OPINION
A jury convicted David Green of attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Green appeals, arguing that the District Court erred by allowing the Government to introduce evidence that he threatened to kill an undercover police officer. We will affirm.
I.
In March of 2006, Green was arrested in New Jersey on state-law drug charges. This arrest came about in part through the efforts of an undercover officer identified in the record as “A.G.,” “Gus,” and “Gussy.”
Three months later, Green and an acquaintance, Jacqueline Stahl, were in a vehicle together when they drove past A.G.’s home. Green told Stahl that he was going to blow up A.G. as retaliation for getting him arrested. He stated his desire to purchase dynamite and blasting caps, as well as cocaine. Alarmed, Stahl contacted law enforcement, reported what Green had said, and agreed to act as an informant. 1 In the weeks that followed, Stahl, acting at the direction of the FBI, surreptitiously *236 recorded a series of conversations with Green about the possibility of acquiring dynamite and cocaine through “Frankie,” Stahl’s boyfriend from Florida.
On July 1, 2006, Stahl and Green met at a convenience store in Mantua, New Jersey. Green confirmed his interest in buying dynamite and blasting caps. Stahl told Green that Frankie could get him six sticks of dynamite. The conversation then turned to the possibility of buying cocaine through a man Green knew in Miami. Stahl volunteered to drive to Florida to consummate the deal. Green agreed that Stahl should make the trip, because she was “middle class looking” and would not arouse suspicion. Later, the conversation returned to the subject of explosives. Green said, “look, serious ... let’s do some dynamite.” Stahl asked him what he planned to do with it, and told him he’d better not kill anyone she knew, or “go blow up that Gus’s house.” Green remained coy, saying only that he wanted to keep “something handy” because he intended to do “something.” When Stahl pressed him, asking “who you got in mind?”, Green responded, “you never know.”
On July 7, Stahl and Green again discussed the possibility of buying cocaine and dynamite from Frankie. Stahl asked Green whether he needed small sticks of dynamite, such as would be used to blow up a car or a tree stump, or big sticks, to destroy a building. She again asked whether he intended to use it to blow up A.G.’s home. Green steadfastly refused to specify his target, but he did ask Stahl to tell him more about A.G. The remainder of the conversation revolved around the terms of the deal. Stahl told Green that Frankie would accept “fifteen hundred [dollars] and an ounce of coke for six little ones or 300 apiece for the small ones,” or “2 ounces of coke and a thousand cash” for “the big ones.” Green told Stahl that these prices were too high. He was also skeptical that Frankie would have any use for cocaine from New Jersey, since the drug was abundant in Florida. Stahl promised to find out how much cash Frankie would require.
In the weeks that followed, Green’s interest in buying dynamite appeared to wane. At one meeting, Green told Stahl that the dynamite was on the “back burner” because he was low on money. But he was still interested in cocaine, which he could sell for a hefty profit. On July 19, Stahl told Green that Frankie would sell him a kilogram of cocaine in exchange for $5,000 up front and $11,000 more within a month. She also told him that the total purchase price of $16,000 included “the sticks [of dynamite].” Green responded, “I ain’t, forget the sticks. I’m talking about the powder.” He also told Stahl that he did not “wanna keep talking about this thing” because he feared he was under surveillance. The next day, Green told Stahl that he would accept Frankie’s terms, and described his plan to sell the cocaine through a friend in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. On July 28, Stahl told Green that Frankie’s associates would be up from Florida the following weekend and that Green should have his $5,000 ready. Stahl reminded him that “the sticks are right in with the 11 grand.... Take it, book and then you can deal more with him later.”
The sale was scheduled for August 3. Green had not pulled together the necessary $5,000, but he brought along $3,100 plus the title to a vehicle he intended to offer as collateral. Stahl picked up Green at his apartment and drove him to a motel, where they met “Mario,” an FBI agent posing as Frankie’s friend. After initial conversations inside the motel, Mario, Green, and Stahl went to Mario’s vehicle. *237 Mario opened the trunk and showed Green one bag containing dynamite and another containing cocaine. Green twice said, “alright,” then went to retrieve Stahl’s vehicle. As he walked to the car, however, he noticed police officers sitting in several of the vehicles in the parking lot. He decided to abandon the deal. He got into Stahl’s car, stopped in front of Mario’s car, pulled Stahl into the vehicle, and sped away. As they drove away, Green exclaimed to Stahl that there were police officers (“the man”) in the parking lot. Stahl feigned ignorance, but Green angrily accused her of setting him up. He exclaimed: “Look, look. That’s the fucking man.... bitch I oughta kill your fucking ass.” Stahl denied any involvement with the police, but Green was not convinced. He ordered Stahl to stay away from him, drove her car back to his apartment, and dropped himself off. Stahl drove away unharmed.
