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United States v. Irey
612 F.3d 1160
11th Cir.
2010
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 culpability. points also lack Vidiksis $97,545 disparity penalty between the $5,000 was assessed and the that the

he company estate was assessed.9

real above, explained responsibility

As any behalf of obviate agent does not responsibility. culpabili-

lessor’s Vidiksis’s was not existence of

ty despite reduced requirements agent. on behalf degree of

The statute states The ERP

culpability should a factor.

clearly Simply takes it into consideration. the man- disagrees

because Vidiksis agency which the

ner has chosen take

it into make consideration does not interpretation arbitrary

agency’s capri-

cious.

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing

Because

decisions rendered EAB on at hand

issues are AFFIRMED. America,

UNITED STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellant, IREY, Defendant-Appellee.

William

No. 08-10997.

United Appeals, States Court of

Eleventh Circuit.

July $5,000 company real estate penalty ability pay. was assessed a based on *5 DUBINA, Judge, and

Before Chief TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, BIRCH, BARKETT, CARNES, HULL, BLACK, PRYOR, MARCUS, WILSON, MARTIN HILL,* Judges. Circuit CARNES, Judge: Circuit appeals “The federal courts of review and set aside those federal sentences ” Rita v. United find ‘unreasonable.’ States, 338, 341, 551 U.S. S.Ct. (2007) Unit- (citing 168 L.Ed.2d 203 Booker, 261-63, ed States 543 U.S. (2005)). 160 L.Ed.2d Supreme that statement Court With in the Rita opinion its Later opened case. opinion specific in the was more Court emphatic: areas, sentencing, in other make that are judges times mistakes times, they impose At will substantive. that are unreasonable. Cir- sentences *6 courts correct such mistakes cuit exist to they occur. Our decision in Book- when er recognized much. as Rita, 354, 127 S.Ct. at 2466- 551 U.S. at Supreme believe 67. We Court in the Rita opinion and meant what said duty about to correct sen- elsewhere our time, tencing At the same we mistakes. recognize that our substantive review of only and is deferential that we sentences if its look to see the district abused in by committing a clear error discretion so, Even the sentence in this judgment. Rhodes, FL, Tampa, Peggy David Paul only if can withstand review defer- case FL, Orlando, Ronca, Plaintiff- Morris abdication, if amounts to ence Appellant. unbridled, if and “unreason- discretion Kirkconnell, Ponall, Kirk N. William R. is a hollow The sentence able” term. Yates, P.A., Kirkconnell, Lindsey, Snure & is a imposed district court clear error Park, FL, Irey. for Defendant Winter mistake, and it our re- judgment, in to “correct such mistakes sponsibility they when occur.” * 46(c). Judge C. to 28 U.S.C. Circuit James suant Senior United States pur- participate in this matter Hill elected to it, substantively psychiatrist Irey in put “engaged

The sentence is unreason- other primarily, solely, able but not because of sexually forms of disordered behavior with Irey’s the nature and extent of acts).” William prostitutes (e.g., sadomasochistic criminal stream steady conduct. of That on years, despite went for 15 the fact criminal flowing this through cases Court that he was time. married the entire brings many examples us man’s inhu- Irey in Starting began spending man, manity depressingly and we see every out two weeks month in China on large against number of crimes children. On the he business. weekends when was sexual Irey But the crimes that committed indulge there he would himself more against some of the most vulnerable chil- “sexually disordered behavior” travel- apart. dren set him world He ing to Asian brothels different countries. sodomized, sexually raped, tortured Early on he went to a brothel in Cambodia fifty girls, more as young or little some as that featured underage girls and discover- years age, many four occasions over enjoyed having ed that he chil- sex with five-year period. a four- or also script- He a period years, dren. Over of four or five cast, in, ed, produced, starred and distrib- he numerous brothels where “visited uted worldwide most graphic some underage had Irey, children.” who is 5’10” disturbing child pornography that has pounds, weighs was his forties up ever turned on the internet. at the time. All sexually of the children he Irey’s The horrific nature of crimes re- girls; abused underage were none of them adjusted sulted offense level that sixteen, than older and some of them an advisory guidelines would led to four, five, years were six old. range of life imprisonment. Because the government charged Irey’s had all of went had those brothels and sex count, in just crimes one statutory “many times,” many the children years maximum was 30 that had it, he recounted during trips his numerous guidelines effect of reducing range to world, part and as time went court, as well. The district how- on he became “more more obsessed ever, did not impose that sentence. In- returning and was Asia more and more *7 stead, deciding after that pedophilia was sexually often” to paid abuse children. He impaired Irey’s “illness” that had voli- $1,500 the up Cambodian brothels to tion, pronouncing Irey and that himself child, each the use of he typical- and would victim, all was a like of the little children ly buy or two three the at of children a he sexually long, had violated for so the busy time. he When was too in on China district court deviated from downward the get away business to visits weekend to 30-year guidelines range imposed and a Cambodia, Irey pay would sometimes to years. sentence of duty Our to 17-1/2 of young girls some to him flown set requires aside unreasonable sentences sexually so that he could abuse when them that setwe aside this one. Irey’s he found the time. sexual violation of August the children did not end until of I. The Criminal Conduct law country 2006 when enforcement in this Irey William a seemingly had insatiable finally caught up with him. appetite. sexual as a psychiatrist Or he The little Cambodian children whom it, phrase Irey later retained would Irey “abjectly impover- victimized were Orlando, “highly sexualized.” While and, noted, ished” as the district court business, he Irey where lived and had his “perhaps of indulged appetite by his sexual most vulnerable consorting with a prostitutes weekly society.” on As basis. the world’s We know of the some body points vaginal which her area.” because Irey did to them of what details comput- ‘Front,’ his agents writing seized show enforcement Some of them “the law that he had memorialized ‘Back,’ ‘Brown,’ door,’ and found ers ‘Back ‘9 Yo Fuck’ on photo- he had done part of what least writing prepubescent girls’ bodies. viewing later for his and videos graphs vaginal anal pointing has arrows and computer hard one of his On pleasure. images Irey are of “en- areas.” Other 1,200 images more than there were drives and gaged vaginal anal intercourse children, and sexually abusing the Irey of girls” are up Asian who “tied prepubescent not include obscene that number does grey tape.” and with black and duct bound of the children images Irey produced images Irey also “of with nude There are picture. him in the Differen- do not show trophies.” children prepubescent posing many images so tiating children little Irey’s children defilement difficult, over of period taken a rape, sodomy, and humilia- stop did Irey sexually victimized but we know them. tion. He also tortured There underage girls.1 fifty at least different “Irey inserting images plastic Irey photographs pro- videos dildos, stick, green/yellow glow cockroach- he some details of how violat- duced reveal cavity candy vaginal pre- es and There are the children.2 ed debased pubescent images Asian females.” Some “Irey on with sever- images showing a bed inserting tube “Irey plastic show into per- children prepubescent al female Asian vagina Asian prepubescent female. performs him he forming oral on while sex images plastic Several of the show images depict on Other oral sex them.” into containing crawling tube cockroaches vaginal in anal inter- “Irey engaged image these vagina children.” One prepubescent with a Asian female course “performing vaginal shows him intercourse on Yo Fuck’ marked her with the words ‘9 girl” “[i]mbedded on her on painted prepubescent “an arrow is body,” and 1,200 images Irey abusing who more than them. of little children were 1. The number literally Irey object Irey’s photographs him- victims is countless. did not those or count, apparently keep although did not representation self showed about 50 bought he children sexu- he did recall that of his victims or that there were "over 50” times,” usually ally "many many abuse two or setting findings, its victims. out time, five-year three at a over a four- court stated about circum- 1,200 period. than ob- Some of more quarrel with of the crime: "I cannot stances preserve Irey produced to his images scene description that.” Ms. Hawkins’ Based many chil- perverse exploits show the faces of finding, considering the un- AUSA’s dren, images framed and but the were not disputed representations at the sentence hear- count, *8 a head and with the focused to aid probability ing, the of well as an under- as passage years appearances of the chil- the of count, least 50" we will use 50 or "at as undoubtedly changed they grew as older dren victims. number of sexually being abused. while descriptions Irey's 2. All of conduct con- of the "[tjhere Report The states Presentence paragraph tained and next in the in this victims,” forty Irey did were and not over quoted Report. text from the Presentence are object admitted to that statement but instead accuracy Irey not contest the of these did sentencing hearing During the it was true. Instead, descriptions. he wrote the district Attorney Cynthia United States Assistant presentence in- court that: "I have read Hawkins, case, prosecuted who described vestigation report 11-26-07. I have dated doing rep- Irey's In so she criminal conduct. things graphically spelled done which are of his the court that the number resented to adopted court all of out in it.” The district She child victims was "over 50.” also report in the the factual statements contained photographs the faces of showed of findings as of the court. taken from the "about 50” the child victims of image pics on the all some capitals] phrase: [in trade new never saw before. I Girl, Deep trade this ‘Big Bug Cock Push Into 9 Yo for site access.” ” She Hurt in Pane.’ agents Irey’s searched house on 13, 2006, Irey August computers. If felt about and seized six guilt purchasing they hard helpless On drive found a girls subjecting little them to collection of 1,200 Irey more than images sexually of pain degradation, images he re- violating girls. young agents In sent corded do show it. some themof 1,200 plus images those actually he can National smiling be seen he in- Missing for Exploited Center Chil- flicts the sexual abuse. dren, which in provided turn an extensive Irey did not use the massive of amount report about where the images had been pornography produced only child he for his separate seen before. More than 100 law prurient perusal; keep own he did not it to agencies reported enforcement to the Na- copies images himself. He used of the he they tional Center previously had gain made to access to collections of up turned images some of those of Irey’s purveyors other pornography. of child underage sexual abuse of girls their Irey gave copies pictures them investigations of child pornography. The produced videos he had showing his sexual graphic images Irey produced had and dis- violation of and humiliation Cam- little already tributed were widely known as the bodian children in return their waiver “pink series,” infamous wall so named be- of the access fee to the collections cause the pink walls that could be seen already had on Through their websites. in the background of some the photos type operators of trade the of those and videos. images The series included websites Irey’s were able to add graphic some of the worst child sexual abuse the collections, images their which led to agents And, had ever seen. as the Assis- images those being spread around the tant United Attorney States pointed out at Irey world. in turn was able to save some hearing: the sentence pictures of these money expanding while his collection children, five, some of whom “four pornography, child he and was able to also six old ... will forever out there card, minimize the use of his credit which online.” As record of their abuse con- made it easier for him to hide what he was circulate, tinues to “[t]hey will be victim- doing from his wife. over again.” ized and over Capture II. The and Conviction aIn one-count indictment filed on De- 13, 2006, Irey cember charged Irey’s use of the internet led to his 2251(c). violating 18 U.S.C. The indict- capture. Federal agents intercepted and alleged ment that he knowingly “did em- Irey traced messages email that he had use, ploy, induce, entice, persuade, illegal sent to an offering website child coerce engage sexually minors to explic- emails, pornography. one those States, it conduct outside the United which sent in mid-January he the purpose producing depictions visual asked operator: the website you “do re- *9 conduct, of such and transporting such vi- before, member me from could I trade depictions sual by any United States you my some pics days of latest for 30 means, including by computer and mail.” your good site. Let me a know address to you send some samples.” Irey About a month was into custody taken on Decem- later, agents intercepted another email ber 2006. He was released on an from Irey, which you stated: “do want unsecured bond conditioned on his being exploitation of involving the sexual facility “for treat- was one psychiatric in a housed sexually explicit of by production related to the minors health issues mental ment of at that Added to that printed remained or matter. charges.” He visual current thirteen home for at least four levels under facility near his offense level were base 2G2.1(b)(l) § because the offense involved months. 12; of two levels age children under the July hearing on change plea of At a 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) § the offense under because count of guilty to one Irey pleaded of the actual commission sexual involved 2251(c). asked § When violating 18 U.S.C. 2G2.1(b)(3) acts; § levels under two done, Irey he had tell the court what pornography; of child distribution overseas, nu- visited replied: “Went to— 2G2.1(b)(4) § because it four levels under underage had where brothels merous sadistic con- portraying involved material them, had sex photographed children and duct, adjusted offense level producing an my laptop them, them on and had with 44. levels were of Then two “subtotal” He States.” I entered the United when § a of group- under 3D1.4 as result added period over a of happened that it added victims.4 Those ing multiple because of being time 2006. the last years,3 four adjusted produced a combined state- additions government’s with the Irey agreed that were de- had admitted offense level of 46.5 From hearing that he at the ment 3El.l(a) § had for ac- overseas he two levels under that while ducted agents minors, responsibility knew were additional ceptance children he with sex that, 3El.l(b) images timely § notifica- pornographic under produced had level images those transported plead guilty. Subtracting then intent to and had tion of country. produced into this from the 46 back those three levels final offense level of 43. Proceedings Sentencing III. The prior no convictions Irey Because had and Sentence was I. Even .history category his criminal A. The Calculation level of 43 category an offense Range Guidelines imprison- advisory guidelines produces an range of life. The statute under ment began the cal- Report Presentence however, convicted, carries which he was Irey’s guidelines culation of statutory years. maximum of 30 See 18 under level of 32 range with a base offense 2251(c). result, the guide- As a 2G2.1(a), the offense U.S.C. because U.S.S.G. (the group- two change plea added rather than Irey have been Although at the stated ceiling regardless of the ing fixed at 5 levels children hearing abuse of the that his sexual offenses), given which would years, he told number of period of four occurred over adjusted offense level of 49 period a combined over a Ted Shaw that it occurred Dr. level of 46. and a final offense years. five Report pointed out charged in the 5. The Presentence Although only was one count n.6, upward depar- indictment, sepa- "[a]n under 2G2.1 cmt. guidelines each consider may because the offense pur- ture be warranted separate "group” for as a rate victim upward minors.” No more than ten U.S.S.G. involved poses offense-level calculation. case, requested by government 2G2.1(d)(1). departure the PSR did not In this court, probably applied be- groups were beyond because two proceed two made difference it would not have put ad- cause enough the defendant’s combined adjusted level and criminal offense final offense since justed level at 46 and his offense guidelines im- history worked out to score maximum level avail- which is the level up- range without an prisonment of life even guidelines. Had the PSR con- able under children, departure. ward fifty levels would all five sidered *10 (30 Scott, became See States v. 426 F.3d “range” lines 360 months United Cir.2005). (11th 1327, 1330 years); spread top was no and there —the range bottom of the were the same. See anticipation argument In of that 5Gl.l(a) (“Where U.S.S.G. the statutori- volitional,” purely Irey’s actions were “not ly maximum sentence is less authorized government argued Irey that not “has guide- applicable than the minimum of the shown his mental condition is outside statutorily maxi- heartland of range, line authorized similar cases” and cited our in support two of of that decisions guideline mum sentence be the sen- shall Caro, proposition. See States v. tence.”). United (11th Cir.2002) F.3d objected party Neither to the calculation (“[M]ost people collect a who sizeable guidelines range. In sentencing his of pornography amount child are in some- memorandum, Irey’s “Mr. counsel stated: it.”); addicted way collecting to United object Irey does not the Probation Offi- Miller, (11th States cer’s advisory guideline calculations and Cir.1998) (“Nor poor impulse would control departure does not seek a downward from purveyor be unusual or of [for collector guideline range described in the PSR.” pornography], regardless child of whether did, however, ask for a be- sentence impulse it stemmed from an control disor- guidelines range years. low the of 30 The An impulse der. ... control disorder is requires statute a minimum sentence of 15 atypical not or that it separates so unusual 2251(c). years. Irey’s See 18 U.S.C. defendants.”). this defendant from other argued memorandum that “[a] Acknowledging Irey may have “ra- prison, sentence of 15-20 followed against tionalized his crimes children by a term of supervised substantial re- perceive failing the harm he was inflict- imposed. lease” ing,” argued should be it that “is not so uncommon take this as to case out of the heartland.” government The filed a mem- regard to the possibility Irey, arguing orandum case “[i]f this may pedophile, “experience[d] self- atypical, it is of aggravating, because not deceptive thought processes,” govern- factors,” mitigating, it urged and the court emphasized horribly ment that he “has impose equal guide- sentence to the sexually abused numerous children over a lines range statutory maximum 30 years.” period government’s The sen- years. government told the court that tencing memorandum concluded argu- give great weight “should findings “any ing that variance under 18 U.S.C. Congress ... that departures be should would be unreasonable because extremely rare in child sex crime cases” nothing there unusual about the nature because of the seriousness of those crimes. or circumstances of this offense or the argued It specifically that any variance personal defendant’s characteristics.” based on Irey’s “diminished aber- capacity, behavior, family rant responsi- ties and The Reports Psychiatrist B. bilities” result Psychologist would an unreasonable sentence. government also pointed In connection with sentencing defense precedent establishing guidelines that a counsel hired two experts the field where, may appropriate even psychology psychiatry, fur- he government’s words, in the the defendant’s their reports nished to the court. One “psychological evaluation found that [had] Berlin, reports Fred from Dr. who he a significant was not risk to children or general is board-certified in fo- both likely to children in future.” psychiatry. Although molest rensic he did *11 stated, however, that He also report decision.” hearing, his testify at the [Irey’s] fault that he “[although it is not Report, a Presentence in the mentioned disorder, responsibility to is his to defense coun- has the attached of it was copy Dr. Berlin something about it.” Report, Presentence do objections sel’s Shaw, Irey professional needed thought Dr. who did that it was discussed out that pointed but he also hearing. treatment testify at treatment, past, he without “[e]ven a Irey that “has reported Dr. Berlin to from sexual able refrain had been as heterosexual known disorder psychiatric with children within United contact experiences “he which means pedophilia,” States.” prepubescent to attraction strong a sexual than ordinarily are less girls who that he had girls; report Berlin’s stated Dr. Dr. stated Berlin thirteen-years-of-age.” Irey suggest to that was found no evidence relating intimate- capable flawed,” Irey that was “characterlog[icall]y and conclud- woman, he found that ly to an adult “not anti-social or generally that he was ed cravings sexual intense Irey “experienced makeup,” psychological his psychopathic Irey was as well.” children for female generally has was he “a man who nor having admitted to “highly sexualized” Instead, he a sense of conscience.” lacked sexually disor- forms of “engaged other Irey simply had often been thought (e.g. sado- prostitutes behavior dered “readily the extent appreciate unable acts), having ... viewed masochistic Dr. with the children. improprieties” his bestiality on the Inter- involving images Irey had “a malicious denied that Berlin Nonetheless, Dr. Berlin asserted net.” well-being girls for the disregard my knowledge and best of that “to the Instead, professional in his question.” unwilling belief, coerced he has never Irey genuine have a af- “Mr. did opinion, their will.”6 against person youngsters for those and concern fection he was actually thought at that time” “a opinion that sexu- gave Dr. Berlin his sexually he girls the little was helping does not pedophilia as al disorder such that, except abusing.7 Dr. Berlin’s view is consequence of a volitional develop as a facts, in Cambodia ing the child brothels undisputed visited that state- view of the times,” though many he knew “many even astounding. We it inconceivable find ment is wrong, and that it was girls were minors impoverished Cambo- believes that Dr. Berlin late, my addiction adding sex children, to[o] "but it was among the vul- most dian who Later in the world, in full of me.” was now control willingly people in the submit- nerable letter, stop Irey this [had] said: "I wanted sexually tape and being duct ted to bound years, could not. insanity at least 15 but I anally by a orally, vaginally, and penetrated prostitutes, I sneaking pick up male, was out to I having well as to 200-pound adult developed leading I had sticks, dildos, a double life. was including glow objects, various this terrible dark side.” vaginas, pushed into their and cockroaches words, Irey's “Hurt in Pane.” they, fully theory Irey while had not Dr. Berlin’s explanation Irey only plausible wrongfulness what he was appreciated the forthcoming ap- with Dr. Berlin was less than Cambodia doing the little children in he had done to those Irey’s details of what about the parently was too much of stretch many “many argue times” over at least children in his counsel. Counsel did defense four-year period. “Irey has been sentencing memorandum that diagnosed pedophile, and had limited as a supporting the ability control the behavior disagree with Irey probably would himself argued, He never fully of conviction.” offense opinion that he had Dr. Berlin’s however, what he had not realized wrongfulness of his conduct. appreciated the appreciate wrong failed to doing was to the district court letter he wrote In a criminal con- fully wrongfulness of his sentencing, Irey admitted to hav- week before *12 spent for the fact that had edged, though, he four or five that the children “suffer years raping, sodomizing, sexually and tor- the most and are victims.” turing some of most the vulnerable chil- Dr. report Irey’s Shaw’s noted escalat- world, Irey in dren is “an otherwise ing sexual over the ten preceding interest decent man.” years, which “could described as a ‘sex- Shaw, Dr. Ted psychologist, was also addiction,’ many ual with behaviors and defense, by retained and he submitted obsessive which frequent fixation included “psychosexual report” evaluation on be- masturbation, anonymous sex with prosti- Irey. half of Dr. When Shaw evaluated tutes and the eventual use of in brothels Irey August 23, Irey on was at the Irey Cambodia.” He described as “sexual- Lifestream in Behavioral Center Lees- ly obsessed for at least the years,” last ten Florida, burg, “on conditional release from and opinion “Irey’s stated his that paraphi- jail.” undergoing He was treatment behaviors, lias clearly drove his of spite alcohol problems abuse and sexual addic- being an moral responsible otherwise and Shaw, tion. According to Dr. a review in individual, upon many in- people, whom May Irey 2007 indicated that making “was cluding family, employees, clients and de- appropriate progress,” although his wife pended.” and children personal “refused attend counseling” family part as sessions. Under one of the risk assessments that Dr. applied, Irey’s Shaw score “places him Irey admitted to Dr. Shaw that he had in the risk category Medium-Low for sex- prostitutes used country in this and in ually one, re-offending.” Another doing so disease, had contracted a venereal Minnesota Screening Sex Offender Tool- passed along which he to his wife. Irey Revised, in a placed resulted score that “experimented had also with bisexuality” Irey in the “Moderate Risk Range.” More “enjoyed had consensual bondage” said, specifically, Dr. five-year, Shaw “the with Irey adult females. “described a lack ten-year, fifteen-year recidivism rates women,” interest in well-endowed telling development individuals research Dr. Shaw that he “when married his wife study 14%, Irey’s 12%, with Mr. score are breasts,” she was thin and had small but Overall, and 19%.” he reported, dy- “the physique changed “[h]er has over the factors, namic and suggest static years.” moder- Irey admitted that he had visited ate to low child moderate risk of a new charge,” brothels in past Cambodia “for the did, which years.” however, five “can through He be reduced lie to continued Dr. Shaw about some treatment supervision details of and informed upon his sexual Irey abuse of children.8 acknowl- his release.” memorandum, duct —not in Irey his acknowledge, or knew and later would brief, hearing, panel at the photographs his many or in he made showed his girls en banc importantly, younger brief. More the district were than twelve and some Irey years young age. never found were as fully Irey had not as four also conduct, appreciated wrongfulness told only Dr. Shaw he would of his have oral appeared girls younger sex with the who the conduct was than purely However, age. twelve a photograph volitional and part instead was substantial Irey having vaginal him pedophilia. due to made shows his inter- young girl, course with a “[Embedded girls told Dr. Shaw that some image capitals] he phrase: ‘Big [in all is the teens, Girl, had early sex with "were their Bug Deep Cock Push Into 9 Yo She Hurt ” fact, youngest being about twelve." in Pane.’ They are ready. by fueled obsessive Hearing The Sentence

C. thinking masturbating hearing, began the sentence The court themselves. sex acts January held on which was that it had reviewed noting questioned The court Dr. Shaw about *13 memoranda, and presentence report, mean, asking him: it an pedophilia, “I is witness was report. The first Dr. Shaw’s mean, you illness? I how would describe Irey that gave opinion He his Dr. Shaw. professional?” Af- that as a mental health problem with sexual long-standing “a has Dr. noting that Berlin was on the ter ad- obsession,” like sexual “something and it purposes that defined of committee diction,” Psychiatric As- and American TR, Dr. the DSM-IV Shaw testified: sociation, Man- Diagnostic and Statistical at it. my I’ll take shot It is a disorder (4th rev. ed. text ual Mental Disorders of behavior, you interest and and of sexual TR) 2000) (DSM-IV terms, “obsessive- diagnosis only the can have the with disorder, full- type not compulsive fascinated, you interest. So could be disorder, but with the sexual behav- blown sexually attracted to children and never So being prominent the most feature.” ior it, if you act on and—but it troubled or tell, enough not he could there was far as any problems you, you would caused any person- diagnose Irey with evidence disorder, diagnosable that still be with Irey Dr. that is ality disorder. Shaw said being engag- that and is attracted to explained psychopathy” and “very low behaviors, behaviors, ing in sexual with encapsulated area where that “he has this prepubescent children. cheating, lying, he was he was where clearly it a disor- well-recognized So is laws; but outside violating where he was der, thought I a and Dr. Berlin did that, appears to be—to have he was— job saying good that it’s not a disor- law-abiding citizen.” been a der that someone chooses. It’s some- Irey’s sexually abusing risk As for you thing you is within and have that: again, Dr. Shaw testified children tendency towards some it. essentially in medium low to “He’s frankly quite sadly, I think And categories, moderate which medium or risk child availability images, particu- likely.” a is below threshold of is—which Internet, larly epi- fueled an on has might risk be further reduced kind of pedophilia demic of that was hesi- use of certain but he was drugs, people in the probably background, require that the court tant to recommend they not have even known that might their and the given all of side effects them it, and across suffered from then come they’re always not useful.” He fact “that nonetheless, But it images. these older going to be also noted disorder. So it’s disorder treatable released, going if he’s and he’s “when and origins. that has different naturally experienced to have reduction Irey talks how the And Mr. about in sex and a reduction testosterone him in his disorder manifested itself for the risk up Dr. Shaw summed drive.” very young' with a being provided situation: —or asking very young prostitutes without said, overall, be, I find as I So him to initially; he found for them then risk, risk, a moderate low-moderate repelled but then attracted himself first have—has psychopathy. He does low them, that’s of natural interests, that sort he deviant interests. Those part of it that’s dif- biological disorder reducing working himself has been moral issues. al- from the and ethical likely somewhat reduced ferent they person, ing, urge, if had even if have an for another So situation, they may in the been same same way compulsive dessert eaters stayed repulsed been repulsed have can choose not eat dessert. and, know, said, you -just not— They strug- different levels of I’m again ever “Don’t do that gling, and are aids to that: there Good interested;” spi- him into a but that led treatment, supervision, good replacing sexually. in children ral of interest So healthy those needs with needs. A lot way that’s the that it’s manifested itself is helping people treatment under- here. origin stand their disorder and then remarked that to, all, then them teaching first of *14 knowing of not what “people accuse me danger signs, aware of risks to illness, talking say I’m about I when it’s relapsing, replac- at the time same maybe why asking I That’s I’m and don’t. ing way they meeting that were you.” The court continued: behavior, needs met with the disordered guess question is, I from a And healthy meet them in and ways; that’s standpoint criminology, person is a something taught. can people People who acts out a result of this condition Irey, like Mr. bright, who’s who has acting totally of rational free or is will business, in he been successful can cer- person acting that out as a result of tainly techniques learn the that we teach something that inis essence an illness prevent responsible to himself for —be point that he at that has no over? control preventing a reoffense. you saying? Do what I’m understand It’s—I think like say, because we Dr. Shaw answered: words, “You can’t other be cured”—in do, I Your Honor. I think that the the best long-term treatment is to be pedophilia underlying fact that is not an alert to the problem and to—that’s not a sanity for competency element or is—it Cures, you cure. can forget about it. I, an Axis treatable disorder. Those of go again Just be around kids and don’t us have in who been the field—I’ve been That, worry about it. we can’t do. actually in the sex field offender since are, know, you But there thousands of 1976; and were pioneers there in the molesters, pedophiles and child differ- me, long field before me. before We ent, there, belief, in my out who aren’t treating been pedophilia for dec- who in re-offending, recovery are and ades. just doing fine. The new treatments problem It is—I think that the that a are, think, very we I that use effective. lay in people distinguishing lot of have is cross-examination, On Dr. Shaw con- disordered, people are between who ser- Irey firmed for the record that was “a disordered, iously curability versus pedophile with a sexual in interest children treatability. Pedophilia very treata- younger prepubescent than children.” ble, many and there in pedophiles are assessment, for Irey’s As he risk conceded community doing just who are fine study it relied was not confined to managing their behavior. pedophiles but also included other sex of- know, I’m you As sure probationers, acknowledged fenders. Dr. Shaw also that probationers, are now subjected U.S. photo- he had not looked at they an annual about polygraph whether graphs Irey’s victims and not know did following proba- are the rules of their many they or how victims there were. When re-offending. tioner whether are Pedophiles capable surprise of not if it him to know re-offend- asked would chil- make this world what we all envision “over 50 “to Irey sexually molested had be- A dren,” Irey’s it wouldn’t be.” friend testified responded he could that he had become Irey help “did admit in cause used his contacts China Irey had was re- more obsessed and more in family of man’s wife China. out the often.” more and more turning to Asia years of during added that his 32 He also City York he had law enforcement New only people Dr. Shaw the than Other people Billy Irey is seen “a lot of bad for, or testified statements who submitted people.” Irey’s one of those brother at, hearing not so as charac- the sentence did Irey, had about how when a senior Irey. Although testified ter witnesses in fam- willing fully participate his coat to high school had loaned been him, all immedi- Irey’s victim, ily therapy of his typical an accident which was on his did make statements family ate kindness,” if acts of and how “random (wife, daughter, video behalf either need, you could count on someone (two sons) son) at the person other him. In his video state- hearing. short praise No one was more effusive in his ment, youngest son told about his Irey’s nephew. than his He recounted building a and dirt bike father clubhouse *15 get uncle had him a com- helped how his statement, In her short track. video puter college, had him talk for listened to 16) fa- Irey’s (age described her daughter oth- aspirations, helped about his and had “has “loving” ther and said that he years. that proclaimed ers over the He respectful, to taught strong, me how be way of Irey touching people’s “had a lives honorable, and the can on and loyal, go list before,” way in a that I’ve never seen and on.” the in “bring[ing] every single out best of 25 Irey’s In video statement wife her is, he in his person Irey that meets.” years loving him as “a and won- described view, spirited giv- most “the most and the “mind- and father” who is derful husband of a ing person” just and “overall is one people’s feelings.” ful She said of other He even said that: “I like to think kind.” Club, Rotary that he was a member the Bill, created that when God Uncle He took YMCA, Masons, Way, the United said, really He going a back and ‘I’m step theater, Shriners, and a chari- local ” like this one.’ to He was ty called “Give Kids World.” evidence, de- At the conclusion of the he good so and kind that had even rescued to argued counsel that a sentence fense Indeed, stray in a she dog. and taken statutory would years maximum of 30 “very proclaimed that she been had necessary Irey than Mr. in “greater for part to have been of Bill’s life blessed light mitigation present- that’s been many many years. taught so He’s me so that he was not watching After her video state- ed.” He assured court things.” ment, “I under- gravity the district court stated: to minimize of the acts trying “the family Irey good Mr. has been a Irey stand that but ar- charged,” with which Mr. family support.” man and has gued compartmentalized that were “a being his whole that is a result of area of 24) that (age son testified Irey’s oldest argued He that Dr. pedophilia.” his taught his had him much about father “so testimony report and Dr. Berlin’s Shaw’s hero, my “my life love” and called him and pedo- that “the of a established behavior 20) star, (age father.” His son our middle is, volitional, phile totally that is not Irey that had him “to stick taught testified degree disease in some dictated a lot of times up guy for the little because had will,” argued Irey also that Irey things and itself.” He nobody else that did that, “lived, than I people other this disease and this can’t undo but I can addiction, exemplary an life.” Counsel cit- willing learn from and I’m to learn.” decisions, ed two from this three Court then in argued The AUSA favor of the Circuit, Eighth and one from the which advisory guidelines range sentence of 30 guidelines affirmed sentences below years. Irey court She reminded the range involving cases defendants con- being prosecuted being pedo- “is not distributing pornography victed of child phile; being prosecuted for he’s the acts over the internet.9 argued he committed.” She that: “As told if Irey Counsel the court that were car, does alcoholic not have drive guidelines 30-year sentenced range put pedophile doesn’t have to themselves he years sentence would be 81 old when he Cambodia, a brothel which this defen- got sentence, out.10 Instead of that coun- years years years, dant did for sel the court impose asked one of “be- Your Honor.” tween 15 and 20 here with up The AUSA reminded the district court lifetime supervised release.” Counsel as- description Irey’s 20-year conduct in serted that 15- or Report “writing “would make him 66 Presentence included: got when he out, bodies, if he served filth inserting objects the entire sentence.”11 on children’s them, binding into up tying them and them After defense counsel made his argu- up, treating them posing as tro- ment, asked if wanted to them — phies, having engaging several of them say remarks, anything. Irey apol- brief him acts with other children at ogized government to “the agents that time, the same [and] this is run-of-the- get my have had to involved horrible *16 mill pornography child if deeds,” ... there is such office,” attorney’s to “the federal court, a thing.” She that this pro- “to stressed is a the children that I have case, duction years harmed over the and “the defendant clearly last several of go- Cambodia,” ing on; had family, parts two different of his life going his and to “my one, employees, star, writer, that but in pretty I’ve much hurt this he was the director, and, them.” He also end, said: “I’ve hurt a lot person who months, year The decisions years cited were United v. States sentence in 26 2 and and McBride, (11th Cir.2007), released, years 511 F.3d 1293 Unit- he 76 would be old when (11th Gray, 3624; ed States v. 453 F.3d 1323 18 § Cir. 81. See U.S.C. 28 C.F.R. 2006), White, 523.20, (2005); §§ and United States 541.13 see also Barber v. - (8th Cir.2007). Thomas, -, 635 In none of those cases U.S. produce (2010). actually did the defendant the child L.Ed.2d 1 pornography he distributed. And there is no depicted por- indication that the acts in the 11. The he served "if the entire sentence" con- nography important, Irey involved in three those cases even dition is because would not depraved came close to the nature of the acts have to his serve entire sentence unless he depicted graphically Irey's pink badly prison wall series. behaved so that he did not qualify additional credit for entirely good 10. That statement is not supra accurate. behavior. See 10. Assuming note behavior, good Under U.S.C. Irey complete 3624 federal inmates rou- would a 15- month, tinely days year years receive 54 additional credit to- sentence in 13 and 63; age ward the complete service their sentence at the end released he would year months, good of each that 20-year have served with years sentence in 17 and 5 (with year age behavior credit for the last be released at See 18 U.S.C. 523.20, part 3624; being prorated (2005); §§ thereof and credited with- 28 C.F.R. 541.13 Barber,-U.S.-, imprisonment). in the six last weeks of the see also S.Ct. Irey complete Because of 3624 could a 30- 177 L.Ed.2d 1. conduct, according to his own ad- forever ruined dant’s ruined, just absolutely and missions, just rape lives.” “not even child 50 children’s was over molestation, dealing with and child argument, the AUSA During her prostitutes, lying when he doesn’t of about photographs the court showed to,” him stealing. She characterized Irey’s pink taken from the children fifty of “who lies and steals and hurts person series; pho- particular of those none wall people.” other acts or revealed any obscene tos showed they did show some private parts; 1,200 images in the Focusing on the with the pleaded faces. She children’s Irey pornography collection of child faces,” babies’ to “look at these produced, argued the AUSA that there is of these children out that “some pointing no better word for it than “torture.” She five, years They’re old. four or six Irey out that what did to the small pointed babies, Referring to the Your Honor.” egre- “some of the most produced children in- Irey produced child pornography agents have ever gious images children, pointed same she volving these seen,” doing it for had been “[tjheir pictures will forever be out that many paying up and on occasions and They will be victimized out there online. $1,500 rights particular for the to use chil- lives can again.... Their over and over any way dren in he wanted. the same.” never be concluded her remarks AUSA the court that also informed AUSA 30-year asking impose the court to sen- caught and the cache of Irey was when tence, allowed, produced had maximum the law pornography he child the National Cen- computer, “justice on his for these children who found order to do Exploited Children Missing ter for plead cannot on their own behalf.” which agencies, contacted law enforcement “you’ve found expressed astonishment Findings D. The Sentence and Sentence ‘pink wall’ person produced who began The court its remarks infamous on the The series “was series.” sentencing was the hardest by stating that Internet, turning up even cases and is “particularly and was thing had to do *17 more of now, finding we’re more and in cases like this.” The court difficult young of these chil- pink wall series statutory minimum or floor noted dren.” years, ceiling was 30 and out that “in pointed also The AUSA what the court called “the which was also the defendant is photographs, of the some guideline score.” The court observed abuse.” smiling perpetrates as he this guide- while it was to take into account this with square “How can we She asked: consider that score as a lines score and today? we’ve heard How can the stories throughout analysis benchmark you than treat a you dog treat a better 3553(a) factors, guidelines 18 U.S.C. baby?” An- being, human a defenseless mandatory; important an are not while argued that swering question, her own she calculus, the re- of the element than there’s makes no sense other “[i]t calculation is guidelines sult of the really, really bad about the de- something it court then stated that advisory. also asked

fendant.” She other fac- to look at the needed victimization, and and consider the offense an basis order tors on individualized message we send to argued that “[t]he for the appropriate an sentence determine would do this has to be consid- people who out that the defen- case. pointed ered.” She illness, importance

