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Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co.
123 F.3d 126
3rd Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 It ing grounds.” mootness concluded evi- Nor has PIRG offered ration. was, ill-equipped to appellate “as an aquatic of the River has that the life dence questions in the first instance.” salinity these from some- decide suffered excess Church, at Presbyterian MEI’s sodium 529. more vulnerable to dis- how organisms that oc- charges than those penalty phase was goal during the PIRG’s cupy the Creek. particular harms its mem- not to document Majority Majority Op. Op. at 123. also See again standing is a live Now that bers. (“[T]he attempt affiant no makes at opportunity issue, given the it should be affect salt show how MEI’s excursions might be able to so. Given that PIRG do salinity that comes out water level of position, I support its prove facts sufficient to plant. if MEI even the treatment court, “persuaded am, Presbyterian like the faithfully, report all of excursions were to its re- prudent course of action is to that the concerning lack information he still would pro- for further mand to district court potability drinking Similarly, of his water. standing. ceedings” regarding of its the basis affiants would continue lack the other Id. at 528. toxicity of regarding the fish information River.”). the Delaware argu- majority also dismisses PIRG’s high TOC levels could ment River, impact on not-

negative the Delaware the TOC in this case benefitted

ing that “[i]f by adding Creek nutrients

the Wickecheoke waters, cannot under- oxygen to its we Complaint time, COAL could, CONSOLIDATION same harm stand how COMPANY, of the Motor Ves- as Owner Majority Op. at River.” 123. the Delaware Barge Elizabeth sel Charterer Ultimately, majority criticizes PIRG Exoneration From Number MC for support producing stand- for not evidence Liability. or Limitation of during notice ing, PIRG was not on but standing- penalty phase litigation of this George Newman, Appellant. may As there remained a live issue. No. 96-3434. prove relevant certain evidence I prove damages, standing, but not Appeals, States United Court remand, could introduce remand. On PIRG Third Circuit. regarding the effect of increased evidence and on the salinity on the Delaware River Argued June explain attempt It could also affiants. Aug. Decided a nutrient- an increase nutrients how may ecosystem an have a poor portion of of a nu-

negative impact on the remainder Clearly, ecosystem. it is for

trient-rich issues. such fact-intensive

us to decide Presbyterian the Ninth Circuit noted

As (9th Cir.1989), U.S., 870 F.2d 518

Church v. position in a than an court is better findings of fact court to make re-

appellate case, standing.

garding provided allegations complaint in a standing, adequate foundation to deter- to the remanded allegations could be

mine whether suspicion

proved. spite It did this in the “case should be dismissed stand- *4 PA, (argued), Pittsburgh,

Paul L. Hammer Appellant. for Dickie, Miller (argued), R. McCam- James PA, Chilcote, ey Pittsburgh, Appellee. for & McKEE, Before: GREENBERG GREENAWAY,* Judges, and Circuit Judge. District OPINION THE COURT OF GREENBERG, Judge. Circuit appeal case is this court on This before exonerating order the district court’s (“Consol”) from Coal Co. Consolidation injuries employee George liability for to its presents complicated appeal This Newman. admiralty procedure. and unusual issues of Consequently, we forth convoluted set history procedural of ease at and factual length. considerable I. HISTORY CASE History A. Procedural 27, 1989, injured April Newman was On working as a deckhand Consol. while Thereafter, his wife filed suit Newman and of in the Court Common against Consol Pennsylvania, Allegheny County, as- Pleas of negli- of serting claims unseaworthiness Act, App. U.S.C. gence under the Jones 20, 1990, July in- Subsequently, § § jurisdiction voking under U.S.C. * Jr., sitting designation. Jersey, Greenaway, Judge Joseph New A. Honorable Court for the District States District United Pennsyl- findings. jury’s pursu- court filed suit (“Limi- Supreme Liability Courts Act vania and United States

ant to the Limitation § alloca- seeking petitions for Act”), App. respectively then denied tation U.S.C. any liability or limitation of exoneration from tur and certiorari. may As have had the Newmans. 15, 1995, Newman moved On June convenience, refer to Con- matter we will After action revived.2 limitation “limitation action.” simply sol’s case case, a mo- Newman filed restored the court Act, to the Limitation the district Pursuant adopt seeking the district court tion to have proceedings. enjoined the state jury, but the district of the state §

