UNITED STATES оf America, v. Thomas David STEINER, Appellant
No. 14-4628
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
February 1, 2017
103-121
2006 Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 25972.
The Commission‘s observations about nonprofits in this passage—that they send noncommercial messages and that such messages, including, for example, offers to attend fundraising dinners, are not advertisements—seem inconsistent with applying to nonprofits the apparently unqualified rule in the provision regarding Offers of Free Goods and Services. As a result, a court might conclude that the Commission intended the “Free Goods and Services” provision to apply to faxed offers by commercial entities, and not to similar faxes sent by nonprofits. It is, furthermore, unlikely that the 2006 Rule‘s statement about thе frequency with which offers of free goods and services are prefatory to commercial advertisement was predicated on the Commission‘s observation of such offers by nonprofits. If a court, therefore, faced a suit brought against a nonprofit, based on a faxed offer to distribute free benefits, the court might conclude that the Commission‘s 2006 Rule simply does not address that circumstance, so that the case should be adjudicated solely by reference to the provisions of the statute, which would presumably support the conclusion that a nonprofit‘s fax offering free goods or services was not an unsolicited advertisement.
While I concur in the panel opinion, ruling that the Complaint states a claim, I note that other courts might interpret the Commission‘s 2006 Rule differently.
Rebecca R. Haywood, Jane M. Dаttilo [Argued November 6, 2015], Office of United States Attorney, 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Counsel for Appellee United States of America
Before: FUENTES,* JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
This case returns to us on a “grant, vacate, and remand” (“GVR“) order of the Supreme Court of the United States. Our earlier precedential opinion and judgment of March 3, 2016 had affirmed defendant-appellant Steiner‘s conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon (
The Supreme Court‘s GVR order2 instructs us to reconsider our decision in light of Mathis v. United States,3 the Court‘s latest case about predicate offenses and the “categorical approach.” We asked the parties to file short supplemental statements addressing both the impact of Mathis on our previous opinion and the merits of Steiner‘s Mathis challenge more generally; Steiner also separately moved to remand for expedited resentencing. Both Steiner and the government agree that Mathis did not affect the validity of our earlier decision affirming Steiner‘s conviction. They also agree that it does affect Steiner‘s sentence; the District Court used a 1993 Pennsylvania burglary conviction as a predicate “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which the government now concedes was plain error.
Because we agree with the parties that, under Mathis, Steiner‘s 1993 burglary conviction was not a predicate “crime of violence” under the Guidelines—and, thus, that his Guidelines range should not have been enhanced—we will grant Steiner‘s motion for summary action, vacate the District Court‘s judgment of sentence, and remand for expedited resentencing. Steiner is to be released from federal custody pending resentencing, subject to the supervised release terms contained in the District Court‘s judgment of sentence. And because our previous precedential opinion was not at all affected by Mathis, we will once again affirm Steiner‘s conviction. We therefore revise and reissue below our previous precedential opinion as altered by our Mathis discussion and the alternative disposition it requires.
A. INTRODUCTION
During the execution of two separate search warrants at properties that police believed were owned or occupied by defendant Thomas Steiner, police seized, among other things, a sawed-off shotgun, .32 and .38 caliber ammunition, and 12 gauge shotgun ammunition. As a result, Steiner was indicted on two counts for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of
During the trial, the government introduced into evidence the fact that a warrant had issued for Steiner‘s arrest on an unrelated charge. Steiner contends that the District Court improperly admitted evidence of the arrest warrant that was unrelated to the offenses he faced at trial. He also argues that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict as to each type of ammunition seized. While we conclude that the admission of the unrelated arrest warrant was error, the error was harmlеss. We also conclude that the District Court did not err when it declined to provide a unanimity instruction. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the conviction. As intervening Supreme Court precedent has affected the validity of Steiner‘s 87-month sentence—an error that the government concedes is worthy of remand—we will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for expedited resentencing.
