UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. VAUGHN LEWIS, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 18-1916
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
June 16, 2020
Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Before Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Inga S. Bernstein, with whom Zoraida Fernández and Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
I.
A.
Lewis‘s charges stem from an investigation into a drug-trafficking conspiracy led by Luis Rivera in Brockton, Massachusetts.1
On February 22, 2016, the police intercepted communications between Lewis and Rivera in which Lewis arranged to purchase sixty-two grams of cocaine, asking for the “same thing as last time.” In another intercepted communication, Rivera told Lewis to meet “where you seen me last” to complete the transaction. While surveilling the address provided, police observed a transaction between Rivera and an unidentified individual driving a gray 2007 Toyota Camry, which turned out to be registered to Lewis‘s girlfriend, with whom Lewis lived at the time.
On February 26, 2016, law enforcement intercepted another communication between Rivera and Lewis about an additional purchase. The police identified Lewis, who was driving a black 2010 Nissan also registered to his girlfriend, when he met with Rivera.
On June 9, 2016, police executed a search and arrest warrant at Lewis‘s apartment. In a storage area associated with his apartment, the police found “small amounts of drugs (including cocaine)” as well as “drug paraphernalia,” such as a bag containing scales and packaging material. The police additionally uncovered a loaded revolver, three dozen rounds of ammunition, and personal documents belonging to Lewis. Lewis denied ownership of all the items seized from the storage area except for his personal documents. He insisted that the revolver was not his, although he did not contest the firearm enhancement for purрoses of his Sentencing Guidelines calculation.
B.
On July 13, 2016, a federal grand jury returned a one-count superseding indictment charging Lewis with conspiracy to distribute cocaine powder in violation of
The Probation Office‘s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR“) assigned a base offense level of sixteen, pursuant to
Lewis objected to the PSR on several grounds, most notably by challenging his career-offender classification. He argued that his instant conspiracy conviction could not count as a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines and that existing circuit precedent to the contrary should be reconsidered.
On September 7, 2018, the district court sentenced Lewis to 108 months of imprisonment to be followed by three yеars of supervised release. The district court adopted the PSR‘s recommendation classifying Lewis as a career offender under
The district court stressed the seriousness of the offense, including the presence of the gun, and stated that “[r]egardless of whether [Lewis is] a career offender or not, [he has] a history of recidivism,” and it needed to “send . . . a very clear message . . . that [Lewis] cannot continue to sell drugs.” The court nevertheless varied Lewis‘s sentence down to 108 months because his first predicate offense, the 1998 drug conviction, involved the sale of $40-worth of drugs when he was seventeen. The district court judge also stated that “if career offender does not apply, I want this to come back to me to resentence because I am using career offender as an anchor.”5
On September 14, 2018, Lewis timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court‘s interpretation and application of the Sentеncing Guidelines. United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013).
When determining whether to apply a career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing courts adhere to §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines and their corresponding enabling statute,
[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance or the possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. Id.
Lewis raises five arguments as to why the career-offender enhancement nevertheless should not apply in his case: First, Application Note 1 is inconsistent with the text of the Sentencing Guidelines and their enabling statute, and therefore following the Application Note amounts to unconstitutional and “[u]nchecked . . . [d]eference to the Commission‘s [i]nterpretation of its [o]wn [r]ules.” Second, even if Application Note 1 is not inconsistent with the definition of “controlled substance offense” in
Lewis‘s first two arguments, and the additional points he makes in support of those arguments,8 run headfirst into our prior holdings that “controlled substance offenses” under
In Fiore, we encountered as a “question of first impression” the issue of whether a prior conviction for conspiracy could qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidеlines. 983 F.2d at 1, 4. The defendant in that case contended that his prior convictions for conspiracy to violate a Rhode Island controlled substance act and conspiracy to break and enter a commercial structure did not qualify as predicate offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines’
In Piper, we again encountered a challenge to whether a conspiracy conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense. The defendant argued both that Application Note 1 was inconsistent with the career-offender guideline and that inclusion of conspiracy exceeded the Sentencing Commission‘s statutory authority. 35 F.3d at 617. As to the first claim, we applied Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). Piper, 35 F.3d at 617. In Stinson, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines commentary constitutes the Sentencing Commission‘s “interpretation of its own legislative rules,” and that so long as it does not “violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [the Guidelines].‘” 508 U.S. at 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Under that framework, if any inconsistency arises between the commentary and the guideline it interprets -- i.e., if “following one will result in violating the dictates of the other” -- the guideline supersedes the commentary. Id. at 43. We held that a conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute over one hundred kilograms of marijuana could serve as a triggering offense for career-offender purposes so long as a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” was the object of the conspiracy. Piper, 35 F.3d at 613, 619. We reasoned that “[b]ecause [Application Note 1] neither excludes any offenses expressly enumerated in the guideline, nor calls for the inclusion of any offenses that the guideline expressly excludes, there is no inconsistency” between the two. Id. at 617; see also id. (reasoning that Application Note 1 “comports sufficiently with the letter, spirit, and aim of the guideline to bring it within the broad sphere of the Sentencing Commission‘s interpretive discretion“).
