UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus CHRISTOPHER JASON HENRY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-15251
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
June 21, 2021
The United States petitioned for rehearing or rehearing en banc after issuance of our opinion of August 7, 2020. We grant the motion for panel rehearing, vacate our earlier opinion, and substitute in its place the following opinion.
D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00508-WKW-GMB-1; [PUBLISH]
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, Circuit Judge, and ANTOON, District Judge.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
GRANT, Circuit
Christopher Henry was sentenced to 108 months in prison after pleading guilty to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm. He now challenges that sentence as unreasonable, arguing that the district court erred by imposing a term of imprisonment that was simply too long under the circumstances and by failing to adjust his sentence under
Both of Henry‘s challenges fail. The Sentencing Guidelines, though they are the starting point for all federal sentencing decisions, are no longer mandatory in whole, or even in part. The district court needed to consider
I.
In one of a string of robberies, Henry broke into a business and stole eight firearms. Police arrested him a few days later. When questioned, he admitted to breaking into the shop and stealing the guns. He also told the investigators that they could enter his residence; once inside, they found many stolen items from his recent crimes, including one of the shotguns taken from the shop.
Henry pleaded guilty to burglary in state court and was sentenced in early 2017 to 20 years’ imprisonment. A few months later, a federal grand jury indicted Henry on one count, felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report using the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The report assigned Henry a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of VI—the highest possible category—resulting in an advisory guideline range of 130 to 162 months’ imprisonment. But because the maximum term of imprisonment for a violation of
At sentencing, Henry requested that his federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentence, and that the court adjust his federal term downward for the time he had already served on the state sentence. That second request was based on
imprisonment if the court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.”
The government agreed that the federal and state sentences should run concurrently but argued that the 24-month adjustment under
The district court chose a third path. It imposed a sentence of 108 months to run concurrently with the remainder of Henry‘s state sentence. The court explained that it had “evaluated the reasonableness of a sentence through the lens of
necessary, to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing.” After Henry asked whether that sentence included a 24-month reduction under
I‘m giving the sentence under all the circumstances. To the extent that I didn‘t give him credit for the relevant conduct from the 120 down, that would be an upward variance. But I am also giving him credit for a concurrent sentence, which I don‘t give many of. So 108 is my judgment of a fair sentence under all the circumstances in this case.
Henry objected, but without success. He now appeals his sentence.
II.
We review an interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2019). And we review all sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 618 (11th Cir. 2015).
III.
Henry argues that
And because the district court considered the proposed applications of
A.
Before the United States Sentencing Guidelines were implemented, district courts had almost total discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum for a given crime. That led to what many saw as unwarranted disparities between sentences. In response to that concern and others, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the United States Sentencing Commission and directed that body to create the Guidelines. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. The new law cut off much of the district courts’ discretion over sentencing because the Act required courts to “impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range” established by the Guidelines.
That system, however, did not last. Because the Guidelines required judges to make factual findings to determine the appropriate sentence, defendants could be sentenced to higher prison terms based on information not admitted by them or found by a jury. But those determinations were inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s earlier holding that any fact besides a prior conviction “which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 244 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). That meant trouble for the Guidelines.
The Supreme Court held in Booker that this mandatory system was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment. Id. To bring the Guidelines in line with that amendment, the Court held that the entirety of
Still, the Guidelines are not irrelevant. After Booker, a sentencing court must “consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing“—what we have described as establishing the “procedural reasonableness” of a sentence—but the Guidelines are no longer
kinds of sentences available, and the like. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. So while many guidelines use the terms “must” or “shall,” that language simply requires courts to properly consider them when deciding the advisory Guidelines recommendation—it does not render them mandatory when imposing the final sentence. See Sarras, 575 F.3d at 1209 n.22.