Because of the of the court’s because I think other than the findings explanation, and we set Irey, acts of Mr. there’s no indication them out in full: engaged that he has other sort of thing

The first I need to do is consider criminal conduct represent- or conduct the nature and circumstances of the of- ing poor character. fense, I quarrel cannot with Ms. Also, in terms of the characteristics of description Hawkins’ of that. The con- defendant, just I think begin- we’re duct here was horrific. The victims ning to learn what pedophilia is and how were perhaps numerous and the most to deal with I you it. think if look at the society. vulnerable of the world’s ISo reports of the mental people health here don’t think a,ny question there’s literature, and into the which I have dealing we’re with here with offense done, Mr. Irey’s acts that him bring that rises to very top terms of its today, here I think say, it’s safe to were seriousness and its effect on other hu- purely volitional. I think they were beings. man due in part substantial to a recognized young These children were victims illness. And while it does not excuse his never, may

who never overcome their conduct and he will still be held account- course, recognize, abuse. I that Mr. it, able for I think it inappro- would be Irey family and his and friends are also priate ignore that fact. here; society victims large ais I also think appropriate it’s to credit because, indicated, victim Dr. Shaw opinion profes- the mental health every development new in human history, sionals who good there seems to come indicate that Mr. it; bad with and with all good pursuing treatment and doing ap- so Internet, perhaps one of the bad fea- and, parently successfully in the view of tures of is that it possible has made the mental professionals, health is treat- what Dr. Shaw epidemic describes as an able and has a low risk of recidivism. And, of child pornography. unfortu- course, Of all of that is somewhat nately, system we here the court wit- academic because gets the time he it; ness that and have to deal with out prison, he’ll likely be most at an government, our in an effort to deal with age where unlikely, recidivism would be it, imposed has penalties, criminal —has just from a physiological standpoint. very harsh sentences for conduct like Mr. Irey obviously very has a loving this. family, I know proud he’s of his inSo terms of the characteristics of family and deserves whatever credit he offense, itself, the seriousness of it should take for having produced these the long-standing, long-term engage- *18 people who have today come here to certainly ment mitigate does not speak for him. IAnd know it was diffi- any leniency. favor of cult for family, but I think your that But next I need to look at the history support important lot, is says not and characteristics of the defendant. your about family, but about Mr. accounts, By all Mr. has been a Irey himself. good husband and father for his wife Another aspect of the defendant’s good children and a friend to his character, to, I as have alluded friends and a good person to his commu- course, not nity. thefts, think, his character but The lies and I his individ- re- characteristics, ferred to ual Ms. Hawkins age. were essen- is his As I indi- tially part cated, of his effort to up cover his here, even the minimum sentence hand, in light I On the other guess an old man. going he’s to be man, crimes, an old but he will I think a that makes me seriousness of sen- gets man when he certainly be an older mandatory tence above the minimum is think, that’s, I prison; out of called for. into account.

factor to take that, all it’s the having judg- So said of the statute aspects There are other defendant, ment of the Court subjective in nature. essentially are Irey, is committed to the custo- William course, adequate deterrence to crimi- Of dy of the Bureau of Prisons to be im- mean, a nal conduct. I serious prisoned for a term of 210 months. to others from hopefully going deter Upon imprisonment, release from Mr. affairs, although conducting similar Irey, you’ll supervised on placed re- an illness like dealing when we’re with mandatory lease for a term of life. The this, rationally I’m not sure that drug testing requirements of the Violent But, nevertheless, follows. deterrence imposed. Crime Control Act are While consideration, and a appropriate release, supervised you comply must keeping is in with the seri- stiff sentence adopted by with the standard conditions ousness of this offense. this court. public from protecting As far as addition, going require you I’m defendant, for further conduct of this participate pro- a substance abuse indicated, I think that the reasons I’ve your probation gram and to follow offi- sentence, 30-year against militates regard. in that You cer’s instructions that he age, given his the fact given participate must also a mental health now, recognizes from apparently every- program specializing in sex offender seen, thing recognizes I’ve he condi- your probation treatment and follow offi- him to commit these tion that has led regard cer’s in that as well. instructions his life and put acts and to himself and register, appropriate, You must family’s in the order that it is. his life any registration with state offender toward rehabili- step He’s taken the first agency cooperate your proba- appears tation and to be amenable complying respect tion officer with also, according to the treatment and with that directive. professionals, health is of low mental impose I’ll the standard terms con- I think soci- risk of recidivism. So don’t is, control, cerning risk no direct him, ety protection further from needs without contact with minors under 18 beyond statutory minimum at least approval your probation the written sentence. officer, prohibition possessing, sub- cases, my in these happens As often to, scribing viewing any maga- video or human I am a fallible judgment —and zines, depicting otherwise chil- literature necessarily I being. So what do is sexually explicit nude or dren right. just I do the best I can under the positions. possess You shall not or use my It comes down to circumstances. computer with access to online promotes respect of what for the view approval your service without written just punishment. And provides law and *19 probation officer. here, indicated, 30-year I think that Also, going impose Tm to search sentence, given personal factors to a search requirement, you submit than upon, greater I have touched is residence, place of busi- statutory your person, necessary accomplish any your area under con- ness or other objectives. at a and in a trol reasonable time rea- the minimum limit.” reache[d] United any manner 1223, (11th sonable based reasonable Irey, States v. suspicion by your probation officer of Cir.2009) (Hill, J., vacated, concurring), violating contraband or evidence these (11th Cir.2009) (en banc). 579 F.3d 1207 supervised terms of release. IV. Our Review of the Reasonableness

You must cooperate with the collec- of the Sentence tion of DNA. I’m going impose not a fíne. You appealed, The United States contending ordered, however, pay special that in view of the facts and circumstances $100, assessment of which shall be due unreasonably light, sentence was

immediately. amounting to an abuse of discretion. A you It’s ordered that shall forfeit to panel of this disagreed Court and affirmed the United States those assets identified the sentence. Id. After voting to rehear your Plea Agreement subject that are banc, the case en parties we directed the to forfeiture. argue to brief and this issue: “Is the sen- indicated, As imposed Court has tence imposed this case unreasonable applicable sentence below guideline thereby an abuse of the district court’s sentence for the reasons indicated. sentencing discretion?” objection The defendant no any had Standard, A. Scope, sentence,

aspect of the including the 210- Importance (17/é-year) Appellate month imprisonment. term of States, On behalf of the United Review AUSA objected to the downward variance of 150 1. The Pre-Booker Era (12^ years) months as unreasonable Our review aof sentence that is chal- “based on the factors adduced this rec- lenged on grounds substantive is deferen- ord, particularly long- the seriousness and tial but still important, history as the term nature of the offense.” She charac- substantive review of federal in- sentences terized the being variance as “almost half.” dicates. Before the Sentencing Reform The court responded that the sentence was Act was prac- enacted there was “more percent guideline, like 60 tically no appellate review of federal sen- half.” tences, except to ensure that did not Actually, the sentence of 210 months stray outside of statutory minimum amounts percent to 58 advisory and maximum. long So as sentencing guidelines months, sentence of 360 or a judges stayed statutory within the bound- downward 42 percent variance of from the aries, they had unbridled discretion to ar- guidelines But, course, sentence. rive at they pleased. sentence See court could not sentence below the statuto- States, Dorszynski v. United 418 U.S. ry years minimum of in any event. 431-32, 3042, 3047, S.Ct L.Ed.2d 855 that, light of it is say also accurate to (1974) (“[OJnce it is determined that a within statutorily prescribed range of sentence is within the limitations set forth (a years 15 to 30 spread of 15 or 180 in the statute under which it imposed, months), the court imposed a sentence appellate end.”); review is at an United percent was 83 maximum from the Tucker, 443, 447, States v. only 17 404 U.S. percent above the minimum. As (1972) (“[A] it, Judge put Hill S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 592 the district court had imposed by “move[d] so far downward from the maxi- a federal district upper mum limits, limit that nearly judge, he if statutory general- within *20 review.”). result, ‘equal justice under law1—demands that subject not to The ly widespread disparity Frankel, predictably, was this be so.” Jail Re- Sentence sentences, gave a rise to a lot problem E21; form, at see also Martin v. Franklin See, 98-225, e.g., S.Rep. criticism. No. 132, 139, Capital Corp., 546 U.S. S.Ct. (1983), reprinted 38-39 (2005) (“Discre- 704, 710, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (complaining 3221-22 U.S.C.C.A.N. whim, not limiting tion is discretion “unjustifiably range wide of sen- according legal helps promote standards judges imposed different on simi- tences” justice principle the basic that like cases defendants). larly situated alike.”). should be decided Frankel and debate, other although reformers won the leading champions change One of the Frankel, it was Marvin who was himself a took a number of to enact the judge. Frankel described federal necessary legislation put the new sen- “a sentencing as then existed as non- tencing system place. every a system judge which law unto legislation Sentencing The was the Re- sentence a

himself or herself de- form Act of whose primary purpose judge on the he gets depends fendant or was to channel district courts’ sentencing Frankel, gets.” Marvin E. Jail Sen- she disparity discretion and reduce in sentenc- Times, 15,1978, at Reform, tence N.Y. Jan. ing. Sentencing See Reform Act of reforms, proposed E21. He a number of (codified 98-473, Pub.L. No. 98 Stat. 1987 some of which were similar to what would §§ amended 18 U.S.C. 3551-3586 sentencing guidelines system. become the (1988) (1988)); §§ and 28 U.S.C. 991-998 Frankel, Marvin Criminal Sentences: See States, v. United Mistretta 488 U.S. (1972). Law Without Order 113-14 One of 364-69, 647, 651-53, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d key Judge proposals Frankel’s was that (1989) (discussing background to the subject federal sentences be to at least a Sentencing guide- Reform Act and the appellate review. degree limited See id. lines). Act, which became effective on at 75-85. The standard he recommended 1, 1987, November created the Sentencing discretion, 82-84, was abuse of see id. at gave responsibility Commission and it the which he in these terms: described develop system sentencing guide- understood, Correctly the “discretion” of lines. judicial system in our officers is not guidelines binding, were arbitrary fiat. It is an blank check required and district courts were state law, authority, weigh within the imposing particular reasons sentence. appraise (lawfully diverse factors know- 3553(b)-(c). factors) 18 U.S.C. A court could im- a responsible able and make judgment, undoubtedly pose applicable a sentence outside the with a measure finality varying according guidelines range only of latitude and if it found exis- scope to the nature and of the discretion tence of an cir- aggravating mitigating But “discretionary” kind, conferred. does not cumstance “of a a degree, or to “unappealable.” may mean Discretion adequately taken into consideration abused, discretionary decisions Sentencing in formulating Commission may be reversed for abuse. 3553(b)(1). guidelines.” making Id. finding, such a court could goal system, Id. at 84. The of the new guidelines consider themselves explained, “[s]entencing Frankel [that] policy and the statements and official com- just. would be more Like cases would alike,” Sentencing mentaries of be treated Commission. “[t]he tend to because noted, legal principles— Supreme most fundamental of our Id. As the Court later *21 1182 rarely

departures depart on this basis were avail- The district court’s decision to cases, guidelines from the was reviewed for able because most as a matter “[i]n in law, three-step process. abuse of discretion will adequate- the Commission States, Koon v. account, See United 518 U.S. ly taken all relevant factors into 98-100, 2035, 2047-48, 135 legally departure permissi- and no will be (1996). First, L.Ed.2d 392 the court of Booker, ble.” v. United States 543 U.S. appeals deferentially reviewed the district 220, 234, 738, 750, 160 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. court’s determination of whether the facts (2005). of the case it took outside the “heartland” Restraints on the exercise discretion applicable of the guideline. United States by through district courts are enforced (11th Hoffer, 129 F.3d Cir. review, appellate Sentencing and the Re- 1997). A case was outside the heartland provided form Act of 1984 for it. only unusual, if something there was either Act, § U.S.C. Under the about the defendant or circumstances (1) appealed ground could be on the that: crime, surrounding the that warranted a (2) law; imposed it was in violation of the different sentence. See United States v. it imposed was as a result of an incorrect (11th Miller, 1281, 1284 Cir.1998). (3) application guidelines; of the the term by That compar determination was made fíne, imprisonment, supervised or re- ing the facts of the case to the facts of greater lease was than the maximum or falling other cases within the heartland of than less the minimum established guidelines. Id. step As second (4) guidelines range; or imposed reviewing departure decisions the court of an offense for which there is no appeals determined for itself whether the guideline “plainly and was unreasonable.” departure by factor used the district court 3742(a)-(b). §Id. “has categorically proscribed, been is en Departures guidelines from the range couraged, encouraged but taken into con were reviewed under the third of the stat- applicable sideration within the guideline, utorily grounds appeal, listed discouraged, see id. at or not addressed the [Sen 3742(a)(3), (b)(3), § resulting tencing] and the sen- Hoffer, Commission.” 129 F.3d at tence was vacated if the 1201. In the appellate step appeals court third court reviewed with determined it was deference the district “unreasonable” finding court’s light of the the factor on which factors to be considered departure was based did exist. Id. imposing § a sentence under the district court’s stated reasons for the In 2003 Congress amended the sentenc- Booker, 261,125 sentence. See 543 U.S. at ing statute provide for closer review of (quoting pre-2003 S.Ct. version guidelines. sentences that were outside the 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.)). § of 18 U.S.C. In Under the amendments a sentence could review, conducting appeals its the court of if departure vacated from the accepted the findings district court’s of guidelines range was based on a factor erroneous, fact clearly unless were (1) objectives that: did not advance the which was giving decided after (2) due 3553(a)(2); § set forth regard to that opportunity judge court’s (3) 3552(b); § was not authorized under the credibility of witnesses. 18 U.S.C. “justified was not facts the case.” 3742(e) (1994 ed.). reviewing 3742(e)(3)(B); 108-21, 18 U.S.C. Pub.L. gave also “due 401(d)(1), deference” to the district 117 Stat. 670. The court of application court’s guidelines appeals made each of those determinations facts. Id. 3742(e); de novo. Id. see also United *22 5H1.1, 1205, §§ Pressley, prison. 1209 n. tive to Id. 5H1.4. The States Cir.2003). (11th The 2003 amendments guidelines provide that also charitable con- va- specified that a sentence must be also tributions and a defendant’s mental and departed cated if it “to an unreasonable generally ap- emotional condition are not light degree” guidelines range, from the propriate grounds departure. Id. 3553(a) § of the district factors and 5H1.11, §§ 5H1.3. imposing the court’s stated reasons for 3742(e)(3)(C). § Id.

particular sentence. 2. Era The Booker outside-the-guide- that an The result was Then came the Booker decision if lines sentence could be vacated it was Supreme In it the Court held the sentenc- if impermissible based on an factor or ing statute unconstitutional insofar as the A degree departure was unreasonable. guidelines mandatory were and to the ex- correctly calculated sentence within a upper tent that allowed the limits of however, range, essentially guidelines depend the sentence to on facts that had long as the district court unreviewable by plea guilty not been established or 3553(a) § considered the factors and ex- proven jury beyond to a a reasonable 3553(c). § plained reasoning. its See id. Booker, doubt. 543 U.S. restricted even The 2003 amendments striking Instead of down the en- ability court to further guidelines system, salvaged tire the Court depart guidelines from the downward by making guidelines much of it advi- involving against cases sex crimes chil- sory mandatory. rather than Id. at type dren. In that of case a court could salvage 125 S.Ct. at 756-57. The work only if it found two depart downward required the Court to sever and excise two (1) mitigating of a things: the existence (1) 3553(b)(1), § provisions of the Act: “affirmatively circumstance that had been required which had the district court to specifically permissible and identified as a impose guidelines within the ground departure” by downward (2) 3742(e), range; § which had set statements, sentencing guidelines policy or scope forth the and standard of review of taking into account amendments sentences. Id. at 125 S.Ct. at 764. (2) Congress; mitigating circum- 3742(e) § gap: excision of left a The stance had not been taken into consider- jurisdiction § appellate 3742 still created Sentencing ation Commission in review, but with subsection formulating guidelines range for that (e) gone longer specified it no the standard 3553(b)(2). § offense. Id. of review. guidelines sharply themselves also Supreme gap by filled that Court permissible grounds limit the for down- inferring a standard of review from “relat- departure ward cases of sexual abuse of statutory language, ed the structure of the children, specifically disallowing depar- statute, sound administration of capacity tures based on diminished 260-61, justice.” Id. at 125 S.Ct. at 765 (U.S.S.G. (id. 5K2.13), § aberrant behavior omitted). (quotation marks Those consid- (id. 5K2.20), 5K2.22), § substance abuse erations, past as well as “the two decades community family responsibilities appellate practice involving in cases de- (id. 5H1.6). They provide gen- ties partures,” implied practical “a standard of erally age an health offender’s relevant, already appellate review familiar to courts: except rare cases where the (brack- Id. elderly offender so and infirm that home review for unreasonableness.” 3742(e)(3) omitted); ets confinement would be effective alterna- see 18 U.S.C. (1994 ed.).12 ap- apply district courts The Court reasoned factors decisions, in making their pellate ample experience apply- courts had appeals apply courts of also must those ing the “reasonableness” standard to sen- in determining same factors whether guidelines range outside the before tences sentence is reasonable. Id. at the 2003 amendments and to sentences for (“Those at 766 factors in turn S.Ct. will *23 by guidelines. offenses addressed the courts, guide appellate as have in the Booker, 262, at at 766. U.S. 125 S.Ct. past, determining in whether a sentence is appellate Booker Court saw review unreasonable.”); accord United States v. important system, sentences as to the new (11th Cir.2008) 1179, Pugh, 515 F.3d because it “would tend to iron out sentenc- (“Booker further in performing held differences,” ing avoiding disparity. undue review, this we must measure ‘reasonable- 263,125 Id. at S.Ct. at 767. against by ness’ the factors outlined Con- 3553(a).”); gress in 18 U.S.C. United 3553(a) plays Section a critical role in (11th 784, Talley, States sentences, appellate just review of as it Cir.2005) curiam) (“We (per must evaluate sentencing does the initial decision. whether imposed by the sentence the dis- Booker instructs us that not must trict court fails to achieve the purposes 3553(a).”).13 sentencing as stated in section (3) statutory available; language" 12. The "related and the the kinds of sentences (4) appellate practice” “two decades of the Su- the kinds sentence and the sentenc- preme provi- ing range Court drew from did not include established for— (A) by expe- sions added the applicable category 2003 amendments or the of offense purpose rience under them. Because the by applicable category committed the effect of those had guidelines— amendments been “to defendant as set forth in the (i) make Guidelines even by Sentencing more man- issued the Commission been," datory 994(a)(1) 28, than pursuant it had the amendments to section of title Code, legislation scrap pile were tossed onto the subject any United States to with the comment that "the reasons for guidelines by amendments made to such Booker, Congress [them] have ceased to be relevant.” (regardless act of of whether 543 U.S. at S.Ct. at yet incorpo- such amendments have to be by Sentencing rated the Commission into 3553(a) entirety: 13. Section reads its 994(p) amendments issued under section (a) imposing Factors to be considered 28); of title impose sentence.-—The court shall a sentence that, (ii) except provided in section sufficient, greater necessary, but not than to 3742(g), are in effect on the date the comply purposes para- with the set forth in sentenced; defendant is or (2) court, graph of this subsection. The (B) probation in the case of a violation of determining particular sentence to im- be release, supervised applicable or posed, shall consider— guidelines policy by or statements issued (1) the nature and circumstances of of- Sentencing pursuant Commission to history fense and the and characteristics of 994(a)(3) section of title United States defendant; Code, taking any into account amend- (2) imposed— the need for the sentence guidelines policy ments made to such (A) to reflect the seriousness of the of- by Congress (regardless statements act of fense, law, promote respect to yet of whether such amendments have to provide just punishment to for the of- incorporated by Sentencing be Com- fense; mission into amendments issued under (B) adequate to afford deterrence 28); to 994(p) section of title conduct; criminal (5) any pertinent policy statement— (C) protect public (A) to from further Sentencing issued Commission defendant; 994(a)(2) crimes of the (D) pursuant to section of title provide Code, the defendant with needed subject United States training, educational or vocational medi- policy amendments made to such state- care, cal Congress or other correctional treatment (regardless ment act of manner; in the yet most effective whether such amendments have decisions, Supreme of earlier Court believed such light Read presumption simply the fact that reflects adopted standard Booker “reasonableness” sentencing judge when both the and the of discretion that review for abuse entails Sentencing Commission have reached the deference” to the dis- accords “substantial sentence, proper same conclusion as to the Koon, sentencing decisions. trict court’s “significantly increases” the likelihood 97-99, at 2046-47. 116 S.Ct. 518 U.S. Id., that the sentence is reasonable. law, course, only- Pre-Booker decisional all, After S.Ct. the Court ex- the reasonableness standard to applied Congress plained, directed both the Sen- from departed guide- sentences that tencing Commission and the for offenses not range lines or to sentences carry out judge same basic guidelines. in the id. at 98- addressed See 3553(a) objectives; guidelines them- Booker, at 2046-47. After application selves reflect *24 of discretion standard outlined the abuse factors, and so should the district court’s broadly more to the dis- applies Koon 347-48, sentencing decision. at Id. 127 decision, judge’s trict sentence whether at It S.Ct. 2463. follows that when a is within or without sentence particular sentence is consistent with the Rita, range. See 551 U.S. at guidelines guidelines’ application fac- 364, (Stevens, J., 127 at 2472 concur- S.Ct. cases, tors in the run” “prob- “mine it is ring). able” that the sentence is reasonable. Id. Booker, years Supreme after Two 351, at 127 at If S.Ct. 2465. the sentence in greater addressed detail the sen- Court guidelines is not consistent with the that appeals, tence review function of court of exist, probability although same does not leaving importance no doubt about the reviewing may presume court Rita, 338, function. See 551 U.S. guidelines sentence is outside the 2456, L.Ed.2d 203. point- S.Ct. As we unreasonable, 354-55, id. at 127 S.Ct. at beginning opinion, ed out at the of this 2467. opinion categori- line of the Rita opening States, decision Gall v. United cally appeals states that courts of are to 38,128 586,169 552 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 445 federal sentences and set aside “review (2007), importance illustrates the of all the those find ‘unreasonable.’” Id. at facts and circumstances to the reasonable- 341, 127 S.Ct. at 2459. And later in the sophomore ness of the sentence. As a opinion Supreme Rita explains Court college had in a participated conspira- Gall that, Booker, according the world 41, cy ecstasy. to distribute Id. at appeals courts of exist to correct substan- at role S.Ct. 591-92. His was limited to tively imposed by unreasonable sentences delivering drugs conspirators. between 354, the district courts. Id. at at S.Ct. Id., 128 S.Ct. at 592. Later Gall voluntari- 2466-67. himself, ly stopped using drugs and seven specific holding of Rita is that a after joining conspiracy months he may appeals presume sen- from it withdrew and told the others he guidelines free, tence range quitting. within is rea- was Drug gradu- Id. Gall at at college sonable. Id. 127 S.Ct. 2462. ated from and became a master (6) incorporated by Sentencing Commis- the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among sion into amendments issued under sec- defendants with similar 28); 994(p) guilty tion of title records who have been found of simi- that, conduct; (B) except provided as in section lar (7) 3742(g), provide is in effect on the date the defen- need to restitution victims of the offense. dant is sentenced. so, 41-42, doing all carpenter. Id. at the Court reiterated that sentences, the con- years withdrawing Two after from whether within or without the questioned by federal spiracy, guidelines, Gall was be reviewed agents participation. and admitted his Id. reasonableness under an abuse of discre- and a half after he had with- Three tion standard. Id. 128 S.Ct. at 594. and turned his conspiracy drawn from the rejected any requirement It out- around, conspira- life Gall was indicted for side-the-guidelines justi- sentence must be He cy illegal drugs. circumstances, to distribute Id. by “extraordinary” fied guilty. co-conspirators, His pleaded Id. rejected any “rigid mathematical formula” conspira- who had not withdrawn from the percentage departure that uses the cy, ranging received sentences from 30 to determining strength the standard for 54-55, 36 months. Id. at 128 S.Ct. at 599- justification required specific for a sen- tence. Id. at 128 S.Ct. at 595. At the time, however, same the Court said that guidelines range Gall’s was 30 to 37 give court must “serious months. Id. at at 593. The S.Ct. any depar- consideration” to the extent of district court varied downward from that guidelines, ture from and must offer range to a of probation, largely sentence justifications” “sufficient for its conclusion young because Gall had been and imma- unusually light that an harsh or crime, ture when he committed the he had *25 46, at appropriate. Id. 128 S.Ct. at 594. from conspiracy withdrawn the be- means, explained, That the Court that the filed, fore the charges were and he had justification for the deviation from the 44, something made of himself. Id. at 43— guidelines range “sufficiently must be com- government 128 S.Ct. at 593. the When pelling support the degree of the vari- argued guidelines range for a sentence on 50,128 ance.” Id. at S.Ct. at 597. ground the that the co-conspirators three range, had received sentences in that the review, appellate Supreme About the that, Gall, district court noted unlike the reviewing Court held Gall that “[i]n the conspirators other had continued with the reasonableness of a sentence outside the 54-55, conspiracy. at Id. 128 S.Ct. at 599- range, appellate Guidelines may courts therefore degree take the of variance into account and consider the extent of a devia- appeals The court of proba- vacated the Guidelines,” tion from the in addition to tionary unreasonable, sentence as conclud- justifications. court’s Id. at ing the district court had erred 47, 128 at rigid S.Ct. 594-95. While math- giving weight too much voluntary Gall’s ematical formulas and withdrawal, proportionality tests age his at the time of the used, offense, cannot be rehabilitation, Court concluded that post-offense and his “the extent of the and too little difference between a consideration to the need to particular avoid sentence and the recommended disparities. unwarranted sentence 45, relevant,” range surely Id. at at Guidelines at Supreme 128 S.Ct. 594. The id. 41, 591, major Court at that “a reversed decision after discuss- S.Ct. ing length departure at some unique supported by “the facts of should be a more 54, significant justification Gall’s situation.” at Id. 128 S.Ct. at than a minor one.” 50, at Id. 128 S.Ct. at 597.14 In other 2008) difficulty (noting example 14. The of the distinction the chal- "[a]s Supreme regard lenge” post-Booker Court drew in this has not sentence review the See, gone e.g., messages unnoticed. United States v. "somewhat mixed that can be Levinson, 190, (3d ruling pro- F.3d 197 n. 6 Cir. drawn” Gall's from statement out ators who were sentenced within words, justification for the variance “sufficiently compelling support guidelines voluntarily had not must be withdrawn degree of the variance.” Id. Check- conspiracy from the and had not shown justification is suffi- ing to see that any comparable rehabilitation. Id. at 55- duty remains the ciently compelling 56, 600; Lyes City 128 S.Ct. see also time, At the same appeals. court of Beach, 1332, Riviera may presume that a appellate court Cir.1999) (en (11th banc) (“[I]t is worth guidelines is unrea- sentence outside noting equal treatment consists not “due deference to give and must sonable alike, treating things like but also court’s decision that district treating things differently unlike ac- 3553(a) factors, whole, justify on a differences.”). cording their The dis- of the variance.” Id. at extent reasonably trict court concluded that un- fact that court of at 597. The S.Ct. der the unusual facts that case the “might reasonably have concluded appeals “on justified factors the whole” appropriate” that a different sentence was the below-the-guidelines sentence it im- justify Id.; is not sufficient to reversal. Gall, 59-60, posed on Gall. 552 U.S. (“A Talley, see also 431 F.3d at 788 S.Ct. at 602. may impose a sentence that is either day The same that Gall was released the than the more severe or lenient Supreme Court also issued its decision in imposed, would have but that sentence we States, Kimbrough v. United 552 U.S. reasonable.”). must still (2007), 169 L.Ed.2d 481 appeals case the court of erred Gall’s which involved for an “unre- “virtually no giving deference” drug-trafficking markable offense” and an a significant district court’s decision that offense, possession unremarkable firearm guidelines justified. from the variance id. at 128 S.Ct. at 575. *26 Thanks Gall, 56, at at 600. The 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. large part the much-criticized 100 to 1 that it Supreme Court decided was entire- crack/powder cocaine disparity give for the district court to ly reasonable guidelines, of advisory bottom weight voluntary substantial to Gall’s with- range charges for the combined was 19 drawal. Unlike all his co-defendants and 92, years. Id. at at 128 S.Ct. 565. After majority “the vast of defendants convicted 3553(a) considering all of the factors and court,” conspiracy of federal Gall’s ef- strong upward influence of forts at began long self-rehabilitation be- crack/powder disparity guidelines on the got gave fore caught, he which the district range, the district court concluded that a “greater justification believing for 19-year sentence greater would have been genuine.” Gall’s turnaround was Id. at necessary accomplish than the purposes 56-57, at It 128 S.Ct. 600-01. was also 3553(a). sentencing set forth in at Id. reasonable for the district court to con- 92-93, reason, 128 at that S.Ct. 565. For guidelines range clude that a sentence for it varied have created downward to sentence of 15 Gall would unwarranted sen- 93,128 tencing disparities, co-conspir- years. because his Id. at at S.Ct. ableness’'); Evans, portionality embracing requirement United v. 526 F.3d States variances); greater justification major 155, (4th J., Cir.2008) (Gregory, 168 concur- Feemster,

see also United States (“I ring) must conclude that the has left Court (8th Cir.2009) (Colloton, J., 467 concur- specifics appellate of how courts are to Gall, (after ring) “one searches in vain for a review, conduct substantive reasonableness principled basis on which to conduct a consis- unclear.”). charitably speaking, appellate tent and coherent review for reason- guidelines the sentence involved issues related to the government appealed The offenses.”). solely the Fourth Circuit reversed be- for crack cocaine The Su- case, that a on preme opinion cause of its view variance based Court’s in that howev- er, ratio disagreement crack/powder with the also contains number of observations guidelines per in the was se unreasonable. application. example, For broader re- Supreme granted Id. After the Court discussed “the discrete Court institutional view, government argued against strengths” sentencing courts and the at 101- ground. variance on same Id. Commission, Sentencing and how those at It 128 S.Ct. 570-74. asserted strengths different affect the amount of guidelines usually while the advi- respect vary due court’s decision to from sory, crack/powder the 100 to 1 ratio guidelines range. Kimbrough, guidelines exception were because Con- U.S. at 128 S.Ct. at 574-75. It said gress sentencing had directed courts to that vary “may great- decisions to attract 101-02, follow that ratio. Id. at respect est the sentencing judge when government’s position, es- a particular finds case outside the heart- sence, crack/powder was that the ratio in land to which the Commission intends indi- part guidelines the offense level to apply.” vidual Guidelines Id. at pocket a little of mandatoriness in an oth- (quotation at 574-75 S.Ct. marks omit- advisory system. erwise ted). contrast, By may “closer review in order when the judge varies rejected Supreme posi- Court tion, solely from the Guidelines based on the disagreeing govern- with all of the judge’s range view that the Guidelines arguments Congress ment’s had re- fails quired properly Sentencing Commission and reflect consider- Id., courts to follow the 100 to ations even a mine-run case.” 102-11, every omitted). ratio in case. Id. at (quotation S.Ct. at 575 marks government S.Ct. 570-76. The did not in Kimbrough The Court also reiterated contend that the below-the-guidelines sen- importance appellate review sen- tence was unreasonable for other rea- tences substantive reasonableness. son, and the Court found that it was rea- 107-08, See id. at 128 S.Ct. at 573-74 110-11, sonable. Id. at 128 S.Ct. at 575- (explaining that appellate along review — 76; States, Spears see also v. United ongoing guidelines with the revision of the *27 -, 840, 843-44, 129 U.S. S.Ct. 172 help “will to avoid excessive (2009) curiam) L.Ed.2d 596 (per (clarifying disparities” among and variations district Kimbrough means “district courts are courts). reject vary entitled to and categorically 3. The Abuse of Discretion Standard

from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement a with those Guide- Supreme Since the Court’s Booker lines”). it “pellucidly decision has been clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of Kimbrough a spe- decision involved now applies appellate review review of part guidelines, cific the one involv- Gall, sentencing decisions.” ing peculiar 552 U.S. at crack/powder disparity, 46, 594; at Pugh, which the 128 S.Ct. see also 515 Sentencing Commission itself consistently (explaining F.3d at 1191 that the emphatically Supreme had and criti- at goals teachings cized as odds with the Court’s “leave no doubt that an behind 3553(a). Kimbrough, appellate may See at court still overturn a 552 U.S. sub 111, 576; sentence, stantively 128 S.Ct. at Pugh, see also 515 unreasonable albeit F.3d at 1189 n. 7 (“Kimbrough primarily only examining through prism after it discretion, balancing proper solidly and that factors is appellate abuse of estab of That extinguished”). has not been in Supreme precedent review lished Court range a of choice standard “allows See, familiar e.g., Piper our circuit law. Aircraft court, as that choice long the district so 235, 257, Reyno, 454 Co. v. U.S. judg- does not constitute a clear error (1981) (“The 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 fo Frazier, ment.” United States v. 387 F.3d rum non conveniens determination is com (11th Cir.2004) (en banc) (quo- mitted to the sound discretion of the trial omitted) (quoting Rasbury tation v. marks may court. It be reversed when (11th Cir.1994)). I.R.S., 24 F.3d discretion; there has been a clear abuse explained, “under the abuse of As we where the court has considered all relevant discretion standard of review there will be factors, public private interest occasions in which we affirm the district balancing where its these is rea factors gone though court even we would have sonable, its decision deserves substantial way it been our call. That is other had added)); (emphasis deference.” Ford v. discretion standard differs how an abuse of (11th Broum, 1302, 1308 Cir.2003) 319 F.3d of review.” Id. from a de novo standard (“We conclude that the district court over 168); Rasbury, 24 F.3d at see (quoting factors, highly looked some relevant also, Peeples, 605 F.3d e.g., Ledford ultimately struck a balance that was (11th Cir.2010) (“[T]he ques- relevant discretion.”). abuse reviewing for abuse of discre- tion [when whether we would have come is not tion] sentencing, the context of deciding if to the same decision issue proper factors are set out in 18 U.S.C. inquiry, in the first instance. relevant 3553(a), district court commits a rather, is whether the district court’s deci- in judgment weighs clear error when it tenable, or, say, ‘in might sion was we unreasonably, those factors at a arriving outcomes.”). ballpark’ permissible pur does not “achieve the 3553(a).” poses as stated in