We also determined in Piper that Application Note 1 did not “contravene[]
Finally, in Nieves-Borrero we relied on Piper to hold that it was not plain error for the district court to count a conviction for the crime of attempt to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance as a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. 856 F.3d at 9.
This circuit precedent forecloses Lewis‘s arguments as to the authority of Application Note 1, including his contention that Application Note 1 is inconsistent with the text of the career-offender guideline,
Two exceptions exist to the law of the circuit doctrine, neithеr of which applies to Lewis‘s case. We recognize a first exception when “[a]n existing panel decision [is] undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or a statutory overruling.” Williams v. Ashland Eng‘g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995). A second exception applies “in those ‘rare instances in which authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind.‘” Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 57-58 (quoting Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34). These “exceptions to the law of the circuit doctrinе are narrowly circumscribed” to preserve the “stability and predictability” essential to the rule of law. United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d 60, 74 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (“Adherence to precedent is ‘a foundation stone of the rule of law.‘” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014))).
There is plainly no subsequent contrary controlling authority on the question at hand. Neither our court nor the Supreme Court has considered the relationship between
Lewis, therefore, relies primarily on the second exception. He submits that the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, which issued three months after Lewis filed his opening brief in this appeal, compels us to reexamine our precedent.10 In his view, Kisor, even if not directly controlling, “offers a sound reason for believing that [our] former panel[s], in light of fresh developments, would change [their] collective mind[s].” Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 57-58 (quoting Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34). We disagree.
In Kisor, the Supreme Court considered, but rejected, a challenge to the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine, which reflects the long-standing practice of deferring to “agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations,” 139 S. Ct. at 2408,11 and which serves in part as the foundation for our circuit‘s prior precedents concerning Application Note 1. See Piper, 983 F.2d at 617 (citing Stinson, 508 U.S. 36 (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414)). See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 410. It is nevertheless fair to say that Kisor sought to clarify the nuances of judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations. In the Court‘s words, Kisor aims to recall the limits “inherent” in the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine and to “restate, and somewhat expand on, those principles.” Id. at 2414-15. As the Court put it, when reviewing an agency‘s interpretation of its own regulation, “a court should not afford Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous,” and after deploying the full interpretive “legal toolkit” to “resolve . . . seeming ambiguities out of the box.” Id. at 2415. Then, “[i]f genuine ambiguity remains,” a court must ensure that “the agency‘s reading [is] ‘reasonable,‘” id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)), meaning that it “must come within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after employing all its interpretive tools,” id. at 2416.
We see nothing in Fiore, Piper, and Nieves-Borrero to indicate that the prior panels in those casеs viewed themselves as deferring to an application note that strayed beyond the zone of ambiguity in the Sentencing Guidelines. Nor did those panels suggest that they regarded Auer deference as limiting the rigor of their analysis of whether the guideline was ambiguous. And it is also plain that those panels viewed their analyses as considering both the letter of the text and its purpose. So we fail to find a sound basis for concluding with sufficient confidence that our prior panels would have found in Kisor any reason to “‘change [their] collective mind[s]‘” with respect to the deference owed to Application Note 1. Wurie, 867 F.3d at 35 (quoting United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2008)). At least three circuits have, post-Kisor, adhered to prior circuit holdings akin to our own concerning
Lewis also points us to United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2016), another case which he argues casts doubt on the durability of the Fiore, Piper, and Nieves-Borrero panel decisions. The court‘s holding in Soto-Rivera, however, was necessarily limited to the issue presented there: whether Application Note 1 properly categorized the offense of being a felon in рossession of a machine gun as a “crime of violence” under
Finally, Lewis calls our attention to the D.C. Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2018),12 the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc),13 and the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Crum, 934 F.3d 963. These cases do not constitute controlling authority in this circuit. See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 604 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that the second exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine has been interpreted narrowly and should be аpplied when recent Supreme Court precedent calls into question a prior panel opinion); United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The law of the circuit rule does not depend on whether courts outside the circuit march in absolute lock step with in-circuit precedent.“).