The Supreme Court‘s later cases confirm the same point. In Kimbrough v. United States, the Court explained that “the Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.” 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007). It held that sentencing courts are not bound to enforce a provision of the Guidelines related to cocaine charges, confirming that “the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only.” Id. at 91 (emphasis added); see also id. at 113 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he district court is free to make its own reasonable application of the
Our Circuit has not left this principle in doubt. As we announced shortly after Booker, “all guidelines decisions are now advisory.” United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1185 (11th Cir. 2005). We have regularly corrected litigants who “fail[] to appreciate the advisory nature of every provision of the
guidelines.” Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1141 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis added). And when we rejected the idea that “all misapplications of the advisory guidelines” necessarily result in a “complete miscarriage of justice,” we grounded our conclusion in the fact that “the guidelines are advisory.” Id. at 1140. In one of our many opinions affirming an outside-Guidelines sentence as reasonable, we again emphasized their advisory nature: “the guidelines and their application provide advice about sentencing; they do not control it.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2015). Any notion that some guidelines may remain binding after Booker is foreclosed by the Supreme Court and is out of step with this Circuit‘s precedent too.
Even so, Henry suggests that Booker‘s remedial holding only applies to guidelines that affect the “range” of the sentence, not those that affect the “kind of sentence.”2 But Booker‘s holding unequivocally applies to both. The Supreme Court held that
In fact, one of the Supreme Court‘s earliest post-Booker cases shows that the remedial holding applies to guidelines like
imposed. In Gall, the Court considered the applicability of
Consistent with what we would expect—after all, Booker explicitly applies to guidelines affecting both the “kind of sentence” and the “range“—the Supreme Court affirmed in Gall that
sentence, so the district court was not required to follow the directive of
So under Gall, not only are the Guidelines advisory—it is error to treat them as mandatory. Id. at 51. Determining an accurate Guidelines recommendation is “the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Id. at 49. That determination is required, so skipping it is procedural error. But if a sentencing court goes the other direction—and treats particular guidelines as mandatory instead of advisory—that too is error. Id. at 51. Given all that, holding that a district court must treat
Despite what Henry contends, that was not a holding that
The Sentencing Commission now explicitly directs courts to follow that same sequence. In response to Booker, the Commission amended the Guidelines and added a new provision,
“the kinds of sentence and the guideline range” (
The dissent, like Henry, sees things differently. Booker, in its view, held invalid the provision “that made the sentencing range produced by the Guidelines binding on the sentencing court” but did not touch “kind-of-sentence” guidelines at all. Dissenting Op. at 30–31. In fact, the dissent says that if a guideline affects the kind of sentence, Booker “provides no basis to disregard the mandatory language of the guideline.” Dissenting Op. at 34. But as we have already explained, Booker‘s remedial holding explicitly addressed both “range” and “kind-of-sentence” guidelines—meaning
Past its attempt to set apart kind-of-sentence guidelines, the dissent does not really attempt to align its two-tiered proposal with the Supreme Court‘s holdings in Gall and Kimbrough. Nor could it. Its reading of Booker is irreconcilable with how the Court has treated sentencing requirements in the years since that opinion. For example, the dissent says that “before and after Booker, provisions in the
Guidelines that neither enhance a defendant‘s sentence based on judicial factfinding nor mandate the imposition of a sentence within the guideline range are binding on sentencing courts.” Dissenting Op. at 31. But the Booker Court itself rejected that kind of “Sixth Amendment violation only” sentencing structure. See 543 U.S. at 268 (“[W]e must apply today‘s holdings—both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act—to all cases on direct review.“); see also Lester v. United States, 921 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]s a matter of severability, the Court held that the Guidelines could not be applied as mandatory in any cases, even when their mandatory application would not violate the Sixth Amendment, because the resulting system would be structurally unsound and contrary to the intent of Congress.“). Booker and the decisions that follow foreclose the possibility of a dual system where some types of guidelines are mandatory while others are not. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 59–60.
Nor does the dissent align its approach with the sentencing sequence set out in the Guidelines. Though it acknowledges the plain language of the
We disagree. First, only subsection (a) of
to apply
Moreover, the commentary the dissent cites does not even address whether a court must consider the
The dissent also argues that the fact that the guideline uses the word “imposition” means courts must apply it after the
that sentence in light of the
Recognizing that its reading creates a conflict with the order laid out in
between guidelines relating to the range and guidelines relating to the kind of sentence.