B. STING OPERATION, SEARCH, AND INDICTMENT
This case arises from a sting operation. In August 2007, police informant Timothy Stants told Pennsylvania State Trooper Thomas Baumgard that Thomas Steiner, a convicted felon, was staying on his (Stants‘) property and was “on the run” from law enforcement. Stants also claimed that Steiner had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner had described to him as a “cop killer,” and that Steiner said he would use the gun to avoid being arrested. Stants claimed that the shotgun would be found in a camper on Stants’ property.
Based on Stants’ tip, Baumgard obtained a search warrant for the camper. Before executing the wаrrant on August 27, 2007, Baumgard paid Stants $100 for his help in securing Steiner‘s arrest and told Stants to drive Steiner to a nearby gas station. There, officers would be waiting to arrest Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner‘s arrest for failure to appear at a preliminary hearing scheduled that same day, on an unrelated sexual assault charge. Baumgard conducted his search of the camper in the afternoon, just after Stants drove Steiner away to the gas station. He found, among other things, a sawed-off shotgun loaded with six rounds of 12-gauge shotgun ammunition; a wallet containing various documents, all bearing Steiner‘s name; and a discharged shotgun shell. Soon after the search, Baumgard ordered Steiner arrested on the warrant issued for his failure to appear at the preliminary hearing earlier that day. At the time of his arrest, Steiner was in Stants’ car at a nearby gas station.
Apparently, there was more to the story than the gun and ammunition found in the camper. Stants also told police that he had seеn the missing pieces of the sawed-off shotgun (part of the barrel and stock) at a home that Steiner supposedly owned, located at Meadow Avenue (the “home” or
Police executed the search warrant for the home on August 29, 2007. When they arrived, they entered the basement of the home, which was in disarray.5 There, they found a shotgun stock on the bar and a shotgun barrel in the ceiling where a tile was missing.6 Also, they discovered a hacksaw and pipe wrenches on the basement floor and a single 12-gauge shotgun shell in a pocket of the pool table. Four other 12-gauge shotgun shells were found in a bowl, on top of which was Steiner‘s notice of impending warrant of arrest. In addition to the shotgun ammunition, the police also discovered a variety of other types of ammunition, including 20 rounds of .32 caliber ammunition and 17 rounds of .38 Special ammunition.
Based on the shotgun аnd ammunition found in the camper, a grand jury charged Steiner with one count of being a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of
C. THE TRIAL
1. Testimony
The government‘s case against Steiner proceeded to a jury trial.7 At trial, Steiner stipulated to having a prior felony conviction. He testified in his own defense and denied that he ever owned or possessed the shotgun or ammunition seized from either the camper or the basement of the home. Steiner also acknowledged that he owned the wallet found in the camper and admitted that he owned the Meadow Avenue home at some point in 2007.
Steiner‘s ex-wife, Greta Steiner, was called as a witness. She testified that although she had been living at a different address in 2007, she occasionally stopped at the Meadow Avenue home to retrieve her belongings. She also testified that during these visits she saw neither firearms nor ammunition in the home but she recalled having stored boxes of antique ammunition that belonged to her deceased ex-husband in the home‘s garage. She denied that anyone ever brought the ammunition into the home and claimed that Steiner was unaware of the ammunition. Neither Steiner nor the government presented evidence about whether the ammunition stored in the garage may have been moved to the basement.
Mark Williams, Stants’ close friend, testified for the government. Williams claimed that he had been inside Steiner‘s home in August 2007 because he was interested in purchasing the property.8 At that time, Williams said that he noticed the shotgun barrel and the hacksaw laying on
Stants also testified. He denied receiving any benefit for his help in securing Steiner‘s arrest, despite Baumgard‘s testimony that he had paid Stants $100 for his assistance. He also corroborated Williams’ testimony rеgarding the basement of the home and admitted that he had visited Steiner‘s home twice in Steiner‘s absence.
