UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DONNIE BRYANT
No. 24-3093
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
July 21, 2025
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, D. Michael Fisher, and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONNIE BRYANT, AKA Little
Donnie,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-3093
D.C. No.
2:06-cr-00234-
RHW-GWF-1
OPINION
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 31, 2025
Phoenix, Arizona
Filed July 21, 2025
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, D. Michael Fisher, and
Ryan D.
*
Opinion by Judge R. Nelson
* The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 USA V. BRYANT
SUMMARY**
Criminal Law
Affirming the district court’s denial of Donnie Bryant’s
motion for compassionate release under
youth at the time of his offense, nor a sentencing disparity
resulting from a codefendant’s guilty plea, is an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
The panel rejected as resting on a false premise Bryant’s
contention that the sentences for his three firearm
convictions under
violation of the First Step Act and that this is an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release. The panel explained that the imposition of three
consecutive mandatory ten-year sentences for Bryant’s
§ 924(c) convictions as a first offender is not the kind of
“stacking” for “second or subsequent” offenses that
Congress outlawed in the First Step Act.
COUNSEL
James J. Gaeta (argued) and Jim W. Fang, Assistant United
States Attorneys; Adam M. Flake, Appellate Chief; Jason M.
Frierson, United States Attorney; Office of the United States
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
USA V. BRYANT 3
Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Las Vegas,
Nevada; Peter H. Walkingshaw, Assistant United States
Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, United States
Department of Justice, Reno, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Angela H. Dows (argued), Cory Reade Dows & Shafer, Las
Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
When he was sixteen, Donnie Bryant participated in a
gang-related shooting for which he was sentenced to 70
years’ imprisonment. Decades later, he moved for
compassionate release, arguing that his youth at the time of
his offense is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for
relief.
not qualify as “extraordinary and compelling” under
§ 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm.
I
Before turning to Bryant’s case, we start with some
background on compassionate release.
A
Our justice system relies on the finality of criminal
judgments. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). Once
imposed, a sentence may be altered “only in very limited
circumstances.” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476,
501–02 n.14 (2011). With
Congress provided one such “narrow” exception—
sometimes called compassionate release—for when
4 USA V. BRYANT
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant reducing a
defendant’s sentence. See Freeman v. United States, 564
U.S. 522, 526 (2011).
For most of its history, § 3582(c)(1)(A) kicked in only
when the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
filed a compassionate release motion on a defendant’s
behalf. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir.
2021) (per curiam). Then, in the First Step Act of 2018,
Congress amended the statute to allow a defendant to file his
own motion, provided he first exhausts administrative
remedies within the BOP. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1),
132 Stat. 5194, 5239.
Sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is
discretionary. United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945
(9th Cir. 2022). The statute allows that discretion to be
exercised only when three conditions are met. Id. First, the
district court must find that “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” warrant a sentence reduction.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, the reduction must be “consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Id. Third, the district court must consider the
sentencing factors in
nature of the offense and the defendant’s characteristics—to
determine “whether the requested sentence reduction is
warranted under the particular circumstances of the case.”
Wright, 46 F.4th at 945 (citation modified); see Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007). The district court
may deny the defendant’s motion if he fails to satisfy any of
these conditions. Wright, 46 F.4th at 945.
Congress did not define the first condition,
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” It instead
instructed the Sentencing Commission—“in promulgating
USA V. BRYANT 5
general policy statements” for § 3582(c)(1)(A)—to
“describe what should be considered extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the
criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.”
U.S.C. § 994(t). Congress put one limit on that delegation:
“Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be
considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” Id.
The Commission answered Congress’s call with
§ 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines. That policy
statement defines “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to
include (among other things) terminal illness,
physical or mental decline because of the aging process, and
the death or incapacitation of the primary caregiver of a
defendant’s child. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4). The
Commission also included a provision for “Other Reasons.”
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). But that category is narrow—it is
restricted to reasons “similar in gravity” to the listed
examples. Id.
In its original form, § 1B1.13 only addressed
compassionate release motions by the BOP Director. After
the First Step Act, courts questioned whether § 1B1.13 also
applied to motions by a defendant, considering the
Commission—having lost its quorum—had not updated the
policy statement to reflect changes in the law. We, along
with most other circuits, held that § 1B1.13 did not apply to
defendant-filed motions. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d
797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); see United States v.
Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021). Because
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) only requires consideration of “applicable”
policy statements, and because the then-governing version
of § 1B1.13 only referenced motions by the BOP Director,
we concluded that the Commission had “not yet issued a
policy statement ‘applicable’ to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions
6 USA V. BRYANT
filed by a defendant.” Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802. Without a
binding policy statement for defendant-filed motions, courts
could decide for themselves what constituted extraordinary
and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Though
the definitions in § 1B1.13 could “inform” a court’s
decision, they were not binding. Id.
That changed in 2023. Having regained a quorum, the
Commission revised § 1B1.13 to govern motions by a
defendant. See Notice, Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 28,254, 28,256 (May 3, 2023).
Now, courts are “bound by” § 1B1.13 in deciding all
compassionate release motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).1
United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2022);
see Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 495 (2022)
(“[C]ongress expressly cabined district courts’ discretion by
requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s
policy statements.” (citing § 3582(c)(1)(A))). If a defendant
cannot show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” as
defined in § 1B1.13, then he is ineligible for compassionate
release.
B
Donnie Bryant was a member of Squad Up, a Las Vegas-
based street gang that dealt crack cocaine in the early 2000s.
When he was sixteen, Bryant participated in a plot to kill a
rival drug dealer, Jabirey Carter. The gang handled the
details in advance. Bryant would shoot at Carter, prompting
him to flee down a nearby alley where Jonathon Toliver—
different rule for motions filed by defendants after the effective date of
the 2023 revisions to § 1B1.13. See 993 F.3d at 802. Bryant filed his
motion after the 2023 revisions went into effect.
USA V. BRYANT 7
another Squad Up member—would execute Carter in cold
blood.
Around 8:00 p.m. on September 13, 2004, Bryant found
Carter with a group of friends. Bryant fired three shots,
causing Carter and others to escape down the alley toward
where Toliver was lying in wait. As the group approached,
Toliver started shooting. The bullets missed Carter, but not
without a cost. One killed Carter’s cousin; another struck a
bystander in a nearby apartment. Bryant, Toliver, and
another gang member fled the scene. Bryant was arrested
the next day.
At trial, a jury convicted Bryant under the Violent
Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute,
§ 1959, and for
crime of violence under
its judgment several times, the district court imposed its
sentence: 40 years on the VICAR count, plus consecutive
10-year terms on each of three § 924(c) convictions. Bryant
is set to finish his 70-year term in 2067. Toliver, Bryant’s
codefendant, pleaded guilty and is serving a 35-year
sentence.
C
In 2024, Bryant filed a compassionate release motion
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). He made three arguments for why
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” support reducing
his sentence. First, that he was a minor at the time of his
offense. Second, that his sentence was 35 years longer than
his codefendant Toliver’s, even though Toliver committed
his offense as an adult. Third, that the sentences for his
§ 924(c) convictions were “stacked” in violation of the First
Step Act, which postdated Bryant’s sentencing.
8 USA V. BRYANT
On the first point, the district court held that “an
offender’s juvenile status can be an extraordinary and
compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction” in an
appropriate case. See United States v. Bryant, No. 2:06-cr-
234, 2024 WL 2028268, at *5 (D. Nev. May 6, 2024). The
court noted that § 1B1.13 envisions “other” extraordinary
and compelling reasons that are “similar in gravity” to those
listed in the statement. Id. And it pointed to a separate
Guidelines provision, § 1B1.13(e), that says that “an
extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been
unforeseen at the time of sentencing . . . to warrant a
[sentence] reduction.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(e)).
But the district court said little about how youth fits within
that scheme.
Instead, the district court applied a “holistic” balancing
test that weighs certain factors—immaturity, salvageability,
dependence, and susceptibility to peer pressure—in deciding
whether to reduce the sentence of a defendant who was a
minor at the time of his offense. Id. at *4–6 (citing United
States v. Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417–23 (S.D.N.Y.
2021)). Applying those factors, the district court reasoned
that Bryant’s crime was not the product of youthful
immaturity, nor had Bryant shown that he was taking
affirmative steps toward rehabilitation. Id. at *6–7. The
dependence and susceptibility factors were thought to lean
slightly in Bryant’s favor, but not so much as to outweigh
the seriousness of his crime. Id. at *7–9. The district court
therefore concluded that Bryant’s juvenile status at the time
of the shooting was not an extraordinary and compelling
reason for reducing his sentence. Id. at *9. Still, the district
court maintained that a defendant’s youth could be
extraordinary and compelling if the factors pointed in that
direction. Id. at *5.