See U.S.C. ap- then that motion. Newman court denied ac- filing his claim in the limitation After petitioned pealed denial this court and (in trial), he which demanded grant for a of mandamus this court writ 18, 1991, January to dis- Newman moved on We, however, dismissed him relief. similar proceedings. stay of the solve the a final clearly was not from appeal, injunction court dissolved petition for a writ and denied the judgment, stipulated:' after Newman court thereafter of mandamus. The district 1. The waive claim Claimants damages. jury’s assessment of adopted *5 any judgment judicata upon ob- res based the court at a bench Accordingly, proceeding. in the tained State Court action novo on heard the limitation de trial Company shall 2. Coal Consolidation admiralty is- liability as well as on certain relating right litigate to all issues have the The sues, we need not here set forth. and exoneration of claim of limitation its on in favor of Consol district court found present proceeding.... remaining liability, rendering the issues of limita- 3. issue of valuation the The moot. re- shall remain an issue to be fund by District Court solved the United States History B. Factual Pennsylva- of for the Western District injury, employed time of Consol At the his nia. ... 1989, April On Newman as deckhand. time, At the the district at 132. same serving capacity in that on was Newman administratively limita- dismissed the Elizabeth, tug, Timothy Stin- the with M/V subject reopening after conclu- tion action being pilot. Elizabeth son as the was proceedings. New- sion of the state court barge, empty an No. from used to move though stipulation even man into entered yard, Monongahela the repair across Consol’s rejected He instead could he have it. could yards fleet of couple of hundred to a river a the of to this court from denial appealed barges. empty injunction if the to dissolve the a motion injunc- refused to dissolve the district court long, Barge 1029 was about feet stipulation. the See 28 U.S.C. tion without deep. and and feet feet wide Stinson 1292(a)(1). § inserting Barge into a were Newman empty removing after anoth- of the fleet row in the state court The case then continued barge repair yard. the er Newman (his Newman wife where in November line, Barge tie claims) using rope, verdict her obtained a had withdrawn barge at halfhead. adjoining the the 1029 to negligent the un- and vessel Consol already attached the ends of had damages at Newman seaworthy setting Newman’s and barges the with wires. Stinson testified of $1,327,00o.1 exception an issue With the away briefly, he turned interest, he and when Pennsylvania Superi- looked concerning back, going through the Newman was judgment of the com- “Mr. affirmed the or Court court; a little bit of force-” air backwards with pleas disturb mon thus tug trial showed that the The evidence jury found contribu- 1. The also Newman 11.83% $120,000, barge far less had total value of torily negligent. molded the ver- and $1,244,519.50 damages the state making adjust- recovered in than the certain dict court. ments we need not detail. memory adopt of motion to has no of ment the denial his App. at findings. fell into the accident. Newman bottom state Newman also severely barge, head hitting and that the district court’s part he of injuring himself. said saw clearly Stinson the exoneration issue were erroneous. half-head, line still attached to further contends that the court’s exclu- He part Stinson untied sion, measure, down Newman. subsequent as a remedial of a repair took across barge and it back to the safety about memo issued Newman’s facility bring aid. Newman medical accident was erroneous as was denial of made motion he to dismiss limitation barge out of lifted spoliation action reason evidence. Mi- on the bank to await ambulance. set argument predicated spoliation He on the Hughes, operating assistant chael Consol’s if was cut contention that the line after the manager piece retrieved cut it. accident Consol must have the barge. from the Thomas line bottom Brown, facility, repair at the foreman II. DISCUSSION piece eye line with the from

removed Hughes possession half-head. then took A. of Keview Standard office, line, put it in his and later of the whole appeal two highlights This areas for The line bagged and labeled it. was taken first the legal review. The arises from con analy- Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory for flowing sequences circumstance (the Clegg. Clarence Warren Orr sis that the accident led to both state and feder (assistant port captain), Louis Truntich essentially proceedings. al area is This foreman) they both observed testified inqui area legal in character. The second it had thought fine after the accident ry plena on the We have focuses trial itself. did not cut. Brown stated been *6 ry legal over the district court’s deter review freshly instead and look cut but was old Minerals, minations. Inc. v. C.A. Universal witness, expert Clegg, testi- worn. Consol’s Cir.1981). (3d Co., 98, 102 Hughes & 669 F.2d sharp cut that the had been with a fied affirm the district court’s factu But we must instrument, except for a few strands on clearly they al unless erroneous. ten- have broken under outside could 52(a); Corp. FMC v. United Fed.R.Civ.P. employees All the testified Consol who sion. Commerce, 833, F.3d Dep’t 29 838 States practice was for stated standard (3d Cir.1994) (in banc). using inspect replace a and person out, have a although if worn Consol did not evi We review the district court’s policy to this effect. New written rulings dentiary principally on abuse of needing to line was available for deckhands Philadelphia v. standard. Glass discretion replace old line. Cir.1994). (3d Co., 188, 191 34 F.3d We Elec. however, review, of its rul July 18,1996, plenary the district court entered exercise On they legal the extent are based on a exonerating ings decision and order its of Evi liability, interpretation there of the Federal Rules finding that was neither from Co., v. F.3d Barker Deere and 60 negligence. The court dence. nor unseaworthiness (3d Christos, fell, Cir.1995); 158, Lippay v. 161 slipped fact and as a that Newman found Cir.1993). 1490, (3d re entirely through F.2d 1496 We cut 996 line was and court’s motion seek result view the decision the accident. This obviated spoliation of by reason of ing a dismissal court decide need for on an abuse of discretion standard. then evidence liability issues. Newman limitation Corp., Tool 13 v. Milwaukee Elec. jurisdiction pursuant Schmid appealed. We have (3d Cir.1994). 76, § 78 F.3d 28 U.S.C. appeal argues that the district On Admiralty Background Law B. stipulate him to improperly forced provides Act that when judicata The Limitation res effect claim