2. The Government‘s Arrest Warrant Evidence
During Steiner‘s trial, the government introduced the arrest warrant that had issued based upon Steiner‘s failure to appear on the sexual assault charge. The government argued that the arrest warrant,9 though not the underlying conduct, was admissible to show that Steiner “was on the run from law enforcement at the time, hiding out in this trailer,” and was intending to “evade the warrant and not appear” at the preliminary hearing because “[t]hat‘s what led officers to his trailer in the first place.”10 The government claimed that the arrest warrant “complete[d] the story” because it was “background of what led law enforcement to Mr. Steiner to begin with in this case.”11 However, this was not true. Stants’ tip regarding the shotgun was the actual source of the government‘s initial interest in Steiner. The District Court, relying on the government‘s representation, admitted the arrest warrant evidence as “background” under Federal Rule of Evidencе 404(b). The court reasoned that, as long as the underlying conduct was not admitted, any prejudice to Steiner was minimized. The court, though, expressly rejected any argument that the evidence could be admitted to prove Steiner‘s motive or intent under Rule 404(b).
3. The District Court‘s Jury Instruction on Unanimity
The government requested that the jury be instructed that although the defendant was charged with possessing ammunition in different varieties or from different locations, it need not unanimously agree on which ammunition he possessed to convict him of felony possession under
Although all jurors must agree with respect to Count 1 that the Defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition and with respect to Count 2 that the Defendant possessed different ammunition, you need not all agree on the exact item possessed. For example, if a Defendant was charged with possessing one piece of ammunition found in the bedroom, one piece of ammunition found in the living room, and one piece of ammunition found in the basement, you must all unanimously agree that the Defendant possessed at least one piece of ammunition in order to convict. You do not have to agree on which one or if he possessed more than one.
Therefore, it would be sufficient if ten jurors determined that he possessed one
piece of ammunition in the bedroom, one juror determined that he possessed one piece of ammunition found in the basement, and one juror determined that he possessed them all. In other words, if the Defendant is alleged to have been in possession of ammunition of different varieties or from different locations, you must all find that as to the ammunition charged in each count he possessed at least some ammunition as charged in that count in order to convict, but ... need not all agree with respect to a count on exactly which ammunition was actually possessed as charged in that count.12
The jury found Steiner not guilty on Count One (charging possession of the gun and ammunition in the camper), but guilty on Count Two (charging possession of the ammunition found in the Meadow Avenue home).
II. CHALLENGES TO STEINER‘S CONVICTION
A. Admission of the Arrest Warrant
First, Steiner argues that the District Court erred by admitting evidence of the arrest warrant that had issued for his failure to appear at a preliminary hearing on an unrelated charge. The District Court stated during the in limine hearing on the admissibility of the arrest warrant, and memorialized in its minute entry, that its decision rested on Rule 404(b) grounds.13 Based on the government‘s representations, the court admitted the evidence as “background” or to “complete the story” of the felon-in-possession crime.
Steiner argues that, while courts in this Circuit have occasionally admitted prior-act evidence under Rule 404(b) for the purpose of “completing the story” оr providing “background,” they have also generally limited the use of those purposes to conspiracy cases. In response, the government asserts that the arrest warrant was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because it identified a proper purpose for the evidence: it was necessary to provide background and complete the story of Steiner‘s arrest, interrogation, and the police investigation of the crimes charged.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the District Court erred by admitting the arrest warrant.
1. Admission of the Arrest Warrant Under Rule 404(b)
We review the District Court‘s evidentiary rulings principally on an abuse of discretion standard, which occurs only when the district court‘s decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable“—in short, where “no reasonable person would adopt the district court‘s view.”14 We conduct “plenary review, however, of [the District Court‘s] rulings to the extent they are based on a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”15 This
In United States v. Green, we concluded that “allowing the jury to understand the circumstances surrounding the charged crime—completing the story—is a proper, non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b).”23 We also stated that prior-act evidence is admissible to supply “helpful background information to the finder of fact.”24 With all of this in mind, one might ask: is not all evidence helpful to providing background to the factfinder? The answer is yes. But not all helpful evidence is relevant to a proper purpose under Rule 404(b).