USA V. BRYANT 9
As for the sentencing disparity, the district court
attributed the discrepancy to Toliver’s guilty plea, not to any
unfairness. Id. at *3–4. And because, in the district court’s
view, Bryant “is not serving a ‘stacked’ sentence,” the First
Step Act did not support Bryant’s request for a sentence
reduction. Id. at *3. Bryant timely appealed.
II
We have jurisdiction under
court’s decision on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release
motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wright, 46 F.4th
at 944. But when faced with questions of law, like the
interpretation of the compassionate release statute or the
Sentencing Guidelines, we review de novo. See United
States v. Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021).
This appeal raises three questions, all with the same
answer. Is a defendant’s youth at the time of his offense an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release? No. How about a sentencing disparity with a
codefendant? Also no. And were Bryant’s § 924(c)
convictions “stacked” in violation of the First Step Act? No
again.
A
Start with youth.2 Section 1B1.13 defines
“extraordinary and compelling” in several subsections. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(5). Because § 1B1.13 now binds
issue in his compassionate release motion. We disagree. The motion
consistently framed Bryant’s juvenile status as an independent reason for
a reduced sentence.
10 USA V. BRYANT
defendant-filed motions, see supra, at 6, we must decide
whether any of its subsections can be read to encompass a
defendant’s youth. If not, then youth cannot satisfy the first
condition for compassionate release. See Wright, 46 F.4th at
945 (citing § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).
The first four subsections are poor fits. Subsection (b)(1)
says little about age. It only describes severe medical
conditions—like terminal illnesses or situations requiring
long-term or specialized care unavailable in prison and
without which the defendant is at serious risk of death or
bodily harm. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1).
Subsection (b)(2) addresses advanced age, not juvenile
status. It applies only when the defendant is at least 65 years
old, is experiencing a decline in physical or mental health
because of the aging process, and has served at least 10 years
or 75 percent of his term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(2).
Subsection (b)(3) covers extenuating family
circumstances without reference to whether the defendant
was a minor when he committed his crime. Examples
include, among others, the death or incapacitation of the
main caregiver of the defendant’s minor child, and the
incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant
would be the only available caregiver for the parent. Id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3).
And subsection (b)(4) speaks to situations in which a
defendant was sexually or physically abused by a BOP
employee after he began serving his term of imprisonment.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(4).
So the only way youth can qualify as extraordinary and
compelling is through subsection (b)(5): the “Other
USA V. BRYANT 11
Reasons” provision. Subsection (b)(5) is narrow. It only
covers a “circumstance or combination of circumstances”
that is “similar in gravity” to those described above. Id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). The question, then, is whether a defendant’s
youth at the time of his offense is “similar in gravity” to the
other circumstances in § 1B1.13. Id.
We think not. The circumstances in § 1B1.13 address
situations where continued incarceration risks a defendant’s
health or safety, § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(2), (4), or would severely
burden third parties unable to care for themselves,
§ 1B1.13(b)(3). That a defendant was a minor when he
committed his crime—which, in many cases, occurred years
or even decades ago—does not raise similar concerns.
What’s more, subsections (b)(1) through (4) share an
important characteristic—they generally refer to
circumstances that develop after sentencing. It makes sense
why: § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides “a mechanism for relief”
when the district court failed to “anticipat[e] developments
that take place after the first sentencing.” Setser v. United
States, 566 U.S. 231, 242–43 (2012); see United States v.
Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (the statute
covers “post-sentencing changes to a [defendant’s]
individual situation”). A defendant’s age at the time of his
offense, by contrast, is an immutable fact—one that was
known to the sentencing judge, and which could be
considered from the start in imposing a sentence. See
to the circumstances in § 1B1.13, which arise after a
defendant has been sentenced.
As other courts have explained, the statutory scheme
envisions extraordinary and compelling reasons as post-
sentencing changes to a defendant’s personal circumstances.
12 USA V. BRYANT
See Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1203; United States v. Hunter, 12
F.4th 555, 569–72 (6th Cir. 2021). Even if a district court
identifies an extraordinary and compelling reason, it may not
grant relief unless the § 3553(a) factors support the
reduction. Wright, 46 F.4th at 945. Under § 3553(a), courts
may consider facts that existed at sentencing, like the “nature
and circumstances of the offense” and the “history and
characteristics of the defendant.”