he privity accident “without the judgment; chal- maritime occurs he also from the owner,” shipown- knowledge of [the] the Seventh Amend- lenges as violative of enjoined pursuing common law actions liability not ... exceed the amount er’s “shall Dammers, at 755 836 F.2d interest such owner such other forums.” or value of the omitted). (citation vessel, pending.” derives from freight then The conflict and her 183(a). Amendment, shipowner facing § A the Amendment App. U.S.C. the Seventh as law, potential liability complaint only brought can applies file at common cases admiralty. Waring brought limitation of in a federal district not those (5 How.) stay 441, 458-60, Clarke, all court which then is authorized to 46 U.S. (1847). proceedings against shipowner and other L.Ed. 226 185; § all receive claims. 46 U.S.C. exceptions There are two F(4). Supp. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule admiralty jurisdiction over Limita exclusive Supplemental Rule F Under proceedings. The first arises when tion Act Admiralty Rules for Certain and Maritime freight exceeds the value of vessel Claims, “may shipowner demand exoner is, claims, fund is ade that of all liability.” from well as limitation of ation against the quate to cover all claims filed Williams, 765, 47 F.3d 769 n. See Texaco v. Henn, Corp. v. owner. See Lake Tankers Cir.1995). (5th complaint under 147, 152, 1272, 1 354 U.S. S.Ct. process. two-step Limitation Act Gorman,2 (1957); F.3d L.Ed.2d admiralty sitting in with The district when there is exception The second arises “ jury, first determines ‘whether there out claim exceeds the one claimant whose negligence; negli if there was [second] freight.3 In this value the vessel and its gence, privity whether it was without case, exception applied, because the second owner; [finally] if knowledge of the limi obliged to dissolve the granted, how [limitation] tation is fund stay if against proceedings other ” Complaint In re should be distributed.’ stipulated to district court’s exclusive Scheepvaart & Dammers & Vanderheide relating jurisdiction to all determine issues (2d B.V., Maats Christina See, liability. e.g., parte Ex limitation of Cir.1988) (quoting Towing Co. v. Universal Green, 437, 438-40, 286 U.S. 52 S.Ct. Cir.1979)). (8th Barrale, 414, 417 595 F.2d 602-03, (1932); Langnes v. 76 L.Ed. 1212 show claimant has the initial burden of Green, 531, 540-44, 282 U.S. 51 S.Ct. unseaworthiness, then, negligence ing (1931); Gorman, 246-48, 75 L.Ed. 520 *7 successful, if the burden shifts the claimant is any must stipulations at 524. These waive lack of shipowner to to demonstrate a the judicata claim res based on the state court of knowledge privity and in order to obtain the judgment shipowner’s right the and concede liability. benefit of limitation of Bankers all in federal litigate to limitation issues 761 Corp., v. Bethlehem F.2d Trust Co. Steel 524-25; also, court. at see Grant Gil Id. Cir.1985). (3d 943, n. Black, Jr., more L. The Law & Charles of (2d ed.1975).4 10-19, § Admiralty at 871 admiralty jurisdiction The exclusive Act ac of courts in Limitation the federal Stipulations C. and Trial de novo “saving the to directly conflicts with tions § the Newman that of 28 suitors” clause U.S.C. adopt to denying in mari court in his motion preserves rights law certain erred common jury cases, findings the court on including right to a trial. the factual state time the (3d Cerasia, liability trying in the the issues and exonera v. See Gorman However, Cir.1993). tion limitation de novo. is a conflict because issues There single that jury in insti the law is clear in a claim right is to a actions case no “[t]here this, anVinadequate like the admiralty, the claimants are fund situation in tuted leading to the single for than the the court the dissolution of 3. claim is less If a claimant's freight, injunction against proceedings a limitation of the vessel value proceeding the state court not needed. any is res was that Newman claim of "waive[d] any judicata upon judgment in based obtained judicata” opinion, use terms we the "res In this proceeding.” Court State estoppel” rather than "claim" or and "collateral "preclusion” stipulation in because the "issue” advantage perceived magnanimity of proceed to in state court claimant is entitled juries willing stipulations. they to making appropriate South Texas 540-44, See, stipulate essentially they submit to Langnes, 282 at will e.g., U.S. Gorman, 247-48; by court 2 F.3d at two trials —the state trial followed at S.Ct. any substantially redundant limitation requirement The that the claimant waive federal deny judicata proceeding put court is judg- claim from a state court hard of res —this them.”). right shipowner’s ment and concede litigate in all limitation issues federal court necessary In this case it accepted “has courts for over been federal position for us to far a claim take how century beyond dispute.” half a and is now words, stipulations go. ant’s must In other Any findings by Id. at 524-25. court, we need whether a district not decide jury thus will bind the state court federal injunction dissolving as condition of determining right shipowner’s court in may in against proceedings, the state The Seventh limitation. Id. 528-29. judicata sist the claimant waive the res inapplicable in Amendment is such situa- finding effect of the state court on the liabili privi- on the owner’s because ty preserved issue because has not ty knowledge, critical on which is Here, right in the to raise issue. issue, separate liability limitation in same manner as the claimants Texaco made the state court. determination Williams, agreed by stipulation a ship is less clear on whether law judicata regarding res waive claim of right litigate the issue of owner has limitation issues of and exoneration. both regard exoneration federal court without Although required New the district court, state stipulation dissolving man’s as a condition of liability issue mirrors the deter exoneration injunction against the continuation of the makes. the state court mination proceedings, could have Appeals for Circuit Court of the Seventh stipulation and then refused to enter into recently in an exoneration and limitation held appealed court’s refusal to dissolve liability action issue injunction stipulation. 28 U.S.C. without court and the should determined in state 1292(a)(1) (“the appeals § courts shall case return to the federal court should (1) jurisdiction appeals Inter from: limitation if the claimant issues decide locutory ... dissolve or refusing orders judgment of the limitation wins excess ....”); modify injunction see also Gor Complaint McCarthy fund. In re Bros. man, 2 at 523.5 Because Newman F.3d (7th Cir.), Bridge, 83 F.3d object appeal, Co./Clark to the not take such an even — 361, 136 denied, U.S. -, cert. 117 S.Ct. stipulations the district form of the (1996). Appeals L.Ed.2d 253 The Court issue, Dillinger v. we will not review see Circuit, however, (3d held Cir.1992), the Fifth has Caterpillar, *8 notwithstanding redundancy in stipula the inherent by the and Newman is now bound having overlapping and federal court argue state tions he and cannot made protect can proceedings, stipulations improperly.6 claimant required district court them limit a shipowner’s right to not whether both “the need decide We therefore in litigate the issue of exoneration limitation action must waive claimant in a [to] Williams, proceed judicata v. 47 court federal court....” Texaco res effect state limitation exoneration ings also Oil and Gas as to F.3d at 769. See Odeco Co. both (5th Cir.1993) Bonnette, proceed in in court 401, issues to state 4 F.3d 405 order v. (When do saving to suitors clause. We anxious to take under “the claimants are so addition, apply argument judicial estoppel in attorney In at oral 5. Newman’s conceded injunc he could have Fifth Circuit case law this case. district court dissolved under appeal, but that he stipulations. filed an contended could such Newman Newman’s tion based on unpersuasive Circuit. We find not in the Third argue change position that those cannot now and plain language argument of section his binding stipulations upon him. See Mur are not 1292(a)(1) depending which differs on circuit Cir.1989). Silberstein, 61, (3d ray F.2d v. 882 66 you are in. 134 limi- however, court tried