Moreover, these cases raise arguments that, in any event, mirror those considered by the prior panels in this circuit that we have already discussed. See United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting an argument where the defendant offered “no new or previously unaddressed reason to deviate from our prior holdings“).
None of this is to say how we would rule today were the option of an uncircumscribed review available. That the circuits are split suggests that the underlying question is close. We hold only that the case for finding that the prior panels would have reached a different result today is not so obviously correct as to allow this panel to decree that the prior precedent is no longer good law in this circuit. We are a court of six sitting members, on which it customarily takes four votes to sit en banc. Were panels of three too prone to reverse prior precedent, we would lose the benefits of stability and invite litigants to regard our law as more unsettled than it should be.
III.
Lewis presents two additional аrguments on appeal, neither of which he preserved in the district court. We review each only for plain error. See United States v. Ortíz-Mercado, 919 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 2019). In order to establish plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights; and (4) the error adversely impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2007)). Plain error is a “high hurdle,” requiring demonstration both “that an error
Lewis first contends that the district court erred by not exercising discretion to vary downwardly from his calculated Guidelines sentence and thereby, as he puts it, “disagree” with the commentary‘s inclusion of conspiraсy as a predicate offense on policy grounds. Under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007), district courts have discretion to vary downwardly from a sentence on the basis of a policy disagreement with the relevant guideline. Lewis argues that certain comments made by the district court in applying the career-offender enhancement indicate that the district court did not believe that it had discretion to disagree with the application of that enhancement. We find this argument unpersuasive.
For starters, Lewis expressly petitioned the district court to vary from the career-offender guideline based on policy reasons in his sentencing memorandum. In rеsponse, the district court declined to do so, as was clearly its prerogative. See United States v. Ekasala, 596 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he mere fact that a sentencing court has discretion to disagree with the guidelines on policy grounds does not mean that it is required to do so.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Aquino-Florenciani, 894 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he district court‘s broad discretion obviously includes the power to agree with the guidelines.” (quoting United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009))).
The knowledgeable district court judge said nothing to suggest that she thought she lacked the ability to vary downwardly based on a disagreement with the application note. The judge made clear that she anchored her decision on the Sentencing Guidelines as our court had interpreted them. And she made clear that if our view changed she would want to resentence. But that is simply to say that she intended to anchor her sentence on a clear-cut interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, whatever that may be. It offers no suggestion that the judge thought that she could not vary if she disagreed with the Sentencing Guidelines. Nor did Lewis at the time say anything to suggest that he understood the court to see itself unduly constrained. There was no clear or obvious error here.
Second, Lewis contends that his conviction under
Whether Lewis‘s own offense of conviction under
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court‘s sentence.
- Concurring Opinion Follows -
TORRUELLA AND THOMPSON, Circuit Judges (Concurring). We join the court‘s opinion but write separately to express our discomfort with the practical effect of the deference to Application Note 1, see
Indeеd, we have already held that “there is simply no mechanism or textual hook in the Guideline that allows us to import offenses not specifically listed therein into
The government‘s late-breaking suggestion at oral argument that the offense of conspiracy to commit a controlled substance offense (which forbids only the agreement to commit such an offense plus, sometimes, an overt act in furtherance) “prohibits” the acts listed in
By relying on commentary to expand the list of crimes that trigger career-offender status, which may well lead judges to sentence many people to prison for longer than they would otherwise deem necessary (as the district judge indicated was the case here), our circuit precedent raises troubling implications for due process, checks and balances, and the rule of law. The Sentencing Commission is an unelected body that exercises “quasi-legislative power” and (unlike most other agencies) is located within the judicial branch. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989). Thus, it can only promulgate binding guidelines, which influence criminal sentences, because they must pass two checks: congressional review and “the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.” Havis, 927 F.3d at 385 (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 394). “Unlike the Guidelines themselves, however, commentary to the Guidelines never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment.” Id. at 386. Thus, the same principles that require courts to ensure that agencies do not amend unambiguous regulations in the guise of “interpretation” (“without ever paying the procedural cost“), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420-21, apply with equal (if not more) force to the Sentencing Guidelines and their commentary. Id.
If it were otherwise, the Sentencing Commission would be empowered to use its commentary as a Trojan horse for rulemaking. See Havis, 927 F.3d at 386-87. This it is surely not meant to do, especially when the consequence is the deprivation of individual liberty. See Winstead, 890 F.3d at 1092 (“This is all the more troubling given that the Sentencing Commission wields the authority to dispense ‘significant, legally binding prescriptions governing application of governmental power against рrivate individuals -- indeed, application of the ultimate governmental power,