In fact, Steiner is correct that the majority of criminal cases in which we have deemed “background” a proper purpose involve conspiracies.25 And there is no conspiracy involved in this case. Also, in at least one opinion that preceded our decision in Green, we specifically warned that, while courts have occasionally admitted prior crimes evidence as “background,” “this label is uninformative at best and, at worst, can be an unacceptable substitute
There are unique characteristics that render “background” a proper purpose for admitting prior-act evidence in conspiracy cases. For instance, in proving the existence of a conspiracy, a court might allow a party to present background evidence revealing an ongoing relationship between co-conspirators.27 Likewise, this Court affirmed the admission of background evidence to help the jury understand one conspirator‘s role in a complex scheme.28 But neither of those models applies in this case.
Here, Steiner is the only defendant. There was no need for the government to explain a complicated backstory. We are not suggesting that conspiracy cases are the only ones in which background facts may be admissible as Rule 404(b) evidence. We are saying that, when the information needed to understand what happened in a case is straightforward and easily understood without reference to facts that do not bear on the charged offense, forcing extraneous and potentially prejudicial information into the record in the name of “background” is not defensible under Rule 404(b). That, unfortunately, is what happened here. Stants’ tip entirely explained why the government was focusing on Steiner. In fact, the arrest warrant evidence was completely irrelevant to the government‘s case.29 We therefore find this case to be sufficiently distinct from cases in which “background” evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b).
In Green, by contrast, we concluded that the background information—evidence that the defendant threatened to kill a police officer—was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because it fit “into a chain of logical inferences” and explained why the defendant was under investigation for the crime charged, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.30 We also held that the information was properly admitted for the purpose of proving the informant‘s motive to cooperate, which was put at issue by the defendant.31 We therefore find Green distinguishable insofar as the prior-act evidence there served to complete the story of the crime charged. Here, we conclude that evidence of the outstanding arrest warrant on the unrelated sexual assault charge had nothing whatsoever to do with Steiner‘s charged crime of felony possession of a weapon or ammunition under
Again, to be clear, we do not conclude that any evidence offered for the purpose of providing background is only admissible in conspiracy cases. There may—and likely will—be other situations in which such evidence is admissible outside of the conspira-
To be sure, the District Court was not entirely, or even primarily, to blame for its error. The government played a central role. Here, the prosecutor wrongly asserted that the government needed the unrelated arrest warrant to prove that Steiner was guilty of felony possession. Yet it is clear to us that the government did not need the arrest warrant to try a case against Steiner at all. The government had Stants’ tip, Stants’ and Williams’ testimony that Steiner owned the home in 2007 and possessed a shotgun, and a stipulation that Steiner was a felon. Taken together, this evidence strongly supported the government‘s theory that Steiner unlawfully possessed the firearm and ammunition. The only purpose the arrest warrant served was to improperly suggest that Steiner was predisposed to commit criminal acts.
In sum, we are deeply troubled by the government‘s inaccurate claim that the arrest warrant was “what led officers to [Steiner‘s] trailer in the first place,” and we are persuaded that that inaccuracy led the District Cоurt to err by admitting evidence of the warrant.32 We therefore
2. Whether the error was harmless
While we find that the District Court improperly admitted the arrest warrant, we conclude that the error was harmless.34 We can call a nonconstitutional error harmless, and uphold the conviction, if there is a high probability that “the error did not contribute to the judgment,” requiring us to have a “sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.”35
First, the arrest warrant evidence had no prejudicial impact on the jury‘s determination as to Count One, because Steiner was found not guilty of that charge. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the evidence had no effect as to Count Two. Second, the District Court did not disclose the conduct underlying the arrest warrant, that is, the alleged sexual assault of a minor. Third, at trial, Steiner stipulated to having a prior felony conviction. Also, when he took the stand, Steiner admitted that he was previously convicted of crimes of falsehood: burglary, theft, and felony forgery. And finally, the ample evidence presented surrounding Steiner‘s ownership and occupation of the home, Stants’ and Williams’ testimony regarding
We therefore conclude that any error in admitting the prior act evidence under Rule 404(b) was harmless.