indicate, that we have serious court. so; action, admiralty do thus an case that the claimant must doubts tation/exoneration opin- read right jury courts should not this to a trial. As which there is no for requirement approving implicitly Gorman, a ion as 2 in F.3d at a indicated we judicata stipulation res waiving heard proceeding the Limitation-Act is under must the state court action include effect of jury. admiralty in a by sitting court without a liability issues. limitation not allow a claimant a We will jury trials in the to obtain consecutive action Jury D. Trial and the Seventh through the device of courts state federal Amendment ac- characterizing his claim in limitation argues further Newman Act or being predicated Jones even if retrial of the exoneration issue in Thus, no how matter unseaworthiness. appropriate, federal court it should have was limi- claim in the characterizes his Newman problem jury. been a Newman’s here before part action, a of that his claim was tation jury Congress provide can is that while Co., McCarthy action. See In re Bros. cases, as admiralty trials in it has done under (“Claimants right no to a F.3d Act, Amendment does Jones the Seventh actions, admiralty their jury in and thus lose provide right jury a to a trial admiral common law remedies before right pursue to Co., ty. Fitzgerald v. Lines United States un- admiralty jury a when forced into court 16, 20, 1646, 1650, 10 83 S.Ct. U.S. omitted). Act.”) (citation the Limitation der (1963). admiralty an L.Ed.2d 720 While action, trying admiralty the district by jury a may claim be when it is heard independently considered issues decid- court joined right a with claim for which there a jury, trial, id., by the state court but ed earlier jury bring a a result. Yet the inconsis- Act and claims in fed reached different Jones unseaworthiness entirely might tency appropriate because New- eral court where he have been able was judicata jury relating any a trial on the claims res obtain man waived claim to based proceeding respect exoneration.7 See Simko v. C & C Marine on the state court (3d Co., Maintenance Cir. emphasize that are not exoneration. we We 1979); Towing v. Red Star & Trans. Co. a in which a concerned here with situation (S.D.N.Y. Giant, Ming F.Supp. Act and brings claimant his Jones unseawor- 1982). Instead, brought his Jones in a district court and then thiness claims Act claims state and unseaworthiness brings shipowner a limitation action. stipulations later entered into stay action Consol’s exoneration/limitation by trying he a and return where won novo, judge de the district exoneration issue jury in the district verdict. case re-examining found the state facts entirely admiralty case jury contrary to Amend the Seventh jury. right to a trial did not include See But cases Newman cites on ment. (3d Cooper Loper, point trial or all involved situations where the 1991). We are not aware of authori Cir. rejected jury’s appellate court or modified a nonjury admiralty ty holding that claim Here, the finding in the same case. jury joined when it is not must tried were in a different forum. right claim which carries with another Normally, estoppel judicata collateral res *9 jury trial. apply in such because would circumstances the state claims and the exonera both to think that the

