21-22, 1955. Decided May 31, 1955.
349 U.S. 302
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a native of Tunis, Africa, was ordered deported after a hearing pursuant to
At the hearing before a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, petitioner did not dispute the fact of his conviction. He did, however, object to the proceedings on the ground that they violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act,
Petitioner then brought this action for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the deportation order on the grounds, inter alia: (1) that the hearing under
The Government‘s return to the writ alleged that petitioner‘s deportation had been conducted in accordance with the Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States. No evidence was introduced by either side save the official Immigration Service record of petitioner‘s deportation proceedings. The District Court held the deportation order valid and discharged the writ. 113 F. Supp. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 212 F. 2d 830. Petitioner pursues his four basic objections in this
Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Petitioner concedes that
Under the allegations here made, the single attack of the petitioner pertains to the supervision of the special inquiry officer by the investigative and prosecuting officials of the Immigration Service. The alternative procedure of
The applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to deportation proceedings under the Immigration Act of 1917 was considered by this Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). We there held, contrary to the prevailing interpretation and practice of the Department of Justice, that deportation hearings were subject to the Act. Six months later, Congress provided in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951,
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From the Immigration Act‘s detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and adapting them to the particular needs of the deportation process. The same legislators, Senator McCarran and Congressman Walter, sponsored both the
Section 242 (b) expressly states: “The procedure [herein prescribed] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.” That this clear and categorical direction was meant to exclude the application of the Administrative Procedure Act is amply demonstrated by the legislative history of the Immigration Act. The original bills included statements to the effect that the
Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in
As noted above, the only complaint which petitioner can urge concerning the hearing procedures in this case is the objection that the special inquiry officer was subject to the supervision and control of officials in the Immigration Service charged with investigative and prosecuting functions. Petitioner would have us hold that the presence of this relationship so strips the hearing of fairness and impartiality as to make the procedure violative of due process. The contention is without substance when considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.
The Claim of Prejudgment.
Our opinions in the Accardi cases stand for the proposition that the Attorney General cannot, under present regulations, dictate the actions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260; Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U. S. 280. Petitioner alleges that his case was prejudged within the meaning of these decisions because on the day of his arrest for deportation the Attorney General “announced in a public statement both in Washington and in New Orleans that5 [petitioner] was an undesirable citizen and had been
Considering first the alleged list, it is clear that petitioner has not made out a case of prejudgment. He did not allege that either the inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals had seen the list, had known of its existence, or had been influenced in their decisions by the inclusion of petitioner‘s name thereon. In argument before the Board, petitioner stated through counsel that he had “the feeling—and it‘s a feeling that‘s based upon evidence which we will supply—that the real basis for the denial of suspension here was the fact that Marcello was one of these hundred whom the Attorney General had named . . . .” No evidence of this was forthcoming. As to petitioner‘s charges concerning the Attorney General‘s “list,” the record is completely barren.
Nor does petitioner fare better in seeking to base prejudgment on the unfavorable publicity accompanying his arrest. He introduced newspaper clippings into evidence to show the adverse local publicity and alleged that this publicity must have had a “great effect” upon the special inquiry officer. But the record indicates clearly that petitioner‘s case could not possibly have been prejudiced in the hearing before the inquiry officer. On the question of petitioner‘s deportability, the sole issue decided by him, the hearing officer merely applied the statute to the undisputed facts. Petitioner admitted that he was deportable under the Immigration Act of 1952 if the Act could constitutionally base deportation on his 1938 marihuana conviction. And the hearing officer could be expected in any event to take the law as Congress enacted it. In view of this Court‘s decisions on the ex post facto objection, the only ground of attack, he could do nothing else. Petitioner waived the only issue on which prejudgment was possible when he declined to apply for discretionary relief at the proper time. See
The Board of Immigration Appeals considered the availability of discretionary relief, but as to these officials there was not even an allegation by petitioner that they had known of the unfavorable publicity or had been influenced by it. Indeed, there is every indication that the Board had not prejudged the case, since it considered the question of suspending deportation on the merits although not bound to do so in view of petitioner‘s waiver below. The Board denied the requested relief, giving reasons. It is not for us in this proceeding to pass on the
Finally, we note that, even as to his claim relating to adverse publicity, petitioner introduced no evidence other than the newspaper clippings. Surely on this meager showing the district judge was warranted in finding—as he did—that the special inquiry officer, the only official mentioned in petitioner‘s pleadings, was not controlled in his decision by superiors in the Department of Justice. The decision of the district judge cannot be set aside as clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that under our Accardi decisions petitioner has failed to make out a case for a new hearing.
Ex Post Facto.
Petitioner‘s last objection stems from the fact that his conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act was not ground for deportation at the time he committed the offense, and that he was not forewarned of all the consequences of his criminal conduct. It is urged that we depart from our recent decisions holding that the prohibition of the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation, and strike down as unconstitutional the retroactive application of the new grounds for deportation in
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Petitioner was lawfully brought to this country forty-four years ago when he was eight months old and has resided here ever since. He is married and has four children. His wife and children are American citizens. It is settled that he cannot be deported without being accorded a fair hearing in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1
A fair hearing necessarily includes an impartial tribunal. Petitioner claims that the circumstances here deprived him of that kind of tribunal. The officer who conducted the hearings, decided the case and made recommendations for deportation was connected with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This hearing officer was subject to the supervision, direction and control of the Attorney General and his subordinate supervisory officers of the Immigration Service who perform investigative and prosecutorial functions. Thus the hearing officer adjudicated the very case against petitioner which the hearing officer‘s superiors initiated and prosecuted. Petitioner‘s argument is that requiring him to have his cause adjudicated by such a subordinate of the prosecutors deprives him of due process. This due process challenge cannot be lightly dismissed, but I find it unnecessary to rest my dissent on a determination of that question. For Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act2 has barred hearing officers from adjudicating cases under the circumstances here, and I think that Act is applicable to this case.