“A district court abuses its dis Pugh, at (quoting Talley, 515 F.3d (1) cretion when it fails to afford consider (quotation 431 F.3d at 788 omit marks ation to relevant factors that were due ted)). In order to determine whether that (2) weight, gives significant significant occurred, factor, “required has we are to make to an or irrelevant weight improper (3) judgment [sentencing] error of in the calculus commits clear ourselves” and considering proper factors.” United step the review each district took (11th 1121, 1174 Campa, States v. Id.) Booker, making it. see also 543 U.S. Cir.2006) banc). (en way As for the third (“Those 3553(a)] 261, 125 S.Ct. [§ abused, a that discretion can be courts, guide appellate factors in turn will of judgment court commits clear error they have in the past, determining proper when it considers the factors but unreasonable.”); whether sentence is *28 unreasonably. balances them See Ameri (“Indeed, Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1194 we could Roach, 411 tas Variable Ins. Co. v. Life begin not to review the reasonableness of a (11th Cir.2005) (“[A]n 1328, F.3d 1330 without all of examining the rele abuse of discretion can occur ... when all vant factors embodied Section factors, ones, proper improper and no are 3553(a).”). considered, court, weighing but the reviewing reasonableness factors, those commits a clear error of sentence, must, Supreme a we as the added) judgment.” (emphasis (quotation us, omitted)). has instructed consider the total Court principle marks that dis by unreasonably Pugh, ity cretion can be abused of the facts circumstances. 1190 (unreasonableness however, criteria, applica- constitutes the at 1192 of sen-

515 F.3d requires of law to fact and the review- tion an examination of the depends tence “on ” to ing court undertake more substantive (quoting ‘totality of the circumstances’ scrutiny judgment to ensure that is 597)). Gall, 51,128 at at To 552 U.S. S.Ct. supported in terms of the factors identified the extent that the district court has found (citations omitted)).15 in the statute.” facts, them accept we unless At the time clearly erroneous. Id. same performing required After we can and should consider “additional if, analysis, we are to vacate the sentence elicited, salient facts that were and uncon- if, only left we “are with the definite difference is troverted.” Id. The between and firm conviction that the district contradicting factfinding, a on the one judgment committed a clear error of hand, ignoring uncontroverted facts 3553(a) weighing by arriving factors that the court failed to mention on that range at a sentence lies outside the important the other. That difference is dictated reasonable sentences facts because a district court cannot write out of Pugh, of the case.” 515 F.3d at 1191 undisputed by simply ig- the record facts omitted); (quotation marks accord United noring them. The failure to facts mention (11th Shaw, 1230, States 560 F.3d 1238 may judg- well reflect the district court’s Cir.2009); McBride, United States v. ment that those facts are important, (11th 1293, Cir.2007); F.3d 1297-98 United importance light but the of facts in of the (11th Clay, States v. 483 F.3d 3553(a) question factors is not itself a of Cir.2007). We are not often “left with fact but instead is an issue of law. See definite and firm [that] conviction” be 326, 337, Taylor, United States v. cause, 487 U.S. explained, as we have our examina 2413, 2419-20, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 297 “through tion of the sentence is made (1988) (“Factual findings of district court prism Pugh, of abuse of discretion.” are, course, entitled to substantial defer- F.3d at 1191. But sometimes we are. See ence and will be reversed for clear v. Livesay, United States (11th Cir.2009) A judgment error. must be arrived (vacating “pat 1278-79 at considering applying statutory ently proba- unreasonable” sentence of Judge Tjoflat’s separate opinion 15. Many "factfindings” 128 S.Ct. at asserts "deconstructing” is the abuse of discre- Judge Tjoflat’s separate opinion identifies are Concurring Dissenting tion standard. facts, actually applications statutory law to (hereafter Op. Tjoflat, “Separate Op. J. resulting in a determination that we review 1248; J.”), Tjoflat, see also id. at 1246. It considering for abuse of discretion when wrecking is deconstruction with a ball. Ac- factors, whole, whether "the on the cording opinion, weight given to that to justiffy] the sentence” a district court has piece factfinding, each of evidence ais id. at imposed. Id. at 128 S.Ct. at A 1246-47; degree of seriousness of an of- "judgment decision is a classic 59; factfinding, fense id. at 1246 n. by considering that must be arrived at importance given to each factor is a factfind- criteria,” statutory applying "requires which 61; ing, necessary id. at 1247 n. the sentence reviewing court to undertake more sub- 3553(a)(2) satisfy purpose each is a fact- scrutiny judgment stantive ensure 1246-47; words, finding, every- id. at in other supported in terms of the factors identified thing goes factfinding into a sentence is Taylor, in the statute.” 487 U.S. at subject only clearly erroneous review. To And, contrary Judge S.Ct. 2419-20. contrary, Supreme applied Court has Tjoflat’s opinion, *29 recognition our of the fact weight the abuse of discretion standard to the statutory play that criteria are at does not sentencing given court has to the evidence reviewing mean that we de importance given are novo the dis- it has Gall, 57, balancing factors. See 552 U.S. at trict court’s of those criteria. sentencing in billion-dollar fraud district court’s discretion participant tion for only “meaning- that a holding requirement scheme and of reasonableness and the of incarceration” would fulfill the period ful appellate existence of review to enforce 3558(a)); goals under requirement. While those fetters are (vacating at as Pugh, 515 F.3d 1188-94 by loosened the substantial discretion we substantively unreasonable a sentence of afford district courts in at sentencing, receiving distributing probation for boundaries reasonableness the fetters pornography); United States v. Mar- child Frankel, do fetter. See Criminal Sen- (11th Cir.2006) tin, 1227, 455 F.3d 1238-39 (“ ‘[Discretionary’ tences 84 does not mean (vacating seven-day sentence for billion- abused, ‘unappealable.’ may Discretion be “shockingly dollar securities fraud as discretionary may decisions be re- “wildly disproportionate” short” and abuse.”); Paper versed for Albemarle cf. offense, though even seriousness Moody, Co. v. 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. defendant had rendered substantial assis- (1975) (“That 2362, 2371, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 extraordinary); tance that was United the court’s discretion is equitable nature (11th Crisp, States hardly means that is unfettered Cir.2006) (vacating range as “outside the meaningful standards or shielded from of reasonableness” a sentence of five (citation thorough appellate review.” omit- fraud even imprisonment hours’ bank ted)).16 though provided the defendant had sub- crucial in the stantial assistance may repeating— We not—it bears co-defendant). prosecution of his Out of set merely aside sentence because we the hundreds of sentences that we have would have decided that another one is up point reviewed to this the five Gall, appropriate. more at U.S. decision, since the Booker those are the Frazier, at generally 597. See only four we have found to be substantive- 1259; Ledford, 387 F.3d at 605 F.3d at ly unreasonable. 922. A district court’s sentence need not Looking one, at appropriate only decisions be the most it need through prism is not may discretion reasonable one. set We aside determine, thing turning eye same a blind to unrea if we giving after And, sonable ones. a full Pugh, as we said measure of deference to the sentenc “the district court’s choice of sentence ing judge, imposed truly that the sentence not unfettered.” Id. The fetters on a is unreasonable.17 Barkett, J., 1277-78; Although persuasion may Dissenting Op. the burden of Dis- cases, many Edmondson, J., 1272-73, not be decisive it is on the senting Op. of party attacking the sentence as unreasonable. 1276; J., Separate Op. Tjoflat, at 1260-62. 1189; Martin, Pugh, 515 F.3d at 455 F.3d at course, Of the fact that we find the district 1237; Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. The burden necessarily court's sentence unreasonable being there tends to reinforce the discretion- disagree that we means with it. That is true ary zone in which the district court acts when every appellate instance in which an court sentence, appropriate it decides on an substantively finds a sentence unreasonable. impervious that zone is neither limitless nor appellate agreed If the with a sentence to review. unreasonable, it would not find the sentence illogical suggest disagreement so it is colleagues position 17. Some of our take the ap- with a sentence somehow means that an finding the sentence in this case un- pellate properly carrying court is not out its simply disagreeing reasonable we are with the duty to review judge's substituting the reasonableness of the sen- decision our proper view a own sentence for his. See tence. *30 reasonably dissenting opinion “quite district court attached Judge Edmondson’s reviewing that a sentence for argues that great weight to the fact Gall volun- may we not de- substantive reasonableness tarily conspiracy withdrew from the after placed un- whether the district court cide initiative, change deciding, on his own 3553(a) § the weight reasonable on of life,” strong support his which “len[t] Dissenting Op. factors. See that the District Court’s conclusion Gall (“[T]o Edmondson, J., grant some- at 1272 to return to criminal behavior going in the record or less value than thing more 57, danger society.” and is not a Id. at Judge the District did and so to conclude 128 S.Ct. at 601. The Court also stated weighs that record overall more heavi- the “quite reasonably that the district court oversteps ... ly higher for a sentence great weight attached to Gall’s self-moti- authority.”). disagree [appellate] We rehabilitation, ... vated which lends several reasons. im- strong support to the conclusion that First, only authority dissenting the prisonment necessary was not to deter Gall, opinion proposition cites for that engaging Gall from in future criminal con- actually which contradicts it. The Su- protect public duct or to from his that sentence preme Court decided Gall’s 59, future criminal acts.” Id. at 128 S.Ct. reviewing was reasonable after If appellate at 602.18 review did not ex- weight assigned the district court had 3553(a) weight placed tend to the on a that various factors as well as its decision factor- —as Judge dissenting Edmondson’s 3553(a) factors, whole, justified as a Gall, opinion contends —those statements 56-60, the sentence. See 552 U.S. at at 600-02. It stated Gall would make no sense.19 Judge Tjoflal’s separate opinion argues weighing resulting court's and the 18. Gall, were disregarding argument we are reasonable. Id. at 128 S.Ct. at 600. reading that is based his of that decision to appellate If an court could not review the appellate weight put mean that review of weight reasonableness of the court 3553(a) on the various factors the sen- placed on a factor—if all that mattered was tencing necessarily court is akin to de novo factfindings correct and accurate recitation of sentencing, may review of which we not un- applicable many Supreme law-— J., Separate Op. Tjoflat, dertake. See at Court’s other statements in its Booker- (asserting 1260-61 that one reason for the ihrough-Kimbrough decisions also would have Supreme Court’s conclusion in Gall that the See, Gall, purpose. e.g., little or no 552 U.S. Eighth analysis closely Circuit's "more resem- (“In reviewing 128 S.Ct. at 594-95 de review” bled novo than abuse discretion reasonableness of a sentence outside the appeals review was that the court of decided range, appellate may Guidelines courts there- "gave too much degree take the fore of variance into account weight conspir- to Gall's withdrawal from the and consider the extent of a deviation from (citation omitted)). acy” reading That Guidelines.”); Booker, 543 U.S. at Gall, however, decision, misreading is a of the ("Those 3553(a)] S.Ct. at 766 [§ factors courts, actually appellate which confirms that courts, guide appellate in turn will deference, proper with the should measure past, determining have in the whether a weight review the reasonableness of the unreasonable.”); Kimbrough, sentence is placed aon factor the sentenc- 107-08, (explain- U.S. at 128 S.Ct. at 573-74 Gall, 56-57, ing court. See 552 U.S. ing appellate review for reasonableness Eighth S.Ct. at 600-01. The Circuit's mistake help sentencing dispari- will avoid excessive was not that ties). had reviewed the district point And there would have been no factors, weighing statutory decision, court's all in the Rita which held that we doing wrong ques- that in so it had asked may presume guidelines a sentence within the its view” tion—whether "in the sentence was is reasonable. 551 U.S. at 127 S.Ct. at appropriate of whether the district —instead

1193 3553(a) Second, position Judge factors, including vant the need dissenting opinion takes is Edmondson’s protect public.”); United States v. with the familiar abuse of dis- (6th inconsistent Camiscione, 823, 591 F.3d 834 Cir. Supreme cretion standard that the Court 2010) (“General deterrence is one of the apply. already has us to As we have told key purposes sentencing, and the dis- explained, a district court commits a clear trict court abused its discretion when it discretion, judgment, error of abuses its give failed to that matter its proper when it factors proper considers but weight.” (quotation and other marks omit- unreasonably. Piper balances them See ted)); Sayad, United States v. 589 F.3d 257, Co., at 454 U.S. 102 S.Ct. at Aircraft (10th Cir.2009) 1110, (“Unlike 1118 proce- 266; 1174; Campa, 459 F.3d at Ameritas review, dural reasonableness which focuses Ins., 1330; Ford, Variable 411 F.3d at Life permissibility on the relying partic- on a purpose 319 F.3d at 1308. One of reason- factor, ular substantive reasonableness re- ableness review is to correct those errors. broadly view looks to whether the district If weight given various factors could court abused its discretion in weighing appeal, not be reviewed on there would be 3553(a) permissible in light factors way no purpose. appellate to serve that If ” ‘totality of the circumstances.’ (quotation determining courts were limited to wheth- omitted)); Cooks, marks United States v. proper er procedures were followed and (5th 173, Cir.2009) 589 F.3d 186 (stating clearly erroneous, whether factfindings are that a substantively sentence is unreason- review, there no only would be substantive able if it “does not account for a factor that Gall, procedural review. at See 552 U.S. should significant weight, receive it gives 51, (defining procedural 128 S.Ct. at 597 significant weight to an irrelevant or im- review to include a determination of factor, proper represents or it a clear er- whether the sentence on clearly was based ror of judgment balancing sentencing facts). erroneous would be to “a We back factors”); Moore, United States v. 565 non-system every judge which ais law (8th 435, Cir.2009) (“We may F.3d find Frankel, unto himself or herself.” Jail an abuse of discretion where the sentenc- Reform, Sentence at E21. ing court fails to consider relevant factor Third, position significant should have received weight gives court weight, gives significant weight to an im may factors not be reviewed has proper factor, or irrelevant or considers rejected only by been not this Court but appropriate factors but commits a by also all of our sister circuits that have judgment clear error of in weighing those addressed the issue. See United v. States omitted)); (quotation factors.” marks Russell, (D.C.Cir.2010) 631, 600 F.3d Cavera, 180, United States v. 550 F.3d (“Substantive reasonableness is the catch (2d (en Cir.2008) banc) (“At the substan all criterion under reviewing which the stage review, tive of reasonableness (deferentially monitors abuse of —for appellate court may consider whether a discretion) whether the district court has factor relied on a sentencing court can given reasonable weight to all the factors it.”); assigned bear the weight United required considered.”); to be United (3d Goff, States 501 F.3d Cir. Ressam, States v. 1131-32 2007) (9th (“[D]eterring production Cir.2010) (“[I]t of child appears that the dis pornography and protecting the children trict court weigh abused its discretion in who are ing victimized it are factors that by giving relevant factors too much weight should have cooperation given significant weight [the been defendant’s] enough weight to the other sentencing....”); rele- United States v. (4th (explaining at 597 552 U.S. 288-89 Cir.

Hampton, F.3d *32 3553(a) 2006) substantively sentence as to consider the fac- (vacating “failing that the district court unreasonable tors, because failing adequately explain ... or to statutory weight” to one gave “excessive sentence,” proce- the chosen constitutes others); account for factor and failed to Ellisor, error); dural United States O’Neill-Cancel, also Torres-Rivera v. see (11th Cir.2008) 1255, (Tjoflat, F.3d Cir.2008) (1st (stating 524 F.3d 335-36 J.). in case no one has ever And this that, may general, in abuse of discretion that the district court committed argued sig- to consider a occur if the court “fails sentencing. error in That any procedural calculus, if nificant factor in the decisional not mentioned either possibility was working factor in improper it relies on an court, in in the district or their briefs party calculus, if it all the that or considers panel, argument or in the oral be- makes a serious appropriate factors but panel, panel’s opinion fore the or in the relative judgment in as to their error (which joined), in the Judge Tjoflat or en join those circuits in reaf- weight.”). We instructions, or briefing par- banc exists, that review firming substantive us, at oral argu- ties their briefs to or correct sentences that part, substantial to us, anywhere ment or else at all before weighing deci- are based on unreasonable Tjoflat’s emerged Judge sepa- until it accepted position sions. If we set out opinion. appeal in this has rate The issue Judge dissenting opinion, Edmondson’s reasonableness, procedural never been only circuit to do so.20 we would be substantive reasonableness. instead Adequacy B. the Sentence Tjoflat’s Judge opinion, although purport- Findings Explanation ing recognize Irey’s to can- sentence procedural grounds, not be vacated on Judge Tjoflat’s separate opinion up procedural objections to making dresses its own criticizes the district court for not findings more detailed sentence and not the sentence as substantive ones. No offering explanation a for the sen better couture, however, amount of rhetorical can imposed. Separate Op. Tjoflat, it tence up opinion really cover the fact that the is sentence, J., Irey’s at 1257-58 ac complaining procedural unrea- about cording separate opinion, to that is unrea sentence, an sonableness of the issue that sonable because the district failed is not before us. “intelligible” “specific” findings make Second, if even issue were before 3553(a)(2)(A)factors, and because us, required the district court was not weigh it not “explicitly” did those factors. any findings give make detailed or a more criticism, at Id. 1257-58. About we thorough explanation more than it In did. all, things say. have four First of Supreme upheld Rita the Court the ade- adequacy findings of a district court’s quacy “sentencing judge’s of a statement procedur a classic explanation issue, Gall, legally al not a of reasons was brief but [which] substantive one. See weight impossible; we reinforces the 20. Each of the circuits have cited has determined, implicitly, weight deferential the review. we have at least that the nature of As 3553(a) emphasized, given may each be reviewed there is "a difference between factor fashion, agree. Crisp, principled we deference and abdication.” Even difference, though appropriate weight given we "the to each at 1290. If there were no if 3553(a)] meaningful play, role to we [§ factors cannot be calibrated did not have rule,” Pugh, would never have set aside sentences as slide 515 F.3d at unreasonable, appellate substantively but we have. that does not mean review of that tation of reasoning sufficient.” U.S. S.Ct. its on each of the the record showed 2469. It did so because factors: to the evidence and judge that the listened (or [W]e cannot read the statute our aware of the various arguments and was precedent) insisting upon a full opin- put factors the defendant forward for in every ion case. The appropriateness lesser sentence. Id. brevity length, conciseness or de- much, judge say did not defendant the tail, write, when to what say, depends acknowledged “might the Court he upon judi- circumstances. Sometimes a *33 more,” it that have said surmised “[h]e opinion cial responds every argument; must have believed that there was not; sometimes it does sometimes a say.” Although much more to Id. judge simply “granted,” writes the word judge did not even state that he had con- or “denied” on the face of a motion while argument why sidered the evidence and or relying upon context and the parties’ rejected arguments variance, he for a prior arguments to make the reasons enough “the context and rec- much, clear. The law leaves in this re- reasoning ord” indicated the behind his spect, judge’s own professional 359, conclusion. Id. at 127 S.Ct. at 2469. judgment. No member of this Court has ever before Rita, 356, 551 U.S. at 127 at S.Ct. sentencing judge indicated that a is re- depth quired findings to articulate his of detail that Judge Tjoflat’s and rea- soning great detail or in separate opinion detail require would exceeds the See, e.g., matter. United States v. requirements precedent. id.; of that See (11th Sanchez, 918, 586 F.3d 935-36 Cir. see also id. at 127 at S.Ct. 2009) (“In J.) (Tjoflat, general, the district (“Where a conceptually matter is as simple required court is not to state on the record the case at hand and the record explicitly that it has considered each of the makes clear that the sentencing judge con- 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the sidered the evidence arguments, and we do 3553(a) factors. It is sufficient that the requires not believe the law judge district court considers the defendant’s ar- write extensively.”). more guments and states that it Third, the district court’s sentence find- has taken the factors into ac- ings explanation, which we have set (citation count.” and quotation marks omit- full, 1177-80, out see supra are far ted)); Brown, United States 526 F.3d specific more and detailed than we have (11th Cir.2008); Ellisor, 522 F.3d majority seen in the vast of other cases at 1278. where we have reviewed the substantive Tjoflat’s Judge separate opinion now fact, reasonableness of sentences. we asserts, however, that he would have this seeing cannot recall findings sentence sitting prece- Court en banc overturn our explanations that were more specific and specificity dent on the amount of required case, detailed than although those this of a judge. Separate Op. of the substantive of the reasonableness sen- J., Tjoflat, at 1245 n. 56. While we as an tence is another matter. We have never en can prec- banc court overturn our own required expected or judges edent, see, e.g., Drug, Main Inc. v. Aetna compose a explain why doctoral thesis to Healthcare, Inc., U.S. 475 F.3d they imposed particular sentence. (11th Cir.2007), we cannot overturn Fourth, problem with the district Supreme precedent. Court And the Su- court’s preme already findings explanation has sentence Court laid out the re- quirements for a sentencing they unintelligible court’s reci- is not that or lack- (8th Cir.2009) effort; instead, (request & n. 5 660-61 specificity

ing from a 360-month ed variance downward substan- the sentence is problem is months, to one of 240 guidelines sentence That tively unreasonable. unreasonable- percent, would have been reduction of underlying cause for ness is the variance”); major v. Abu “a United States findings Tjoflat opinion’s criticism of (4th Cir.2008) (not Ali, 210, 261 “intelligible,” for its explanation as not per variance of 40 ing that downward “cannot be rec- pronouncement “major”); a sentence of 30 is cent to sentence, and for its con- onciled” with the Burns, 577 F.3d see also United States v. the sentence light clusion that in of them (8th Cir.2009) (a 887, 888-90, 896 variance Separate Op. “inconceivable.” percent from a 360- downward J., at The reason that Tjoflat, 1256-57. one of 144 guidelines month sentence to against when viewed imprisonment “beyond dispute” months inconceivable, irreconcilable, findings is one). major fault unintelligible is not the *34 The findings but of the sentence itself. proportion Although there is no Tjoflat opinion confuses the unreasonable- major ality principle sentencing, a with an absence of ness of the sentence require significant variance does a more it, and the impossibility stated reasons for justification than a minor one—the re giving a for the sentence of reasoned basis justification quirement is that the part a lack of effort on the of the with “sufficiently to compelling support to do so. sentencing judge Gall, degree of the variance.” 552 U.S. justifica at at 597. The explaining turn of We now to task tions the district court offered for its why, even under the deferential standard major variance downward in applies, viewing that of review facts only insufficiently were not compelling light of this case in of and circumstances variance, support degree of the but 3553(a) § factors leads to the conclu- insufficiently compelling were also sion that the downward deviation sentence support any variance. imposed is district this case substantively unreasonable. in judg- The district court’s clear error apparent ment becomes when all of the

C. Substantive Unreasonableness facts and circumstances are considered statutory minimum appli- The 3553(a) light § factors. What years cable to this case is 15 and the 3553(a) sufficient, § requires is “a sentence years. advisory maximum is 30 greater necessary, not than comply but guidelines range years, top is 30 and bot- purposes with the forth in paragraph set tom. The district court deviated (2)” down- Throughout of that subsection. his (nineteen a years years, ward to sentence of separate opinion by times our 12/6 17/6 only years statutory 2]6 which is above the count), Judge Tjoflat refers minimum. The downward variance was 42 § requirement that a sentence be percent.21 considered in absolute adequate pur- Whether but not excessive for the terms, 3553(a)(2) “major” or it percentage poses parsi- is vari- out in set as “the sentencing mony ance in of legal parlance principle” parsimony “the re- Smith, J., Separate Op. Tjoflat, of quirement.” law. See United States v. 573 F.3d noted, months) already percent we have viewed in or 180 that was 83 As when statutorily permissible range only percent terms of the below the maximum and 17 years, Irey, 15 to 30 the district court chose a above the minimum. See 563 F.3d J., (a (Hill, range concurring). spread of 15 sentence within 3509, 3511, 3513, 3516, 3520, Calling statutory require- & n. too short. 3527-28, 3530, 3532, n. n. ment “the parsimony principle” is as in- that has in a It is term been used complete inaccurate as it would be to See, e.g., United States few other circuits. requirement severity call the “the princi- Carrasco-De-Jesus, (1st 589 F.3d ple.” The reason that counsel defense Cir.2009) appellant “posits that the (noting argue sentences, those who for shorter parsimony the sentence violates the cases, generally either or in specific like 3553(a)”); United of 18 principle U.S.C. “parsimony the term principle” is that Martinez-Barragan, States v. tends to slant the discussion toward short- (10th Cir.2008) (“[T]he 894, 904 er sentences emphasizing part guided court must be ‘parsimony requirements. the twin But terminolo- ‘sufficient, principle’ the sentence be gy that completely is less than —that accurate greater necessary, but not than to comply should not guide judicial be used to deci- criminal purposes’ punishment, term, sions.22 A more accurate if one is 3553(a)(2).”). expressed as needed, might princi- be “the Goldilocks ple,” because goal is to lock in a sen- problem parsimony with the termi- tence that is not too short and not too long, nology statutory command has just right purposes serve the components equal standing, two and it 3553(a).23 opinion, however, In this we ignores requirement one them. The using will avoid merely simply that a court when catchword and apply provision Congress handing stingy enough down sentence be wrote it. *35 long, to avoid one that too We turn now to the sentencing also that factors set 3553(a).24 enough § it to in generous avoid one that is out "parsimony principle” Judge Tjoflat's opinion 22. The term interprets is an ex- 24. the statu- 3553(a) tory language § ample require of what Holmes once referred to as an to the sen- word[],” tencing judge identify single "driving "inadequate by catch which could purpose,” "explain why driving and then the "very felicity, delay analysis.” its further Oli- purpose purposes.” subsumes the other Id. Holmes, ver Wendell Law in Science and Sci- 37; (“[T]he at 1239 n. see also id. at 1247-48 Law, (1899). ence in 12 Harv. L.Rev. (a)(2) purposes weighed against should not be Judge Tjoflat's separate opinion says that other; rather, each the court should [district] "[ajlthough quibbles the court with the label (a)(2) identify purpose the the drives sen- ‘parsimony principle,’ disagree it does not parsimonious tence and fashion a sentence underlying concept.” Separate Op. with the purpose.”); id. at 1249 & n. 63. Under J., Tjoflat, contrary, at 1232 n. To the approach, driving purpose that novel emphatically disagree "parsimo- we with the sentencing judge chose would run over all of ny principle” terminology concept and the purposes the other in the listed statute. it, that underlies which is that one of the two "impose The statute directs courts to a sen- 3553(a) § principles given predomi- is to be complies] purposes tence ... [that] with the nance "parsimony over the other. The term 3553(a)(2). § § set forth” in 18 U.S.C. 3553 principle” "inadequate added). is an catch word” that (emphasis The direction is that the prefer the deck we stacks would to deal comply "purposes” plural; sentence with the 3553(a)(2), result-neutral terms. § four of them are listed in "and,” they joined by conjunctive thought 23. Research reveals that this oc- has disjunctive "or.” Id. judge. curred to at least one other See United 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). Tjoflat opinion The cites Pruitt, (10th States v. authority proposition no for that courts Cir.2007) (McConnell, J., ("The concurring) pick "driving purpose” speed should one Goldilocks, judges, factors tell like ahead and flatten the other three. high not to sentence only disagree too not to sentence approach Not do we with the low.”), vacated, Judge Tjoflat’s too 552 U.S. opinion, S.Ct. but so does the (2008). Supreme 170 L.Ed.2d explaining Court. In how 3553(a)(1) availability pornog- of child a victim the

1. Section Dr. the internet. Nor did Berlin. raphy on actually factor—it is two The first listed Irey counsel. Nor did Nor did defense a district court must factors one—that one who saw as himself. and that a court of sentencing, consider in court. victim was the district reviewing appeals must consider reasonableness, is for substantive with the district problems There are two of the of- nature and circumstances “the predator prey: re-casting court’s of the characteristics of history and the fense premise. premise legal factual and its its 3553(a)(1). the defendant.” U.S.C. factually is not with the problem “the nature and circum- large To a extent finding that the internet explicit court’s component of this stances of the offense” of child possible epidemic “has made listed consid- overlaps factor with the next disputes No one that. pornography.” eration, for the sen- which is “the need implic- with the problem Nor is the court’s tence reflect seriousness imposed—to finding availability por- that the of child offense, for the promote respect internet has caused some nography on the law, just provide punishment and to sexually by pedo- children to be abused 3553(a)(2)(A). offense,” For that id. otherwise re- philes who would reason, some our dis- postpone we will discussing pedo- strained themselves. nature and circumstances of cussion of the philia generally, Dr. Shaw testified that (a)(1) until component the offense we availability pornography on the of child (a)(2)(A) factor up take offense-related epidemic pedo- internet fueled an “has in the next section. philia probably that was kind of background, people might not have even a. The “Victim” it, known that suffered from and then Most of the district court’s reasons for images.” come across there is a these So major imposed variance it relate to the finding that some basis the record “history characteristics of the defen- to action pedophiles are excited *36 3553(a)(1)factor, § component dant” of the child on the internet. That is pornography and it is here where most of the court’s problem. not the factual in judgment leading errors to the unrea- is, instead, problem The factual with the begin sonable sentence can be found. To implicit finding that child district court’s with, Irey, who the district viewed pornography Irey, on the internet caused sodomized, fifty raped, had and tortured court, defendant before the underage girls, a victim. The as himself sexually that it abuse children. We know exactly recognize, court said that: “I not, that from no did and we know less course, Irey family that Mr. and his authority Irey an than himself. a letter here; society friends are also victims he wrote to the district court a week be- because, large is a victim as Dr. Shaw Irey fore stated that he did not sentencing, indicated ... the Internet ... has made viewing pornography start child on the possible epidemic pornogra- of child Irey begun having internet until he had phy.” Dr. Shaw never said that after 3553(a)(6) 3553(a)(6) sentencing disparity § § factor folds directs courts to con- 3553(a)(2) purposes, sider the need to avoid unwarranted sentenc- into the and that one ing disparities, purposes driving the Court instructed us that of those then becomes sentence, disparities weighed against purpose but instead that “these must be behind 3553(a) 3553(a) Kimbrough, weighed other factors.” all of the factors are to against (emphasis U.S. at add- each other in order to determine the S.Ct. ed). say proper The Court did not that sentence. girls little sex with the Cambodia.25 victim of child pornography on the internet than a defendant rapes has who an adult government throughout insisted wom- an is entitled to be considered a victim however, it chal- appeal, this is not sexually provocative images on television. any of the district lenging court’s factfind- The victims in this case are the underage ings, only characterizations, the court’s its girls, old, some as young as four fact, of law to application weight it Irey whom violated for his perverse own factors, assigned to various and the overall pleasure, filming that violation for distribu- reasonableness of the sentence it imposed. tion Suggesting worldwide. Irey, like reason, For that we will not disturb the children, those little awas victim is ab- clearly district court’s finding erroneous surd. Even defense counsel refused to pornography the existence of child defend it before us.26 Irey sexually the internet enticed abuse The district court’s view of Irey as contributing children or was a cause of his a victim permeated reasoning its and taint so, doing accept and we will instead ed its weighing factors, finding given analysis. as our (a)(1), including which is “the nature and problem The more fundamental with the circumstances of the offense and the histo Irey-the-crimi- district court’s recasting ry and characteristics the defendant.” Irey-the-victim legal premise nal as is the The nature of an would offense tend to it, suggests behind one that the criminal is morally seem less outrageous if the one like his wrongdoer, victims. who committed it were himself a victim. predator, the victimizer. The little And if the characteristics of the defendant girls in wronged, Cambodia victim, being include naturally he is more prey, the victims. The district court sympathetic than otherwise. kept separate should the two and not b. The commingled Pedophilia them in its “Illness” of thinking. Child molesters and the children who are their lines, Along these same the district occupy victims do not the same moral court insisted on describing Irey as suffer- plane position or anything resembling ing from pedophilia, the “illness” of while sexually it. A man who violates little chil- the two experts defense described dren is no more entitled to be considered a “treatable disorder.”27 The district court court, Irey In his letter During argument, stated: "I oral defense counsel many many visited these brothels questions gave times after was asked these these *37 girls that. I knew that these were answers: not 18. late, my But it was Q. to[o] sex addiction was factfinding What Irey about his that now in full control of me. awhile I supports himself was a victim? What that? After porn started to look for child on internet” Judge, A. I think that his in statement that added). (emphasis report And Dr. Berlin's regard is unfortunate I think it was in Irey any stated that: "Mr. denied sexual fan- response direct Q. to Dr. Sh— tasies of children he had before the sexual You don’t defend that statement do experiences you? in the Cambodian brothels.” A. I do not. us, During argument oral before defense quoted question exchange The first in that Irey’s counsel conceded that own statements labeled the district court's statement a fact- negated finding pornogra- a that he saw child finding, Calling Irey but it was not. a victim phy on internet that enticed him to travel characterization, finding is a not of fact. to Cambodia and have sex with children. acknowledged TR, Counsel it was "correct” that pedophilia 27. Under the DSM IV is a Irey "went to paraphilia Cambodia visited the child and an Axis I disorder. Other