Green was arrested four days later. He was indicted on one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was not charged in connection with his attempts to procure dynamite or his threat to kill A.G.
Before trial, the Government filed a motion in limine to admit recorded and testimonial evidence of Green’s attempts to purchase dynamite and threats to kill A.G. Specifically, the Government’s theory of admissibility was that Green’s pursuit of dynamite constituted “intrinsic evidence” concerning the charged cocaine offense. This argument relied on
United States v. Williams,
Green argued for exclusion of all references to the dynamite and why he wanted it. He argued that discussions about dynamite and killing A.G. were not “intrinsic” to the charged cocaine offense, and could easily be redacted from the recordings of his conversations with Stahl about cocaine. He also argued that even if the references to dynamite were intrinsic evidence, they should be excluded under Rule 403.
After a hearing, the District Court granted the Government’s motion. The District Judge apparently accepted the Government’s “intrinsic evidence” argument, because he did not conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis. He reasoned that “the dynamite explains how we got into a drug deal in the first place,” and that “the Government certainly is entitled to give the background [and an] explanation [of] how this all came about, how they ended up together in this position to arrest [Green] under these charges.” The District Judge also declined to exclude the Government’s evidence under Rule 403. He recognized that the evidence was highly prejudicial, *238 but offered to give a limiting instruction to the jury.
At trial, the jury heard recordings of the conversations between Stahl and Green recounted above. Stahl supplemented those recordings with testimony about the conversations and Green’s attempts to procure dynamite and cocaine. She testified that she went to the FBI after she learned that “Green wanted to kill a couple officers and he was looking for ... some cocaine and dynamite.” She also said that she agreed to cooperate with the subsequent investigation because “officers’ lives were in danger.” Shortly after that testimony, the jury heard the July 7 conversation in which Stahl questioned Green about his desire to “blow up” Gussy. The prosecutor asked who Gussy was. Stahl responded that Gussy was “an officer” and that Green “wanted to know where he lived ... because ... you know, he wanted to kill him. He wanted to murder him because he was busted.”
Meanwhile, Green attacked Stahl’s credibility throughout the trial. In his opening statement, he called her a “profane, aggressive, and unpleasant individual” whose cooperation with the FBI was “motivated by money.” He developed this line of attack during his cross-examination of the Government’s first witness, FBI Agent Robert Barbieri, who was Stahl’s FBI handler. Barbieri testified that the FBI paid Stahl approximately $900 for her work as an informant, both to compensate her for her time and to reimburse her for gas and the use of her cell phone. He acknowledged that Stahl had asked for money from the FBI “five or six times” since the investigation of Green had concluded, and had threatened not to testify against Green unless the FBI gave her more money. He also admitted that Stahl had asked if the FBI could help her son, who was facing state-law criminal charges in an unrelated matter. Green resumed this attack during cross-examination of Stahl herself. He suggested that the $900 she received from the FBI was a lot of money to her, and again suggested that she cooperated to help her son. Stahl denied any improper motive and insisted that she approached the FBI out of a desire to “protect people, lives that [were] in danger.”
Near the end of the trial, the District Court reminded the jury that Green was “not on trial for any acts or attempted acts relating to dynamite,” and cautioned jurors not to use evidence about dynamite as proof that Green was a bad person with a propensity for committing criminal acts. Green’s trial counsel approved this charge, telling the District Court that its proposed instruction was “great.” The jury found Green guilty.
In determining Green’s offense level for purposes of calculating his advisory Guidelines range, the District Court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Obstructive conduct under § 3C1.1 includes “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a ... witness ... directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(a). Green received this enhancement because he yelled, “bitch I oughta kill your fucking ass” at Stahl as they drove away from the motel. The District Court concluded that this statement amounted to a “threat,” inasmuch as Green had menaced Stahl precisely because he realized she had set him up, and was likely to be a witness against him in the future.
The Court sentenced Green to 96 months in prison. Green filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. *239 § 3742(a). 2
II.