Section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act forbids hearing officers covered by the Act to conduct hearings if they are “responsible to or subject to the super-
Section 12 of the Procedure Act provides that “No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.” The 1950 appropriation rider was an express modification of the prior Procedure Act, but unlike the Court I find no such express modification in the 1952 Immigration Act. Indeed that Act‘s legislative sponsors disclaimed any purpose to bring about even an implied modification.
Both the Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act were sponsored by Senator McCarran and Representative Walter. Their original proposals which finally evolved into the 1952 Act did expressly provide that the Procedure Act should not control proceedings under the Immigration
Senators who voted for the new version which became the 1952 Immigration Act were assured by the senatorial sponsor:
“The Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill. The Administrative Procedure Act prevails now. . . . The bill provides for administrative procedures and makes the Administrative Procedure Act applicable insofar as the administration of the bill is concerned.”7
And House members voting for the 1952 Immigration Act were assured by its House sponsor:
“Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we undo what the Congress did in a deficiency
appropriation bill several years ago when it legislated to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable in deportation proceedings. We undo that. So here, instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we actually see that it is reinstated in every instance.”8
Reassuring the House again the next day, Representative Walter said:
“We have been very zealous to see that the philosophy underlying that act [Administrative Procedure] is embodied in this measure. I am sure that if the gentleman will look at page 163, paragraph 46, he will find that the law as it was before the House adopted this amendment to an appropriation bill, has been reinstated and that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sung case will be the law of the land when this code is adopted.”9
As previously pointed out the Sung case held that § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act did apply to deportation cases.
Other statements in the discussions of the 1952 Act may look in a different direction from the statements just quoted. But whatever was said, no language in the 1952 Immigration Act expressly authorizes deportation cases to be heard, contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, by hearing officers who are the dependent subordinates of the immigration agency‘s prosecutorial staff. The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes or supervise and control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly inconsistent with our concepts of justice. It was this principle on which Congress presumably acted in passing the Procedure Act. Only
I would reverse this case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The Constitution places a ban on all ex post facto laws. There are no qualifications or exceptions.
There is a school of thought that the Ex Post Facto Clause includes all retroactive legislation, civil as well as criminal. See Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, Vol. I, c. XI; Vol. II, p. 1053. Mr. Justice Johnson took that view, maintaining that a restriction of the Clause to criminal acts was unwarranted. See Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 271, 286; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 416, 681 (Appendix). The Court, however, has stated over and again since Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only in criminal cases. See Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 17 How. 456, 463; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 242; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 39.
At the same time, there was a parallel development in the field of ex post facto legislation. Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138-139, refused to construe the Ex Post Facto Clause narrowly and restrict it to criminal prosecutions. The Fletcher case held that property rights that had vested could not be displaced by legislative fiat. That liberal view persisted. It was given dramatic application in post-Civil War days. The leading cases are Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, where the right to practice a person‘s profession was sought to be taken away, in the first case by a State, in the second by the Federal Government, for acts which carried no such penalty when they were committed. The essence of those proceedings was the revocation of a license. Yet the Court held them to be violative of the Ex Post Facto Clauses because they were “punishment” for acts carrying no such sanctions when done.
Deportation may be as severe a punishment as loss of livelihood. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 154; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391. As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284, deportation may result “in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”
I find nothing in the Constitution exempting aliens from the operation of ex post facto laws. I would think, therefore, that, if Congress today passed a law making any alien who had ever violated any traffic law in this country deportable, the law would be ex post facto. Congress, of course, has broad powers over the deporta-
In the absence of a rational connection between the imposition of the penalty of deportation and the present desirability of the alien as a resident in this country, the conclusion is inescapable that the Act merely adds a new punishment for a past offense. That is the very injustice that the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to prevent.
Notes
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, involved an attempt to cancel a certificate of citizenship on the ground it had been fraudulently and illegally procured. The Court pointed out that the Act did not impose a new penalty on the wrongdoer but merely provided a method for depriving him of a privilege “that was never rightfully his.” Id., at 242-243.
“Attorney General James P. McGranery announced today that Carlos Marcello of Miami, Florida, and Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, has been arrested on a deportation warrant by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
“The arrest in New Orleans was the first major deportation move undertaken since the new Immigration and Nationality Act became effective December 24, 1952. The action was another step in the Attorney General‘s program of denaturalization and/or deportation of undesirable persons of foreign birth who are engaged in racketeering or other criminal activities.
“Marcello, born February 6, 1910, in Tunis, Africa, entered the United States for permanent residence October 7, 1910, at New Orleans.
“He allegedly is engaged in large-scale slot machine operations and other gambling activities in Louisiana.
“The deportation warrant was based on his conviction in 1938 for violation of the Marijuana Act. Such a conviction is a deportable offense under the new Immigration and Nationality Act.
“The action follows lengthy investigations by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. His conviction under the Marijuana Act was one of only two in his checkered career. The other case in which he was convicted was under Louisiana State law, the conviction being for assault and robbery, and on May 13, 1930, he was sentenced to serve a term of 9 to 14 years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The Governor of Louisiana gave him a full pardon for this crime July 16, 1935.
“Marcello served a year and a day after his conviction under the Marijuana Act.”
Emphasis supplied.