Hunter, 12 F.4th at 569. That tells us something about the
separate, extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons
requirement. To fit with the rest of the statute, the
requirement must address considerations not already
subsumed in the § 3553(a) analysis. Otherwise, the
requirement would be redundant. And Congress seldom
drafts statutes that way. See Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452,
463 n.8 (2016) (“[O]ur ordinary assumption [is] that
Congress, when drafting a statute, gives each provision
independent meaning.”). Thus, consistent with the binding
definition in § 1B1.13, “extraordinary and compelling”
generally refers to “post-sentencing factual developments,”
Hunter, 12 F.4th at 569, which do not include a defendant’s
age at the time of his offense.
That does not mean, however, that youth can never be
considered in ruling on a motion for compassionate release.
As the preceding discussion shows, the fact that a defendant
was a minor at the time of his offense can be considered
when weighing the § 3553(a) factors at the third step of the
compassionate release analysis. See
(considerations include the “history and characteristics of
the defendant”). The third step is where district courts
consider facts that existed at sentencing. But youth is not an
extraordinary and compelling reason at step one, which
focuses instead on developments that occur after a defendant
USA V. BRYANT 13
has been sentenced. So long as a defendant identifies an
extraordinary and compelling reason that fits within
§ 1B1.13’s binding framework, a district court could decide
under § 3553(a) that a defendant’s youth is another factor
supporting compassionate release. The statute allows for
that possibility.
What the statute does not allow is contorting the
extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons requirement to
convert compassionate release into an “unbounded
resentencing” mechanism. Hunter, 12 F.4th at 570. In
enacting § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress did not authorize district
courts to take a second bite at the sentencing apple. Rather,
compassionate release is a limited, discretionary exception
to the default rule that a federal defendant will serve his
entire sentence. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817,
819 (2010).
Yet interpreting “extraordinary and compelling” to
include a defendant’s youth would turn compassionate
release into a loophole for reevaluating sentencing decisions
without congressional authorization. The time to focus on a
defendant’s youth is at sentencing, when the district court
must craft a punishment “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to satisfy the
§ 3553(a); see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (“A downward departure
also may be warranted due to the defendant’s youthfulness
at the time of the offense or prior offenses.”). Here, for
example, the district court weighed Bryant’s juvenile status
in arriving at its original sentence. And it was right to do so:
in sentencing, “youth matters.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593
U.S. 98, 109 (2021).
But compassionate release is not sentencing or
resentencing. The focus of compassionate release
14 USA V. BRYANT
proceedings is not on what sentence is most appropriate
given the defendant’s background and crime; it is on whether
new circumstances warrant discretionary relief. See supra,
at 11–12; see also Dillon, 560 U.S. at 830 (there are
“fundamental differences between sentencing and sentence-
modification proceedings”). Using the compassionate
release statute to second-guess a sentencing determination
years later endorses “an endless repetition of inquiry” into
sentences that have already been through the wringer of
judicial review. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492
(1991) (quotation omitted). The text and structure of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and its accompanying policy statement do
not permit that interpretation of the extraordinary-and-
compelling-reasons requirement.
Thus, the district court erred in concluding that a
defendant’s youth can meet the definition of extraordinary
and compelling in an appropriate case. See Bryant, 2024 WL
2028268, at *5. The “holistic” balancing test on which it
relied lacks any basis in the text of the statute or the policy
statement. Id. at *5–6 (citing Ramsay, 538 F. Supp. 3d at
417–23). And the district court did not elaborate on how
youth is “similar in gravity” to terminal illnesses,
deterioration from the aging process, extenuating family
circumstances, or abuse suffered at the hands of a BOP
official.
Instead, the district court invoked § 1B1.13(e), which
provides that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need
not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing” to
warrant a reduction in a defendant’s sentence. As the
argument goes, because a defendant’s youth is known to the
sentencing judge, and because § 1B1.13(e) does not preclude
consideration of facts that may have been known at
USA V. BRYANT 15
sentencing, youth is a permissible consideration in granting
compassionate release.