In the District Court, Green challenged the admissibility of all evidence concerning his attempts to buy dynamite. He has narrowed his challenge on appeal. He admits that his discussions about dynamite permeated and “could be said to have intertwined” with his discussions about cocaine. Green contends, however, that the District Court erred in allowing evidence that he had threatened to use that dynamite to kill A.G. In other words, he no longer argues that the jury should not have learned that he sought to buy dynamite. He argues only that it should not have been allowed to learn why he wanted that dynamite. He claims that this evidence was not “intrinsic evidence.” Additionally, he argues that evidence of his threat to kill A.G. was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), and in any event should have been excluded under Rule 403. 3
As it did in the District Court, the Government asserts that evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. was intrinsic evidence and thus admissible without reference to Rule 404(b). In the alternative, it argues that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b), and need not have been ex-eluded under Rule 403. As a fallback position, the Government maintains that admission of the evidence was, at worst, harmless error.
“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings principally on an abuse of discretion standard.”
Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co.,
III.
We begin with Green’s argument that evidence of his threat to kill A.G. was not “intrinsic” to the crime charged. In doing so, we examine several evidentiary con *240 cepts that have frustrated courts and commentators alike. Accordingly, recourse to some legal history affords useful context.
“The original attitude of the English courts was that any relevant evidence of the defendant’s misconduct was admissible even if the only theory of relevance was to establish the defendant’s character and, in turn, use character as circumstantial proof of conduct.” 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:25 (2009) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence ]. Abuse of this rule, among others, by the inquisitors of the Star Chamber prompted Parliament to pass the Treason Act of 1695. Id. That law granted several new rights to individuals accused of treason. First, it entitled the accused to a copy of the indictment stating the charges against him. Second, it mandated that any overt act of treason alleged in the indictment be proved by two witnesses, testifying in open court subject to cross-examination. Third, and most importantly for present purposes, it provided that no overt act that was not alleged in the indictment could be proved at trial. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. Cin. L.Rev. 713, 716-17 (1981) [hereinafter Reed, Trial by Propensity ] (citing 7 Will. III, ch. 3 (1695)). Over time, courts extended the rule against proving uncharged acts to criminal trials generally, not just trials for treason. Id. at 717. By 1810, it was more or less settled that “bad acts evidence which merely demonstrate[d] the propensity of the defendant to do acts similar to those charged” was inadmissible. See Norman Krivosha et al., Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts To Convict, 60 Neb. L.Rev. 657, 664 (1981) (citing the 1810 case of Rex v. Cole). 5
English decisions in this area influenced American courts, and the rule here throughout the 19th and 20th centuries mirrored that of England: evidence that the accused had committed some other crime was not admissible to prove that the defendant had a propensity for committing crimes, and therefore probably committed the charged crime. 6 Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra, at 736, 739. See also David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 3.3 at 101 (2009) (“American courts plainly followed English practice in excluding [uncharged misconduct] evidence when offered to prove guilt through an inference of bad character.”).
It was held early on, however, that this rule did not require the exclusion of
all
*241
evidence of uncharged crimes.
7
Courts allowed such evidence when it was introduced not to demonstrate propensity, but to establish the “res gestae” (“thing done”) of the charged crime.
8
Most of the early cases arose in the state courts.
Walker v. Commonwealth,
[i]t frequently happens, however, that as the evidence of circumstances must be resorted to for the purpose of proving the commission of the particular offence charged, the proof of those circumstances involves the proof of other acts, either criminal or apparently innocent. In such cases, it is proper ... that the chain of evidence should be unbroken. If one or more links of that chain consist of circumstances ... which tend to prove that the prisoner has been guilty of other crimes than that charged, this is no reason why the court should exclude those circumstances. They are so intimately connected and blended with the main facts adduced in evidence ... that they cannot be departed from with propriety; and there is no reason why the criminality of such intimate and connected circumstances ... should exclude them, more than other facts apparently innocent.
Id. The court gave the following hypothetical: suppose a man is indicted for murder. Suppose further that the murder weapon was a pistol; that this pistol once belonged to another man, but was stolen on the same night the defendant was seen at the rightful owner’s house; and that the defendant was seen in possession of the pistol on the day of the murder. This evidence would tend to suggest that the defendant had stolen the pistol. Should it be admitted in the murder trial? The court said yes, even though the evidence tended to prove both larceny and murder, because it was “intimately connected and blended with the main facts” of the charged murder. The court distinguished between evidence which “constituted] a part of the transaction”—the sort of evidence that be *242 came known as res gestae—and evidence of “circumstances hav[ing] no intimate connexion with the main fact.” Id. The former was admissible; the latter was not.