Newman seems from the same set action arose un his Jones Act and district court retried tion/limitation Here, however, explicit Newman That of events. belief is not cor seaworthiness claims. judicata ly any right to res on the in the state waived rect. Those claims were tried course, We, before us. rule he have the situation we describe is not do not that could of jury as in these circumstances obtained trial that’s, Thus, that issues.8 theories. I don’t know is limitation and exoneration Then, the, theory.” not forbid the inde- Id. after Consol’s Amendment did Seventh attorney admiralty responded, case of the court “But pendent examination in the said: they certainly have, adjudicated I’ve seen it in their previously the issues in the state jury pretrial report, trial for mentioned court case. Newman received there.” circumstances, attorney’s in which he Consol’s statement those claims forum was easily response seen to the court entitled to one. can be as although only theory, that it not the it was by facts Adopting the found the state court possible theory. was a pro- mean would state ceedings judicata application res on the had This with conclusion is consistent Consol’s issue would eliminate Con- exoneration earlier on the matter. statements right litigate the exoneration issue in sol’s pretrial argued in its statements that application court. Such an cut, rope it it but did not know when was was contrary stipulation directly be to Newman’s cut, and if it had been cut before the accident right to liti- in the district court to Consol’s replaced it Newman should have seen relating in gate the district court all issues 88-89,1086 (“It rope. App. present- is and limitation. The district both exoneration ques- ly precisely rope in unknown when jury’s adopt findings did on dam- cut, cut, except it was was whom damages ages because the issue was not brought prior being cut was judicata. covered Newman’s waiver res ways landing marine Consolidation’s Thus, the court trial was not a “com- accident.”). state alleged These statements nullity” Newman now New- plete as claims. sufficiently with the consistent court’s may in man his efforts state court to consider factual that Consol cannot be deemed time, given have been a waste the final waived disclaimed the issue. result, sought who party but he was is Newman also that there no he entered into the as support finding that evidence to the court’s result, stipulations which have led to this he memory slipped. Newman Newman has no consequences. must live their Stinson, accident, witness, only away began looking Newman was when Findings E. District Court Factual fall and turned back when inquiry turn now to the second area of We already falling New was backwards. relating appeal, the area to the trial itself. on is there is direct evi man correct that no argues that fac- the district court’s slipped, that Newman nor could there dence support decision to tual apparently be. The district court inferred clearly were exonerate Consol slipped after the court first that Newman First, respects. he con- erroneous in several break, rope but was found that pretrial tends that Consol did not disclose accident. cannot find these cut after the We claiming proceedings that was findings clearly erroneous because was cut after the line Newman used support for them in the record. there clear accident. The evidence Newman has witness, expert Clegg, the testified response from Consol’s at- contention is one entirely cut rope New- had been almost torney at After pretrial conference. (of yarns through except for 156 total legal theory a few attorney if the man’s asked rope) yarns in the the outside of rope was after the on case that the cut “No, ap- accident, under tension. Newman attorney I don’t which broke said: Consol’s argue the line cut before theory.” pears at 1110. is the believe that accident, mention, however, partly but remained at least does attorney’s pulled it so that it attached until Newman responded first to Newman’s “Well, breaking remaining intact men- was the inquiry by saying: that has been theory the, certainly yarns that caused him to fall. This one of the tioned one *10 preclusion. 2 encompasses the of issue that term doctrine This in Gorman held "res stipulation F.3d judicata” action also at 528-29. in a limitation 136 facts, a employee fell after line broke and