Section 1B1.13(e) does not stretch that far. The
provision cannot encompass a defendant’s youth because it
does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for
compassionate release—it takes that term as it comes. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(e) (“For purposes of this policy
statement, an extraordinary and compelling reason need not
have been unforeseen . . . .”). The definition comes from a
different provision: § 1B1.13(b) and its various subsections.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) (“Extraordinary and compelling
reasons exist under any of the following circumstances or a
combination thereof . . . .”). Putting the two provisions
together, an extraordinary and compelling reason could be
foreseen at sentencing, but it still must fit one of the
circumstances in subsections (b)(1) through (4) or be
“similar in gravity” to those circumstances under subsection
(b)(5). And again, a defendant’s youth at the time of his
offense does not align with any of those categories. See
supra, at 11.
Section 1B1.13(e) still does some work. It prevents a
district court from rejecting circumstances that satisfy
subsections (b)(1) through (5) simply because they
“reasonably could have been known or anticipated” at
sentencing. See U.S.S.G.
illustrate the point. A district court could be aware of a
defendant’s medical impairments at sentencing. The court
could even expect that those impairments will get worse. If
the defendant’s condition later deteriorates so much that he
begins experiencing extraordinary and compelling medical
circumstances under subsection (b)(1), then § 1B1.13(e)
keeps the door open for compassionate release, even though
16 USA V. BRYANT
the sentencing court could have known or anticipated the
defendant’s worsening condition from the get-go.
Here’s another. At sentencing, a district court could
know that the main caretaker of the defendant’s child—say,
a grandparent—is suffering from an illness that makes it
difficult to care for the child without the defendant’s help.
The court could still choose to sentence the defendant to a
lengthy prison term. If the caretaker’s condition becomes so
debilitating that she can no longer care for the defendant’s
child, then § 1B1.13(e) allows a court to reduce the
defendant’s sentence based on extenuating family
circumstances under subsection (b)(3), despite its awareness
at sentencing that the caretaker’s health could deteriorate.
These examples show that § 1B1.13(e) is not a
freestanding category for circumstances not otherwise akin
to those in subsections (b)(1) through (5). Rather,
§ 1B1.13(e) is a safeguard to prevent district courts from
quickly discounting relief just because there was some
inkling at sentencing that an extraordinary and compelling
reason could develop down the line. Those reasons must still
track the examples in subsections (b)(1) through (4) or be
“similar in gravity” to them. A defendant’s youth does not
fit any of those categories, and so it cannot be an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release.
In short, the district court erred in concluding that youth
can be extraordinary and compelling for purposes of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). But because we can affirm “on any ground
supported by the record,” we affirm the district court’s denial
of Bryant’s compassionate release motion as it relates to his
youth at the time of his offense. Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker
Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
USA V. BRYANT 17
B
Next is Bryant’s argument based on the 35-year disparity
between his sentence and that of his codefendant, Toliver.
Like Bryant, Toliver was sentenced on several VICAR and
§ 924(c) counts. Years later, Toliver was resentenced to 35
years’ imprisonment based on an agreement in which he
pleaded guilty to a different firearm count. So while Toliver
and Bryant were convicted for offenses arising out of the
same incident, Toliver’s final judgment and corresponding
sentence are different.
In Bryant’s view, the disparity between the two
sentences is an extraordinary and compelling reason for
compassionate release. That is wrong for many of the same
reasons as before. For one, a sentencing disparity with a
codefendant is not “similar in gravity” to the circumstances
in subsections (b)(1) through (4), which focus on a
defendant’s health and safety or that of an interested third
party. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(5). And again,
compassionate release addresses post-sentencing changes to
the defendant’s circumstances or those of an immediate
family member. See supra, at 11–12. That prosecutors
showed Toliver leniency says nothing about how Bryant’s
situation has changed since his sentencing. See Hunter, 12
F.4th at 571–72. Lastly, as Bryant acknowledges, Toliver’s
sentence derives from a bargained-for plea. Because “a
codefendant’s acceptance of a guilty plea is a
explanation for a sentencing disparity,” there is nothing
extraordinary and compelling about the length of Bryant’s
sentence relative to Toliver’s. United States v. Valdez-
Lopez, 4 F.4th 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2021); see Hunter, 12 F.4th
at 572 (“There is nothing ‘extraordinary’ or ‘compelling’
about a sentence disparity that results from a co-defendant’s
decision to plead guilty and assist the government.”). The
18 USA V. BRYANT
compassionate release statute is not a tool for eliminating
sentencing disparities based on legitimate guilty pleas.