Surprisingly enough, though it correctly states that Gonzalez-Murillo involved resentencing, the dissent relies heavily on another resentencing case, this one out of circuit, to support its view that
769, 784 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
In short, any suggestion that we treat an adjustment under
B.
Though the district court here was not bound to follow the Commission‘s advice in
At Henry‘s sentencing hearing, the court did not expressly resolve the parties’ competing arguments for how to implement
that even under Henry‘s proposed method, a sentence of 108 months was the court‘s “judgment of a fair sentence under all the circumstances in this case.” And if 24 months should have been deducted from the initial advisory range to reach the correct Guidelines recommendation—the government‘s view—the court would have still chosen an “upward variance” to end up at 108 months. The court‘s statements show that it both considered and understood the effect that accepting
Henry‘s 108-month sentence was also substantively reasonable. We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Johnson, 803 F.3d at 618 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 41). Nothing prevents a court from varying from the Guidelines based on the
have upheld the substantive reasonableness of an above-Guidelines sentence where the district court concluded that the defendant‘s string of burglaries warranted a stronger sentence than what the Guidelines recommended. See Johnson, 803 F.3d at 619-20.
After evaluating Henry‘s case, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
A sentencing system where some guidelines are binding, and others are not, is not the one that the Supreme Court set out in Booker. District courts must consider the Guidelines, of course, but are not bound to follow their advice. Here, the district court needed to consider the effect of
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority opinion on three grounds. The majority first concludes that our precedents leave us free to decide whether the provision of the sentencing guidelines at issue,
I respectfully dissent. I would vacate Henry‘s sentence and remand for the district court to adjust his sentence as
A. We Have Already Held that Section 5G1.3(b) Is Mandatory.
We have already rejected the majority‘s position. In United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009), we vacated a sentence when the district court did not apply
The majority points out the parties agreed in Knight that the district court should have applied
Decisions involving party concessions fall into two categories. Sometimes, a party‘s concession prompts us to resolve an appeal without reaching a holding about how the underlying law works. E.g., Wilkes v. United States, 289 F.3d 684, 687 n.6 (11th Cir. 2002) (awarding relief “[o]n the basis of these concessions, and not on the basis of a resolution of the legal issues“); Garcia v. United States, 278 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the parties have agreed” about a preliminary legal question and “assum[ing] for the purposes of argument” that they were correct). This first category of course does not constrain us to reach the same outcome in a later appeal; it is not a holding.
Other times, we point out the concession and express agreement with the parties’ position after our own evaluation of the matter. E.g., United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1346 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (“As [Cain] concedes, our existing precedent forecloses his argument.“); United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The government‘s concession might well be the end of this case, but since the district court did not accept the government‘s concession filed with it and addressed the matter at length, we shall do so also.“). Our own evaluation may even lead us to reject the concession. E.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The State‘s concession notwithstanding, we think that Davis‘s rule still bars the claim.“). This second category is obviously as much of a holding as any other decision.
Knight clearly falls into the second category because we explained why the government‘s concession was correct instead of resolving the appeal without reaching a legal conclusion. Far from relying on the government‘s concession, we stated without qualification that “[t]he district court erred when it did not reduce Knight‘s sentence” under
Nor is the majority correct that Knight is consistent with the view that the
Knight, by the way, is not the only post-Booker decision in which we have applied a guideline as mandatory. We held in United States v. Moran that “[s]upervised release is mandated whenever a sentence exceeds one year of imprisonment and may be imposed at the discretion of the district court ‘follow[ing] imprisonment in any other case.‘” 573 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
The Supreme Court has not overruled or abrogated our precedents. The majority says the Court “has already said” that
The majority also rests its rejection of my position in part on our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Murillo, 852 F.3d 1329, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2017), which requires district courts to treat
The amended guideline range in a sentence-modification proceeding carries a significance that does not attach to the original guideline range. Unlike at sentencing, where the guideline range is advisory, a district court in a sentence-modification proceeding is forbidden to reduce the defendant‘s sentence beneath “the minimum of the amended guideline range” except in one limited circumstance not relevant here.