consistent with the but so is the one ropes employees inspect all to rope that the cautioned reached object- carefully through using them. Consol This before was cut after the accident. subsequent that memo a remedi- particularly plausible, ed this was conclusion is because fairly if al measure and thus inadmissible under Fed. rope a held would be obvious was 407, agreed. While yarns, R.Evid. and the court together by only a few of 156 and argues is not a the dissent memo re- Newman testified that he would have subsequent remedial measure within the it. We not placed had he noticed do bad only meaning of Rule 407 because Newman facts we find decide which version dealing portion with sought to admit probable. more The district decided accident, dissent investigation of the Consol’s rope after and was cut the accident 19, supporting the exclu- authority there clearly say finding this was we cannot investiga- post-accident of evidence of sion erroneous. Jensen, Specht under Rule 407. See v. tions rope not Given the did Cir.1988) 700, (10th (uphold- F.2d 863 701-02 break, cut, permissible but was if not press detailing city ing exclusion of release necessary inference to be drawn is that New- response investigation of incident and to walking along slipped. man He was a 2-3 discovered);9 Stauffer, problem Alimenta v. gunnel large barge drop-offs foot on the with (N.D.Ga.1984) (exclud- F.Supp. side, presents a on either a situation which post-incident report and ing recommenda- slipping hazard. We cannot find clear severe Furthermore, improvement). for New- tions fell in error in the conclusion that he these the memo should have been man circumstances. to exception an Rule admitted under break, cut rope If and was that he offered memo he contends accident, after then not defective. was testimony impeach the of Truntich theory liability for his unsea- Newman’s cut like it with an ax. line looked had been negligence claims was that worthiness properly considered provided rope. Newman Consol defective memo the framework of Rule 407. within negli- offered no other evidence of Consol’s It can be reversible error ex tug gence the unseaworthiness of or subsequent of a remedial clude evidence barge. Inasmuch as the court found that entirely it is for im measure when offered defective, affirm the was and we peachment purposes. Petree v. Victor Fluid conclusion, findings supporting this' (3d Cir.1989). Power, Inc., 34, 38 887 F.2d negli- legal finding there neither interpret impeachment Yet a court must must af- gence nor unseaworthiness also be circumspectly exception Rule because firmed. subsequent remedial mea “any evidence of thought might to contradict so sures Evidentiary Rulings F. party’s] impeach in a testimo [a sense Co., ny_” v. Honda Motor challenges certain evi Flaminio Newman also Cir.1984) (7th (emphasis add rulings by the district court. New F.2d dentiary ed). safety Accordingly, the evidence offered for attempted introduce a Consol man memo, impeachment must contradict the witness’s regarding memo the accident. (five Kelly testimony directly. May days See Crown prepared Co., (3d Cir.1992). 1273, 1278 accident) Kreutzer, Equip. an stated that David lines, Rocky Helicop and advise them of measures to avoid Mountain worn 9. The dissent relies on (10th Helicopters, danger, inspection. Cir. inherently ters v. Bell closer This is 1986), post-event proposition that "tests for the designed pre subsequent remedial measure of Rule 407. reports” are not within the ambit investigation than vent future accidents rather Rocky dealt See at 138 n. 3. Mountain dissent purpose ... test "conducted discov or ering] specifically reports designed tests might gone wrong right.” what though, problem, the nature of while determine Mountain, Thus, Specht Rocky 805 F.2d at 918. alert,” "safety question here was a the memo Rocky than more relevant to this case Moun designed app. "safety alert" at 1279. This tain. danger, employees potential alert *11 rope rope for the that Here, ap the line substituted cut testified that Truntich rulings cut an ax. But are not con- to him to have been broke. the court’s peared tradictory. employees memo accident testified that The Kreutzer described Consol broke, presumably pieces Newman’s the line they line retrieved the two once where But the although barge brought repair no names were mentioned. was back to directly custody contradict Truntich’s facility memo does not and showed chain of from testimony. offering his Truntich was point forward. Stinson testified that he that the line immedi appearance of the opinion in pieces the line two after Newman fell saw accident. As the Court of ately following the cut that he did not the line. Stinson and held, has there Appeals for the First Circuit cutting admitted that there were tools on the greater “a nexus between the state must be rope removing that in tug and he handled sought impeached and the reme ment to be Barge empty fleet to take from Harri measure than the case at bar.” dial attention. The district Newman medical Sears, Co., & Roebuck son testimony, faced this could have with Cir.1992). (1st cor The district court thus contention that he did discredited Stinson’s in rectly interpreted Rule 407 and did not err cut the and inferred that he did. not excluding the evidence. absolutely no evidence that Consol There line, the cut line a broken substituted that, out as we important point It is also argument that cut the line Newman’s Consol above, there was evidence observed theory is inconsistent with his that the line Thus, not after the accident. line was cut compelling broke. there was no rea- memo, it was en- Kreutzer wrote his when to find Consol son for that de- warning give the tirely natural for Consol to circumstances, any stroyed evidence. all, surely appropriate After it it did. surely not the court abuse discretion inspect using employees ropes before tell denying in motion to dismiss on Newman’s them. spoliation grounds. Furthermore, it the memo recited that was “investigation.” Thomas on Consol’s based look III. the line did not CONCLUSION