Application of similar rules led to a different result in
Heath v. Commonwealth,
The most famous case on this issue was
People v. Molineux,
In the decades that followed, federal courts generally adhered to the approach outlined in
Molineux.
They held that evidence of uncharged misconduct was generally inadmissible, but recognized many exceptions to that rule, including one for evidence that was part of the res gestae.
Gianotos v. United States,
Similarly, in
United States v. Tuffanelli,
the Seventh Circuit allowed evidence of uncharged wrongful acts in a conspiracy case involving violations of federal liquor laws, on the theory that those acts were “logically connected” with the charged offense and “so closely and inextricably mixed up with the history of the guilty act itself as to form part of the plan or system of criminal action.”
While use of the res gestae exception grew common, critics argued the term was too vague to be useful and encouraged rote incantation of Latinisms in lieu of thoughtful analysis. Professor Wigmore was especially unsparing. He wrote that res gestae was an “empty phrase [which encouraged] looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision,” 6 John Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1767 (Chadbourn rev. 1976), and “most frequently used as a cover for loose ideas and ignorance of principles,” 1A John Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 218 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). Professor Morgan wrote that res gestae *244 was a “troublesome expression” which owed its prominence “to an inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and precise thinking.” Edmund Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 229 (1922). He argued that the phrase was marked by “exasperating indefiniteness” that did “nothing but bewilder and perplex,” and faulted courts for choosing to “express[] in a dead and foreign tongue an idea for which there are accurate and adequate English words.” Id. Professor Thayer likewise criticized the “growing and intolerable vagueness of the expression.” James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15 Am. L.Rev. 1, 10 (1881). These criticisms were chiefly directed to the use of res gestae as a hearsay exception, but they were equally applicable to its use in the context of uncharged crimes. 9 See Leonard, supra, § 5.2 at 322-24.
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. The new codification included Rule 404(b), which provided that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” was inadmissible to prove a person’s character in order to show action in conformity therewith, but admissible for “other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” The rule codified the common law bar against the use of uncharged crimes to prove criminal propensity—albeit in a modified form. 'The common law rule was widely, though not universally, stated in “exclusionary” terms. That is, it set forth a general rule of inadmissibility, subject to exceptions, such as res gestae.
See, e.g., United States v. Clemons,
*245
Since Rule 404(b) was enacted, the term “res gestae” has largely given way to its “modern, de-Latinized” descendant: “intrinsic evidence,” the term invoked by the Government in this case.
11
See
1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence
§ 4:33 (3d ed.2003).
See also
Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Second Coming of Res Gestae,
50 Cath. U.L.Rev. 719, 728 (2010) [hereinafter Imwinkelried,
The Second Coming of Res Gestae
] (describing the inextricably intertwined doctrine as “arguably the second coming of the common-law
res gestae
principle”). As mentioned earlier, modern cases divide evidence of other crimes and bad acts into two categories: those “extrinsic” to the charged offense, and those “intrinsic” to it. Extrinsic evidence must be analyzed under Rule 404(b); intrinsic evidence need not be. Recalling the logic for allowing res gestae evidence, courts today exempt intrinsic evidence from application of Rule 404(b) on the theory that there is no “other” wrongful conduct at issue; the evidence is admissible as part and parcel of the charged offense.
Compare Gianotos,
This brings us to the issue presented in this appeal. Was evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. “intrinsic” to the charged offense of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute? The answer to that question depends on the definition of “intrinsic evidence,” a term we have used before but never conclusively defined. Exhuming the “inseparably connected” and “inextricably mixed up” language of res gestae,
12
most courts of appeals today hold that acts are “intrinsic” to the charged offense if they are “inextricably intertwined” with that offense.
Cross,
Courts following this reasoning employ a variety of tests for determining whether an act is “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense. The Eleventh Circuit holds that evidence is inextricably intertwined if it is “not part of the crime charged but pertainfs] to the chain of events explaining the context” of the crime; or is “linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime”; or “forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime”; or “completed] the story of the crime for the jury.”