Although I have doubts about whether Gonzalez-Murillo was correct on this point, see United States v. Helm, 891 F.3d 740, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2018), the decision binds district courts to treat
B. Section 5G1.3(b) Is Mandatory.
We are not only bound by our precedents to conclude that
To be sure, post-Booker references to the “advisory” Guidelines are ubiquitous in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91 (“[U]nder Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only.“). Indeed, “[v]irtually all of us are in the habit of distinguishing, in one way or another, between the ‘mandatory Guidelines’ that operated before Booker and the ‘advisory Guidelines’ that have operated since.” Lester v. United States, 921 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). But sometimes idioms that are accurate in one respect “may be erroneous or inadequate in other respects.” Id. The maxim “advisory Guidelines” is no exception.
Booker involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to the practice of judges finding facts at sentencing that increased a defendant‘s mandatory sentencing range under the Guidelines. 543 U.S. at 226-27. The Court held that this practice violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 227-29 & n.1. To remedy the constitutional violation, a separate majority of the Court held invalid the provision of federal law,
Although Booker held the guideline range advisory, it did not make every provision of the Guidelines optional. Both before and after Booker, provisions in the Guidelines that neither enhance a defendant‘s sentence based on judicial factfinding nor mandate the imposition of a sentence within the guideline range are binding on sentencing courts, so long as they do not conflict with a federal statute or the Constitution. As explained below, a mandatory adjustment under
To understand why some aspects of the Guidelines remain binding after Booker, it helps to review why all the Guidelines were ever considered binding in the first place. The Sentencing Guidelines “are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). The United States Sentencing Commission promulgates the Guidelines using the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, see
The nature of the Guidelines as law is reflected in several provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Because the Guidelines have the force and effect of law, sentencing courts may refuse to apply them only if they conflict with a higher source of law. Cf. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (holding that even the commentary to a guideline is binding unless it conflicts with the Constitution, a federal statute, or the guideline itself). Booker makes clear that, in the light of its constitutional holding, mandatory application of the guideline range would be inconsistent with the otherwise enforceable provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act. See Lester, 921 F.3d at 1314-15 (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). For that reason, sentencing courts need not—indeed, they must not—treat the guideline range as mandatory. See United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). But Booker neither requires nor countenances district courts treating every “shall” in the Guidelines as a “may.” Absent a conflict with a higher source of federal law, sentencing courts must follow mandatory instructions in the Guidelines, which “bind [them] in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391. And Booker‘s holding about the Guidelines that determine the “guideline range” said nothing about the Guidelines that determine the kind of sentence available.
To determine whether
The text of
A second aspect of the text underscores the point that
The structure of the Guidelines confirms that
The contrary view, that
The commentary to
Because
C. The Refusal of the District Court to Apply Section 5G1.3(b) Was Not Harmless Error.
The majority contends that even if the district court erred in its application of
By its terms,
In other words, the provision is a back-end adjustment to account for the time the defendant has already served on another sentence.
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion only by misunderstanding the point in the sentencing process at which
The majority supports its contrary conclusion by pointing out that the allowance for exceptions exists only in subsection (a) of the order of operations prescribed by
Although subsections (b) and (c) prescribe the steps that follow subsection (a), they say nothing about what must occur as part of subsection (a). To make that point more concrete, the only provision that would ordinarily prescribe when
Moreover,
The majority next expresses its view that the commentary to
The majority additionally points out that the Sentencing Commission adopted
There are at least two problems with that argument. As to Booker, the majority never explains its puzzling view that Booker told courts when in the sentencing process to consider
The majority offers one more argument that misses the mark. It acknowledges that
I would reverse and remand for resentencing with correct application of