B. Steiner‘s Jury Instruction Challenge
Next, Steiner argues in his briefs that the District Court erred by refusing to instruct jurors that they must unanimously agree as to which ammunition he possessed to find him guilty under Count Two. In support of his claim, Steiner argues that the government improperly bundled into Count Two multiple, distinct violations of
We reject Steiner‘s argument. In our view, the evidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that Steiner possessed the ammunition in one part of the Meadow Avenue home, which he owned in 2007. For the additional reasons that follow, we therefore conclude the indictment properly charged Steiner with a single violation of
Whether an indictment is duplicitous is a question of law subject to de novo review.38 We also review de novo “whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard.”39 “We review the refusal to give a particular instructiоn or the wording of instructions for abuse of discretion.”40
Duplicity is the improper combining of separate offenses into a single count.41 When a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict is jeopardized by a duplicitous indictment, a court can cure the indictment by issuing a limiting instruction requiring the jury to
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), a motion alleging a defect in the indictment must be made before trial. Yet while a defendant waives technical errors to an indictment by his failure to object to the duplicity before trial, courts have held that the alleged harm to the defendant‘s substantive rights resulting from a duplicitous indictment can be raised at trial or on appeal, notwithstanding the defendant‘s failure to make a pretrial motion.43 “The rationale for this distinction is that, whereas Rule 12 applies only to defects in the institution of criminal proceedings ..., a verdict rendered by a less-than-unanimous jury violates a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights by a harm that arises from the trial itself.”44
Count Two of the indictment charged Steiner with a violation of
To determine whether Count Two was duplicitous, we first focus on the “allowable unit of prosecution” to decide whether the indictment properly charges a violation of the relevant statute.45 We have held that the allowable unit of prosecution under
We have also stated that simultaneous possession of multiple firearms or pieces of ammunition does not give rise to a separate offense for each firearm or piece of ammunition possessed.47 Likewise, multiple convictions for possession of multiple firearms may be appropriate where the firearms in question were seized in different locations or if they were acquired in separate transactions.48
These observations lead us to the question of how we determine whether an in-
In United States v. Marino and United States v. Frankenberry, we held thаt the simultaneous possession or receipt of several firearms by a convicted felon constituted a single offense under the predecessor statutes to
However, in United States v. Kennedy, we held that mere physical proximity does not demonstrate simultaneous possession.52 There, we declined to find simultaneous
These cases demonstrate that determining whether individual firearms or ammunition were simultaneously possessed is a highly fact-driven inquiry that depends on the circumstances surrounding a defendant‘s alleged conduct.
Here, other than Steiner‘s testimony, there is little, if any, evidence supporting Steiner‘s contention that the ammunition found in the home was acquired at different times and for different purposes, or that it was separately stored in the home. By contrast, the evidence at trial strongly demonstrated that Steiner owned the home in 2007 and that all of the ammunition was stored in various parts of the basemеnt.56 Moreover, at least some of the 12-gauge ammunition was literally found resting under Steiner‘s notice of impending warrant of arrest. And, while Steiner‘s ex-wife testified that she brought various types of antique ammunition into
In sum, we conclude that the indictment was not duplicitous. Accordingly, the District Court‘s failure to give a special unanimity instruction as to Count Two did not constitute a violation of Steiner‘s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict.57
III. CHALLENGE TO STEINER‘S SENTENCE AFTER MATHIS
We now turn to Steiner‘s challenge to his sentеnce, which he invoked in his petition for certiorari (but not in his initial appeal to us).58
By way of background, the offense Guideline applicable to Steiner‘s
Steiner filed a petition for certiorari on the basis of the Supreme Court‘s intervening deсision in Mathis v. United States.60 Pointing to Mathis, Steiner argued that his 1993 Pennsylvania burglary conviction was no longer categorically a crime of violence. Without the enhancement, Steiner‘s base offense level would have been 14, not 20, thereby yielding a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment—a range of possibilities all markedly below the 87-month within-Guideline sentence he had actually received.