United States v. Wright,
There are at least three problems with the “inextricably intertwined” test and its subsidiary formulations. The first is that the test creates confusion because, quite simply, no one knows what it means. Such an impediment stands as an obstacle to helpful analysis. Indeed, we have criticized the “inextricably intertwined” standard as “a definition that elucidates little.”
Cross,
Indeed, this case exemplifies how elusive and unhelpful the “inextricably intertwined” standard can be. All of the formulations used by the courts of appeals purport to embody the same test, but clearly they are not interchangeable. Whether evidence qualifies as intrinsic in a particular case may well depend on which version of the test one employs. For example, Green’s threat to kill A.G. would qualify as intrinsic if the test is whether it “pertainfs] to the chain of events explaining the context” of the crime,
Wright,
The second problem with the inextricably intertwined test is that resort to it is unnecessary. The most common justification for admitting evidence of “intertwined” acts is to allow a witness to testify freely and coherently; we do not want him to have to tiptoe around uncharged bad acts by the defendant, and thereby risk distorting his narrative. This is a worthy goal, but it can be accomplished without circumventing Rule 404(b). As the D.C. Circuit explained in Bowie:
If the so-called “intrinsic” act is indeed - part of the crime charged, evidence of it will, by definition, always satisfy Rule 404(b). The rule bars bad acts evidence only when the evidence is offered solely to “prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Evidence that, constitutes the very crime being prosecuted is not of that sort.
The third problem with the inextricably intertwined test is that some of its broader formulations, taken at face value, classify evidence of virtually any bad act as intrinsic.
See, e.g., Gibson,
This Court has never adopted its own version of the “inextricably intertwined” test. In
Cross,
. we noted some of the problems with the test but ultimately reserved judgment. We observed that “the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ... evidence is often fuzzy” and noted that “most circuit courts view evidence as intrinsic if it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the charged offense ... or if it ‘completes the story’ of the charged offense.”
Cross,
Our resistance to the “inextricably intertwined” standard has not diminished since Cross, and today we make clear that this is not our test for intrinsic evidence. Like its predecessor res gestae, the inextricably intertwined test is vague, overbroad, and prone to abuse, and we cannot ignore the danger it poses to the vitality of Rule 404(b).
That is not to say we reject the concept of intrinsic evidence entirely. Instead, we will reserve the “intrinsic” label for two narrow categories of evidence. First, evidence is intrinsic if it “directly proves” the charged offense.
See e.g., Cross,
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that our holding will exclude much, if any, evidence that is currently admissible as background or “completes the story” evidence under the inextricably intertwined test. We reiterate that the purpose of Rule 404(b) is “simply to keep from the jury evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad person, implying that the jury needn’t worry overmuch about the strength of the government’s evidence.”
Taylor,
Applying the standards set forth above, this is a straightforward case. Evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. with dynamite was not intrinsic evidence. First, it did not directly prove that Green attempted to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. Additionally, it did not in any meaningful way facilitate his attempt to procure cocaine through “Frankie” and “Mario”—'the only crime with which he was charged.
Mindful that we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, however, we turn to the government’s alternative argument that evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. was admissible under Rule 404(b).
IV.
To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) have a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may consider it.
United States v. Butch,
First, the evidence served at least two proper purposes. A proper purpose is one that is “probative of a material issue other than character.”
Huddleston v. United States,
Evidence that Green threatened to kill A.G. was also admissible proof of motive. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). “Motive” is “[something ... that leads one to act.”
Black’s Law Dictionary
at 1039 (8th ed. 2004). Here, Green put Stahl’s motives for cooperating with the FBI squarely at issue during the trial. Both in his opening statement and on cross-examination, he vigorously suggested that Stahl cooperated with the investigation in order to make money, or to get the FBI to help her son with his criminal charges. In light of that attack, the Government was entitled to produce evidence of an alternative motive for her cooperation—namely, her concern that “officers’ lives were in danger”— which it hoped would improve her credibility with the jury, especially in light of her testimony that three of her brothers were either active or retired state troopers.
16
See United States v. Scarfo,
*251
Second, evidence that Green threatened to kill A.G. was relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. This definition is “very broad.”
Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington,
If proof of bias is almost always relevant, so too is evidence of a lack of bias.
United States v. Fusco,
Third, and contrary to Green’s argument on appeal, the District Court was not required to exclude evidence of Green’s threat under Rule 403. That rule permits a trial judge to exclude relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. We review for abuse of discretion, which means we must uphold the District Court unless its
*252
ruling was “arbitrary or irrational.”