brothels and then examples paraphilia first after while he started of Axis I disorders in- exhibitionism, fetishism, looking voyeurism, for it internet.” clude against halfway children around the pedo- from crimes that he suffered found because bring country him there Irey’s acts in a third world where philia: globe “Mr. say, I were today, here think it’s safe no risk from law enforcement. was little or I think were purely volitional. it in his own Irey’s self-restraint when was part recognized due substantial indulge not to his lust for best interest not excuse his And while it does illness. that his volition was not proves children held accountable for conduct and he will be any worthy weight extent impaired it, inappropriate I think it would be sentencing. fact.” ignore that During hearing, the sentence the district support The record does not Dr. a person court asked Shaw: “is who finding pedo- that because he is court’s acting out as a result of this condition acts Irey help raping, not much phile could totally rational free or is that per- will sexually torturing little sodomizing, and acting something out as a result of son children, posing trophies, them as and that is in essence an illness that he at that smiling it. The record actual- while he did has no control over?” Dr. Shaw point finding. Dr. Berlin re- ly contradicts that court’s pedophiles- refused to endorse the “Although it is not his fault that ported: Instead, theory. he can’t-much-help-it pedophilia], has the is his he disorder [of pedophi- gave expert opinion his while it,” responsibility something to do about curable, it pedo- lia is not is treatable and to do Irey’s responsibility It could not be philes many molesting can and do avoid if he lacked something pedophilia about his Dr. children. Shaw stressed “Pedo- capacity something to do volitional treatable, very are philia is and there doing it. responsible about One is community in the who many pedophiles something only ability if one has the to do just doing managing fine and their something experts agreed Both about it. that there behavior.” He later reiterated pedophilia treatable. What was pedophiles are “thousands of and child mo- pedophilia his could have done about different, lesters, there, out ... who aren’t it. He once seek treatment never re-offending, recovery who are and are pedophilia, sought treatment for his which doing just “many pedophiles fine.” The part as his “ter- of what he described “just community” doing could not be side,” during dark the four or five rible ... pedophiles fine” and the “thousands sexually abusing little chil- he was avoiding out there” could not be commis- “many many dren times.” Like most if, sion of offenses as the district court criminals, Irey stopped only got when he believed, pedophilia “illness” of ren- caught. dered the criminal acts of those who mo- that, noted, Dr. Not but as Berlin entirely lest children “not volitional.” See treatment, past, without “[e]ven Winick, generally Bruce J. Sex Offender [Irey] refrain from had been able to A Therapeutic Law in the 1990s: Juris- sexual contact with children within the Psychol. Pol’y prudence Analysis, Pub. undisputed United fact is States.” *38 (1998) (“People diagnosed & L. Irey perfectly capable that of not sex- was not children in pedophilia with do molest ually abusing children where the risk of police of officers or in other presence punishment high, detection and was which presenting high to commit his situations likelihood why consciously is he chose frotteurism, fetishism, sexual ma- transvestic 566-67. sochism, at and sexual sadism. DSM IV TR Rather, they act We this recognize finding with would as

apprehension. clear stealth, if government in an error had deception, premeditation argued not, to purpose- point to avoid detection. This is us. Since it did we will accept effort conduct, fact, ful, only, goal-directed not as this case the erroneous planned, finding action or that spontaneous pedophiles and uncontrollable when molest chil- beyond they acting dren are not in a substantially “purely that is indi- voli- action avoid.”); way tional” but instead their ability to id. 523-24 crimes are vidual’s (“There “due in diagnostic part” substantial to their nothing pedophi- in the crite- lia.28 pedophilia any para- or of the other ria for suggests diag- that that individuals

philias That finding, which we assume correct any suffer from with these disorders nosed case, 3553(a)(1) for this is relevant affects cognitive impairment that their concerning factor “the nature and circum- wrongfulness ability understand the history stances of the offense and the or that them irra- their conduct renders characteristics of the defendant.” But the unable to control respect tional reasonably carry assumed fact cannot Moreover, there noth- their actions.... weight. “purely much Not volitional” does the clinical ing suggests literature volitional, not mean not and “due in sub- that sex offenders are unable to exercise part” due, period. stantial does not mean self-control.”). The district Irey court did not find that not help committing could the crimes that district court to acknowl- refused many he committed “many times” over a edge line that both the defense period years. of four or Perhaps five experts pedophilia drew between and child reason the stopped finding short of line, argued, the AUSA molestation —a Irey it help could not at all is that that is similar to between the one alcohol- obviously help doing did it when so suited driving under the influence. Dr. ism purpose his getting caught. While attempted explain Shaw to the court country Irey in this refrained from com- metaphorically the difference between hav- mitting any against children, crimes never ing urge acting urge: “Pe- touching once an American child in an dophiles capable re-offending, of not inappropriate way, and instead consorted they if have an in the urge, way even same prostitutes. with adult It was while compulsive can dessert eaters choose Cambodia, get away where he could eat to not dessert.” The district court did children, sexually violating that he did it so metaphor experts’ not heed the or the “many many times.” And he Shaw, acted with or the of Dr. reports testimony cunning. put As Hill it: Judge pedophiles instead reasoned that because urge they have the diminished voli- I also disagree apparent with the resisting urge. weighty tion when comes to consideration the sentene- Judge Tjoflat’s separate opinion blurring. accuses us the district court insisted on More using reports cited we have to hold that fundamentally, Tjoflat’s Judge separate opin- clearly finding the district court erred statement, disregards ion also our clear pedophiles “purely acting are not in a voli- attached, which this footnote is that because way sexually they tional” when abuse chil- government point, has not contested the J., Separate Op. Tjoflat, dren. at 3539 & n. accepting purposes we are as a fact for of this doing opinion ignores so that the fact finding pedophiles case the that when molest Shaw, opinion that Dr. whom describes as acting "purely children “ are not in a witness,” 1253-54, Irey’s 'star' id. way volitional” but instead their crimes are distinguish pedo- himself careful between *39 part” pedophilia. “due in to substantial their molestation, philia and child a distinction that mat This because it point important this the notion that gave to ing judge for the variance is the reason type ters whether account some acted on defendant outside present de- case defendant acted a fact that takes The of “sickness.” indi by obvious covered cunningly and with the heartland of cases liberately, at least in Supreme the lives of Court guideline. He ruined delight. vidual of) (that know we to forty-three Kimbrough children that decisions us structed triumphs on the his published respect and then when “may greatest attract vary see, com- all the world to internet sentencing judge particular finds marker writ- scurrilous black plete with heartland to which case outside the nine-year-old girls’ tattooed on the ings intends individual Guidelines Commission skin. at Kimbrough, U.S. apply.” (Hill, J., omit (quotation concur marks at 1227 128 S.Ct. at 574-75 Irey, Rita, ted); at ring). also 551 U.S. see (the themselves guidelines at 2465 S.Ct. Moreover, “history and characteris- apply are not to to cases foresee that component tics of the defendant” cases). The Court the heartland of outside 3553(a)(1) distinguish- factor is aimed at contrast, that, “closer review by stated par- who commit ing among defendants may in order when type of offense. ticular offense or based finding, judge how- varies from Guidelines court’s theory of the district view that the Guide ever, solely judge’s non-distinction because on the is one of everyone to reflect virtually properly who commits fails applies range lines 3553(a) According to the dis- type this of crime. even a mine- considerations theory, pedophiles trict court’s Kimbrough, 552 U.S. run case.” —not general— particular pedophiles 575; Spears, also 129 S.Ct. see having impaired the characteristic share implication was (“[Kimbrough’s] at 843 sexually abusing when it comes to volition departure heartland’ that an ‘inside the They all have what the district children. (which policy on a necessarily based calling the “illness” of court insisted on nec with the Guidelines and disagreement molestation of If the sexual pedophilia. basis’) essarily disagrees ‘categorical on a “entirely is not voli- pedophiles children may respect.”). to less be entitled tional,” court found and as as the district court’s reliance on the The district then most sexual abuse assuming, we are have reduced voli theory pedophiles volitional,” “entirely be- of children is not tion, virtually all it does to applying as by pedophiles. most of it is done cause children, involving sexual abuse crimes Hall, Richard Ryan Hall & C.W. See C.W. outside the heart does not take this case Definition, Pedophilia: Char A Profile of the Commission intended land which Recidivism, Treat Offenders, acteristics of relating to sexual offenses guidelines Issues, Outcomes, and Forensic ment Instead, apply. against children (2007) (“An Mayo Proc. Clinic proper variance is more pedophiles-are-ill child molesters and 95% estimated 88% of judge’s ly as a variance based on seen acts) (one person, multiple of molestations for crimes guidelines range that the view who now or are committed individuals abuse of children does involving the sexual also meet criteria for in the future will factors even reflect properly Pedophilic child molesters pedophilia. i.e., cases, majority in the vast mine-run acts 10 times more sexual average commit reason, Kimbrough of cases. For child nonpedophilic than against children omitted)). (footnotes teaches, is not entitled the decision molesters.” *40 That instead should is unreasonable and clear “greatest respect” but error in subject Exercising judgment to “closer review.” on several levels. different review, reject as unreason closer we begin with, To judge’s reasoning in judgment able and a clear error saying that the fact like other than he had guidelines district court’s view an “illness” that him want made to kill against children are involving sex crimes women, young Bundy a pretty Ted pedo in a case because too harsh mine-run guy nice and a valuable member of his impaired The reasons philes have volition. community. That not could have not, but, if we refer apparent should be been said but Bundy, something about like discussion upcoming reader to our about actually Rule, Ann was said. See devastating permanent and harm that (2000) (describ- Stranger Beside Me 33-34 type young this inflicts on its crime ing how the author Bundy worked beside victims. See at 1206-08 see also infra at a prevention crisis clinic with a suicide Quarterman, 471- Garcia line, Bundy where the community served case) (5th Cir.2006) (“The (capital sec “If, many well: as people today, believe argument ond error in sug Garcia’s Bundy lives, Ted took he also saved lives. gestion pedophilia may be considered did, I know he I because was there when ‘mitigating’ culpa of a defendant’s moral did.”). he The district court’s reasoning is bility. No held.... case has so There is also like saying that for his taste for people no sense which reasonable could it, human flesh and how he satisfied Jef- morally view as pedophilia Garcia’s miti frey Dahmer was not bad. See so Lionel gating guilt, any more than reasonable Dahmer, (1994) (de- Story A Father’s people would find defendant’s uncontrol scribing how Jeffrey helped Dahmer had compulsion lable to commit incest or eat baby rescue a bird that had fallen from the ”), human ‘mitigating.’ flesh vacated on health). nest and had nursed it back to (5th grounds, Fed.Appx. other Cir. By simple expedient assuming 2007). away putting or out of mind all the crimi- Husband, Father, c. and Member committed, nal acts that one Community

of the most, may many, describe if not criminals good people “any other without sort of considering history While the “the and criminal conduct representing or conduct defendant” compo- characteristics poor Irey merely character.” did not 3553(a)(1), slip nent of court also up and commit per- one criminal act. He weighed in Irey’s favor his status as a sistently halfway flew around the world on family community: man and member regular basis for four or five and By accounts, all Mr. has been a “many many sodomized, times” raped, good husband father for his wife sexually helpless tortured children. And good and children and a friend to his he recorded his sexual abuse and debase- good friends and a to his commu- person ment of the little thefts, think, photographs children nity. The I lies and re- videos for personal enjoyment his own ferred to Ms. Hawkins were essen- to share with others. No one tially part up of his to cover who effort his illness, good commits such crimes has because I think other than heinous regardless character of whether the crimi- Irey, acts Mr. there’s no indication nal, raping, sodomizing, that he while he was not engaged has other sort of children, represent- torturing helpless good criminal conduct was a conduct or father, ing poor husband, character. or member of his local *41 1204 character, the term has good (as person a distinguished from

community mentioning. meaning unreasonable worth community). It was no world vary to judgment a clear error and husband, fa- Irey as a The facts about that he theory Irey downward community are ther, and member Martin, F.3d character. See good has weigh question is how to disputed, (disapproving 1239-40 at uncon- sentencing purposes. The them for lack of on the defendant’s emphasis court’s Irey facts are that as husband troverted na- and the aberrational a criminal record prosti- cheating on his wife had been crimes, guidelines which the of his ture years, was past for the which tutes account, point- already taken into had years they had been three-fifths of the spanned criminal conduct ing out that his F.3d at 1192-93 Pugh, married. See harm). caused much period beyond findings (considering sentence sim had a somewhat The Fourth Circuit that were salient facts “these additional it in States ilar situation before United uncontroverted, elicited, at the sen- (4th Ali, 258-59 Cir. Abu Gall, 552 tencing hearings”); see also U.S. 2008), court in a case where (the appellate varied involving attempted terrorism had “will, course, the total- take into account guidelines range sen from downward circumstances”). He did it on a ity of the years after life to a sentence of 30 tence of Orlando, his weekly basis while he was things, many considering, among other Irey’s Because of immoral hometown. “describing Abu letters it had received conduct, he contracted a venereal disease reputation young as a ‘general Ali’s decent passed it on to his wife. He lied to his character.’” ‘good man’ and his overall Irey’s depraved crimi- wife. As a result of Vacating 30-year Id. at 268. family expen- his lost their nal misconduct lenient, unreasonably the Fourth Cir house, savings, and their second- sive their letters, by those ex cuit was “unmoved” family Irey admitted generation business. plaining: spent he had so much time because reputation” person of “decent What mar- years pursuing over the sex outside leaders of coun- seeks to assassinate his children riage, spent he less time with character” person “good tries? What cheating my “I than he should have: of fellow hu- destroy aims to thousands taking them to things children out of like innocent of beings man who are I game, or a because parks basketball him? This is not transgressions against go pick up prostitute.” to In view of had it, understand good character as we facts, significant no those uncontroverted provide letters of this sort to allow given Irey’s having been weight can be variance for such a basis substantial good “a husband and father for his wife character” of deprive “good be to would and children.” all its content. just Irey lied not to his wife good person Likewise here. Id. What it, “I would lie put others as well. As he character commits the horrific crimes I did not need to.” people even when fifty different Irey against did at least business, which family from the He stole many” occasions “many children and on century started a half be- his father had five-year period, stopping four- or over a long- put fore. His criminal conduct finally caught? when he is What business, cost- company out of established applies as well to this Fourth Circuit said community their ing fifty members of the Irey good “This is not case and what did: club member- Irey jobs. If No number of civic it.” character as we understand ships outweigh Still, can the harm that Irey the district court.29 it was not unrea- family caused his wife and and the commu- sonable for the district court to conclude nity. has a “very loving family” and *42 “deserves whatever credit he should take however, was, appropriate

It for the dis- for having produced people.” these We trict court to find and “Irey consider that grossly unreasonable, would find however, obviously very loving family” has a any suggestion that the Irey may credit be “deserves whatever credit he should take due for family’s his feelings for him could having produced people” for these who remotely even approach heavy weight spoke on at his behalf the sentence hear- stacked against him for the criminal acts ing. That is true though even the ex- he committed. Irey’s family tremes members went to in expressing them affection for and devotion

himto seem detached from reality Age d. the circumstances in which they were The district court also considered upon called to do it. It incongruous at “[ajnother aspect of defendant’s character” best to describe the man sexually who had Irey’s age weighed in his favor many tortured so little children as “lov- the fact that with “even the minimum sen- “hero,” “star,” ing,” a and as one who going tence here he’s to be an old man ... taught others “so much about life and when gets he out of prison.” Irey was 43 love,” way and who “had a touching or 44 years old when he started sexually Still, people’s lives.” we are sympathetic, children, abusing and he was 50 when he was, as the district court to the terrible was sentenced. With the sentence the plight Irey’s emotional family was in district court imposed, minus time off for because of his crimes. It is admirable that good 3624, behavior Irey under would be him, by chose to stand but in deciding years 65 old when released. With the that weighs how in the sentencing calculus maximum sentence years, of 30 minus time their statements have to be considered behavior, off for good Irey would be 76 context. years old when released. 18 U.S.C. be, may It well government as the 3624; 523.20, §§ 28 C.F.R. 541.13 suggests, good some of the things — (2005); Thomas, see also Barber v. Irey’s family members say had to about U.S.-, L.Ed.2d him are testament to ability his to lead a (2010).30 double life and to evade detection even

those closest to praise him. Their We fail Irey to see how those facts may prove that he knew how to keep Irey his show is different any from other family and friends in person the dark about his who commits horrendous crimes side,” “terrible dark as he described it to middle age and faces a long prison sen- that, report We know from Dr. Shaw's or in the Separate Op. district court. See 29. Irey’s psychological least the time of one of J., 93, 1264-65, Tjoflat, at 1263-64 n. 1265. evaluations, his wife was unaware of the se- position opinion That is an odd for that verity of his crimes. Dr. Shaw also testified opinion take since the itself cites and discuss- people going that "I assume that to mini- §es in connection with things mize and leave some of the worst out.” "honesty.” Id. at 1229-30 n. We will not law, blind give ourselves to the a less than Judge Tjoflat's separate opinion takes the it, accounting ignore honest position relevant performing that in our statute, merely review we statute should not because it was not consider discussed in such as 18 U.S.C. unless it was cited the district court. standpoint From the defendant’s Seljan, v. States tence. United Cf. banc) Cir.2008) (en (9th unreasonably not be 997-98 sentence should F.3d to 20 sentenced (87-year-old defendant under all the circumstances harsh children); abusing Unit years sexually substantially not differ case and should Zastrow, 534 F.3d ed States given to another simi- from the sentence Cir.2008) (8th man (73-year-old sentenced of a defendant convicted larly situated coercing an 8- enticing to 20 circum- offense under similar similar sexually conduct girl explicit into year-old stances. Besides, if photographed). which he No. 98- (quoting S.Rep. at 1195 *43 successfully evaded detection had not 3258-59); 75-76, 225, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. much be that or five he would four Lychock, 578 also United States v. see prison. In younger gets when he out (3d Cir.2009); 214, 220 United States F.3d rewarding Irey for circumstances be these (8th 733, Face, F.3d 740 v. White 383 evading him for detec ing older rewards Cir.2004); Beasley, States v. United that. it unreasonable to do tion and is (1st Cir.1993). 280, F.3d 3553(a)(2)(A) 2. Section punishment Because a district court factor that second crime, the more serious the fit the should sentencing, and that must consider greater is the the need criminal conduct must consider review- appeals court of longer and the the sentence for retribution for substantive reason- ing the sentence The seriousness of a crime should be. ableness, “the need for the sentence is directly the harm it causes or varies ... to reflect the seriousness imposed greater It that the threatens. follows law, offense, respect to for the promote crime, and the harm the more serious the just punishment for the provide and to pun be for the longer the sentence should 3553(a)(2)(A). This offense.” 18 U.S.C. to fit the crime. As we have ishment beyond, extends but also ov- requirement before, stated sex crimes “[c]hild with, the “nature erlaps to some extent egregious despicable and among the most compo- of the offense” and circumstances criminal offenses.” of societal and United 3553(a)(1). nent of (11th Sarras, States 3553(a)(2)(A) consideration is the Cir.2009) (affirming as reasonable 100- “just concept, deserts” which carries the offender sex year sentence for a first who retribution, the need to make the need for single 13-year-old girl and ually abused a crime, need not punishment fit the and the it). Irey’s criminal photos of And took justly. just punish but to punish conduct, beginning, as we stated at the quoted Report we from the Senate Pugh in a virtually unparalleled egregious “most regarding provision: this of crime. circuit despicable” and field This “just des- purpose essentially This — few, any, if other criminals who has seen concept be reflected clear- erts” —should long span raped, have over such a time sentences; way it is another ly all children, sodomized, many so and tortured that the sentence should reflect saying very young, and all of some of whom were of the defendant’s conduct. gravity among helpless peo the most whom were public’s standpoint, From the sen- man, Irey, 200-pound in the world. ple type length of a tence should be helpless young victims not subjected his reflect, among adequately other will anal just intercourse but also to to sexual the harm done or threatened things, sodomy torture that and oral sexual offense, interest public and the depravity beyond far the heartland a recurrence of the offense. went preventing his astating rape pres- for child molesters. treated dimension that is not even objects, toys, raped. Long-term as as his which ent when an adult is child victims pleased. he bought and then did with as that sexual grossly he studies show abuse is if pain. cried out in As He smiled intrusive in the lives of children photo- enough, Irey also were harmful their normal psychological, debauch- and video recorded his graphed development ways emotional and sexual internet, ery distributed it on the just which no or humane society can toler- thereby guaranteeing (citations that the record of and quotation ate.” marks omit- us, inspiring him ted)). would outlast and all of justices that, agreed All nine about other child molesters to commit crimes and so do we. children.

against Even the Kennedy opinions, before has been Much said to describe Supreme long had recognized Court grave harm that sexual emphasize sexual abuse devastating childhood has children inflicts on its victims. abuse of and long-lasting effects on its victims. See descrip best and most recent Some Ferber, New York v. n. U.S. that harm can in Kenne tions of be found *44 9, 102 S.Ct. 3355 n. 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 — Louisiana, --, 128 dy v. U.S. S.Ct. (1982) (“It sexually has been found that (2008). 2641, Although 171 L.Ed.2d 525 exploited children are develop unable to by a 4 margin 5 to decided that Court healthy relationships affectionate in later punishment could not constitution capital life, dysfunctions, have sexual and have a child, ally imposed rape for the of a all be tendency to become sexual abusers as justices agreed that sexual abuse of nine Schoettle, (citing Exploita- adults.” Child on children inflicts enormous harm Study tion: A Child 19 Pornography, J. majority acknowledged that: victims. 289, Am. Child Psychiatry Acad. 296 fright, Here victim’s the sense of (1980))). damage children who injuries betrayal, and the nature of her of sexual victims abuse is not limited prolonged physical caused more and and psychological injury; emotional seri- than, kill- suffering say, mental a sudden injuries physical ous often well. result as attack ing by unseen assassin. The See, 2646; e.g., Kennedy, 128 at State S.Ct. just her not on her but on child- was 522, 231, Goodwin, 208 Mont. 679 P.2d Rape permanent psy- hood .... has a (1984) (seven-year-old 232 victim suffered emotional, and sometimes chological, vaginal “a severe laceration in the area impact on We cannot physical the child. way Major extending all to the cervix. that long anguish dismiss surgery required repair vaginal was by of child must endured the victim laceration.”); (doctor id. at 234 testified rape. also wheth- early that too to know “[i]t (citations omitted). at Id. er normal sexual intercourse or childbear- ing possible” for later would be the victim justices dissenting Kennedy The four life); Eagle, also see United States v. rape that child a serious believed was such (8th (“After Cir.2008) pun death as imposed crime that could be assaults, 8-year-old expe- (Alito [the victim] J., ishment for it. Id. at 2677-78 mental, emotional, rienced physical and Roberts, C.J., Scalia, joined by and Thom instance, problems. began feeling For he as, JJ., dissenting). They stressed unhappy en- experienced sad and and also devastating, long-term rape effect that has (foot- (“The involuntary copresis, imma defecation.” on See id. at 2677 children. omitted)). child, it worth vulnerability regard, and of a both note this is turity remembering Irey physically psychologically, proudly and adds dev- imbedded investigations. he in their If child images the series capitals in all one of Bug Deep “Big that: Push is cause of child sexual produced pornography Cock Girl, abuse, Yo She Hurt in Pane.” Into 9 Dr. Shaw and the dis- as testified found, then sexu- trict court produced child pornography When fifty ally girls abused or more little of chil- conjunction with the sexual abuse multiplied he the harm Cambodia but also dren, here, child as it was the harm to the by inciting sexually abuse he did others to magnified perpetuated. See victims countless more children all over the world. Ferber, 458 U.S. The district court did not even mention “the are a (stating produced materials harm-multiplier Irey’s crime partic- aspect record of the children’s permanent exacer- ipation findings. and the harm to the child is in its circulation”); Pugh, their bated sure, the de To be district court did (citing at 1197-98 & n. 12 extensive F.3d “horrific,” crime as scribe the the victims harm congressional findings about “numerous,” “perhaps the most vul recogniz- child pornography caused of the and it did society,” nerable world’s legisla- ing light of these detailed “[i]n that it was “an that rises to state offense findings legislative en- tive numerous very top terms of its seriousness actments, help we cannot but underscore beings” and its effect on other human who crime”); the seriousness this see also never, “may never their abuse.” overcome Safety Adam Walsh Child Protection also, in an The court incredible understate 109-248, Act of No. Pub.L. ment, said that “the characteristics (2006) (codi- 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. *45 offense, itself, the of it the seriousness note) (“Every at fied 18 U.S.C. long-standing, long-term in it engagement viewing pornog- images instance of of child certainly any does not mitigate in favor of of raphy represents a renewed violation added). leniency” (emphasis But the privacy repetition of the and a victims proceeded leniency then court to show abuse.”). of their crimes, anyway, this worst of worst aspect There is another of the com- by varying guidelines downward from the pounding production harm that range by years of to 12½ 17½ inflicts. pornography distribution child years, only years which is above the 2½ may or encourage It incite others to sexu- statutory Irey, minimum. See Indeed, ally abuse children. the district (Hill, J., (noting how far concurring) pornog- court found this that child case the sentence from the maximum and have that raphy did effect on at least some minimum). how close to the causing pedophiles, sexually them to abuse sentence, 17-1/2-year if all of it were who children otherwise would not served, only 4 to be would amount abused. See at 1178. The supra been months and a week for each of the 50 court, however, ig- to have seems distinguishable Irey raped, victims that so- finding nored what its own means to the domized, sexually light or In tortured. is, of harm He Irey calculus caused. likely serve 18 U.S.C. will all, producer after distributor of only years and 3 months of his sen- depraved, one of the most graphic, tence, which works to less than four out widely pornogra- distributed child series of months for each of 50 victims who internet, those phy “pink on the infamous distinguished it can be from each other widely wall series.” So distributed Irey’s agen- images that over a hundred show some of law enforcement from in- up pornography cies had turned child crimes. And that calculation does not mandatory additional crimi- to a minimum any Irey’s time for sentence of 15 elude 2256(2)(A)(v) producing distributing prison. id. years nal behavior See extremely graphic (“sexually massive amount of explicit conduct” defined in- per months child pornography. child Four clude “lascivious exhibition of genitals sodomized, grossly or tortured is raped, pubic person”). or area of That sentencing there should unreasonable. Irey, years means for all of his of sexual for the sexual quantity no discount violation, be torture, and humiliation of at Crisp, of children. 454 F.3d at abuse children, least 50 received 30 months Cf. (“The Crisp hours for gave five than if more all he had done was on a $484,137.38 in harm. a crime caused single single photo occasion snap of a $96,827.48 equates per hour or That single, teenage in an pose by child obscene $1,613.79 per custody. minute served That herself. cannot reasonable.31 sentence does not reflect the serious- years, We realize that even when 17½ crime, respect of the for the promote ness is, reduced to serve as the 15½ law, provide just for the punishment stated, portion “a panel substantial of a 3553(a)(2)(A) offense, requires, §as nor person human life'—and no serious should it afford to crim- adequate does deterrence regard Irey, it as a trifle.” 563 F.3d at 3553(a)(2)(B) conduct, requires.”). inal trifle, regard 1226. We do not as a toway gauge is another There rea- required all challenged we to review Irey’s com- sonableness sentence: sentences substantive reasonableness. what the time he re- paring he did and Gall, See U.S. 128 S.Ct. at 591 statutory minimum ceived above the (“[Cjourts appeal must review all sen to violate required minimum conduct inside, just outside, tences—whether and receive the minimum sentence. statute significantly outside Guidelines “just an aspect This is deserts” range.”). longer And sentences even than concept. The less it takes to have the years have been held to be unreason 17/4 statutory imposed, minimum sentence ably short of all in view the facts and be for higher the sentence should someone course, including, circumstances *46 much, than mini- who does much worse Ressam, crime. See F.3d 1130-31 mum amount of criminal behavior that (a 22-year sentence); Ali, Abu Irey would violate the statute. was con- (a sentence). 30-year Irey, all, after 2251(c), § violating of U.S.C. victed raped, the children he sentenced sodom prohibits enticing “any using which or mi- ized, sexually to a tortured lifetime of in, any to assist engage nor” other harm, and the egregious pornogra child in, sexually to person engage “any explicit will, he created and distributed phy be outside States for conduct” the United internet, to uploaded cause he con of visual purpose producing any depiction 17)4 far causing longer tinue harm for than any of that conduct. “Minor” defined as wall years. Irey’s pink series will last age. person years under 18 of 18 U.S.C. ours, longer than his own lifetime or incit 2256(1). person § A traveled to who an- ing encouraging the sexual abuse of a country single photo- other and took yet multitudes of children unborn. 17-year-old engaging of a in an graph impose The district court did pose by guilty herself would be of obscene violating subject supervised Irey of on same statute be lifetime release once noting mandatory 30-year It is also that if sentence. worth had minimum See sexually single 2241(c). of § abused one his 50 victims 18 U.S.C. country, this have received a in he would inconvenient, may release terms recom Those guidelines as the prison,

he leaves burdensome, sexually they but are every annoying, offender who mend for 5D1.2(b). § being See U.S.S.G. bars. equivalent abused children. of behind not super that someone on it is true were, While no convicted sex offender they If free, entirely it is not release is vised in prison he remained would care whether in a confined that he is not equally true subject those condi- to or was released has Supreme Court either. As the prison tions. release, in to held, contrast “[supervised imposing a sentence below in of lieu punishment is not a probation, range, the district advisory guidelines v. Grander incarceration.” United States enough unreasonably give failed to court 1259, 1266, 39, 50, son, 511 U.S. “the nature and circumstances weight to (1994). “a And term 127 L.Ed.2d 611 3553(a)(1), offense,” and to 18 U.S.C. replace por release does supervised imposed “to the need for the sentence but imprisonment, of the sentence of tion offense, reflect the seriousness in addi supervision an order of rather is law, pro for the and to promote respect imposed imprisonment term of tion offense,” just for the id. punishment vide Goad, 44 court.” States v. United 3553(a)(2)(A). (7th Cir.1995). If n. F.3d puni were the being supervised release 3553(a)(2)(B) 3. Section if it being prison, equivalent tive well, just function as served the deserts that a court The third factor put most crimi there would be no need to sentencing, and that a must consider put we could them on su prison; nals must consider review- appeals punitive instead. If the pervised release for substantive reason- ing sentence same, convicted of the two were the impact ableness, “the need for the sentence term longer not ask for a criminals would adequate ... afford deterrence imposed getting supervised hopes release 3553(a)(2)(B). Id. to criminal conduct.” Yet imprisonment. term of shorter judge in this case referred Irey’s attorney, example, pleaded do. important sentencing purpose as to this impose the with the district court not to factors that “essen- one of the in range 30-year guidelines sentence He tially subjective in nature.” did at “between 15 stead to set hopefully that “a sentence is say serious [aj up to lifetime of and 20 conducting others from sim- going deter Irey clearly views supervised release.” affairs,” expressed ilar but then his view being significantly supervised release as dealing with an illness that “when we’re *47 it imprisonment. than And punitive less this, rationally that that like I’m not sure is. though judge said that follows.” Even restric- The same is true of the other “nevertheless, appropriate is an deterrence imposed, all of tions the district consideration,” apparent it is that his idio- required strongly which are or recom- pedophiles about whether syncratic doubts offenders, all convicted sex mended for committing deterred from crimes could be in a abuse participation such as substance and involving the sexual abuse of children program spe- and a mental health program he weight affected the pornography child treatment, compli- cializing sex offender factor. gave important to this registra- ance with state sex offender about sentencing judge’s skepticism The law, subject based being tion to search not types of crimes is deterring these “the upon suspicion, reasonable stan- Sentencing Com- by Congress, shared concerning terms risk control.” dard Court, Court, mission, Supreme Lychock, this or United States v. 578 F.3d 214 See, Ferber, (3d appeals. e.g., Cir.2009), courts of other involved a defendant who (“The at 458 U.S. S.Ct. had been of possessing por- convicted child only if expeditious practical most not nography. guidelines range The was 30 to may dry method of law enforcement 37 months but the district court varied up pornography] by the market for [child down to a probation sentence of and a fine. imposing penalties per- severe criminal court, Id. at 216. That district like the one selling, advertising, pro- or otherwise sons case, acknowledged this that the crime Ohio, moting the product.”); Osborne v. offense,” “is a serious but characterized 103, 109-10, 1691, 1696, 495 U.S. the defendant as otherwise “law abiding” (1990) (“It surely 109 L.Ed.2d 98 is also impressed and was “supportive with his reasonable for the to conclude that it State family,” and the fact that he sought had will the production por- decrease of child (after psychological help he was caught) if nography penalizes possess those who benefitting it. (quotation was from Id. product, thereby and view the decreasing omitted). marks The district Ly- court in demand.”). chock, case, like the one this skepti- Far from questioning the value of deter- cal about whether pedophiles could be de- rence, in Pugh we held that the deterrence terred. The court there remarked: objective “particularly is benefit I impris- could see [to compelling pornography in the child con- onment would as a deterrent be] to oth- explained text.” 515 F.3d at 1194. We ers, and that ais factor.... So other imposing lighter sentence on one people recognize would cannot convicted of a child pornography offense subscribe to images impunity. these “tends to undermine the purpose gener- I am persuaded jail that a term for deterrence, turn, al tends to in- warrants, this defendant equ- is to be (in crease if palpable some unmeasurable ated with that value. The psy- kind of way) pornography the child market.” Id. chological problem in persons who are problem opportunity of missed drawn to this kind of material it seems deterrence, observed, compounded we going to me is not be deterred when the just posses- crime involves not jail term porno for an internet observer. sion but also distribution of child pornog- raphy. agree. E.g., Id. Other circuits Id. at rejected 217. The Third Circuit Goff, United States v. 501 F.3d 261 reasoning and held the sentence substan- (3d Cir.2007) (“[D]eterring the production tively unreasonable. Id. at 220-21. pornography protecting child noted, As the Third Circuit the district children who are victimized it are fac- downplaying court’s of deterrence where tors that should have given signifi- been pedophiles are policy concerned reflects “a cant weight sentencing....”); United disagreement Barevich, (7th with the Guidelines States v. recom- mendations, Cir.2006) such a disagreement [and] (“Transporting receiving permissible only if a pornography pro- child District Court increases market de- *48 ‘sufficiently mand. vides greater compelling’ concern under reasons to 219-20, justify Guidelines is for the it.” Id. at welfare of these ex- 125 S.Ct. 738 Gall, ploited 50, (citing children. The avenue at Congress U.S. 128 S.Ct. at has chosen to weaken the child and pornogra- Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 575). phy industry punish is to conclusory those who traffic S.Ct. at And “[t]he state- it.”). in personal provided ment of belief in this in case would add that this it! at 672. We Lychock, suffice.” does not

case in the young raped children is true here.32 were at 220. The same producing pornography, child course of in United States The defendant actually raping. did the Irey is the one who (7th Cir.2007), had F.3d 668 Goldberg, 491 pornog- child possessing convicted of been crime The more serious the 63 to range was raphy guidelines and the it, in the defendant’s role greater and the The district court months. Id. at 669. strong it is to send a important more impose only a nominal downward to varied that will deter others. message clear followed a decade to be prison sentence Irey the district court In Id. at 669-70. The supervised release. under-weighed not have should reversed the sentence Circuit Seventh 3553(a)(2)(B)adequate deterrence factor substantively because the unreasonable conclusory of its on a statement based things, had judge, among other district (what subjective views the Sev personal “idiosyncratic on her based sentence “idiosyncratic peno would call enth Circuit views,” at and had id. penological views”) the value of questioning logical of deterrence “neglected considerations in the sexual involving crimes deterrence desert,” at The court ex- id. Kimbrough allows a abuse of children. why important was so plained deterrence vary guidelines court to from the district involving in the sexual abuse of crimes poli that the solely judgment on its based children, including pornography child guidelines wrong. See cies behind crimes: at 575. 552 U.S. When in Young raped children were order so, however, “closer re district court does production pornogra- enable the Id. reasoning view” of its is warranted. downloaded phy that the defendant both review, Exercising that we conclude himself uploaded consumed —both a clear error of the district court made great- to others. The and disseminated judgment downplaying importance por- er the customer demand for child deterring type this of crime. pro- more that will be nography, behavior, influence duced. Sentences Jp. 3553(a)(2)(C) Section Congress thought when in 18 so least that a The fourth factor deterrence a U.S.C. made sentencing, that a must consider statutory sentencing logic factor. The appeals court of must consider review- suggests lighter that the of deterrence reason- ing the sentence for substantive punishment downloading up- ableness, is “the need for the sentence greater loading pornography, child ... from imposed protect public for it and so the the customer demand further crimes of the defendant.” produced. more will be Supreme Pugh, rejected the deficiencies the Court iden- we the notion that Kim- hibit guidelines] brough-style policy disagreement justify the crack cocaine [in could tified pro- Kimbrough.” We do not rule out the impose Id. the district court's decision pornography possibility that a court could ever bation-only in a child sentence disagreeing with guidelines a reasoned case for the minimum make case where pornog- judgments the child policy behind F.3d at 1201 n. 15. We was months. 515 simply raphy guidelines. We hold that in this guidelines concluded that the sentences crimes, (involving pornogra- judg- production of child pornography which reflect case child Pugh (involving possession child Congress Sentencing phy), as and the ments both pornography), did not come the district court Commission as to the seriousness of the of- recidivism, doing “do not ex- close to so. fense and the risk of *49 3553(a)(2)(C). specific This is the duced using U.S.C. testosterone-reducing incapacitation factor. drugs, deterrence Dr. Shaw testified that “come side-effects,” with a number of that Berlin, psychiatrist, Dr. the defense did “they’re always useful,” and that when Irey committing not rate the risk of more if Irey going is released “he’s to have against high, crimes children as low or experienced a naturally reduction in tes- if gave opinion Irey instead his that tosterone and a reduction sex drive.” mercy given opportunity, “shown Dr. say Shaw did not through any society he will be able to re-enter as a safe combination of factors and circumstances productive report citizen.” Dr. Shaw’s Irey would a negligible risk of com- was more descriptive risk. It re- mitting more against crimes children. assessing vealed under one method of risk, method, Irey’s the Static-99 score The district court credited opinions placed him in “the Medium-Low risk cate- of experts, the two which it re-eharacter- gory sexually re-offending.” Accord- Irey ized as having “a low risk of recidi- Shaw, ing study to Dr. the research he vism.” But then the court added: “Of people Irey’s relied on indicated that course, all of that is somewhat academic 12%, 14%, score had recidivism rates of because gets time he out of prison, five, ten, years. and 19% after and fifteen he’ll be likely age most at an where recidi- report Shaw did add that: au- “[t]he unlikely, just vism would be from a physio- instrument, in reviewing thors de- logical standpoint.” velopment samples, found that few individ- At the completion of the sentence that uals beyond age sixty. recidivated him, the district court imposed on with the Though finding this has mixed research considered, 3624 reductions Irey would support, general age as males their old. There is no support in Irey’s sexual interest wanes.” score on finding record for a that a 65-year-old another instrument used to assess the risk male with what Dr. Shaw called “deviant recidivism, the Minnesota Sex Offender interests,” who has a just record of not Tool-Revised, Screening placed him raping and abusing children but also of “the Range.” Moderate Risk The Shaw them, sexually torturing is too old to do it report that all concluded of the risk assess- again, thereby rendering concern about re- ment “suggest factors a moderate to low cidivism “academic.” That is not what Dr. charge,” moderate risk of a new which Shaw said about the aging process. He could through “be reduced continued treat- said, talking when about whether he would ment and informed supervision upon his drug advise therapy Irey when he was release.” released, they age that as “going men are point At during one the sentence hear- experienced to have naturally reduction ing Dr. Shaw Irey testified that was “es- in testosterone and a reduction in sex sentially in the medium low to medium or drive.” That saying is different from categories, moderate risk which is—which pedophiles in their sixties lose interest is below a likely.” threshold of At a later sexually abusing children physically or are point, “overall, he testified that I him find incapable of doing so. No one testified be, said, risk, as I a moderate a low- the risk of recidivism is “academic” risk, moderate low in psychopathy.” He pedophile seventies, for a in his sixties or immediately Irey added that “does have— probably simply because that is not true. has deviant In discussing interests.” whether sexually the risk that would One need look no further than the facts abuse children the future could be re- in published opinions to that. see For