Brown testified cut, freshly obviously the district court but order the district court entered trial. In the rejected that evidence at the 18,1996, exonerating from July liabil- circumstances, hardly it conceivable that Therefore, ity not be affirmed. we need will at trial could introduction of memo arguments Newman’s that Consol consider in of the bench trial have altered the outcome knowledge thus is not privity and had suggests that case. the dissent this While liability. entitled to limitation Brown’s memo would have corroborated testimony, we do not see how could McKEE, dissenting Judge, part in Circuit any to the evi- further corroboration added concurring part. showing of a at the trial in the absence dence part “investigation” respectfully led to Kreut- from II.F. I must dissent sending Although I majority opinion. memo led to information concur zer of the aware, analysis, I majority’s at trial. As far as we the rest of the available showing. make court erred exclud- such that the district Newman did believe say under Certainly he did. memorandum Rule ing his brief does not the Kreutzer Rules of Evidence. More- of the Federal evidentiary ruling second over, error I do this not believe of mo challenges is the denial harmless, and therefore remand for I would spoli action for to dismiss this limitation proceedings. further of evidence. ation rope “leaving line” The condition motion is inconsistent with denial of Consoli- rope crucial to the determination was cut was court’s factual cut, liability. lines are used Those dation Coal’s because if it was Con- the accident can, good barges together and condi- prevented tie must have cut sol 18,000 pounds. tion, piece, a force over in one withstand examining *12 138 damage been leaving line should have the and the

The district court concluded that holding when he fell had out service. line Newman was taken of Clearly, if that was cut after been cut. line added).1 dis- (emphasis at The App. 1279a concluded, plaintiff fell, as the Rule trict court excluded this evidence under Coal would not be liable. Consolidation as a of Federal Rules of Evidence 407 the However, fall, if before the the line had been subsequent presumably remedial measure condition, in cut or was defective Consolida- that, goes memo on to announce because the may v. well be liable. See Earles Union future, the “careful examination of (3d Corp., Barge Line 1104 prior lines to their rigging and shall be made Cir.1973) (A shipowner duty a “to furnish has App. Rule any operation.” at 1279a. use place working reasonably for ... one a safe 407 states: barge ... perform his chores aboard the event, When, tak- after an measures are duty] breach of that results [The which, previously, if would have en taken negligence proximately when the breach occur, likely to evi- made the event less injury person.”). causes to a foreseeable subsequent is not dence of the measures seaworthy shipowner’s duty to furnish “[A] prove negligence.... This admissible completely independent ship is absolute and require rule the exclusion of evi- does duty ... of his to exercise reasonable of- subsequent dence measures when of (internal quotations at care....” Id. purpose, such as ... fered for another omitted); Edynak Ship- also v. Atlantic see impeachment. Cir.1977). Inc., (3d ping, 562 F.2d if Certainly, 407. Fed.R.Evid. Truntich, foreman at Louie the assistant sought language about admit the memo’s accident, time of the testified that he saw the lines, examining then Rule 407 the would day leaving line on the the accident of reflects, implicated. clearly The how- record fall, appeared it to have after Newman’s and ever, only sought to admit that that Newman just a “cut an axe.... It was been company’s investiga- portion related nice, smooth, at straight cut.” 1271a. tion into I do not believe that his accident.2 testimony sought to this discredit proffered scope this evidence was within the days by introducing a circulated five memo Therefore, Rule I remand this 407. Kreutzer, top his David after accident for a determination case the district court day company official the scene of whether that evidence could have been part: That stated in accident. memorandum grounds other it excluded on whether investigation showed that the line Our should have been admitted. damage prior although and had suffered Even if the memo’s statement about MPO [inch] normal 1-1/2 investigation company’s into Newman’s acci- typically purpose, close line used for measure,3 pointed subsequent inspection have dent is remedial should out Major- Although investigations specifically men- under Rule 407.” 1. the memo does not accident name, ity Op. support position, its it is clear from content at tion Newman’s 136. Jensen, referring majority Specht date it is fail. cites v. Cir.1988) (10th Stauffer, v. 701-02 Alimenta (N.D.Ga.1984). could have been redacted exclude F.Supp. memo Both regarding "subsequent language remedial attempt party cases involved an one to admit subsequent measure.’’ specifically for the reme- document explained I dial measures above, contained. As excerpt Arguably, above here; the last few lines clearly that is not case suggest fall action that would within remedial wanted to admit the from Consoli- scope inspection Rule "[A] 407: close investigation, namely, had dation’s "that line damage pointed out the should damage,” company’s prior suffered re- App. at out of should have been taken service.” sponse thereto. However, added). (emphasis that infer- 1279a explained This in the Tenth Cir- distinction is ence tenuous best. opinion Rocky Helicopters cuit’s Mountain (10th Cir.1986), Helicopters, suggests Bell 805 F.2d 907 majority memo Kreutzer’s Specht, cited in 863 F.2d at 702. unambiguously scope within Rule authority spirit of It would strain the the remedial mea- that "there further contends prohibition post- supporting sure in Rule 407 extend its the exclusion evidence of (3d Cir.1989), we ruled the district court have determined wheth- court should refusing to error in ad- Rule committed reversible under it was nevertheless admissible er If, warning decal that had mit evidence of as the impeachment evidence.4 injury applied years plaintiffs was been suggests, the condition of memo *13 ” impeach when that evidence was offered to inspection have that “a close such testimony press that mechanical had no line not have been disclosed that the should dangers. I used, rejected inherent believe Kreutzer’s the court could have could been admitted for similar testimony rope appeared memo have Truntich’s that the purposes. axe” and to have been “cut with an concluded nice, smooth, straight “just it was that Moreover, it important is to bear mind least, very At the cut” Truntich testified. proceeding that the exoneration/limitation