Mathis is the latest in the Supreme Court‘s series of opinions on how prior convictions can be used as predicate “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA,”
In Mathis, the Supreme Court analyzed an Iowa burglary statute that prohibited unlawful entry into not just “buildings or other structures“—which is the “generic” federal definition of burglary64—but also into “land, water, or air vehicle[s].”65 The Court explained that the Iowa statute laid out not separate elements, but alternative ways of satisfying a single locational element; “the statute defines one crime, with one set of elements, broader than generic burglary.”66 Because a “state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense,” a conviction under Iowa‘s burglary statute could not suffice under the proper elements-based categorical apрroach.67 The District Court had erred by using a “modified categorical approach” instead, treating the statute‘s separate means of committing the offense as if they were elements. The District Court therefore looked at the “records of [Mathis‘s] prior convictions [to] determin[e] that he had burgled structures, rather than vehicles.”68
The relevant 1992 Pennsylvania statute has many of the same features as the Iowa statute discussed in Mathis. The Pennsylvania statute defined burglary as “entering] a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.”69 “Occu-
The question Mathis tells us to ask—are these alternate means or alternate elements?—can be resolved by reference to “authoritative sources of state law” or, if necessary, “the record of a prior conviction itself ... for the sole and limited purpose of determining whether” we confront means or elements.71 In this case, the 1993 Pennsylvania information charged Steiner with “feloniously ... enter[ing] a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein,” although the information did identify the specific “location” immediately following.72 To the extent this is equivocal, we note that Pennsylvania‘s model criminal jury instructions, albeit for the current version of the statute, “do[] not require the jury to unanimously agree on the nature of the location; it can be a building, or occupied structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion of a building or structure.”73 By contrast, it appears that jury findings arе generally required for a
We therefore hold that these are alternative means of committing the core burglary element.76 The statute is not divisible and, after Mathis, a categorical approach, rather than a modified categorical approach, must be used.
We pause to recognize that other Courts of Appeals have, aftеr Mathis, held that various state burglary statutes set out different elements, and not different means, based on the wording of particular statutes. The Iowa burglary statute analyzed in Mathis defines burglary as the entering of “an occupied structure,” a term it then
Based on our discussion above of Pennsylvania law and practice, as well as the substantial overlap between “building” and “occupied structure” under the statutory definition, we believe that we are on solid footing. Nevertheless, the divergence of outcomes after Mathis suggests that the “elements or means” inquiry is not quite as easy as the Supreme Court thought, not the least because state legislatures and state courts do not draft their laws and craft their decisions with this particular distinction in mind.
Returning to our analysis, we next compare the Pennsylvania statute to the generic offense of “burglary of a dwelling.” We have previously defined “dwelling” by reference to the then-current Sixth Edition of Black‘s Law Dictionary: a “building or portion thereof, a tent, a mobile home, a vehicle or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.”81 The Pennsylvania statute plainly sweeps more broadly than “burglary” narrowed to dwellings.82
Under the categorical approach, then, a conviction under the Pennsylvania burglary statute in question is not a predicate § 4B1.2 “crime of violence.”83 Thus, Steiner‘s 1993 burglary conviction should not have been used to enhance his sentence. As the government concedes plain error,84
We must reach one final matter before closing: Steiner contends that he has already served a term of imprisonment longer than would be authorized by a Guidelines range without the “crime of violence” enhancement. As we noted above, at offense level 14 and with a criminal history of VI, Steiner‘s range would be 37-46 months instead of the 70-87 months he faced before. Although Steiner does not provide us with the Bureau of Prisons information he used to compute the months he has already served—he was serving a state sentence when the underlying federal criminal proceedings began, and there is no obvious indication on the docket of when he was formally committed to the Bureau of Prisons—it appears likely that he has already been in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for over 46 months, and the government does not dispute his characterization of his time served. We therefore will order that Steiner bе released from custody, subject to the conditions of supervised release imposed in the District Court‘s original judgment, pending expedited resentencing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment of conviction, vacate its judgment of sentence, grant Steiner‘s motion for remand, and remand for expedited resentencing. Steiner is ordered released pending his resentencing.
v.
The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LANCASTER, Appellant
No. 16-3528
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued December 5, 2016
(Filed: January 30, 2017)