1214 so, not remove the doing age and does Seljan, 547 F.3d States example, United Cir.2008) (en banc), (9th Tracey a & involved threat. See Mark Motivans 993 was arrested Kyckelhahn, man in mid-80s who Federal Prosecution Child his of “sexually 2006, way Philippines to the his Bureau Exploitation Sex Offenders by engaging children 2007, 1, educate” some Bull., at tbl.6 Dec. 5 Just. Stat. at 997-98. with them. Id. sexual relations of offenders arrested (reporting that 7.3% Philippines 43 times He had been children, of includ- exploitation for sexual he was years, 11 when during previous abuse, and ing pornography, child sex sex 74 and approximately of ages between the 60); age are over the of see transportation, with children in order to have sex (“The Hall, at supra, Hall & 457-58 also he agents He told after there. See id. usually long term. pedophilia course “sexually that he had been was arrested study relationship that examined the for about educating” ages children 8 13 crimes, age types of sexual between years, means that he started 20 which Dickey up et al found 44% years id. he was around 65 old. See when of- sample in their of 168 sex pedophiles doing it bragged at He had about age range adult fenders were the older and video collection scrapbook and had a years). compared with (age 40-70 When at Even pornography. of child Id. sadists, pedophiles com- rapists and sexual years old at the time of though he was 87 offenders, indicating prise 60% of all older imposed the district court a 20- pedophiles offend their later him. The Ninth year sentence on Id. greater than other sexual offend- at rate rejected his attack on the sentence Circuit (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, ers.” as though even it was tanta as unreasonable out, photos government points 1007; see mount to a life sentence. Id. videos show that some the worst (affirm Zastrow, also 534 F.3d 855-57 potency. Irey’s require acts do not sexual 20-year of a ing conviction and All Dr. of this is consistent with Shaw’s coerced 73-year-old man who enticed or testimony that: can’t cured” of “You sexually 8-year-old girl explicit into “Cures, you forget can pedophilia, and photographed); conduct he United which about it.” (3d MacEwan, States v. that the This Court has stated threat (defendant Cir.2006) repeatedly had violat sexually by pedophile recidivism a who has possession, prohibiting ed federal laws “appalling.” Pugh, a child is abused distribution, pornogra receipt of child (“As Congress F.3d at 1201 has found and phy ages when he was between the discussed, child sex offenders 70); we have 66 and v. Purk approximately Weiler (8th Cir.1997) ett, appalling rates of recidivism and (plain F.3d tiff, inmate, under-reported.”); see prison a state had sodomized their crimes are Allison, for 3 sexually abused female child States v. F.3d also United (5th Cir.2006) 7 and years, beginning girl when the ex- (“Congress 405-06 70). The approximately the defendant was rate plicitly recognized high of recidi- facts of those cases show that the risk of offenders, especially vism in convicted sex sexually abusing male sex offender chil offenders.”). Supreme child sex age after he reaches the of 65 is dren concerns over “grave Court has also noted anything but “academic.” high among rate of recidivism convict- dangerousness ed sex offenders and their reports

Studies and this field class,” found that risk “[t]he as a and has judicial consistent with what decisions offenders is posed of recidivism sex pedophiles sexually show: who have Doe, frightening high.” Smith v. abused children are a threat to continue

1215 103, 84, 1140, 1153, who, 123 S.Ct. U.S. 155 the sex offenders Irey, like have a (2003) (quotation L.Ed.2d 164 marks omit- high diploma school college but not a de- ted). Supreme gone Johnson, gree. Court has even James L. Sex Offenders further, finding that “[w]hen convicted sex on Federal Community Supervision: Fac- society, they Revocation, offenders reenter are much tors that Fed. Pro- Influence bation, than likely any type 2006, 18, more other of offend- June at 19. And the rape er to be rearrested for a new or experience of states which have had sex Lile, sexual assault.” McKune v. release, 536 U.S. offenders on supervised such as 24, 33, 2017, 2024, probation 153 L.Ed.2d or parole, shows that it often (2002).33 47 prevent fails to sex offender recidivism. al., Patrick Langan See A. et Bureau of Nor does the fact that will be sub Statistics, Justice Recidivism Sex of Of- ject to supervised restrictions and release 199k, Released Prison in fenders from gets prison any when he out of guar offer (2003) (“Of 4,163 14 sex offenders rear- any antee that he will not commit crimes. crime, rested for a new nearly [state] 9 in alone, example, In 2003 12.8% all (87%) 10 were on parole when taken into supervised federal offenders on release custody....”). committed new crimes. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice, Dep’t of informative, Federal Crimi Those studies are but even Trends, 2003, nal Justice at 37 tbl.29 without them we supervised know that re (2006). Sex offenders often fail to com guarantee lease is no that a criminal will plete programs. their treatment See Lor not commit more crimes gets when he out Stalans, etta J. prison. Adult Sex on of Courts of appeals regularly see Offenders Community Supervision: A Review Re cases which serious crimes were com cent Assessment Strategies and Treat mitted those on supervised release. ment, 564, See, 31 Crim. Just. & e.g., Wilk, Behav. 573 United States v. 572 F.3d (“Sex (2004) (11th Cir.2009) high 1229, offenders have rates 1232 (possession of either dropping being expelled out or from pornography); child United States v. Williams, (11th treatment. Termination rates in the 846, Unit 322 Fed.Appx. Cir.2009) outpatient ed States programs treatment (unpublished) (aggravated child ranged have quarter from one to more molestation and enticing child for inde ”). than one half of adult sex offenders.... cent purposes);34 United States v. Hors Supervised (11th Cir.2008) fall, release is revoked for 37.7% of 552 F.3d Judge Tjoflat’s separate opinion argues Unpublished opinions precedential, are not 36-2, see 11th Cir. R. and we do that we not cite should not consider of the deci- any legal holding point Williams for of law Supreme sions of the Court and this Court Instead, opinion. discussed in that we cite high pedophiles about the recidivism rate of solely as a source of facts about the crime special and the need for deterrence when committed while super- the defendant was on punishing against sexual crimes children. 36-2, vised release. See 11th Cir. R. IOP 7 J., Separate Op. Tjoflat, at 1264. rea- (“The may cite to them ... to establish gives wanting pretend son it us to case.”). the ... facts of the those decisions do not exist is that were contrast, By Judge Tjoflat's separate opin not cited in the district court. Id. No mem- “precedent” ion cites as point on a of law two Court, certainly ber of this not the- author unpublished opinions, Separate Op. Tjoflat, opinion, suggested has ever before that in J., which under our rules and our determining ought the law we to confine our- precedent precedent. cannot be See 11th Cir. selves to the decisions that were cited in the 36-2; R. see also United States ex rel. Atkins v. We, courts, duty McInteer, district court. like all have a (11t 1358 n. 15 hCir.2006) J.). apply (Tjoflat, to find and the correct law. think I we want to be able to have them United

(viewing pornography); child (8th Trobee, F.3d Protecting v. smaller case loads.” Our States Cir.2009) pornogra of child (possession Sexual Predators Nation’s Children from Azure, F.3d phy); United States Be Criminals: What Needs to and Violent *52 Cir.2008) (8th 904, (robbery); Unit 905-06 Done?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 763, 763-64 Defoor, v. 535 F.3d ed States Terrorism, Crime, Security and Homeland Cir.2008) assault); (8th (aggravated Unit Judiciary, H. on the 109th of the Comm. (1st 31, 34 Eirby, v. 515 F.3d ed States (2005) (statement Fred Ber Cong. 30 of S. Cir.2008) (sexual minor); abuse of Unit lin, M.D., Professor, Hop Associate Johns Ralph, v. 480 F.3d 888-89 ed States University). kins (child (8th Cir.2007) molestation); United why many Regardless of so convicted (5th F.3d Spraglin, v. States release, supervised including on criminals Cir.2005) (murder); States v. Mar United offenders, crimes, fact sex commit new (8th Cir.2004) tin, (rape); 382 F.3d Supervised that do. release is Marshall, 42, 44 v. 371 F.3d United States release, it unsupervised better than (2d Cir.2004) (robbery); see also society protec- not offer the level of does States, 646 McNaught F.Supp.2d v. United tion from a convicted criminal that incar- (S.D.N.Y.2009)(arson). 372, 380 Despite ceration does. that undeniable may be understaff- problem Part of the fact, Irey, court that the district found one resulting high and the case loads of ing prosecuted of the worst sex offenders ever doing responsibility those who have the circuit, recidivism, in this had a low risk of example, Sep- as of supervising. For pose or would a low risk when released at 30, 2009, 14,987 people there were tember it imposed the end of the reduced sentence in the post-conviction supervision under him. on probation system in this circuit federal alone, 12,216 supervised of them on however, government, has never at release. Admin. Office United clearly factfinding tacked that as errone Courts, Report 2009 Annual States Instead, throughout ous. has insisted Director: Judicial Business the United that it appeal challenging this is not Courts, (forthcoming spring States tbl. E-2 result, factfindings. purposes As a for 2010). And that does not count all of those that at the appeal of this we will assume or the pre-trial supervision on thousands 17½-year end of a sentence—15 presentence investigation reports imposed Irey months after it was would — the federal officers this circuit have to present a low risk of recidivism.35 complete year. each The nationwide situa- mean, however, That does not (the up

tion was summed Dr. Berlin imposed the district will Irey purposes same one evaluated who adequately “protect public from fur case), of this when he testified before Con- defendant,” ther crimes of gress “Many parole that: of these 3553(a)(2)(C) very requires. thin. A low risk is not probation people are stretched J., Tjoflat, Although part opinion at 1264-65. we have This is another of our Judge Tjoflat separate opinion pointed in his has mis- out for the benefit of opinion operates under the errone- courts in the future the reasons and decisions read. His rejected indicating finding assumption that we have that the district court’s ous finding wrong, government that when is re- because the has not chal- district court's lenged factfinding expressly we imposed on him ac- leased from the sentence it finding goes supervised pose cepted the low risk of recidivism release he will reviewing Separate Op. purposes of this sentence. low risk of recidivism. See attempted specify any particular not Adequate protection as no risk. the same given guide- the level of that should be weight of two variables: is a function will occur and the level of so range that conduct lines and will do now. Our risk if that conduct subject that will be inflicted harm best discussion of the came Boyd, (11th See States Hunt, does occur. United States v. 459 F.3d 1180 United Cir.2007) (7th (up- 877-78 Cir.2006), rejected “any where we across- determination holding regarding ap- prescription the-board acts created a substantial the defendant’s give propriate deference the Guide- injury person to another bodily risk of lines.” Id. at 1184. We decided instead a func- “[djangerousness is part because that, reasonableness, subject to review for of the harm that will magnitude tion of the “determine, may sentencing courts on a *53 danger proba- if materializes and the occur basis, case-by-case weight give materialize”). child bility that it will With Guidelines, long so as that determination is Irey of the kind that we know sexual abuse remaining with reference to the sec- made committed, the harm capable of and has is that court tion factors must liter- permanent. It can is enormous in calculating also consider the defendant’s Accordingly, even with ally destroy lives. so, In doing sentence.” Id. at 1185. we low risk of recidivism follow- an assumed recognized that “Booker restored to dis- months, in and 3 ing release trict courts measure discretion time length for that does imprisonment removed,” mandatory Guidelines had fur- adequate protection from not afford important id. at but we added this by him. district court ther crimes The bounded, caveat: “This discretion is over the not one extra month imposed course, by Congress’s mandate to consider pro- statutory purpose minimum for the 3553(a), which, in the factors section one of fur- society and its children from tecting four, Sentencing subsection is the Guide- by Irey, stating: “I don’t think ther crimes lines.” Id. him, society protection needs further from in We stressed Hunt that consid statutory minimum beyond the at least advisory guidelines range eration of the is magnitude of the sentence.” Given guidelines “are an important, because commit harm that will occur if does indispensable helping tool courts achieve children, against crimes more sexual mandate to consider ‘the need Congress’s judgment. error in was a clear disparities’ to avoid unwarranted 3553(a)(í) (5) 5. Section & defendants,” id., among similarly situated required which is 18 U.S.C. in sentencing, District courts and courts 3553(a)(6). § though Even not bound sentences, must appeals reviewing guidelines, may not guidelines range any also consider the little give them so consideration policy guide- statements pertinent weight 3553(a)(4)-(5).36 giv[ing] any amounts to “not real Of lines. 18 U.S.C. range imposing the sen course, Guidelines have guidelines since Booker the 1200; Pugh, tence.” 515 F.3d at see also advisory, they are to be been still Booker, at at 767 543 U.S. S.Ct. given respectful consideration. We 3553(a)(2)(D) sug- one requires kinds of sentences available.” No 36. Section consider- gests provide defendant that either of those two considerations is ation of the need "to appeal. anyone train- relevant to this Nor has men- with needed educational or vocational factor, care, 3553(a)(7) "the need to ing, treat- tioned the medical or other correctional manner," provide restitution to victims of of- ment in the most effective 3553(a)(3) requires consideration of "the fense.” (“The courts, not in making while bound to considered decisions about vari- Guidelines, apply the must consult those All policy point ances. statements Guidelines and take them into account in one direction in this case and that is sentencing.”). generally when See Kim away from a below-the-guidelines sen- brough, 552 at at U.S. 573- tence. (“[I]t unquestioned uniformity guidelines poli- state as matter of important goal sentencing. remains an cy that age ordinarily “is not relevant in Booker, however, explained As we advi determining departure whether a is war- sory Guidelines appellate combined with ranted,” at least not unless “the defendant ongoing review reasonableness and re elderly and infirm.” U.S.S.G. 5H1.1. vision of the in response Guidelines present In the case the district court ex- sentencing practices help will ‘to avoid ex pressly Irey’s considered age ”); Rita, cessive sentencing disparities.’ (50 favor, years) in his though even he was (“The 551 U.S. at S.Ct. elderly or infirm. upshot is that the sentencing statutes envi guidelines state as a matter of poli- sentencing judge sion both the and the “civic, charitable, cy that public service carrying Commission as out the same basic ... prior good and similar works are not *54 3553(a) objectives, one, retail, § ordinarily relevant in determining whether wholesale.”). case, other at In this departure § is warranted.” Id. 5H1.11. advisory guidelines range calculated out at Yet one of the reasons the district court life imprisonment and was to thir lowered gave varying Irey’s downward was civ-

ty years only because that statutory is the ic good work—that he had been “a person maximum way based on the the crime was community.” to his guidelines The also charged. supra See at 1169-70. In view advise, policy, as matter of that aberrant of all of the facts and circumstances of this may behavior be used support a down- case, given the weakness of the dis if, departure ward among other trict explanation court’s for deviating from things, “the defendant single committed a guidelines range, effectively it gave the criminal single occurrence or criminal guidelines range no weight impos real in transaction” that significant was “without ing the sentence. planning” and “was of limited duration.” In addition to requiring consideration of 5K2.20(b). §Id. This any case does not fit guidelines range, Sentencing Re- requirements, of those yet the district form requires Act also that district courts court used what amounted to an aberrant any pertinent consider policy statement theory part justification behavior Sentencing issued Commission. 18 variance, for its downward “I stating: 3553(a)(5). § U.S.C. policy The state- think other than the acts of Mr. Irey, guidelines ments in the that are relevant there’s no indication that engaged he has to this departures case address when any other sort of criminal conduct or appropriate in calculating the sentencing representing poor conduct character.”37 range. dealing We are not guide- with a here, departure guidelines lines decision but a state as a poli- matter of “[mjental Still,' variance cy decision. that even and emotional conditions though policy way statements are in ordinarily no are not relevant in determining 3553(a)(5) binding, § requires departure warranted,” be whether a except 37. The district thought doing court either overlooked the "represent!] so does not man, Irey, fact that patronized married had poor character.” prostitutes weekly years, on a basis for 15 Everyone agrees Irey that what Id. 5K2.8. present not here. in circumstances description, yet did fits within vary down- deciding Yet 5H1.3. district court varied downward. ward, placed significant the district it character- Irey having what weight binding on the district While To the pedophilia. “illness” of as the ized court, policy guide statements court relied on its the district extent lines, required by it was the Sen which pedophile he was a that because belief consider, all tencing Reform Act to advise raping capacity to resist had diminished guidelines below the against a sentence children, his criminal behavior or that effectively ig range. The district court an- part pedophilia, in substantial due nored them all.39 statement is relevant. policy other that a court should not state guidelines 3553(a)(6) 6. Section ca- based on diminished depart downward 3553(a) requires that district Section actual “the offense involved pacity where courts sentencing, appeals courts in violence,” or threat of or a serious violence sentences, reviewing “consider ... has been convicted of the defendant where unwarranted sentence dis need to avoid Chapter 110 of Title under an offense parities among defendants similar § 5K2.13. Irey was. Id. which guilty records who have been found 3553(a)(6). guideline policy state- similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. There are also particularly important This factor is a one upward departure advising that ments reviewing the substantive reason when case. While appropriate this would be because one of the ableness of a sentence extreme conduct was so Irey’s criminal purposes appellate review of primary calculations maxed out guideline that the out in or sentences is to iron differences depar- upward even without at life *55 Booker, disparity. to avoid undue 543 der 3553(a)(2)(5) tures, re- expressly still 264, 125 at 767. S.Ct. U.S. be con- policy that those statements quires Report As the Presentence sidered. involving to find a case It is difficult noted, §to 2G2.1 the comment this case compares of children that sexual abuse departure may upward (at that “[a]n advises Irey’s The number of victims this one. if the involved more (four, five, warranted offense 50), be very young age least old) them, cmt. n.6.38 10 minors.” Id. 2G2.1 years than of some of and six involved at least Irey’s criminal conduct the abuse and torture extreme nature of minors, them, yet than 10 number of five times more that he inflicted on (four five), or and the court varied downward. it went on pornogra- an graphic statements also call for amount of child guideline policy massive produced and phy single-handedly the defendant’s that he departure “[i]f upward (at heinous, cruel, 1,200 photographs or unusually bru- distributed least conduct was sexually himself abus- tal, showing videos degrading to the victim.” Id. or erroneous, regulation with the inconsistent comment 2G2.1 of 38. The cited technically policy a guidelines they interpret, contrary state- to the Constitution ment, guidelines provide law.”). that it is to or federal § 1B1.7 treated as one. See U.S.S.G. ("Such commentary is to be treated as exception. court did 39. With one The district statement.”); policy legal equivalent of a see release, supervised impose term of a lifetime Smith, v. 568 F.3d 927 United States also 5D1.2(b) policy in U.S.S.G. statement (11th Cir.2009) ("The commentary and n. 1 where the defendant advises for all cases Sentencing Guide- application notes of the against a a offense minor. convicted of sex authoritative, plainly unless lines are children) occasions);41 Kapor United States v. ing combine to make his those delis, (11th Cir.2009) (35- criminal behavior the worst of worst. 569 F.3d 1291 Yet, defendant, Irey major year gave the district court who fell variance, I, resulting history category downward a sentence within criminal who just statutory span years: minimum and of at drugged above over least 20 than a guidelines boys, aged more decade below the two 11 and occa three range. seriously That sentence is out of sions before photographing genitalia; their abroad, imposed line with sentences on other de- traveled where he molested and behavior, digital pictures fendants whose criminal while took videos and of three cases, minors, atrocious some was not as ex- some of whom drugged, he had Irey’s many engaged treme as or did not involve as in oral and anal sex with at See, Frank, e.g., United States v. 17-year-old; victims. least one solicited sex from (11th Cir.2010) (40-year prostitutes age male under the of 18 while countries; sentence for defendant who in foreign drugged had twice trav- 16-year- his Cambodia, eled to paid where he three old second cousin and videotaped then girls minor; who were ages ap- having between the himself sex with the proximately 11 engage possessed approximately 10,580 and 15 to in sexual images him sexually acts with and to take explicit and 400 videos of child pornography, some v. acts); United States pictures of those of which featured personal victims he had Culver, (11th Cir.2010) (60- Wilcox, molested); v. ly 598 F.3d 740 United States (11th year Cir.2009) sentence for who with- Fed.Appx. defendant fell (45-year II, history defendant, in criminal category had used 50-year-old sentence for the tranquilizers gun and a stun to render his diabetic with no prior history, criminal who 13-year-old unconscious, stepdaughter posted took and on the porno internet produced had a pornographic videotape graphic photographs of himself touching pictures depicting and four 11-year-old girl, the uncon- attempted gain Huskey, United States girl); scious commercially photographs, from the (11th Cir.2009) Fed.Appx. (70-year possessed approximately 120 child pornog (like defendant, sentence for Irey) raphy who fell images, including a picture sadistic I, history within criminal category who of a 5-year-old girl wearing dog collar anal, oral, engaged in vaginal sex with being vaginally penetrated while by an *56 his daughter penetrated male); and United v. vagina her States Har unidentified ris, objects, (11th Cir.2008) (30- with while she was between Fed.Appx. 291 300 ages of 6 and year recorded the in defendant, abuse sentence for the who fell photographs and on videotapes, I, and traded within history criminal category who images of the abuse over the internet for photographed filmed and seven 15- and Sarras, pornography);40 other child 16-year-old boys, 575 two of whom were his (100-year F.3d 1191 godchildren, sentence for the de- engaging in sexual acts with fendant, who fell history bedroom, within criminal each in other his shared videos I, category engaged who in oral and vagi- photographs and depicting those occur nal 13-year-old others, sex with his step-daughter with rences and on one occasion approximately during 23 times a 4-month invited his friend over to watch two under period and photographed age it on three of engage males in sexual activities and unpublished opin- We include a number of 41. The defendant in Sarras was sentenced in list, citing ions in this each one not for year the same courthouse the same holding solely but for the facts about the judge. a different district court imposed by crime and the sentence the dis- supra trict court. See at 1215 n. 34.

1221 defendant, (140-year had sex one sentence for the as his friend with who then filmed Carter, prior two for lewd acts them); v. 292 had convictions in States of United Cir.2008) minors, (11th sexually front of who abused and (45-year sen- Fed.Appx. 16 photographed boys ages between the defendant, three specified with no tence 6-year 16 approximately of 8 and over an possessed approxi- history, criminal who period, produced pornographic at least 150 text, 4,800 and files image, movie mately victims, of images transmitted un- describing exploita- the sexual depicting or images known number of those over the tion, bondage, of at eleven including least internet, and possessed either or transmit- 14; 7 to of young girls, ages some different at least engaging ted 24 videos of children produced those and distributed files were conduct); sexually in explicit United States and him depicted defendant himself (11th Hersh, Cir.2002) v. 297 F.3d 1233 two genitalia young girls); touching defendant, (105-year sentence for the who Oliver, Fed.Appx. v. 281 898 United States I, history category fell within criminal and (11th Cir.2008) (130-year sentence for the who traveled to third world countries dur- defendant, criminal with no record ing period years a and enticed mentioned, produced images who eight boys, least 8 and between victim, single 6- molesting himself his old, him, engage encouraged in sex with year-old granddaughter, distributed them to in with a engage pedo- sex fellow internet); images those over the United phile, family convinced one Honduran (11th Hodnett, Fed.Appx. States v. allow their live minor son to with him Cir.2006) (30-year sentence the defen- States, in illegally pos- United dant, criminal history who fell within cate- images sessed least 120 of child pornog- I, gory images at least possessed who raphy). some which de- pornography, child minors picted prepubescent engaged criminal conduct of While the all activity, images por- sexual traded of child ranges in the cited cases defendants internet, over the and had in the nography truly depraved, from serious to none of it past following in the sexual activi- engaged conduct, yet worse criminal Irey’s than kidnaping raping ties with minors: received far more he a sentence lenient 6-year-old girl Vietnamese 1969 while they than The lesser sentence did. Vietnam; molesting engag- serving Irey by means imposed ing step- in sexual intercourse his two major variance creates a downward sub 1970s; daughters in the engaging arises disparity. disparity stantial 2004); 6-year-old girl oral sex with in the cited because defendants cases Foster, 209 Fed.Appx. United States were denied a downward variance (11th Cir.2006) (life imprisonment for the should received and were sentenced history who fell within criminal *57 harshly, Irey defendant given too but because was I, during 4-year peri- category and who downward variance he should not have re vaginal engaged od oral sex with too leniently. ceived was sentenced single years victim who was less than 12 The unreasonableness is not the sen began); imposed tences in the cited cases but in old when the abuse United States (11th Cir.2006) Johnson, imposed the sentence in this case.42 dissenting opinion Dissenting Op. Judge argues of Bark [those] Barkett’s defendants.” ett, J., statutory Irey whether 1278 n. 1. The command that we cannot assess is similar ly is to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted situated to defendant convicted of sexu among ally abusing disparities "without sentence defendants with children the benefit of guilty found entirety of all similar records who have been records law, 7. What “It Comes Down To’’ provide just punishment and to for the offense.” But the court was court suggested that these wrong, it committed a clear error in judg factors weighed Irey’s favor: he was 50 ment, in deciding that those purposes old; years him; family his still loved when could be major served downward consorting prostitutes he was not point variance to a statutory closer to the country raping, this or sodomizing, and minimum sentence than it guide is to the Cambodia, torturing girls little he was range. lines The district leap court’s from guy; not such a bad pedo- the “illness” of advisory guidelines sentence of 30 philia rendered his criminal acts pure- “not just-above-minimum down to a sen volitional”; ly and he a victim of child tence of years does not reflect the 17½ pornography on the internet. The court seriousness of provide just punishment discounted general the value of deterrence Irey’s rape, sodomy, and sexual torture for sexual against crimes children. It children, fifty of at least acts that he com thought present would a low risk “many many mitted times” over a four- or and, of recidivism once released as a re- year period, five- production and his sult, no time above the statutory minimum distribution of one of the worst series of protect was needed to society from him. child pornography on the internet. Nor The result the court reached created an promote does it respect for the law. unwarranted disparity sentence among de- fendants who have committed comparable For all of the reasons we have egregious less involving offenses explained, no downward variance from the sexual abuse of Along children. way guidelines range is reasonable in this case. to its final sentencing decision the district Nothing less than the advisory guidelines court, as we explained, committed a sentence of years, which is the maxi number of subsidiary in judgment, errors available, mum will serve the sentencing if even we disregard all of them there 3553(a). purposes set out in We are left remains one overriding clear error in judg- with the definite and firm conviction that it ment that renders the downward variance was substantively unreasonable, a clear er sentence substantively unreasonable. ror in judgment, discretion, an abuse of discussing

After factors, the other the district court to conclude to the con district court said: “It comes down my trary. otherwise, Were we to hold “we promotes view of what respect for the law would come perilously holding close to provides just punishment.” The appellate dis- review is procedural limited to trict right court was about importance irregularity,” and that the Supreme Court 3553(a)(2)(A) factor, which re- has appellate “eviscerated review at the quires consideration of the need for the same time that it has appel mandated the imposed “to reflect the serious- late courts to continue to review sentences offense, ness of the promote respect for for reasonableness.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at similar 3553(a)(6). conduct.” 18 U.S.C. quiremenl that the record in other cases be That information can be discerned from the scoured before the sentences in those cases appellate cases, opinion in including most can be considered impossible would render it those that we have cited. See also Kim statute, comply with the and we will not brough, 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. at 574 *58 interpret the way statute in a that effectively (holding requires that the statute consider see, Winn, nullity, e.g,, renders it a Hibbs v. ation of sentences of other courts in order to 88, 101, 2276, 2286, 542 U.S. 124 S.Ct. comply 3553(a)(6)'s §with instruction that (2004), ignores L.Ed.2d 172 and what the the need to sentencing avoid unwarranted Supreme Court has said about it. disparities account). be taken Any into re- Rita, occur.” paradoxical holding would when 551 U.S. at That 1203-04. century into quarter back a of a at 2466-67. In throw us the course era, Act with sentence, Reform pre-Sentencing reviewing the this deter- we have a every judge which is “non-system that, its given mined the extreme facts in the herself,” Frankel, himself or Jail law unto case, a the downward deviation from E21, that is Reform, an era Sentence range substantively rea- guidelines not gone good. for We have that decision af- sonable. made studying the record of the sentence ter conclusion, reaching we this proceedings, complete; which is consider- not, asserts, Judge Tjoflat usurping are as ing findings expla- the district court’s sentencing Sep court’s role.43 the district nation, pur- which are for the adequate Tjoflat, J., In Op. of at 1258-60. arate pose; granting the court’s decision stead, re performing we are our sentence due; the full measure of that it is deference Again, Supreme has view role. Court considering all of arguments judges that “district at times instructed us parties against for and the reasonableness that make mistakes are substantive” unreasonable,” the sentence. appellate that That is what sentences are “impose to supposed we “exist to correct such mistakes courts are do.44 we, Tjoflat's opinion Judge government "any as said that under 18 43. Nor are variance creating, taking step charges, toward U.S.C. be- would be unreasonable decisions, through judicial nothing of man- cause there is the na- unusual about system sentencing ranges datory "that is identical in or circumstances or the ture of this offense respects pre-Booker] personal [the man- all relevant The defendant’s characteristics.” Sep- sentencing range[s].” datory-Guidelines government argued sentencing memo- its J., Tjoflat, Op. We are arate at 1267 n.98. atypical, that this “[i]f randum case is it is Rita, simply doing duty, prescribed our aggravating, mitigating, fac- because of the substantive reasonableness of to review position And it took the at the tors.” same imposed in the sentence this case. hearing. supra See at 1176-77. sentence government's Irey's objection that sen separate Judge Tjoflat’s opinion goes to substantively was suf tence was unreasonable argu- great lengths addressing accuse us of preserve grounds specific ficient to preserved that were not raised and ments objection already it had raised in its Op. Tjoflat, Separate court. See the district argu sentencing memorandum and its J., 1258-59, opin- 1262-65. Much of that during Espe proceeding. ments sentence faulty premise analysis based ion's cially given pro the context the sentence government "simple made ceedings, government not need to did Irey’s objection” that "unreason- sentence is arguments regurgitate its in favor of a 30- already As ex- Id. at 1259. we have able.” however, pronounced after the government year sentence court had been plained, has sentence; govern enough it is that the 30-year arguing for a sentence ever since objected to the variance sen ment downward memorandum in the dis- filed supra That memo- tence as unreasonable. See United States trict court. See at 1170. Maurice, (11th Cir.1995) emphasized magnitude 69 F.3d randum sheer Irey’s (holding general objection depravity of criminal conduct and that a after the utter respect findings pre urged Congress' was the court announced is sufficient extremely supporting arguments "departures should rare in made before it serve for the crime cases” because of the serious- was announced where the reasons child sex clear); specif- government objection crimes. see United States v. ness of those also Candelario, (11th Cir. ically argued not be 1304-05 variance would 2001) J.) (Tjoflat, approval, a Irey’s (citing, justified even if risk of recidivism low, diminished, "reviewing the defen capacity was his behav- circuit court decision his aberrant, responsi- preserved review family his sentence under error ties and dant's ior was significant, argued decisions where the defendant in his bilities were and his Indeed, drugs that the pedophilia. his memorandum amount of were clouded *59 1224 years.45 cases where There is no other sentence