Universal Rehab. Servs.,
We find no abuse of discretion here. The evidence at issue carried some probative value. It helped explain why talk of dynamite permeated Green and Stahl’s taped conversations about cocaine, and why Stahl was working with the FBI. Meanwhile, the risk of unfair prejudice, while certainly present given the deplorable nature of Green’s threat, was not so great as to require reversal. We note that we have rejected Rule 403 challenges to the admission of evidence that was just as prejudicial as the evidence at issue here.
See, e.g., Scarfo,
For these reasons, we hold that the challenged evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b). As a result, we need not decide whether its admission was harmless error.
V.
Evidence of Green’s threat to murder A.G. was not intrinsic evidence. It was, however, admissible under Rule 404(b). The District Court did not err by admitting it at trial. We will affirm the judgment.
Notes
. Three of Stahl's brothers were active or retired state troopers.
. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
. He also claims that the District Court erred by enhancing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. He admits that he threatened Stahl, but argues that he did not obstruct justice because his threat was neither "real” nor "credible” and was never carried out. We are not persuaded.
See United States v. Ramey,
.The fact that Green has narrowed his intrinsic evidence argument on appeal does not necessitate plain error review. The argument he advances here—that evidence of his motive for purchasing dynamite should have been excluded—was necessarily included within, and specifically advanced as part of, his broader argument in the District Court for exclusion of all evidence about dynamite.
. See also Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, supra, § 2:26 (explaining that Cole "forbade the prosecution only from using the defendant's subjective character as circumstantial proof of the defendant's conduct” with respect to the crime charged); David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 4.3.1 (2009) (“The general ban on evidence of character to prove action in conformity was well-established in Great Britain by 1810.”). But see Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv. L.Rev. 954, 960-61 (1933) (recounting English courts' treatment of character evidence and arguing that Cole announced "a very narrow principle of exclusion” that was not widely followed).
. Theories varied for why this should be. Some argued that evidence that the defendant had committed an uncharged crime as proof of criminal propensity was simply irrelevant. The most common view was that such evidence was relevant, but that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed its usefulness. Others pointed out the unfairness of surprising the defendant and forcing him to defend against uncharged misdeeds—hearkening back to the abuses that brought about the Treason Act of 1695. See Leonard, supra, § 1.2 (collecting citations).
. We will sometimes use the term ''crimes” as a shorthand for the more accurate, but cumbersome, term "crimes or wrongful acts.” For purposes of this discussion, there is no material difference between criminal and non-criminal bad acts.
. Use of the term "res gestae” in the evidentiary context originated in the law of hearsay. It developed as one exception to the general rule against hearsay, with the applicable rule being stated as follows: “Whenever any act may be proved, statements accompanying and explaining that act made by or to the person doing it, may be proved if they are necessary to understand it.” James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15 Am. L.Rev. 1, 2 (1881). See also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 218 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining hearsay origins of res gestae). The idea was that, with respect to the events at issue in a case, “the conduct and the accompanying words were all part of the same transaction or the 'things done,’ and if the conduct was admissible, so were the words.” Chris Blair, Let’s Say Goodbye to Res Gestae, 33 Tulsa L.J. 349, 350 (1997).
. These criticisms live on.
See, e.g., United States
v.
Hill,
. A minority of courts, including this Court, adhered to an inclusionary rule even before Rule 404(b) was adopted.
See United States v. Stirone,
. The term "res gestae” is still incanted by courts from time to time.
See, e.g., United States
v.
Till,
.
See Gianotos,
.
See also United States v. Conner,
.
See also Taylor,
. Of course, the fact that evidence is admissible for some purpose does not necessarily mean that it should be admitted. As always, district courts must exclude evidence under Rule 403 where its clarifying value as "background" may be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
. Or, to skip a step in the analysis, the required proper purpose was the rehabilitation of Stahl’s credibility, in light of Green’s suggestions that she was motivated by money and cooperated solely for selfish reasons.
See United States v. Jemal,
. Green’s only argument against admissibility under Rule 404(b) is that evidence of his threat to kill A.G. could not have been admitted under Rule 404(b) because his motive for buying dynamite (retribution) was entirely un *251 related to his motive for the charged cocaine offense (making money). Even if true, the point is irrelevant. As we have explained, Rule 404(b) does not require that the evidence at issue help explain the defendant’s motives, only the motive of some person whose motive is relevant.