Bryant counters that a reduction finds support in United
States v. Roper, 72 F.4th 1097 (9th Cir. 2023), and Chen, 48
F.4th at 1093. Those cases deal with other issues—whether
and when district courts can consider sentencing disparities
created by non-retroactive changes in the law in deciding
whether a defendant has shown extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release. Roper, 72
F.4th at 1099; Chen, 48 F.4th at 1098; see also United States v.
Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 366–67 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)), cert. granted, 2025 WL 1603603
(U.S. June 6, 2025) (No. 24-820). Toliver’s sentence is not
35 years shorter than Bryant’s because he benefited from
changes in the law; his sentence was reduced in exchange for
pleading guilty. Toliver’s cooperation is not an
extraordinary and compelling reason for Bryant’s release.
C
Finally, we turn to Bryant’s contention that his sentence
was impermissibly “stacked” as to his § 924(c) convictions,
and that this is an extraordinary and compelling reason for
compassionate release. Bryant’s argument rests on a false
premise: he is not serving a “stacked” sentence.
In Deal v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
defendants without a prior § 924(c) conviction could be
charged for both a first offense (carrying a five-year
mandatory minimum sentence) and a “second or
subsequent” offense (carrying a 25-year sentence, to be
served consecutively) in the same indictment. 508 U.S. 129,
USA V. BRYANT 19
130–36 (1993) (quoting § 924(c)(1) (1988)).3 Thus, under
Deal, a defendant convicted of multiple § 924(c) offenses in
the same case would quickly face mandatory enhanced
sentences for “second or subsequent conviction[s],” despite
having not been previously convicted of a § 924(c) offense.
See id. This became “colloquially known as the practice of
§ 924(c) stacking.” Chen, 48 F.4th at 1094 (citation
modified).
Congress outlawed § 924(c) stacking in the First Step
Act. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. at 5221–
22 (codified at § 924(c)(1)(C)). Negating Deal, the Act
revised the statute to make clear that the 25-year enhanced
sentence may be imposed only when a § 924(c) violation
occurs “after a prior [§ 924(c)] conviction . . . has become
final.” United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 450 n.1 (2019)
(quoting § 924(c)(1)(C)). That means a first-time § 924(c)
offender cannot receive the 25-year enhanced sentence, no
matter how many § 924(c) convictions he accumulates in the
same case.
Bryant, a first-time § 924(c) offender, did not receive a
stacked sentence for his three § 924(c) convictions. Because
he discharged a firearm, each of those convictions
a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence,
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which, by law, must run consecutively,
id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). The district court treated each
violation as a first offense, thus imposing a 30-year sentence
with ten years on each count. Bryant never received the 25-
year enhanced sentence for a “second or subsequent”
subsequent” offense was 20 years’ imprisonment. 508 U.S. at 130
(quoting § 924(c)(1) (1988)). The penalty was increased to 25 years in
1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469.
20 USA V. BRYANT
conviction. So Bryant’s sentence does not implicate the First
Step Act’s revisions to § 924(c).
Bryant’s argument rests on a new theory of stacking. He
is actually challenging § 924(c)’s consecutive-sentence
mandate for multiple convictions. See
§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Such sentences are “stacked” in that they
occur one after the other. But that is not the kind of stacking
that Congress addressed in the First Step Act: Congress was
concerned with the 25-year enhancement for “second or
subsequent” offenses. That is why Congress amended
§ 924(c) to bar imposing the 25-year enhancement without a
prior “final” § 924(c) conviction, while leaving the
consecutive-sentence mandate untouched.4
Indeed, if
Bryant were sentenced again today, the district court would
have to impose (at a minimum) the same sentence for his
§ 924(c) convictions: three ten-year terms, all consecutive to
each other. See United States v. Beltran-Moreno, 556 F.3d
913, 915 (9th Cir. 2009). Nothing about that is extraordinary
and compelling.
IV
A defendant’s youth at the time of his offense is not
“extraordinary and compelling” under § 1B1.13. See
stems from a codefendant’s guilty plea. And we do not
credit Bryant’s novel conception of § 924(c) stacking.
AFFIRMED.
of whether the sentence was enhanced by 10 or 25 years.” But Bryant’s
ten-year sentences are not “enhanced”—they are the mandatory
minimum sentence for his offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).