This is one of those unusual left. top guidelines range judg- of the When we vacate a district court’s the and bottom remand, same; routinely years. are the both are 30 There ment we include can the the line of our that we upward be no variance because bottom decision statutory years. sending is As a the case back for “proceedings maximum also 30 result, holding vari- with opinion.” our that no downward consistent this Because we totality of ance is under the the have determined that a downward reasonable devia- guidelines range facts means from the and circumstances this case tion this case unreasonable, be that on remand the sentence must 30 is it follows "substantively to a which he was to be sentenced had be sentence is unreason- pleaded by trigger equivalent in the indictment and found to able” of a new sen- (emphasis jury beyond tencing hearing appeal. Separate a reasonable doubt” Op. See added) omitted)); J., (quotation decision, marks see also Tjoflat, at 1263 & n. 90. Our Bartlett, 901, however, v. United States 567 F.3d 910 is consistent Jones and its Guthrie, (7th Cir.2009); Weir, United States v. 557 progeny. In United States v. 51 F.3d 243, (6th Cir.2009); (11th Cir.1995), F.3d States v. 255 United explained 1031 we that "[i]f 452, (4th Cir.2006) (con Curry, 461 F.3d 459 objection pres- after the relevant is raised cluding government, "by vigorously that the [pre-sentence investigation] entation re- arguing for a sentence within Guidelines port, imposition ... but actual before the range hearing,” throughout sentencing sentence, Jones is satisfied.” Id. at 1033. preserved objection had its sentence to the Weir, Specifically, in held we that Jones was though object did even it not at the end of the clearly satisfied because district court “[t]he sentencing colloquy); United v. States Shu position understood the Government's mard, 339, (2d Cir.1997). 120 340 F.3d specifically rejected Similarly, it.” Id. we specifically recognized long We have that so in Miaurice held that the rationales behind government as the raises "the of its crux long objection "are served as the Jones so to sentence,” objection to the district court’s it is preserved grounds objec- and the for the required not to articulate all the details of its sentencing tion are clear to the court at the Smith, position. United States v. 39 F.3d hearing.” conclusion of 69 F.3d at 1557. 1143, (11th Cir.1994); 1146 see also United result, party required “a reargue As a to not 1324, Livesay, States v. 484 F.3d 1327-29 & general objection made after if (11th Cir.2007) (concluding n. 7 that the argument support objection of that has government's objection to the extent of the previously presented been departure preserved objec- an downward also objection and the court reasons for the re- tion "to the reasonableness of the sen- overall pronounced.” main clear after the sentence is tence”), grounds, on other vacated U.S. government enough preserve Id. The did to 872, (2008); 128 S.Ct 169 L.Ed.2d 712 arguments 30-year all of in favor of a Arevalo-Juarez, United v. States 464 F.3d sentence here. (11th Cir.2006) (stating 1249-50 Judge Tjoflat's separate opinion points out though grant even the district court did none of departure government’s that in the other cases where we have argument that a vacated departure enough as unreasonable have we was unwarranted was particular directed the district preserve enter a issue whether the sentence J., unreasonable); Separate Tjoflat, Op. sentence. at 1265 otherwise see also United true, Carlson, & 96. That States n. but in none of 498 F.3d 763 & n. 2 those (8th Pineiro, Cir.2007); four other cases did have United we both extreme States v. (5th Cir.2006) ("We rendering any F.3d facts circumstances 204-05 down- required party objection express pinpoint never ward variance and a its unreasonable terms.”). ultra-precise guidelines range minute detail where bottom and —one point, Judge Tjoflat's opinion On a top similar were the same sentence. Because this is situation, implicitly overruling unprecedented accuses us United nothing an adds Jones, (11th Cir.1990), "unprecedented States v. step.” our decision an label grounds by overruled on other Morrill, United States v. Id. at Whatever we do in a situation (11th Cir.1993) (en is, definition, F.2d that has never been us before banc), allowing unexplained objection unprecedented way an step or the one other. *60 guidelines will be is to be resentenced within that consistent action on remand range. resentencing is within the opinion with this necessarily which means

guidelines range, AND REMANDED. VACATED years.46 a of 30 sentence

HILL, concurring: Judge, Circuit V. CONCLUSION I the court opinion concur in the judgment reversing in the and remanding substantial deference dis- Because of the with instructions. give we sentencing, trict are due courts I I do so in fact that spite origi of the is about what reasonable their decisions panel nally concurred in the now vacated always them wide and almost let berth Irey, 563 opinion, United States v. F.3d difference, a be- pass. though, There is 1223(11th vacated, Cir.), 579 F.3d 1207 another usually that has recognizing tween (11th Cir.2009). one’s way abandoning right I should explain. quit post that we post. We will to hold in have ordered been original That was based concurrence en- responsibility goes that review and tirely my perception extent of Supreme Court has instruct- with it. The judge. discretion the trial due sen- sentencing, as in other “[i]n ed us that one, my right opinion, tence was not the areas, at times make mis- judges district I but stretched discretion to cover it. I substantive,” it is and that takes that tend, think, properly I to be reluctant to our “to correct such mistakes when duty judge limit the discretion of a trial who is Rita, 551 U.S. occur.” closer to a than its record can bring case S.Ct. at 2466-67. me. vacated, opinion our I panel Since the district court made a this case question persisted putting one to mistake, a judg- clear error in substantive “If this case colleagues: counsel does unreasonably varying ment, downward not demand the maximum sentence au- guidelines advisory from the sentence by Congress thorized for violation of 18 than it

when less is sufficient no sentence 2251(c), what case would?” No U.S.C. purposes to set forth in the fulfill persuaded likely that is one has me duty Act. To Sentencing Reform do our be encountered. mistake, that we vacate the sen- correct imposed case, this, than aggravated the district and re- That more tence remained elusive. mand with instructions the defendant Judge Tjoflat's pong game. hyper- Having that no var- To borrow determined downward language, proceedings "gob- would bolic such reasonable, it would be iance is senseless up judicial resources” that could be ble[] permit the dis- remand with instructions spent Separate Op. better elsewhere. downwardly vary trict court to and resen- J., Doing Tjoflat, suggests as he at 1270. guidelines range again. If tence below the prevent appeal a would the first from sen- remand court on resentenced being from "the event” for tence main deter- years, would have to we vacate mining substantively whether sentence and send the case back. If the court send "the reasonable and would instead un- years, we then tried out a sentence 22.5 appeal message first [the mistakable to vacate that sentence and send would have tryout nothing on the road.” sentence] on, be, term, again. And so back and case back his Id. at to use 1268. That would pointless “shocking.” go ping at 1259. would Id. forth the case *61 argument After oral and the court’s on the basis of new evidence and argu- conference, finally I I realized that had present- that the never ments Government question been no an- putting has short, district In ed to the court. we have predicated upon swer it is because assumed the role of resentencer.

wrong It case assumption. asks that this Resentencing appeal defendants on does to demand the maximum assumed not harm to immense this court’s institutional the elu- sentence. But I now realize that relationship with the district courts case, I sive maximum sentence which transforming the district court’s sentenc- sought, here right before me. ing “main proceeding from the event” to a demanding This case is case This, turn, “tryout on the road.” cre- maximum sentence. perverse ates for the parties incentives Therefore, the sentence re- imposed, court, judicial and district misalloeates markably Congress from what reduced resources, disrespect and creates for the authorized, abuse if does discretion. And rule of law. does, my duty it I would then abdicate view, my question right for us to should I it vote to leave intact. ask is whether the court abused its ISo vote to reverse. “yes” discretion. The correct answer is its I factfindings because as best can un- TJOFLAT, Judge, specially Circuit them cannot derstand be reconciled with concurring part part: and dissenting it imposed. sentence The correct dis- I concur with the judgment court’s position to vacate and remand for resen- Irey’s sentence must be but dis vacated tencing. approach, With this we would sent as to the instruction that the district preserve our ap- traditional function as an years’ imprison sentence 30 pellate court and ensure the district separately ment. I write because event, court is the forum the main result, reaching this the court asks the required which is by United States v. wrong question gives wrong an Booker, 738, 543 U.S. Today’s swer. decision this cir cements (2005). L.Ed.2d approach cuit’s one difficult most questions posed United To roles States Book understand the Booker as- er, court, 160 signed U.S. S.Ct. to the district the Sentencing (2005): L.Ed.2d 621 what proper Commission, is the of appeals, the courts role of of appeals the courts now necessary to see the evolution of these once mandatory Guidelines advi over time. opinion roles This is therefore sory? organized as I part follows: describes the sentencing model before and under the

The court asks whether Irey’s sentence (the “SRA”)1 Sentencing Reform Act be- purposes achieves of 18 U.S.C. Booker, 3553(a). part fore II out sets the sentenc- After own conducting its Booker, ing part model after III “no,” applies analysis, the court answers then discretion proceeds abuse of review the case at to decide what be an would bar, appropriate part years’ imprison- surveys ap- sentence: 30 IV court’s ment. It proach resulting orders district court to im- institutional harm. pose this remand. It does so Part V concludes. Sentencing U.S.C.). Act of Reform Pub.L. No. scattered sections of 18 88-473, (codified, amended, 98 Stat. 1987 early model that com- An

I. Pr e-Booker these four was the purposes bined “medi- model,” penological so because cal named Pre-SRA A. believed that measures tak- experts proper I sentencing model Understanding the during imprisonment could “cure” of- en understanding today requires apply fenders, allowing society to reenter them *62 sentencing and purposes of deeply rooted Accordingly, productive members. re- law. in American criminal their evolution weight than habilitation received more the purposes other three of under Revolution, American colo- the Prior to the the medical model. Under medical with fashioned nial sentences courts model, sentencing were responsibilities di- punish in mind: to purposes three basic the court and the vided between crime, satis- thereby his the offender imposed Parole Board.3 District courts society’s desire for retribution fying that were indeterminate sentences moni- from (“punishment”); to deter others Board, meaning a Parole by tored that a by demon- committing the same crime impose judge would a sentence had a conse- disadvantageous its strating term of and a minimum confinement maxi- deterrence”); and to quences (“general confinement, mum term of but “allowfed wrongdoer, pro- to the so as incapacitate possibility the of release sometime for] activi- society from further criminal terms[, tect expiration the of those between ty “incapaci- or the date and conditions of release (“specific with] deterrence” the maximum term” determined tation”). before Parole Campbell, supra, the Board.4 1204, Scroggins, v. United States § 4:2. Cir.1989). (11th 1800s, peno- 1206 In the District courts fashioned the minimum became with logical experts “dissatisfied maximum bounds of in- prisons the failure of to rehabilitate traditional pur accordance the four mates,” a fourth and rehabilitation became sentencing. They of could consider poses Arthur sentencing. basic of See purpose they thought all facts were relevant to Sentencing Law 1:2 Campbell, W. The purposes, “conducting] inquiry these (2009). em- The American tradition thus scope, largely unlimited either as broad sentencing pun- purposes four braced — kind of ... or to the information deterrence, ishment, de- general specific come.” from which it Unit [could] source rehabilitation;2 terrence, tradition Tucker, 443, 446, this v. 404 U.S. 92 ed States (1972).5 591, 589, L.Ed.2d 592 present day. has 30 continued S.Ct. Thus, 437, Brown, parole. [was] v. U.S. rehabilitation domi 2. See United States 1707, model; 458, 1720, punishment, goal of the 14 L.Ed.2d nant medical 85 S.Ct. deterrence, (1965). general incapacitation [were] only incidentally achieved to the offender's United v. rehabilitative incarceration.” States system Board of 3. The started with the U.S. 1204, (11th Scroggins, 880 redesignated F.2d Cir. U.S. Parole It was Parole. model, 1989). more see For on the id. at the Parole Commission and Commission 1976, (detailing variety 1207 n. 7 Reorganization Act of Pub.L. No. 94- court). 219, (1976). options available to the district 90 Stat. For convenience, I refer to the Parole Commis example, the Parole Board. sion as could consider 5. For in which offender committed the manner crime, which included circumstances the offend- "monitor[ed] Parole Board aggravated mitigated the offender’s crimi- progress. When it de- er's rehabilitative blameworthiness, fully because manner rehabili- nal [was] that the offender cided!] tated, punishment. purpose on was relevant releasefd] the board the offender array on they appeals, Because could consider broad courts the other hand, virtually role facts, had no under medi “wide discretion in enjoyed long cal model. So as the sentence was determining impose.” what sentence to limits, “was, statutory within for all Id.6 practical purposes, ap not reviewable Although court set the district States, peal.” Koon United U.S. sentence, bounds Parole Board 2035, 2045, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 given (1996).8 Because sentences were sub prisoner when a discretion determine review, ject appellate judges rarely ex point in his reached that rehabili- ha[d] plained reasoning behind the sentences process which tation he should be imposed, and there little direct evidence supervision begin released under his pre-SRA judges from the era of how made *63 readjustment community. life in to the Miller, Marc sentencing decisions. Pur By keeping district the min- [the court’s] 413, poses S. Sentencing, 66 Cal. L.Rev. low, imum encour- prisoner [was] the (1992). a judge 451-52 So while sentenc aged “to earn favorable consideration for ing an offender to that im prison implied parole public policy accord with the prisonment punishment, was needed for parole embodied the statutes.”7 general deterrence, specific and reha bilitation, there little of evidence the Benson, 1212, v. Garafola (7th Cir.1974) (internal weights judge assigned relative the to omitted). citations purposes. those The Parole Board therefore determined how much the sentence would be served Therefore, SRA, prior the to district Thus, beyond the minimum term. al- judges had wide in imposing discretion though the Board not Parole could review sentences, but ultimately the Parole Board parameters the court set on had control over how much of the sentence sentence, the offender’s it could re-sen- would be served. The appeals courts of played tence the parameters. very offender within the role. limited parameters Because were often wide— B. SRA not accurately pre- district court could long

dict 1970s, how the offender would need for By the the medical model was rehabilitation, driving the model’s factor— falling Congress out of favor.9 had come powerful the Parole reject Board was actor in to prem- the medical model’s core the medical model. ise—that prison sentences rehabili- could Likewise, able, aspects it they could of the consider de- dividuals as soon as without background being fendant’s were because rele- full confined term of sen- specific

vant imposed’’). deterrence and tence rehabilitation. States, SRA, 6. See also v. United Wasman 468 U.S. Prior Fed.R.Crim.P. al- 563, 559, 3217, 3220, illegal S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d lowed the “court to correct an sen- (“It (1984) illegal is now well that a tence established time.” An sentence was judge sentencing authority or other is to be not “within the limitations set in the forth very determining imposed.” accorded wide discretion in statute under which [was] sentence.’’). States, 424, 431, appropriate Dorszynski an v. United 418 U.S. 3042, 3047, (1974). 94 S.Ct. 41 L.Ed.2d 855 Brewer, 471, Morrissey 7. See also 408 U.S. 477-78, Vitiello, Reconsidering S.Ct. 9. See 33 L.Ed.2d 484 Michael Rehabili (1972) tation, (1991), (explaining purpose that releas- 65 Tul. L.Rev. 1018-26 ing help parole explanation critiques offenders on was “to individu- for an some reintegrate society als into in- the medical model 1970s. constructive in the however, model, was no re rehabilitation well unfair cal as its tate offenders—as concern; fact, longer the dominant while the same who committed sults. Offenders factor in could be a relevant rehabilitation be wildly different sentences crime served prison sentencing, it could not drive sen- dis unfettered the district courts’ cause of 3582(a) (directing 18 U.S.C. that tence. de Board because Parole cretion and court, considering prison when sen- would much of a sentence how termined tence, recognize “imprisonment S.Rep. No. 98- served.10 See actually be promoting correc- appropriate means (1984), reprinted at 38 rehabilitation”). Congress feared tion and 3182,3221. U.S.C.C.A.N. allowing the district court to fashion a medical the vices of the To address purposes based on these each sentencing mainly unwarranted model— the un- perpetuate case would individual SRA, disparity Congress enacted — disparity warranted purposes which codified the traditional Congress plagued medical model. sentencing as Sen- created the United States therefore imposed— for the sentence need (the “Commission”) tencing Commission (A) of the of- to reflect seriousness devising it with and tasked law, fense, for the promote respect guidelines would dictate offenders’ just punishment for the provide sentences. *64 offense; goals: model main The new had three (B) adequate to to afford deterrence (2) (3) (1) fairness, propor- honesty, conduct; criminal tionality. Sentencing United See States (C) further public the from protect to Manual, Commission, Guidelines defendant; and crimes of the 1A1.1(3) (Nov. 2009) (hereinafter 1, § (D) need- provide to the defendant with “U.S.S.G.”); Booker, United States v. 543 training, ed educational vocational 738, 767, 160 U.S. S.Ct. care, or other treat- medical correctional (2005).12 honesty, To achieve L.Ed.2d 621 in the most effective manner. ment replaced Congress parole abolished 3553(a)(2).11 § factors These with determinate sentenc- 18 U.S.C. indeterminate to general ing. Judges deter- sentenced offenders fixed mapped punishment, onto deterrence, prison full rence, rehabilita- and offenders served the specific terms fairness, tion, imposed.13 medi- To achieve respectively. Unlike under the sentence Stephen Breyer, especially the See The Federal 10. was unfair because “honest.” This served, Key Compro Sentencing the length of the sentences offenders Guidelines and decisions, Rest, upon They Parole release Which based on the Board’s Hofstra mises Ch.l, (1988); with to reci- did correlate their likelihood not also U.S.S.G. L.Rev. see Furthermore, Pt.A, divate. because intr. comment. imposed disparity wide in sentences of "the Congress de- By codifying purposes, 11. these by criminal offenses committed for similar traditional the factors relevant to the fined offenders,” were not "fair.” similar sentences ways purposes that some- Ch.l, Pt.A, Lastly, intr. comment. U.S.S.G. the law. Where- differed from common times "impose[ appro system ] did not because historically driven ret- punishment as was for criminal priately different sentences con ribution, Scroggins, see differing severity,” were duct of sentences 3553(a)(2)(A) as encom- defined it U.S.C. "proportional.” Id. passing considerations. the above Because, SRA, less than An offender could still serve 13. prior the sentence sentence, however, credit if awarded imposed full judge was not the sentence served, satisfactory incarcerated. public nor the behavior while neither offender 3624(b) provides: judge’s U.S.C. perceived sentence offender defendant”). Congress severely involving category curtailed the district each court’s discretion to fashion a sentence component The offense-based correlated that, cases, typical court requiring mostly sentencing purposes pun- impose range a sentence within the identi- deterrence; general ishment and the of- by sentencing guidelines. fied To achieve component mostly fender-based correlated proportionality, Congress replaced the the- the purposes specific deterrence and pri- ory imposed sentences should be Mogel, rehabilitation. See 956 F.2d at marily to rehabilitate offenders with The the sen- found theory that be no harsher sentences should by consulting impose tence necessary than to serve the four tradition- table manual: the ta- Guidelines purposes sentencing. Sentencing al The levels; Y specified ble’s axis offense its X Commission’s Guidelines and the courts’ specified categories axis of offenders. in sentencing role to reflect these were 1B1.1; Ch.5, id. Pt.A See U.S.S.G. goals. Table”) (“Sentencing table listed subpart explains The rest of this how appropriate sentencing range each the SRA divided roles category combination of offense level and Commission, between the the district of offender. courts, appeals, respec- and the courts of tively. a. Offense Level Sentencing 1. The Commission’s Role Roughly speaking, the offense level was charged The SRA Commission proxy the Guidelines’ for the need for the designing guidelines that would direct the “to reflect the seriousness how district courts to fashion sentences to offense, promote law, respect for the 3553(a)(2)’s fulfill sentencing purposes in *65 provide just punishment and the for way honesty, a ensured proportionali- offense,” adequate as well as to “afford ty, fairness. See 28 U.S.C. conduct,” deterrence to criminal 18 U.S.C. 994(f). 991(b)(1); § § id. in a Assembled 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B). § Scroggins, See manual, Guidelines the Guidelines resem- matter, F.2d 1208. As an initial the a computer program. bled impose To a type Commission had to determine what of sentence, all a judge had to do was level, conduct factor would into the offense input information requested by the namely manual generate and the manual a would sentencing range. whether to base upon sentences the ac- tual conduct which the en- defendant

Every had an sentence offense- and an gaged regardless of the charges for component. offender-based United States (“real which he was indicted or convicted (11th Mogel, F.2d Cir. 1992); 994(b) sentencing), offense” upon or the con- see 28 (instructing U.S.C. Commission that the duct that “establish a sentenc constitutes the elements of the ing range” category for “each of offense offense for which the defendant was term, prisoner serving impris- a a year subject who term of the first of the to deter- year that, onment of more than 1 other than a mination the of Bureau Prisons imprisonment term of for duration of during year, prisoner displayed has life, prisoner's may receive credit to- compliance exemplary with institutional sentence, prisoner's ward the service of the disciplinary regulations. served, beyond up days the time of to 54 Hence, imposed offenders served the sentence year prisoner's the end of each of the term good less time. imprisonment, beginning of at the end of committing offender’s real conduct was convicted of which he charged and adjustments ap- offense of conviction. The sentencing). (“charge offense” their regardless all offenses plied to (initial policy state- 1A1.1 U.S.S.G. adjust- but not all category. Some ment).14 charged offense. Id. ments related devising hybrid approach, It settled a at 1209-10.18 components: with three an offense level (2) (1) level,” “specific of- a “base offense b. The Offender Characteristics (3) characteristics,” “adjust- fense category The of offender was the Com- 880 F.2d at 1209-10.15 Scroggins, ments.” of the for proxy primarily mission’s need level reflected base offense The protect public “to from Rather than draft a charged conduct. further crimes the defendant.” for in the United each offense guideline 3553(a)(2)(C); Mogel, see U.S.C. also Code, grouped of- the Guidelines States 956 F.2d at 1558-59. Commission level that offense specified fenses categorized exclusively almost offenders average seriousness reflected the history by prior as determined criminal specific offense 4A1.1; Id. at group.16 See see convictions.19 U.S.S.G. to each cate- Mogel, (noting were tailored also at 1560 characteristics F.2d component almost en- captured some “offender-based of offense17 and gory specific robbery, for explained 17. The characteristics the differences 14. The Commission charged example, property taken offense include whether was between real offense office, post from model: a financial institution used, how a wheth- whether and firearm robber, might example, have A bank injured, carjacking people er were whether gun, frightened bystanders, taken used $50,000, occurred, value dollar of the loss. teller, stop injured a refused § 2B3.1. ordered, U.S.S.G. away damaging and raced when pure during escape. A property his real system pure charge on the basis rejected offense would sentence 18. The Commission pure charge A all identifiable conduct. system because it could have achieved offense system would overlook some of offense uniformity: it would treated unfair statutory ele- harms that did not constitute given alike that the criminal unlike offenders the defen- ments of the offenses of which take code is not written to account *66 was dant convicted. in which the offenses committed. manner 1A1.4(a). § U.S.S.G. Breyer, supra note Stephen See 12 at 9-10. rejected pure The a real offense Commission jury guilty plea the or estab- 15. The found possi- system considered all that would have conduct, charged and the the offense lished conduct, only specific selected ble real not to the relevant the district court found facts adjustments characteristics or offense —be- adjust- specific or the offense characteristics administratively cause have un- it would been 24. ments. See note infra permutations wieldy: innumerable factual might punish- bearing a the need on 994(b), § by the As instructed 28 U.S.C. 16. general ment deterrence. Id. at 10-12. crime ac- classified each federal Commission compromise hybrid The model was a to avoid together cording severity, placed it to then its pitfalls primary the of both. similarly ain "cate- with the crimes classified gory all of the crimes of offenses." Because departure a if did allow for The Guidelines severity, category like all had the in a were of defen- information indicates that the "reliable example, level. the base offense For same substantially history category criminal dant’s approximately 130 dif- offense level for base under-represents the seriousness [over or] theft in the United States Code ferent offenses history or the likeli- same, the defendant's criminal by the U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 established (Larceny, will commit other hood that the defendant and Other Forms of Embezzlement Theft). U.S.S.G. 4A1.3. crimes.” particular his their circum- tirely relies on the offender’s criminal sentences to the crimi tory”). The settled on Commission stances offense the offender way history nal because it was workable I consistent with what refer to uniformity. sentencing to achieve See Ste parsimony21 principle: sentence must be phen Breyer, Sentencing The Federal “sufficient, but not greater than neces- ” Key Compromises Guidelines and sary four pur- achieve the traditional Rest, They Which 17 Hofstra L.Rev. upon added).22 poses (emphasis of sentencing, (1988). history 19-20 Criminal based 3353(b)(1), however, Section instructed neatly categorized convictions could impose that “the shall court sentence of into account ma taken Guidelines kind, range” and within the prescribed myriad might trix. The other factors that Guidelines, by the unless “there exist[ed] help predict recidivism were difficult to aggravating mitigating or circumstance categorize quan more even difficult kind, of a to a degree, adequately tify age, example, cut might different — taken Sentencing into consideration ly in including different cases—and them in formulating guidelines” Commission sentencing would make the table unworka “applicable or there was no sentencing ble.20 See id. 3553(b)(1). guideline.” 18 “In U.S.C. of an applicable absence

2. The District Court’s Role guideline, the court impose an [had to] Statutory a. The Considerations sentence, appropriate having regard due for the purposes set forth in subsection SRA tasked the district with courts (a)(2)” four purposes traditional —the sentencing individual offenders in accor- sentencing. Id. also had to but, statutory factors, dance several prescribed by guide- consider “sentences time, at the same eliminated most of the lines applicable to similar offenses and of- carrying district court’s discretion in out applicable policy fenders” and “the state- cases, nearly that task. In all the court’s ments of ministerial, Sentencing job Commission.” Id. to follow the Commis- sion’s instructions. played The scheme obligated Because the district court was out way. this to follow the Guidelines all but cases, required

The district rarest courts were to sen- district court fol- tence pursuant parsimony to U.S.C. 3553. Sec- lowed the principle to the ex- tion directed the courts to tailor tent that creating the Commission did in context, ed.1999). focusing, so ignored Commission parsimony In this trans- Congress (the suggest- using number of factors that had lates to the least harsh sentence means) satisfy ed and the Commission pur- had conceded were needed traditional (the end). predicting poses relevant Although recidivism. See *67 Ch.4, Pt.A, (recogniz- quibbles U.S.S.G. intr. comment court "parsimony with the label ing "empirical principle,” disagree research has that shown it does not the with un- highly derlying concept. other factors are correlated with the recidivism, e.g., age drug likelihood of and sentence, abuse, fashioning In 22. the district policy [but] for not reasons were factors, courts were to take time”). account of other included here at this Other factors (1) education, including: the nature and circumstances disregarded included vocational history skills, record, and the offense and characteris- employment family ties and (he offender, (2) tics of 994(d). the kinds of responsibilities. § sentences See 28 U.S.C. available, (3) guidelines the Commission's statements, "Parsimony” “economy (4) 21. policy is defined as the need avoid un- (5) the disparity, pro- use means an end.” Merriam-Web- warranted the need to (10th 3553(a). Collegiate Dictionary § ster's vide restitution. 18 U.S.C. guidelines applicable to the of- the tified the instructed Congress the Guidelines. conviction, recited the facts relat- guide- fense of sentencing to establish Commission 3553(a)(2) level, specific the purposes, § ed to the base offense the to meet lines adjustments, princi- characteristics and parsimony the offense did not mention 3553(a). level, and, § See 28 the offense after determined appears ple 991(b)(1)(A).23 history, It is thus criminal reciting § the defendant’s U.S.C. into account criminal histo- took the defendant’s that the Guidelines determined clear way they principle, category. specified and the The PSI then ry parsimony created tension with for the offense and the frequently sentencing range operated available. See 18 parsimony principle. kinds of sentences 3552; 32(c)-(d); § Fed.R.Crim.P. U.S.C. sum, dis- Congress instructed while F.2d at 1209 & n. 11. After Scroggins, 3553(a)(2) judges to consider trict objections to the considering parties’ ensure uni- judges purposes, district —to factual recitations and Guidelines de- PSI’s impose always had to formity —almost terminations, officer probation summa- only conduct- They sentences. Guidelines objections in an ad- any rized unresolved analysis independent an ed Scroggins, F.2d dendum to the PSI. 3553(a)(2) princi- parsimony purposes “serve[d] at 1209 & n. 11. The PSI thus aggravating in the rare event ple in a pretrial stipulation of a purpose no existed or circumstances mitigating The addendum framed civil case.” Id. guideline applied. sentencing at the litigated the issues to be hearing. Sentencing Proceeding The b. sentencing hearing followed. The SRA, fash- district courts

Under There, any re- the district court resolved adversary pro- using ioned sentences regarding legal factual and issues maining between the cess, “a confrontation in which of the Guidelines. application the correct that which similar to parties [occurred] 1209, 1211 & n. Scroggins, F.2d at See a civil bench trial.” United occurs at Determining the circumstances of the Scroggins, 880 F.2d States v. history criminal (11th Cir.1989). offense and the offender’s process began the correct questions; factual presented conducted investigation pretrial of the Guidelines to those application officer and the issuance probation court’s questions. After presented facts24 mixed report presentence investigation (“PSI”). the district court hearing parties, from the at 1209 n. 11. The PSI iden- Id. record, (in cases) 3553(a) ("The as a matter of Compare most 18 U.S.C. sufficient, impose responsible making but not judge a sentence shall necessary, comply with the greater than specific findings related to offense character- (2) purposes paragraph of this set forth adjustments. government bore istics and ("The 991(b) subsection.”) with 28 U.S.C. preponderance proving by a the burden of Sentencing States purposes of the United any specific offense characteris- the evidence (1) establish Commission are to (not jury adjustments established via tics and practices Federal criminal policies and for the guilty plea) enhance the that would verdict or (A) meeting system justice assure level, facts that offense defendant's purposes of as set forth support of the defendant’s would an increase 3553(a)(2).”). U.S.C. [18 ] section category The defendant bore the of offender. *68 regarding adjustments that same burden guilty jury the conviction or the 24. Because category the reduce the offense level or would charged plea the offense conduct established Wilson, v. 884 F.2d level) offender. United States (the and the defendant's base offense 1355, Cir.1989). (11th 1356 history have been established criminal would

1234 Appeal’s court 3. The open announced and the Court of Role “state[d] imposition particular reasons for its of the Lastly, Congress the tasked courts 3553(c). § sentence.” U.S.C. If the 18 system by the appeals policing creat- imposed court a within-Guidelines sentence ing grounds appeal. for substantive In range 24 and the Guidelines exceeded right appeal an “illegal” addition to months, had to also “the sentence, the court state which existed had under the par- model, a sentence imposing reasons for Congress medical created three see point range.” grounds appeal, ticular within the Id. new for 18 U.S.C. 3742, 3553(c)(1). § to the district § that assure that court In the rare event the correctly applied the Guidelines. The first kind, court the imposed a sentence “not of grounds that of these was the sentence range,” or ... it [Guidelines] outside application” was the result of an “incorrect had doing to state its reasons for so with 3742(a)(2), § the Guidelines. Id. specificity in written order. Id. (b)(2).26 The second was the sentence 3553(c)(2). than “greater” was or “less” the Guidelines sentence, imposition Following its of the 3742(a)(3), sentencing Id. range. give parties district court had to (b)(3).27 The third was the sentence fact, object chance to findings to its its imposed was for an for offense which no applications legal Guidelines or other rul guideline existed “plainly and was unrea- ings, or the manner in which the sentence 3742(a)(4), (b)(4).28 sonable.” Id. Jones, imposed. United States v. 899 (11th 1097, Cir.1990), F.2d 1102 overruled grounds by on other v. United States Mor sum, structurally the SRA divided (11th Cir.1993) (en

rill, 984 F.2d 1136 responsibility sentencing among three banc). Entertaining objection an at this Commission, entities: the district stage of proceeding gave the district courts, of appeals. and the courts court an opportunity objec to address promulgated mandatory Commission tion may error Guidelines, correct have lynchpin which were the made.25 SRA. The created Guidelines sentences Allowing objection Medina, appealed. an be made not be United States v. 459, appeal give (11th Cir.1996) (“The first objecting time on would F.3d 465 n. 8 party opportunity to blind impose any side the district district has the discretion to sentencing objec- court's guideline range.”). decision. The Jones sentence within the precluded tion rule this and enabled the court appeals objections rejected could party's treat If the district court re- been made were not quest greater as waived. for a sentence or less than the range, Guidelines the sentence applied it or Jones “raise waive it’’ rule was unreviewable unless court erroneous- error, party unless a plain could demonstrate ly authority depart believed it lacked the Jones, 1103, F.2d or the record dis- See, range. e.g., from United closed clearly the district court was Rudisill, (11th v. States 187 F.3d objection aware of the in time to address it. Cir.1999); Fossett, United v. States 881 F.2d Weir, See United v. States (11th Cir.1989). 979-80 (11th Cir.1995) (declining apply the waiver “clearly rule when the district court under- existed, guideline findings 28. When no [party’s] position stood specifically underpinning fact the sentence were reviewed it’’). rejected 3742(e). for clear error. U.S.C. See 18 judge’s 26. A applications of where determination Guidelines were reviewed de See, correctly e.g., Auguste, to sentence a defendant within a novo. United States however, (11th Cir.2004). range, calculated Guidelines could F.3d *69 applicable the termining where within char- and offender considering offense by range to sentence the offender. Guidelines offense to a base In addition acteristics. role was to ensure appeals’ courts of The con- charged the offense reflecting level were followed. that the Guidelines incorpo- duct, characteristics the offense offense characteristics specific rated Model II. The Post-SRA meaning that adjustments, general more the partly on sentenced offenders were v. Booker A. United States The offender uncharged conduct. basis Booker, In v. 543 U.S. United States entirely on the was based characteristic 738, (2005), 220, 125 S.Ct. 160 L.Ed.2d history. criminal offender’s radically re- Supreme Court a fractured statutorily courts were the roles the SRA rearranged formed consis- sentencing offenders charged courts, the district the Com- assigned had of sen- purposes traditional with the tent mission, appeals. courts of At and the In principle. parsimony and the tencing the in Booker was whether SRA’s issue cases, courts though, the district nearly all mandatory violated the Sixth Guidelines a sen- impose Guidelines required were Supreme Court held Amendment. Therefore, rarely the district court tence. “[a]ny fact they did and reaffirmed analysis of independent conviction) (other to conduct had prior than a which is driving purposes four exceeding the a sentence necessary support —the already had done Sentencing by Commission authorized the facts es- the maximum manda- devising jury the or a by plea guilty work for them this tablished Likewise, by the courts the defendant verdict must be admitted tory Guidelines. parsimony proved jury beyond to a reasonable grapple with the rarely had 244, at 756. 125 S.Ct. all, courts exer- doubt.”29 Id. the district principle. sentencing range than de- Because the Guidelines discretion other very little cised doubt, beyond this sen- a reasonable statutory maximum conduct defined the 29. The court " prob- posed tencing no constitutional model judge may im- the 'maximum sentence lem. solely the pose on the basis reflected facts ” SRA, findings jury made the still Under the by jury or admitted verdict defendant.’ charged to the beyond a reasonable doubt as 220, 232, Booker, 543 U.S. States v. United sentencing record If the offense conduct. (2005) 160 L.Ed.2d 621 125 S.Ct. findings regarding only jury's contained Washington, Blakely U.S. (quoting conduct, the maximum charged offense 2531, 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d 124 S.Ct. receive under the could sentence the offender words, (2004)). the relevant 'statu- "In other by called for would be the sentence statute the maximum sentence tory is not maximum' specific plus those offense level the base finding may impose after additional judge sup- adjustments offense characteristics by jury], [beyond but the those found facts findings (plus any in- ported by jury’s any may impose addi- without maximum he criminal histo- based on the offender’s crease 303-04, Blakely, findings.” 542 U.S. tional judge to ry). allowed the make But the SRA at 2537. specif- findings support factual additional —to range Although the Guidelines fell between adjustments be- ic offense characteristics maximum, the statutory minimum findings— supported by jury's yond those judge cases im- requirement that the in most the offender's sentence would increase posed a constitu- pose sentence a Guidelines he could re- beyond the maximum sentence SRA, jury findings. problem. jury's Prior solely tional on the ceive based Thus, that the beyond a reasonable doubt the Sixth Amendment found the SRA violated findings charged would judge’s offense factual had committed because the offender beyond the maximum sen- finding exposed permit offender to a sentence This conduct. based statutory range. allowed statute tence that would be within the full jury. facts found charged on the jury found the offense Because *70 1236 by

was it contained “critical often determined facts established cause cross-refer- 3553(b). 260-61, §to Id. at ences” 125 by by preponder- the district a mere gap, S.Ct. 765. To fill the the Court evidence, mandatory ance of “impli[ed]” held that the statute that sen- Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. should be “review[ed] tences ‘unreason- 244, 749-50, 232-34, Id. at 125 S.Ct. at 756. (citing ”. Id. 18 ablefness]’ U.S.C. problem, To solve Sixth this Amendment 3742(e)(3)) (final § in original).32 alteration two remedies: possible Court discussed later Court clarified “review for (1) transform the Guidelines from manda- unreasonableness” meant review for abuse (2) advisory,30 tory every or require Gall, 46, of discretion. 552 U.S. at 128 fact that would determine the Guidelines at 594. changes, S.Ct. Aside from these range be admitted the defendant the Court left the remainder of the SRA proved jury beyond to a a reasonable intact, concluding that it functioned inde- concerns, doubt. Citing administrative Booker, pendently. U.S. at majority31 Booker opted remedial S.Ct. 764. first choice. Booker redistributed the roles in sen- Accordingly, Supreme Court severed tencing offenders between the Commis- provisions excised two of the SRA. sion, courts, the district and the courts of First, Court struck 18 U.S.C. appeals. The Commission no longer 3553(b)(1), which had mandated the im- framed the district courts’ sentencing dis- position of a Guidelines sentence. mandatory guidelines; cretion with in- Second, U.S. at 125 S.Ct. at 764. stead, it would inform the district courts’ 3742(e), Court struck 18 U.S.C. which sentencing advisory guide- discretion with review, set out of appellate standards be- lines.33 district courts once again held, Supreme 30. The recognized Court previously there we have [A]s a statute that problem would be explicitly no Sixth Amendment if the not forth does set a standard of merely advisory may be read Guidelines "could review do implicitly. nonetheless so Booker, provisions.” past [I]n 543 U.S. at ... this ... instance two dec- departure appellate S.Ct. at 750. The SRA practice involving allowed for ades of in cases circumstances, from the departures[] imply practical Guidelines in rare standard of already appellate that did render the Guidelines adviso- review familiar to courts: ry. Id. at 125 S.Ct. at 750. The clear for "unreasonable[ness].” review Booker, 260-61, import reasoning of this is that the Booker 543 U.S. at 125 S.Ct. at 765 (and problem 3742(e)(3)) (final ultimately (citing be could cured U.S.C. altera- cured) by transforming original). the Guidelines into tion in recommendations, but the Guidelines had to Except requirement for Booker s that the genuinely advisory. See Gall United courts States, consider the Guidelines 38, 47, 586, 595, in ex- 552 U.S. discretion, ercising post- their (2007) ("We however, reject, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 Booker the sentencing resembles appellate an requires 'extraordinary’ rule that performed pre-Booker the district court in im- justify circumstances outside the posing a sentence offense for an for which no range.”). Guidelines existed, guideline guideline existed. When no regard” the court had to due opinions garnered “hav[e] for "the Two different in Booker 3553](a)(2)[,] purposes set forth in [§ ... sen- majority. opinion, five-vote The first often prescribed by guidelines applicable tences opinion,” called the "Constitutional held that offenders, portions similar offenses and [] of the SRAviolated the Amend- Sixth policy applicable statements the Sentenc- opinion, ment. The second called the "reme- 3553(b)(1). ing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. opinion,” dial remedied the Constitutional situation, problem In that by excising parts district court was in of the SRA. work; doing the effect Commission’s because explained: 32. The Court the court was not constrained offense *71 sentencing in the independently uniformity SRA of responsibility the bore sought to achieve. crafting See United States sentences. (11th F.3d 1287-89