the memorandum would have corroborated the usual concern was bench trial so court’s Brown, testimony the the of Thomas foreman impeachment the misuse the that will facility. repair that at the Brown testified majori- Accordingly, is the evidence absent. freshly rope look cut. the did not ty dangers is far more concerned about the admitting “remedial action” evidence majority suggests memoran- by the is warranted circumstances of than directly Truntieh’s did not contradict dum majority op, (quoting case. See at 136 this Sears, testimony cites Harrison v. Roe- Co., Motor F.2d Flaminio Honda (1st Co., Cir.1992), in & F.2d buck (7th “any Cir.1984)(suggesting that evi- support of its statement that “Truntich subsequent remedial measures dence opinion appearance of offering his of the thought impeach”)). ... might be immediately following the acci- [Tjhere greater ... ‘a nexus must be dent. reason remedial [of “The exclusion im- sought to be between the statement encourage after an is to accident] measures peached the remedial measure than post-accident safety precautions or repairs ” Majority Op. at 16. Howev- ease at bar.’ safety.” Kenny, public interest of immediately er, rope appearance of the public not fur- policy at 351. That is F.2d following In- the fall was crucial evidence. by excluding language Kreut- thered deed, I can think of no other basis for simply memo described condi- zer’s rope had district court’s conclusion rope of the and stated that cut the fall than how the been prior damage.” at line “had suffered immediately appeared afterwards. 1279a. Although could have re- Pennsylvania the district court Kenny In v. Southeastern (3d jected Truntich’s accepted Transportation Authority, 581 F.2d evidence testimony Cir.1978), testimony, I was so light believe allowed evidence of new we to have the is entitled installed on a train crucial ing fixtures that were admissibility of impeach court reconsider the an assault there platform after If the court determines that testimony employee this evidence. SEPTA receiving daily. no In Pe other obstacle to lights inspected there platform were Inc., evidence, Power, then court should into 887 F.2d 34 memo tree v. Victor Fluid Mountain, Rocky post-event Rocky tests at contained in shield to evidence Mountain, redesign all were reports. might possible in references It rare situa- or trial, id., suggest I which is what reports excluded see as "mea- tions to characterize such respect which, to the Kreut- could have been done previously, would if conducted sures” post- to Consolidation's zer memo's references Yet it reduce the likelihood of the occurrence. inspection policy. implementation of an recognize that tests accident usually such sounder investigating purpose for the are conducted agent company, might then what Truntich was an of the to discover If occurrence rope's right. condition could be gone wrong statement about the Remedial measures remedy any company impeached statement taken to those actions flaws case, position In this I no as to whether the test. memo. take indicated failures supports that Truntich was the conclusion remedial measure was not Photoelastic record Coal, testifying agent how- Study as an of Consolidation trunnion but rather the subse- redesign ever. quent of the trunnion. lia- question of Consolidation’s reexamine the Ac- light this additional evidence.

bility in

cordingly, respectfully I dissent from section opinion. majority

II.F. of *14 of America

UNITED STATES D’Andrea; SMITH; David

J. Steven

Joseph La Porta.

* GTECH, Intervenor in D.C. Co.; Ledger Morning Texas

Newark Cox Inc.;

Publications, Morning Dallas D.C., Appel

News, Inc., Intervenors

lants.

No. 97-5176. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit.

Argued June Aug.

Decided

* Amended 5/15/97.

Case Details

Case Name: Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Aug 18, 1997
Citation: 123 F.3d 126
Docket Number: 96-3434
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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