Rodriguez, 406 responsibility primary Because the Cir.2005) sentencing post lies with the J., dissenting the -Booker dis- from (Tjoflat, courts, I what explain fashioning trict banc). Thus, rehearing en denial of 3553(a) § in with in- sentence accordance 3553(a), parsimony the which embodies volves, sentencing hearing how the should purposes traditional principle and the four conducted, explanation the the be and dis- forefront, pro- sentencing, moved courts for the give trict must sentences of a viding the for the construction bases they impose. Only then can the abuse of appeals the The courts of bore sentence. review appellate discretion standard of be the reviewing responsibility meaningfully discussed. sentences, the under abuse of courts’ of review. Such re- discretion standard B. The Key Inquiry view, preserve would some thought, 3553(a) sets out seven Section factors

that a district court must “consider” before imposing a At the end of sentence.34 the yet category, incorpo- such have to be to make individualized amendments it had by Sentencing rated Commission the into determination. 994(p) amendments issued under section 3553(a) provides: 28); 34. 18 U.S.C. of title and that, (ii) except provided as in section (a) imposing considered in Factors to be 3742(g), are in effect on the date the impose court shall a sen- sentence.—The sentenced; or defendant is sufficient, greater tence but not than neces- (B) probation in a violation of the case of sary, purposes comply with the forth to set release, supervised applicable the or (2) paragraph in of this subsection. guidelines policy by or statements issued court, determining particular the sen- pursuant Sentencing the Commission to imposed, consider— tence be shall to 994(a)(3) United section of title States (1) the nature and circumstances of the of- Code, any taking into account amend- history fense the and characteristics of guidelines policy ments made to such defendant; the (regardless by Congress act of statements (2) imposed— the need for the sentence yet have whether such amendments to (A) to reflect the seriousness of the of- incorporated Sentencing by law, the Com- fense, respect promote for the to mission issued into amendments under provide just punishment to for the of- 28); 994(p) fense; section of title (5) any pertinent (B) policy statement— adequate afford deterrence to to (A) conduct; Sentencing by issued Commission criminal 994(a)(2) (C) pursuant of title to section protect public to from further Code, defendant; subject any to United States crimes of the (D) policy provide made to such state- the defendant with needed amendments by (regardless training, Congress ment or vocational medi- act of educational care, yet whether cal correctional such amendments have to be or other treatment manner; Sentencing incorporated by Commis- the most effective (3) available; sion into issued under the kinds of sentences amendments sec- (4) 28); 994(p) and the tion of title kinds of sentence sentenc- that, (B) provided ing except range for— section established (A) category 3742(g), applicable in effect on the date defen- of offense by applicable category dant is committed sentenced. (6) guidelines— unwarranted sentence set forth in the need to avoid defendant as (i) Sentencing disparities among with defendants similar issued Commission 994(a)(1) guilty of pursuant records found simi- to section of title who been Code, conduct; subject any lar United States (7) guidelines provide restitution amendments made to such need to (regardless of victims of Congress act whether the offense. however, day, requires the statute ment of dis- the seriousness of the offense and sufficient, trict “impose court to its relative the community. incidence 3553(a)(2)(C) greater necessary, but not than comply Section asks what sentence is set purposes paragraph public forth needed to “protect from further (2).” 3553(a). Thus, although 18 U.S.C. crimes of the defendant.” The basic task all of the predict factors identified in is to the likelihood that the offend- *72 considered, offenses, § must be the heart of er will commit further assess the inquiry potential offenses, is the district court’s of assess- seriousness those and ment of traditional purposes incapacitate the four determine the to need the of- 3553(a)(2) sentencing § has codified. fender as a prophylactic Finally, measure. 3553(a)(2)(D) § on focuses the need for the § 3553(a)(2)(A), The first purpose, re- sentence to rehabilitate the offender —“to “sufficient, quires be sentence but not provide ... needed educational or voca- greater necessary” than to satisfy the need care, tional training, medical or other cor- 3553(a)(2)(A) punishment. for Section ac- rectional treatment the most effective tually inquiries involves three that exist in Ordinarily, manner.” rehabilitation will dynamic a relationship: the sentence must play no in determining role the sentence. offense, “reflect the seriousness of the See 18 U.S.C. 3582(a).36 Jpromote law, for respect [ pro- ] and [ just punishment vide blush, for the At offense.”35 first it seems odd that Con- 3553(a)(2)(B) Section gress focuses on the required need consideration of seven fac- general for deterrence —“the need for the tors but ultimately directed the district imposed ... to afford adequate impose courts to sentences sufficient but deterrence to criminal greater conduct.” The not necessary need than comply for general 3553(a)(2). just deterrence involves an assess- one: On further exami- motivation) easily Seriousness of offense may under- offender's pun- call for less respect ishment, Promoting stood. for the rule of law imposing and a sentence without punishment; turns on perception of the re- taking account of those may circumstances spect may for the of the compro- rule law be engender disrespect for the rule of law. community mised if the or offender believes punishment “[Ijmprisonment an offender's appropriate was too harsh is not an or lenient promoting based on facts of the case or if means of correction and rehabili leads to sentencing disparity. 3582(a); unwarranted tation.” 18 U.S.C. see also United punishment Shortt, Just takes into account the (4th of- States v. Cir. culpability. fender's 2007) relevant, ("Although still the fourth rehabilitation, purpose, recognized by was (a)(2)(A) Evidence will be relevant to the Congress Sentencing and the Commission to inquiry any to the extent it is relevant to insufficient, own, standing be on its justify inquiries. of these Importantly, the first and sentence.”). particular Rehabilitation is inquiries specific third to "the offense." relevant, however, clearly Moreover, when the "offense” is the offense of con- probation viction; offender to a supervised term of or inquiries, on therefore these the dis- See, 98-225, e.g., S.Rep. release. No. trict consider cannot conduct that does ("Rehabilitation conviction, particularly important bear on the offense of such as uncharged formulating consideration in unproven or conduct. conditions for Sometimes, persons placed probation.”). all three factors militate All of the in fa- (a)(2) strong punishment: vor of a determining need for factors are relevant to for example, punishment probation may just supervised severe conditions of for re offense, probation supervised serious impose failure to release can lease— certainly punishment engender such could disrespect punitive aspects, and deterrent Sometimes, for the rule example. simplicity, of law. for though, factors For I limit will although my be in opinion tension: a serious imprison offense discussion in this committed, (such circumstances component as the ment of sentences. however, all of a sentence that the four nation, apparent impose it is satisfies purposes traditional analysis of the inform the the other factors 3553(a)(2). most, cases, if not all one sentencing. Section four purposes If, will purposes drive the sentence. 3553(a)(1) “the requires consideration of punishment example, for should the offense circumstances of nature and out is than sufficient to be meted more history characteristics general specific meet the needs are di- These considerations defendant.” deterrence, punishment then the need all four rectly purposes. Sec- relevant will “drive” the sentence. If the need 3553(a)(3) requires tion consideration (say general deterrence is at the forefront available,” which is of sentences “kinds case) in a tax evasion and the defendant is any determination of what sen- crucial to offender, will be first-time the sentence necessary tence be no harsher than would satisfy imposed general need for *73 (5) 3553(a)(4), punish to or deter. Sections is, imprison- deterrence —’that the term of (6) of the Guide- require consideration purpose greater for that than the ment is sentencing range, lines the Commission’s period required pun- of incarceration for statements, and to avoid policy the need specific ishment or Alterna- deterrence. disparity, respectively. unwarranted .Un- tively, repeat consider the of a offend- case sentencing disparity dis- breeds warranted string er with a of that harmed convictions law respect for the rule of in contravention scores of victims. The of incarcera- period (whose 3553(a)(2)(A) is, § in purpose required protect public tion to the from his law”), réspect the part, “promote to criminal the may future behavior exceed correctly and a calculated Guidelines sen- imprisonment for punish- term needed (which part is in tencing range calculated deterrence, general specific ment and policy by considering the Commission’s deterrence will drive the sentence.37 statements) avoiding is one tool for such 3553(a)(7)’s Finally, § com- disparity. Preparing Sentencing C. For the to mand that the court consider the need Hearing directly to victims is provide restitution I.B, in explain part supra, As I a district just punishment. to relevant might not find what judge the answer to My after the transpires take on what parsimonious would constitute sentence 3553(a) § district court considers the seven the the by consulting Guidelines because the should Commission was not instructed to take factors is that district court punishment otherwise, one would say I that a sentence is often driven the sentence — (a)(2) reading purposes my long sufficiently satisfy of the because of to the need for not statutory language plain of the punishment. that a must be Given the direction sentence sentence, handing down the the district greater necessary not than to sufficient but explain driving purpose judge why must 3553(a)(2) logi- comply purposes, with is, purposes the other the sen- subsumes —-that cally that a sentence should not be follows necessary driving purpose satisfy tence (a)(2) greater necessary satisfy the than is satisfy also sufficient to all of the other is longest purpose that demands the sentence. (a)(2) (a)(2) purposes, purposes. All of the hand, (a)(2) pur- weighing On the other therefore, considered, properly and the poses logi- against other each does not follow "driving pur- court’s characterization of the no cally the statute —even if there is from "speeding] flattening] pose” as ahead and deterrence, example, the specific need for three” is Ante at 1197 the other inaccurate. satisfy the sentence must still be sufficient to explanation (a)(2) enhances mean- n. 24. This also purpose. driving purpose If driving public percep- ingful appellate review punishment, play the and the is a district court cannot justice specific has been done. lack a need for deterrence off tion principle parties’ account The in- parsimony into when needs par- When the fashioning the Guidelines. put parsimonious to fashion a sentence. about disagree parsi- ties what would be adversary is an hearing sentence, is of monious the PSI limited use parties proceeding39 which the frame the As the Supreme the district court. controversy by requesting sentences that Gall, Court the PSI anticipated does 3553(a)’s will meet parsimo- believe question answer which four ny requirement.40 the court en- After has 3553(a)(2) purposes the Guidelines sen- parties’ argu- tertained the evidence and accommodates; tencing range primarily support requests, ments in of their nor does it recommend a sentence that district court whether determines either sufficient, greater would be but not than request supported sentence necessary purposes.38 achieve those factors. Id. 49-50, U.S. at 596. The S.Ct. at PSI obligations placed Gall has on the simply informs the district court of the prosecutor and present defense counsel to that, range of sentences Commis- requests view, to the district court sion’s should be considered cases consistent with their offense and offender characteristics adversarial roles similar to the case before the court. prosecutor ease.41 The must urge *74 process 38. The PSI is the sentencing current format same one role in the under the by probation Principles up- used the district courts’ offices Guidelines. The have not been pre-Booker. changes dated to reflect the Booker and Gall prosecutor's obligations. to made the indicate, Principles prosecutor As the the con- States, 338, 351, 39. Rita v. United. 551 U.S. sentencing presenting siders when the to case 2456, 2465, (2007) L.Ed.2d 203 grand jury Presumably the for indictment. (‘TT]he sentencing subjects the defen- recommendation, acting prosecutor's the on thorough dant’s sentence to the adversarial grand jury the indicts the defendant the for testing contemplated by sentencing federal "the most serious offense is consistent procedure.”). conduct, with nature of the the defendant’s likely and that is to in a result sustainable prosecutor 40. This assumes that the and de- § ("Selecting Id. conviction.” 9-27.300 properly representing fense are counsel their Offenses”). Charges Charging Most Serious — clients, respective as indicated in the follow- "The ‘most serious' offense” is "that which ing Although may they agree, text. times yields highest range sentencing the the under prosecutor generally argue the will a for guidelines.” Id. sentence, harsher and defense counsel for a presented initially If the offense the to prosecutor more lenient sentence. If the and grand jury fully does not embrace the nature prepared defense counsel are not to advance involved, and of the extent conduct criminal positions, ought their the district court to prosecutor the should recommend that the sentencing hearing continue the and recon- grand jury's charges indictment include parties vene the prepared. it when are prosecutor so. would do should seek charges additional when They obligations early assumed these in necessary 1. Are to ensure that ... the prosecutor's obligations the case. The are indictment: expressed Principles the Federal Prose- Adequately a. the nature ex- reflects and ("Principles”), Attorneys’ cution States United involved; the tent of criminal conduct Manual, (1997), § http: 9-27.000 available at and //www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_ appropriate b. Provides the for an basis room/usam/index.html, defense the counsel’s under sentence all the circumstances in the Sixth Amendment. case; the Principles originally promulgated significantly strength were 2. Will enhance the Attorney July General government's against 1980 and of the case the defen- updated prosecutor's were describe dant or codefendant. to the district court advance of “appro- present that is impose court to civil bench trial. In their circumstances of ... under all the priate memoranda, Justice, parties should consider United Dep’t U.S. the case.” Manual, findings § the district court with presenting 9-27.820 Attorneys’ States fact and conclusions of law similar to (1997), http://www.justice.gov/ available at of fact conclusions of law fusao/eousa/ffoia_reading_room/usam/ findings end, present in a the court prosecutor parties civil case To this index.html. following a trial. The prior that the relevant to or bench must endeavor to “ensure the Guidelines court’s attention memoranda would indicate brought to the facts party § the sentence the sentencing range,42 9-27.710 fully accurately.” Id. 3553(a)(2)purpose requests, primary (“Participation Sentencing Generally”). — serve, why the presenta- factual the sentence is to “mak[ing] includes This sufficient, great- necessary ... sentence would be the court when is [i]t tion to [PSI]; necessary comply than er [i]t or correct supplement 3553(a)(2) presenta- purposes.43 defense necessary light of the court; requested by or [i]t tion formulating requests, their sentence (“Establishing court.” Id. 9-27.720 parties should first evaluate how well Sentence”). Finally, the Factual Basis for in the guidelines listed PSI serve as prepared to sub- must prosecutor “[b]e 3553(a)(2)’s proxies purposes. As allegations factual dis- significant stantiate explained, the Guidelines offense level for defense.” Id. Defense coun- puted by the up made the offense conviction is obligation prepare has an sel also level, specific offense charac- base offense fact, hearing; the Sixth teristics, adjustments. Some of the counsel requires that defense Amendment adjust- offense specific characteristics with effective assis- provide the defendant may ments describe acts committed of the case. This would phases tance in all in perpetrating the offense of defendant *75 the district court with providing include conviction; the treats such Commission as the favorable to the defendant evidence part of the “real” offense conduct acts as 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing § court considers properly and includes them the offense objectives. 3553(a)(2)(A)(B) § proxies for the level punishment general needs for and deter- present should their sen- parties The specific rence. Other offense characteris- requests to the district court after tence PSI, adjustments, however, may PSI, to the tics and not the and addendums on fairly any bearing be said to have the ready are in final form and for submission Ideally, defendant’s commission of the offense requests to the court. the should (A) (B) and thus on the and in advance of the sen- conviction presented be well Therefore, the although memoranda needs. Commis- tencing hearing sentencing (A) (B) for and parties routinely proxies sion treats them as pretrial akin to the briefs ("Additional post- Charges”). include information because § tant to this Id. 9-27.320 Booker, may longer uncritically the court no range sentencing out in the 42. This is the set responsi- apply counsel's the Guidelines—it is or, party objects the PSI Guide- PSI if the to § bility explain the fac- to how all of calculation, calculation lines the Guidelines case, given implicated in a with an tors are sentencing range party will the and the ask (a)(2). emphasis on N. Dist. Cal. Fed. Pub. sentencing hear- district court to reach at the Defender, Memorandum, Sentencing Model ing. http://www.ndcalfpd.org/Briefbank/Booker/ 20McColgin% 20Sentenc- David% 20Model% California Federal 43. The Northern District of (last ing% visited sample sentencing 204.25.05.htm provides a 20Memo% Public Defender 30, 2010). impor- explains that that it is June memorandum in determining the Commission considered purposes, they may be irrelevant to wheth- offenses)46 the that party proposes categories er the sentence a is suffi- render so, cient, atypical. the the greater necessary doing than instant case (A) (B) satisfy party of- positing the needs the case.44 would be substitute determining using support fense level it the Accordingly, proxies the (A) (B), may asking sentence it will the court urge the defendant the be impose. the PSI’s offense remove from specific level offense characteristics sentencing will parties’ memoranda adjustments reflect conduct that unre- prescribed also address the criminal histo lated to conviction.45 the offense of which, ry category, coupled with the of may level, The offense not fit the circum- fense would inform the level even stances of the case after irrelevant court’s discretion. If the crimi I, nal indicated, history category considerations are removed. As and the govern level ment applies category Guidelines offense to all does not contend conviction; cases involving ground the offense should be increased it is, speak it unique “substantially under-represents does not the seri particular history circumstances of a case. Conse- ousness of the defendant’s criminal quently, memorandum, in its or the likelihood defendant will crimes,” party may urge court to commit deviate from other U.S.S.G. 4A1.3(a)(1), § the prescribed offense level to take into the defendant’s sentence will account one or more the offense charac- solely by driven offense level for 994(c) (which is, § teristics listed in U.S.C. offense of conviction —that the sentence example, 44. 2-point upward government oppose For is a there will the defen- adjustment probation lying to the officer request specific dant's if believes that PSI, compiling who is U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 & adjustment offense do characteristics n.4(h), usually cmt. but that conduct has noth- bear on the offense conviction. ing charged to do with the offense. The adjust- Guidelines littered manual 994(c), Congress specified In 28 U.S.C. specific ments and offense characteristics that following offense factors: 3553(a)(2) may may not be relevant to case, (1) offense; given grade performed even if the offender 3B1.5, (2) question. the conduct in U.S.S.G. the circumstances under which the of- *76 example, adjusts upward the offense level mitigate ag- fense which was committed body during if the drug offender used armor offense; gravate the of the seriousness offense, body during but the use of armor (3) degree the nature of the harm simple drug transaction which the offender offense, by including caused the it whether anticipate might does not violence have irreplaceable property, involved property, 3553(a)(2) bearing § purposes. no on the person, persons, a number of or a breach examples potentially Other irrelevant ad- trust; public justments (hate § include: U.S.S.G. 3A1.1 (4) community view gravity the of the motivation); (whether § crime 3A1.2 the vic- offense; the official); government § tim awas 3A1.3 (5) public generated by the concern of- the (whether during the victim was restrained the fense; offense); (whether § 3B1.3 the offender (6) particular the deterrent effect a sen- position special abused a trust or used a may tence on the the commission of skill); (whether § 3B1.4 the offender used a others; offense crime); (wheth- § minor to commit the 3C1.2 (7) the of the current incidence offense recklessly endangered er the people offender community the and in the Nation as (whether during flight); § 3Cl.3 the offender whole. was on ted). the release when crime was commit-

1243 im satisfy punish- perception the need for whether the sentence necessary to Gall, fair or 552 at posed will be more is not. U.S. general ment or deterrence fair, at 597. To ensure that it enough satisfy any specif- need for 128 S.Ct. than such, perceived and thus as the sentence ic deterrence. subjected “thorough must be to the adver history criminal cate- If the defendant’s testing contemplated by sarial the federal I, may greater parties than gory is sentencing procedure,” Rita v. United punish- whether the defendant’s dispute States, 338, 352, 127 551 U.S. S.Ct. should for the offense of conviction ment (2007), L.Ed.2d and the rea past of his criminal greater on account imposition explained, sons for its must be 3553(a)(2)(A),or, behavior, see U.S.C. (“Confidence 356, 127 id. at S.Ct. not, fu- predicts if whether such behavior judge’s in a use reason underlies the criminality and thus warrants an addi- ture public’s judicial trust in the institution. A protect of incarceration to period tional public judges’s] statement of [the reasons 3553(a)(2)(C). Regarding public, see id. particular imposed] sentence helps [for latter, parties may point to factors provide public with the assurance on the defendant’s likelihood to that bear trust.”). Moreover, creates but that the Commission did recidivate judge’s statement of reasons “allow[s] reasons, policy into account for such take Gall, meaningful appellate review.” end, abuse.47 In the each age drug 39, 128 U.S. at S.Ct. at 590. history will arrive at a criminal cate- party which, process level The adversarial gory, coupled Supreme the offense presumably support steps. will the Court mandates involves five After proposes, it order, requesting listing the district court them in I them in sentence address what impose. might some detail to indicate take place typical parties in a case in which the Proceeding D. The District Court agree that cannot the Guidelines sentenc- ing range correctly approximates hearing is framed The 3553(a)(2) First, purposes. the district as ex- competing positions parties, sentenc- determines Guidelines memoranda. pressed their 597; range. Id. at ing severe government seeks most 3553(a); U.S.C. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.48 the facts and circumstances of Second, turning prosecutor then to ease will allow. The defendant seeks counsel, leniency. parties manner in which the dis- defense the court asks the requests and sentencing hearing trict court conducts the for their sentence affords opportunity present evidence parties’ public’s is relevant to the and the them (5) condition, including Although physical drug crimi- de- the Commission settled on history pendence; nal as the measure of offender *77 record; Guidelines, (6) previous employment Congress characteristics in the (7) 994(d) family responsibilities; § ties and in 28 U.S.C. a number of other listed ties; (8) community the offender characteristics Commission offense; (9) role in the devising could consider in the Guidelines: (10) history; criminal (1) age; (11) degree dependence upon criminal education; (2) activity for a livelihood. skills; (3) vocational (4) a matter and to mental and emotional condition to the 48. "As of administration se- mitigates consistency, the extent such condition the de- cure nationwide Guidelines Gall, starting point.” culpability be the 552 U.S. fendant’s or to the extent should relevant; plainly 128 S.Ct. at 596. such condition is otherwise 1244 3553(a)(2) § present

relevant to each of the four support request- evidence to their Gall, sentences, 49-50, purposes. ed and this U.S. evidence will often Third, why show the at 596-97.49 the court Guidelines recommendation S.Ct. enter- appropriate is or is not given case.51 parties’ arguments tains the support party might A challenge the offense level Fourth, their requests. sentence Id. by the court has contending set that the court determines whether the sentence ei- generalized Commission’s treatment of the party proposes ther satisfies each of example, weights offense—for accord- 3553(a)(2)’s § purposes parsimony and the ed to characteristics the base offense Fifth, principle. Id. the court fashions a specific level or offense characteristics —is sufficient, greater that is but not inappropriate in present case.52 Aside than necessary to meet those purposes, from relying on the circumstances that this, explains how the sentence does and if “mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the sentence from deviates the Guidelines offense,” party might proffer evi- range parties’ requests, or the gives the dence concerning “community view of reasons for the deviation. Id. gravity offense,” of the or “the current step first hearing incidence of the offense in community.” is to determine whether the Guidelines evidence, contend, This the party would sentencing range by fixed the PSI is cor- 3553(a)(2)(A)(B) relevant to the inquiry rectly By “correctly calculated.50 calculat- regarding the needs punishment ed,” I per mean calculated the instructions general Or, party deterrence. might in the Guidelines stage, manual. At this challenge history the criminal category the the court will resolve disputes regard- has set proffering evidence on ing whether the manual’s instructions were gender, characteristics such as race and properly followed. ethnicity, status, employment educational In the step, second the district court will attainment, and marital status that entertain the parties’ sentencing requests. Commission did not consider establish- government and then the ing defense will the categories of offenders.53 already 49. The record would regardless.” contain the evi- Id. at 127 S.Ct. at 2465 32(f)). dence (citing adduced at trial or the facts the defen- Fed. R.Crim. Pro. dant pleading guilty. admitted in But the 52. When the mandatory, Guidelines were "a parties may present wish to additional evi- party seeking departure generally accepted to, relating example, dence the circum- his starting point base offense level a stances of the offense listed in 28 U.S.C. attempted then to show that the case was 994(c), relating to the offender charac- atypical.” Rodriguez, United States v. 994(d) (and teristics specifically po- his (11th J„ Cir.2005) F.3d (Tjoflat, recidivism). tential for dissenting rehearing from the denial of en banc). "[Ujnder the new model the defen- this, doing the court will have to resolve simply dant can also concede that his case is any Guideline issues the addendum to the PSI typical challenge the wisdom of the Com- may disclose. judgment regarding mission’s appropriate punishment in heartland cases.” Id. 51. Because rough the Guidelines “reflect a approximation might report sentences Sentencing 53. A issued Commis 3553(a)'s objectives,” party achieve may sion found that these factors correlated with argue Comm'n, that "the Guidelines Sentencing sentence should recidivism. U.S. Meas Rita, 350-51, apply.” uring 551 U.S. at Recidivism: History The Criminal Com added). (emphasis S.Ct. at Perhaps putation Sentencing the Federal *78 Guidelines of (2004). PSI’s properly Guidelines calculation "fails to 11-13 The SRA instructed the Com 3553(a) considerations, § reflect perhaps or guidelines mission to "assure that tire ... the case policy warrants a different entirely sentence statements are neutral as to the by making factfindings the sentence re- step, third the court entertains In the (a)(2) the garding purposes55 explain- of their arguments support parties’ the ing parsimonious how the sentence is to requests. 3553(a)(2) § In driving purpose.56 step turns to the fourth The court then process, explain the court must also party’s pro- either determining whether any a party’s reasons for deviation from sentencing purposes meets the four posal request range or the PSI as 3553(a)(2) the sentence “suffi- and is step established in one. cient, necessary than to greater but not sentence, pronouncing After the court Gall, comply purposes. with” those parties’ objections in accordance (“[T]he elicits U.S. Jones, United States 899 F.2d 1097 ... all of the judge should consider (11th Cir.1990). objections impor- to whether factors determine appellate They tant for give review. also by a they support requested the sentence an opportunity the court to correct party.”). made, may errors it which if correct- step to the fifth Finally, the court moves objecting party’s ed to the satisfaction will which, depending and fashions a sentence appeal unlikely. render an determination, may mir- fourth-step its pre- If party’s request. ror a neither side Appellate E. Review step, vailed in the fourth the sentence the Explained 1. Abuse of Discretion may gov- be less than the imposes court It requested appellate or more than the de- is axiomatic that the review ernment supports The court sentence is conducted under the abuse requested.54 fendant race, creed, sex, origin, socio- I stated that the need national district court not dis- (a)(2) purposes 28 U.S.C. cuss each of the in detail. I economic status of offenders.” 994(d). question purport precedent. A I do not did so in adherence to circuit As banc, sitting provision answer is whether this limits the we are now en I would overturn and, ability precedent, despite consider these of the district court to the court’s con- cern, determining doing a de- offender characteristics see ante at so would be potential entirely Supreme recidivism under fendant’s consistent with the Court's 3553(a)(2)(C). statements in Rita. Rita, Supreme opined Court that "we possibilities I from this discussion the omit 3553(c)] (or precedent) cannot read our [§ supported punitive that the record a more insisting upon opinion every a full case. government one the re- sentence than the appropriateness brevity length, or con- quested punitive or a less sentence than the detail, write, say, ciseness or when to what to requested. one defense counsel Rita, depends upon circumstances.” agree. U.S. at 127 S.Ct. at 2468. I I, may 55. These facts come from the PS perhaps parties when the dis- transcript guilty plea, evidence Sometimes— agree trial or points over minor or when both presented by parties at the range parties seek a sentence rec- within hearing. To the extent that the court intends relatively ommended the Guidelines—a facts, notify judicial take notice it should explanation by brief the district court will parties in advance. support finding and suffice to its to allow appellate perhaps review. Other if Requiring judges make that district court times— (a)(2) parties vastly purposes, seek different sentences or factfindings on each of fiercely driving explain contest the evidence—the district identify purpose, how driving necessarily provide will have to a more parsimonious to the the sentence is currently required explanation respond parties’ purpose more than is detailed sentence, opinion arguments, support judges. its and to district court As court’s out, meaningful appellate points opinions in which allow review. I have authored *79 Rita,

of discretion standard. at depends, 551 U.S. discretion has been abused of (“ course, on 351, the bounds of that discretion ‘[Reasonableness’ S.Ct. principles guide and the its exercise.” merely review asks whether the trial court 326, 336, v. Taylor, United States 487 U.S. Gall, discretion.”); abused its 552 U.S. at 2413, 2419, 108 S.Ct. 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (“Our explanation 128 S.Ct. at 594 (1988). words, In other examining what opin ‘reasonableness’ review in the Booker the district court inquiry looks like reveals pellucidly ion made it clear that the famil how and to what the court of appeals iar abuse-of-discretion standard of review II, explained part defers. As I applies appellate now review of sentenc sentencing inquiry primarily a factual decisions.”). ing “familiar” Under this inquiry district court derives ulti- —the Gall, standard, 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. at mate sentence from a factfindings series of 594, a district court abuses its discretion evidence, based on circumstantial credibili- improper procedures, when it follows bas determinations, ty and sometimes conflict- es its decision on an interpreta incorrect ing In light evidence. of the nature of the tion of law or clearly erroneous factfind sentencing inquiry, district court’s I decon- ings, or when the reviewing court is left struct the abuse of discretion standard and with the definite and firm conviction that identify component how its parts apply to the court committed a clear judg error of district court’s determina- making ment in the ultimate decision enti simplified tion. Once way, this the appel- Humana, Inc., Klay tled to deference. v. late court’s task in reviewing sentences for (11th Cir.2004). 1241, 1251 382 F.3d When abuse of discretion becomes clear. review, conducting this ap the court of I begin with the statement that a district peals may only evidence, consider argu court can abuse its by making discretion ments, objections presented to the clearly erroneous factfinding. It is well Weir, district court. See United States established that a finding clearly of fact is (11th 1031, 1032 Cir.1995). 51 F.3d erroneous when “although there is evi- it, support dence to the reviewing court is The abuse of discretion gov standard left with a definite and firm conviction that erns a array appellate broad inquiries; a mistake has been committed.... although the applies same basic framework permissible Where there are two views to all these inquiries, how that framework evidence, the factfinder’s choice be- practice works in depends very much on tween them clearly cannot be erroneous.” being nature of the decision reviewed.57 Anderson v. City, Bessemer 470 U.S. See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. 573-74, 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d Products, Inc., (7th Cir. (1985) omitted). (quotation The sen- 1986) J.) (“[T]his (Posner, phrase [abuse of tencing inquiry is driven in large part by family covers a discretion] review stan factfindings: the underlying regard- facts standard, dards rather than a single and a 3553(a)(2) ing factors,58 weight family whose greatly members differ evidence, given piece to each the district review.”). stringency the actual court’s regarding determinations each Supreme 3553(a)(2) Court has said that purpose,59 “[w]hether and the sentence condition, 57. The court grapple in this case fails to psychological tal or evidence the abuse of discretion standard in mean- about the defendant's likelihood to recidivate. ingful way. example, 59. For how serious offense was example, 58. For the defendant's conduct great general or how aof need there is for offense, committing the circumstances about deterrence. background the defendant’s that bear on the offense, evidence about the defendant's men- *80 3353(a)(2) Second, pur- § the district court would satisfy each misinter- necessary to such, law if it factfindings. pret proce- As the the follows the correct are all pose accepts findings steps explanation these un- dural but its reveals that appellate court it clearly erroneous. misunderstood the nature of the sen- they are less occur, tencing inquiry. This would for ex- its discre- A district court can also abuse ample, weighs if the district court law, although by misinterpreting tion 3553(a)(2) purposes against each other the fact-intensive nature of determining parsi- instead the sentence in that there will be fewer instances means driving purpose monious to the or if the the district court abuses its discre- which erroneously district court believes that Nonetheless, way. in this the district tion cannot consider relevant evidence.61 misinterpret the law in two might court First, ways.60 Lastly, appeals it would be a misinter- the court of key will reverse law for the district court the sentence if pretation of the the district court commit- procedure ted a of judgment. to fail to follow the adversarial clear error This term Gall, part in must required by requires applied carefully reviewing which be when sentence, necessarily very the court to elicit and consider which turns to requests parties explain heavily from the on the district court’s assessment way for its sentence in a of the facts. It seems that the reasons when courts object parties phrase allows for the to to use the “clear of judgment” error context, ap- perceived frequently saying errors and for the court of this peals meaningfully improperly weighed to review the sentence. court ways subsequent factfindings I do not mean that there two could render the clearly which the district court can make a mistake are based on it erroneous as well. law, Likewise, expect ways factfinding regarding I two be the these to the need to (a)(2) satisfy clearly most common. purpose could be erro- underlying neous if the circumstantial facts shows, explanation 61. As this abuse discre- support on which it is based do not the find- through misinterpretation tion of the law ing. generally procedure contrast, refers errors By if the district court considers inquiry. way court the district conducts its impermissible way these facts in an ex-—for This of the district court's is so because most ample, by believing that the seriousness of the during sentencing process determinations always given weight offense must more important are factual determinations —how just punishment than the need for or the need is, (a)(2) example. each factor Because respect determining rule of law in 3553(a) (a)(2) the other factors roll into (a)(2)(A) satisfy need for a sentence to —the relatively inquiry, few law there are issues of misinterpreted court will law. Simi- appeals for the court of to consider. larly, legal the district would commit patently error if it considers irrelevant evi- example, For the need for a dence. 3553(a)(2)(A) satisfy purpose is a fact- important: by proceeding The difference is finding subsidiary based three factfind- way, appeals this the court of to the defers ings need for the sentence "to reflect the —the offense, factfindings long district court's so as the promote respect seriousness of the law, properly inquiry provide just district court understood the punish- for the rule of and to performing. appeals it was The court of ment for the offense”—which in turn are thereby underlying factfindings regarding ensures that it reviews the facts as based on (facts found the district court instead of substi- the offense and the offender such as the (a)(2) tuting findings regarding history, criminal his its own offender’s ties offense, community, during purposes. given his conduct This makes sense that Con- on). factfindings gress designated and so All of these are re- the district court as the fo- error, sentencing. clearly rum viewed for clear and a errone- for the “main event” See factfinding any point process part ous in the IV. infra (11th Cir.2004) See, e.g., (noting factors. United States we “will *81 (11th 1198, 1222 Westry, Cir. grounds not overturn a conviction on the 2008) (“A resentencing remand for due to insufficient evidence unless no rational tri- the of a occurs unreasonableness sentence er of fact could have found the essential only ‘if we are left with the definite and of the beyond elements crime a reasonable firm conviction that the district court com doubt”). context, In the sentencing judgment weigh mitted a clear error of though, appellate the court is limited to 3553(a) ing by arriving the factors at a the facts set forth in the district court’s range sentence that lies outside the sentencing explanation, which shows what by reasonable dictated the facts sentences evidence the court deemed relevant and ”). I explained, the case.’ As have how probative and how that evidence informed ever, the factors fold into the Thus, focusing the court’s decision.62 (a)(2) (a)(2) purposes, purposes and the sentencing explanation, the district court’s other; should weighed against not be each appellate the court light asks whether —in (a)(2) rather, identify the court should the of the district court’s factfindings, its ex- purpose that drives the sentence and fash sentence, planation any for the devia- parsimonious ion a sentence pur to that tion sentencing from the Guidelines range Moreover, pose. satisfy the need to each and the parties’ requests any rational — (a)(2) purpose purpose and which will drive judge could have concluded that the sen- factfindings, the sentence are both the re tence greater was “sufficient but not than view of which I already described. 3553(a)(2) necessary” to achieve the pur- Therefore, for judgment” “clear error of poses. If the sentence imposed cannot be any to do work in appellate review of a 3553(a)(2) reconciled with the factfind- sentence, it must refer to the situation in ings, the sentence must be vacated. which the imposed court has a sentence Deconstructing the abuse of discretion necessary is more or less than standard appellate shows that review of a satisfy driving purpose. impor- But delineated, clearly should be a tantly, the appellate court is not to substi- straightforward process. If the district judgment tute its own of the dis- court proper procedures, followed the court; rather, trict it must determine appeals court of sentencing will have a whether the district court committed explanation clearly explains the facts judgment clear error of by imposing a by court, found the district how relate sentence that cannot be reconciled with its (a)(2) (a)(2) to the purposes, driving correctly interpreted not-clearly- law and purpose, and how the parsimo- sentence is erroneous facts. regards, some this nious to that purpose. From the record inquiry is akin inquiry an appellate (which will parties’ objections include the performs court determining when whether responses), and the court’s jury evidence submitted to a the court is suffi- will support cient to jury’s verdict. able to determine any whether factfind- Cf. Wright, United States v. ings clearly F.3d light were erroneous in of the appeals inquiry 62. The court of limit proper must its defer to the district court's exercise of to the facts set out in the district court’s wholly ig discretion. If the district court sentencing explanation for the abuse of party’s argument dis nores relevant evidence aor (and any cretion standard party objects), to have force. Other the court will have wise, law, the court would be free to misinterpreting search the erred which re entire quires respond record and make its own factual presented find that it to evidence This, course, ings. arguments would be parties. inconsistent made Fed. 32(i)(3)(B). appeals with the notion that the court of must R.Crim.P. step sentencing review each readily It also be should presented. will evidence hearing previous I set out section. properly court whether the district evident the nature of understood Reviewing Sentencing Hearing there, asks inquiry. From facts there are sufficient Having carefully whether examined the abuse of is, it the sentence —that support record to standard in the con- discretion text, reasonable appellate whether I how review must determine now show find, clearly based on the facts identifies judge could under that standard abuses *82 record, im- step sentencing the sentence at each of the found the discretion driving pur- party I a case in which a parsimonious hearing.64 posit is to the posed mind, I the court failed to framework in contends that district pose.63 With this process.65 party appeals five-step follow the explain now how the court (or “failing improperly Supreme ex- to calculate with the Court’s 63. Consistent Gall— Gall, many calculating) range, treating planation of review in the Guidelines the boilerplate incorporate mandatory, failing state- our cases to Guidelines as consider factors, consisting 3553(a) of review as selecting ment of the standard the a sentence steps: facts, rea- procedural and substantive of two clearly failing or based on erroneous to routinely include a sentence,” Our cases sonableness. adequately explain the chosen like this: statement at 597—are instances in U.S. at only sentencing decisions "We review court has abused its discre- which district discretion, two-step and we use a making clearly factfinding abuse of tion erroneous Shaw, process.” United States by misinterpreting the law. If the or sentence First, (11th Cir.2009). is, we must (that clearly procedurally reasonable no is court committed "ensure that the district factfindings proper interpreta- erroneous error, significant procedural such as fail- no law), the tion of the Gall instructs courts of (or calculating) ing improperly to calculate appeals to the substantive reasonable- to turn treating range, the the Guidelines Guide- appel- of the sentence. Id. Because the ness mandatory, failing to consider the lines judg- late court is not to substitute its own factors, selecting a sentence court’s, id., ment for the district substantive facts, failing clearly or based on erroneous ensuring sup- review means that the record adequately explain the chosen sentence- to ports the court's determination that including explanation any deviation imposed is the one sufficient but the sentence range.” (quoting Id. from the Guidelines greater necessary satisfy than to the driv- States, 38, 51, U.S. Gall v. United ing sentencing purpose, clear which is the 586, 597, (2007)). If S.Ct. 169 L.Ed.2d judgment inquiry. error of procedur- we conclude that the sentence is emphasized sound, Supreme the Court has 64. As ally step is to review the the second Gall, process Rita and the district court reasonableness” of the sen- "substantive tence, employs to reach its decision is totality taking into account circumstances, vitally important perception any "including the extent Gall, process handed down is fair. If the range.” sentence variance from the Guidelines tainted, it matters not whether the sentence U.S. at 128 S.Ct. at 597. fair; Moncada, might appear per- 607 F.3d 720 to be the sentence is United States v. Alfaro (11th Cir.2010). Nothing say well. What Gall and our I here is incon ceived as tainted as My goal language. simply routinely "procedural” re- sistent with this cases refer to as language peel boilerplate encompasses appears my to back view what discus- explain through how the abuse of discretion standard steps one four and the district sion as procedural and substantive un explanation step addresses the at court’s of the sentence concerns described in Gall reasonableness five. What Gall and our cases refer to as and in our cases. review involves the final "substantive" proce- When a district court hands down a sup- inquiry step at five—whether record sentence, durally it has abused unreasonable ports the district court’s decision. making clearly erro- it discretion either a district court’s factfinding by misinterpreting It is well settled that neous process prescribed con- procedural failure to follow law. All of the errors labeled as contends, that, defendant, alternatively, if the the opportunity present also their that process, rulings court followed its requests provide and to a factual one of the steps least were erroneous.66 in support proposals.68 basis of their If appeals The court of each chal- considers the court parties failed afford the seriatim, lenge under the abuse of discre- case, opportunity present their it abused standard; is, tion for clear examines (by misinterpreting its discretion the law error the facts on which the district court requiring provide it to an opportuni- such ruling based its and the district court’s ty) and the defendant’s sentence must be If application the law de novo. vacated. district court abused its discretion at three, stepAt given the court must have step, inquiry ends there. The sen- parties opportunity argue —in vacated, tence must and the case re- light of all of presented the evidence resentencing.67 manded for If there is no step two—that sentences step, abuse of discretion in a the court *83 3553(a) requested supported by § are the proceeds to the next. factors and greater are “sufficient but not Step required one the district court to 3553(a)(2)’s than necessary” § to achieve determine the Guidelines sentencing range purposes. this, If the court failed to do it for the case. This determination is vulner- abused its (by discretion misinterpreting able to attack on two fronts: the district law), the and the sentence must be vacat- court’s factual findings application and its ed. of the Guidelines to the If facts. the fact- Step four asked the district court erroneous, findings clearly the district determine party’s whether either sentence court abused its discretion. If the fact- 3553(a)(2)’s proposal § sentencing fulfilled

findings review, survive clear error the purposes, was not inconsistent with the question becomes whether the court erred 3553(a) remaining factors, § and satisfied in applying the Guidelines to the If facts. the statute’s parsimony requirement. If in doing so the court made an “identifiable the court engage process, failed to in this legal mistake” in interpreting the Guide- it abused its (by discretion misinterpreting lines or if it “clear[ly] in applying err[ed]” law) and the sentence must be vacated. them, the court abused its discretion and the sentence must be vacated and the case Step required five the district court to White, remanded. See United States v. select and explain a sentence supported by (11th Cir.2003). 1317-19 3553(a)’s § and, moreover, factors a sen- two,

At step “sufficient, the district court was re- tence greater but not than nec- quired give 3553(a)(2)’s government, essary” § then to meet objectives. Klay, stitutes an abuse step-by-slep of discretion. 67. The appellate review I de- text, posit F.3d at 1251. In the case I application scribe includes of the harmless appellant challenges the district especially court's error doctrine. In most cases— ruling steps sentencing pro- in all five dispute mine run cases where the centers on steps process cess. Because these reflect the sentencing range where within the Guidelines law, required by failing to follow imposed them the sentence should have been —the demonstrates that the district court abused its review will steps focus on fewer than the five by misunderstanding discretion the law. fashioning the district court took in the sen- tence. assuming challenges I am that these were presented to the district court in the government form of 68. Because the initiated the objections preserved appeal and were proceeding, criminal it has the burden of first accordance with going United States v. Jones. proposal. forward with its 3553(a) from the Guide- fashion If the sentence deviated case, the parsimony principle. accordance with range for the lines (“The sentencing judge See id. for the had to set forth the reasons court superior position judge to find facts and question the court of The first deviation. import their under the indi- answer is whether the dis- appeals must case.”) omitted). (quotation vidual explanation for the sentence trict court’s permit meaningful appellate sufficient to Sentencing III. Applying the Model Rita, 357, 127 551 U.S. at S.Ct. review. Irey’s sentence must be vacated and the not, the sentence should be vacat- 2469. If remanded case because court failed to pro- and the case remanded for further ed explain its deviation from the Guidelines ground the district ceedings on sentencing range and its denial of the Gov- it misinterpreted requiring the law request ernment’s and because failed to explanation. The court provide such intelligible findings make on two of the whether appeals also determines 3553(a)(2) purposes. four sentencing explana- on in the facts relied If clearly expla- tion were erroneous. Irey’s A. Sentence clearly and the nation is sufficient facts charged The Government William erroneous, question becomes whether one count of sexual exploitation reasonably supports the record 2251(c). children 18 U.S.C. under explanation court’s and therefore the sen- *84 § part, proscribes relevant 2251 “em does, If it did not tence. the district court ... in ... ploy[ing] engage minor to clear and did judgment commit a error any sexually explicit conduct outside of the its discretion. not abuse ... purpose pro States for the United sum, appellate scrutiny In of a sentence ducing any depiction visual of such con performed through the classic abuse duct,” “transport[ing] such visual de (cid:127) is consistent with discretion lens. This piction to the United States.” Id.69 The command that a district court’s sen- Gall’s mandatory carries a minimum of statute tence is reviewed for abuse of discretion years’ imprisonment and a maximum of 30 whether inside or outside Guidelines years’ Irey pled guilty and imprisonment. Gall, sentencing range. years’ 552 U.S. at imprisonm was sentenced to 17.5 It is with 597. also consistent ent.70 expertise. the district court’s 1. Guidelines Calculation unquestionably The district court is judicial fact-heavy actor to apply Irey’s sentencing process began best inquiry by presentence investigation. The PSI set open-ended demanded text, 2251(c) 2G2.1(d)(1), 69. As stated in the makes it a Pursuant to U.S.S.G. if the exploitation offense involved the more employ single committing crime to minor in minor, Three, Chapter than Part D indictment, however, one Irey's the offense. al- Counts) (Multiple applied shall be as if the employed leged that he “minors" in commit- exploitation of had each minor been con- ting the offense. separate tained in a count of conviction. forty exploited. were at least There minors Irey was sentenced not for commit- highest by offense level allowable indictment, ting alleged the offense guidelines exploitation is a If the level committing uncharged several offenses as forty if it of each of minors is scored as sentence, imposing well. count, separate were contained in a adopted following provision: avail- offense level would be well over the Irey’s eighteen paragraphs. out conduct minor shall be treated as if contained already separate Because the court has detailed count of conviction.”72 U.S.S.G. conduct, that I will not cmt. n.5. replicate Finally, here. 2G2.1 the PSI re- Irey say Suffice it to flew to Cambo- duced the offense level 3 levels based occasions, finding adjustments ap- dia on numerous hired child on its two prostitutes, photographed videotaped plied: Irey accepted levels because re- them, having brought sponsibility crime, himself sex with for the and 1 level be- States, images provided timely back to the United cause he notification of the pornography told, traded them on child plead guilty. Irey’s web- intent to All total Irey sites. The PSI found that had offense level was 43. forty

abused over children. Irey Because had no criminal convic- tions, ap- Section 2G2.1 the Guidelines he fell into criminal history category plied, which carried a base offense level of I. An offense level of 43 and a criminal specific history yielded 32.71 The PSI found four offense I category a Guidelines characteristics, which sentencing range increased the of- imprisonment, life fense level 12: 4 statutory levels because the which well exceeded the maxi- twelve; age offense involved minors under mum. object The Government did objected levels because the offense involved sexu- this calculation. use contact; al Guidelines, levels because the offense of the 2006 represen- PSI’s restitution, involved distribution of child pornography; ability tation of his to pay and levels because the portrayed offense the PSI’s statement there were no sadistic or masochistic grounds conduct. Two more departing from the Guidelines were levels added under the grounds “Irey’s Guidelines’ on the psychiatric because, “multiple counts” rules under condition and his lack of a criminal record 2G2.1(d), specifically “whether in support cited advisory sentence below the *85 not, the count of guideline conviction or each such range.” In support, Irey at- Therefore, only able appropriate maximum level of 43. sentence under all the circum- case,” i.e., groups determining two were utilized in stances of the a sentence that offense level. would be commensurate with the Commis- states, opinion correctly As the court's sion's Guidelines determination of what sentencing range (according Guidelines appropriate. prosecutor would be The either PSI, adopted) which the district presented grand called jury with additional 1169-70, imprisonment, indict, charges for life see ante at but it refused to or did not statutory whereas the penalty present maximum them at all. Irey's years' one-count conviction was 30 im- prisonment. 71. Section 2G2.1 Principles covers three crimes: 18 The of Federal Prose- (sex children), trafficking §§ U.S.C. prosecutors, cution instructs that advising (sexual children), exploitation grand jury, grand and recommend that the (production jury putative pornography of child indict the defendant “with the States). importation to the United commission of additional offenses when addi- charges necessary tional ... are to ensure provides that the ... ... indictment the basis probation applied multiple officer appropriate for an under all the cir- counts rules for two counts of conviction Principles § cumstances of the case.” exploitation 9- because "[i]f of each of the supra forty 27.320. See note 41. I assume that the minors is scored as if it were contained prosecutor count, Irey knew separate would have to be in a the offense level would be 2251(c) charged § with additional violations well over the available maximum level 43.” “provide[ in order to supra ] the additional basis for See note 70. Berlin, history bility, pedophilia, positive of Dr. Fred which con- report tached a society, history, tributor to lack of criminal Irey’s psychiatric condition. explained recidivism, low risk of and sentence be- (Def.’s Objection Investiga- to Presentence years’ imprisonment low 30 was reason- 2.) Report tion (See 1.) Sentencing able. .Defi’s Mem. said, Irey “acknowledged” That the “seri- Memoranda Sentencing ous nature” of his conduct and “conceded” imprisonment that a substantial term of sentencing memoranda parties filed (Id.) appropriate. Accordingly, Irey sentencing hearing. The in advance of the asked for a sentence of to 20 years’ first, filed its memorandum Government imprisonment followed a substantial pages. five After a two- which totaled (Id. 11.) supervised term of release. at facts, recitation Gov- paragraph ernment asked for a Guidelines sentence. In arguing for a below-Guidelines sen- Irey’s case for an outside- Anticipating tence, Irey three child pornography cited sentence, the Government ar- Guidelines cases where a district court’s downward 5K2.0(b) governs § variance gued appeal. Irey that U.S.S.G. de- was affirmed on cases; then focused on the factors and partures in child sex abuse parsimony principle argued and 5K2.0(b) only permits departures years’ imprisonment less than 30 would be Commission; grounds authorized (1) old, appropriate because: had not authorized Commission Irey would be an old man when released ca- departures on the basis of diminished prison just from even if he served the 15 behavior, family pacity, aberrant ties (2) sentence; minimum year Irey’s expert responsibilities. Although the Gov- psychological reports demonstrated that recognized ernment that Booker invalidat- a pedophile ability he is who had a “limited 5K2.0(b), urged ed the court to defer to control the behavior the of- supporting Congress’s policy preferences point- presented fense of conviction” and a “low doing ed out that so would consistent (3) recidivism”; risk of still 3553(a)(5)’s §with instruction to take into (Id. 9.) support family. had the of his policy account the Commission’s state- briefly Irey also criticized the Guidelines Finally, argued the Government ments. 3553(a), light arguing that some of atypical, that if the “case is it is because of specific offense characteristics were factors,” aggravating, mitigating, *86 (Id. 10.) cumulative. terms of evi- Irey’s that conduct and characteristics dence, Irey expert submitted two witness clearly fell within the heartland of the reports and numerous character letters Accordingly, the Government Guidelines. family from his and friends. a sentence.73 asked for Guidelines Sentencing Hearing Irey’s eleven-page sentencing memoran- Irey argued dum was more substantial. The district court did not follow the light acceptance responsi- sentencing hearing procedure that in of his I have out- 3553(a) purposes. any § 73. The Government’s memorandum did not Its reference to (a)(5), requires address how Guidelines calculation fit the factor was to which consider- particular light policy facts of the case in ation of the Commission's statements. 3553(a). propose any § The Government did not The Government did not cite evidence PSI; any findings identify beyond how its what was in the record and the 3553(a)(2) arguments proposed fulfilled the it focused its on the Guidelines. evidence, sentencing hearing began entering lined.74 The his crimes. After this adopting Irey’s argument, with the district court the PSI’s counsel made his which findings applica- of fact and Guidelines rehashed with some embellishment the ar- argument gument tions. But rather than hear on contained his memo- approximated day, Irey how well the Guidelines randum.76 At the end of the 3553(a) factors, argued that a Irey the court turned to sentence of between 15 and years’ plea mitigation. imprisonment up and his for with to a life- supervised time of release would be suffi- witnesses, Irey including put on nine but not greater necessary cient than however, witness, himself. His “star” 3553(a). comply with psychiatrist, Dr. direct exami- Shaw. On nation, essentially Dr. testified that Then came the Shaw Government’s case. The pedophile presented prosecutor put was a who on no witnesses and offered “moderate to low of recidivism” no exception risk based evidence with the limited of a “empirically on sample images validated actuaríais.” Be- few it showed the court cross-examination, permitting fore during argument. the course of the pedophilia prosecutor court asked Dr. Shaw whether began argument her with is an pedophile illness and whether a who observation that “the defendant is not be- acts out ing prosecuted does so out of “rational free will.” being pedophile.... for exchange car, This resulted in the that the As an alcoholic doesn’t have to drive a length. pedophile details and criticizes at See to put doesn’t have themselves cross-examination, Cambodia, ante at 1200-02. On a brothel which this defen- ” (Sen- impeach the Government not Dr. years.... did Shaw dant did for 53-54.) way.75 Shaw, meaningful tencing After Dr. Tr. Hr’g empha- She then Irey put eight character Fi- witnesses. sized that this was not a child pornography nally, Irey case, briefly apologize possession testified to production but a case and entirely surprising given professionals you This is not compart- tell that this is a appeals' regarding courts of confusion being mentalized area of his whole ais proper way to review sentences. See pedophilia, diagnos- result of his which is a infra note 84. psychiatric tic criteria for care. gathered What I from Dr. Shaw's testi- simply 75. The Government had Dr. Shaw ad- mony and the best I could from Dr. Berlin’s (1) Irey pedophile mit: awas interest report pedophile is that the behavior of a 13; (2) younger children than the actuaríais volitional, is, totally it is dictated in groups rapists used had control that included degree by some the disease itself.... pedophiles who were interested in chil- 13; (3) age depression dren above the [Irey] understands he needs to be pedophilia; and alcoholism do not cause- punished.... give But he asks the Court to questions designed asked a series of to elicit him some consideration rest of his depth expert's knowledge Irey’s life, separate apart from the crime he 21-24.) (Sentencing Hr'g crime. Tr. has committed. *87 Among points, Irey’s argued: other counsel You’ve heard that he's treatable. You've heard submit, Honor, that he’s low risk of recidivism. [W]e Your that a 360- got That would make him 66 or 71 when he greater month sentence here is than neces- out, if he served the entire sentence. He sary Irey light mitigation for Mr. of the you would be an old man. We ask presented. that's been guideline's way There consider a sentence less than the is no to minimize ... gravity Irey of the acts with which Mr. recommended sentence. 49-52.) charged. (Sentencing Hr’g You’ve heard the mental health Tr. “ruined, just absolutely for the most society. vulnerable of world’s lives,” I think that any question ruined over 50 children’s some So don’t there’s ever (Id. smiling dealing while he did it. at 54- but we’re with here with an times offense 55.) Asking very top the court to look at the sam that rises to the in terms of explained that seriousness and its effect on ple images, prosecutor other human (Id. added.)) at beings.” (emphasis the children were between and 6 Irey’s Summarizing, distribution of the im the court found that old and “the ages pic over the Internet had made the of the “certainly seriousness” offense does encouraged tures infamous. She the court not mitigate any leniency.” favor of offense, victimization, (Id.) Irey’s to consider the Turning history and char- “message acteristics, to people and the we send who the court found that Irey had (Id. 55-56.) would do this.” at In the good family been a man community end, member, prosecutor focused on the “vi brought the acts that him before Irey’s im ciousness” of crime—over 1200 purely the court were “not volitional” and ages of “torture” of the and some worst “due in part recognized substantial to a illness,” pornography agents child had ever and he had a “low” risk of recidi- impose seen^—-and asked court to finding vism. The recidivism turned on (Id. 56-57.) (1) year at points: sentence. two the court credited the ex- (2)

pert testimony, Irey’s age the—as it, put “by the time gets he out of Findings District Court’s prison likely age he’ll most be at an where hearing parties, After from both unlikely, just recidivism would be from a findings court made its on the record. (Id. 59-60.) physiological standpoint.” at explained The court first its task: 3553(a)(2)(A), § skipped court then I account guideline take into score 3553(a)(2)(B) (C). § jumping to Re- and consider that as a benchmark in deterrence, garding general the court imposing appropriate terms of an sen- found that a “hope- serious sentence would case, given tence in a and that bench- others, fully” deter that conclusion mark kept through- needs mind might “rationally because of ]” follow! analysis.... I out the But what need to (Id. 60.) pedophilia. the illness of at determining guideline do after score deterrence, specific Turning to the court is to look at the other factors on 3553(a)(1), findings referred to its individualized basis an effort to profes- reiterated that the mental health appropriate determine an sentence for categorized Irey presenting sionals particular this case. recidivism, low risk of and therefore found society protec- did not need “further (Id. 57.) him, beyond tion from at least the statuto- saying anything Without more about the (Id. 61.) ry minimum sentence.” Guidelines, the court launched into an 3553(a) factors, analysis beginning Finally, the court seemed to return to 3553(a)(1) 3553(a)(2)(A), stating nature and circum- comes down to “[i]t —the history my of the offense promotes respect stances and the view of what for the (Id.) provides just punishment.” characteristics of the offender. The court law and entirety characterized the as “horrific”: Here discussion: offense is the its “as *88 indicated, sentence, perhaps 30-year “The victims were numerous and I think that a ly responded I have that the sentence was “more given personal factors guideline, upon, greater necessary percent than to like 60 of the not half.” touched 65.) Tr. statutory objectives. (Sentencing Hr’g On accomplish hand, in light the other seriousness crimes, I think a above the of the sentence Why B. Must be Sentence (Id.)

mandatory minimum is called for.” and Remanded Vacated Irey’s sentence must be vacated and the Objections Final Sentence resentencing. case remanded for As I ex- II.E, immediately hearing plained part supra, The court district court —without any argument application imposing on the abuses its discretion in a sen- parsimony principle findings improper to tence when it follows procedures, its —an- an interpre- nounced sentence. The court settled bases its decision on incorrect (or clearly imprisonment on 210 months’ 17.5 tation of law or erroneous factfind- $100, years), a special ings, reviewing assessment of forfei- or when the court is left ture, supervised lifetime term of with the definite and firm conviction that (which mandatory judg- release included a sub- the court committed a clear error stance abuse and mental health ment program making its decision. treatment). specializing objected Irey’s sex offender The Government sen- (Id. 61-62.) tence on substantive reasonableness grounds, Irey’s and I would vacate sen- Jones, In accordance with the court then grounds: tence on those im- the sentence any objection asked whether there was posed cannot be reconciled with the dis- the sentence or the manner in which it had judge’s factfindings trict on pronounced. prosecutor object- been 3553(a)(2)(A).77 variance, ed to “the extent of the which is half, almost and based on the making factors ad- When findings his on record, particularly 3553(a)(1), duced this judge the seri- remarked that long-term ousness and nature of the of- when considering the “nature and circum- fense, offense, [that] extent of variance stances” of the the crime “r[ose] would be unreasonable.” The court top” mere- terms of seriousness and Here, range”). I would also find that the district Guidelines the court improper procedures followed and committed explain why made no effort to it sentenced legal following errors the model that I years’ imprisonment to 17.5 when the forth, objected set had the Government years' imprisonment. Guidelines called for 30 grounds. those This is the case for at least Second, impossible it is for this court to de- First, two reasons. the district court failed to 3553(a)(2) purpose termine which drove the requisite procedure. follow the adversarial sentence. Importantly, adequately it did not address overly This is not to be critical of the dis- either the Guidelines recommendation or the circuit, trict governing court. In this the law request year Government's for a 30 is, neglected to articulate the has been at sea. This reasons circuit’s why greater precedent such sentence was than steps neces- has not made clear the 3553(a)(2) sary satisfy purposes. follow, district court must nor has it clarified clearly Gall indicates that the failure to ex- importance making findings regarding plain range a deviation from the Guidelines (a)(2) purposes. judge The district fol- Gall, constitutes error. 552 U.S. at procedural lowed the and substantive law as (explaining S.Ct. at 597 that the court must best he could discern it. explain "adequately the chosen sentence—in- cluding explanation deviation from *89 offense, ... promote that the “seriousness of the offense did the need to respect for law, the rule of just and the need for mitigate any leniency.” not favor of On (2) punishment; weighing the three con- (a)(2), explaining why after the need for other; (3) against siderations each specific deterrence counseled a sentence of making findings on the sentence needed to years’ imprisonment no more than 15 3553(a)(2)(A) meet the purpose.79 The Irey’s pedophilia, age, family based on (a)(2)(A) court, in making its find- ties, the court turned to the ings, failed to follow these steps. three (a)(2)(A). purpose punishment, The en- While it mentioned the “promote[ need to ] (A) tirety of the court’s discussion on respect for the “provide[] just law” and as follows: punishment,” intelligible it made no find- my It comes down to of what pro- view ings inquiries gave on these no indica- respect pro- motes for the law and what tion that it had considered facts crucial to just punishment. vides I think that a any determination of the “just need for sentence, 30-year given personal punishment” promote and the need “to factors that I have upon touched (for respect for example, the law” the sen- greater necessary than to accomplish received).80 tences other offenders Simi- statutory objectives. On the other larly, although the court stated here that hand, in light of the seriousness of the the seriousness of the offense “called for” crimes, I think a sentence above the “a sentence above the mandatory mini- mandatory minimum is called for. mum,” it specific made no findings on the seriousness of the offense when conducting (Id. 61.)78 (a)(2)(A) know, inquiry. however, I do inquiry a court should conduct on what the court would find on the serious- (a)(2)(A) (1) steps: involves three making ness of offense from during what it said (a)(1) findings regarding There, inquiry. seriousness of the it found that the just 78. Given the punishment context content of this find- need for for the offense and ing, it is unclear that the court understood the promote respect the need to for the law is 3553(a)(2)(A) proper inquiry. The court did permissible. example, For it stands to reason explain by “personal what it meant fac- that someone who acts under duress is less may referring Irey’s tors.’’ It have been culpable and therefore should receive less recidivism, just low risk of which it had punishment ordinary than an offender. It so, If found. the court erred because a find- also stands to reason that the court's failure ing specific bearing on deterrence has no pro- to take account of that difference would (a)(2)(A). II.B, part supra, culpa- As I note cases, disrespect mote for the law. such (a)(2)(A) bility does bear on the need. For however, explain the court reasoning. must its reason, history this criminal can be relevant Ch.4, (a)(2)(A). Pt.A, U.S.S.G. intr. com- Irey’s person- 79. The court’s narrow focus on though history might ment. Even criminal conducting al characteristics belies that it was (a)(2)(A) (a)(2)(C), relevant to both analysis. this finding regard- does not mean that the court's (which ing specific deterrence will be based why It is unclear the court omitted the factors, including on a number of criminal “seriousness of the offense” when it said "it history) (a)(2)(A) bearing has on the need. my promotes comes down to view of what course, may simply Of the court been respect provides for the law just and what referring personal to the same factors it had punishment.” may It have been because the 3553(a)(2)(C) analysis drawn on for the thought it had 3553(a)(2)(A) settled the issue of the up independent § set analy- Generally, during considering per- sis. seriousness the offense an offender's 3553(a)(1) impact inquiry. sonal characteristics for their on the *90 years,81 it is not “horrific,” very- a sentence of 17.5 port “rises to the was offense explanation this for seriousness,” province that “in our to make top in terms of making intelligible judge. of- the Without [the the ... seriousness terms of just punishment respect on fense], findings en- long-standing, long-term the law, weighing the explicitly for and without certainly mitigate not in it does gagement reaching a conclusion inquiries and three any leniency.” favor [sic] (a)(2)(A) need, they the I how bore on on Therefore, all I the district know about say review that appellate cannot on simply (a)(2)(A) that it found findings on court’s imposed supported the sentence It is incon- very serious. the offense to be factfindings. All I have the district court’s on judge’s finding seri- ceivable that the finding on the seri- is the district court’s trans- alone would ousness of the offense offense, of the and I know that it ousness half of late into a sentence at the bottom im- cannot be reconciled with the sentence range of 15 to statutory sentencing the No rational could have sen- posed. judge only two and a years, let alone a sentence Irey years to 17.5 based on the tenced statutory minimum. half above the intelligible finding seriousness rose —that (a)(2)(A) court, conducting inqui- its I top for “horrific” crime.82 this the three ry, may have concluded that Irey’s therefore vacate sentence on would were in tension— relevant considerations ground supported by that it is not the of the offense coun- with the seriousness I am findings, district court’s as able top of the seling a sentence or near understand them.83 but, statutory range, example, Irey’s age and advanced I would remand sentence to the Irey’s impaired volition just that the district court can decreasing punishment the need for so (a)(2) findings If were make and resentence respect for the law. this case, than sup- accordingly making in the record could our own evidence —rather hand, grounds, even if 81. On other if the district court's substantive reasonableness findings just punishment respect proper on the district court had failed to make finding law were with his on (a)(2)(A) consistent findings respect on for the law and offense, (a)(2)(A) instance, would seriousness just punishment. In this I would sentence, Irey’s and a drive sentence 17.5 findings vacate the sentence because years could not be reasonable. Because the district court made on the seriousness of the (a)(2)(A) judge's findings on the three —unlike cannot be reconciled with the sen- offense (a)(2)(A) subsidiaiy inquiries under —cannot imposed, given tence the district court's (a)(2) factors, weighed against the other (a)(2)(A) properly the other failure to address imposed the sentence would have to be harsh considerations, I cannot assume that bal- (a)(2)(A) enough satisfy strong need. finding anced the court's on seriousness the offense. Contrary to the court's characterization of my Irey's opinion, I would vacate sen- judge’s It what the district is also unclear ground tence on the that the district court's general findings were and on deterrence findings insufficiently are "detailed” or "lack- sentence, they supported though whether ing specificity Ante at or effort.” question I need not address this because it is not, My point the court im- 1195-96. as imposed sup- was not clear that the sentence findings plies, that a district court’s need be (a)(2)(A). judge's findings ported unnecessary length of a certain or belabor entirety Here is the of the court’s discussion points. 3553(a)(2)(B): § My point on substantive reasonableness is aspects There are other of the statute that findings that a district court’s must be recon- subjective essentially in nature. Of imposed. Had cilable with the sentence course, adequate deterrence to criminal imposed that was district court a sentence (a)(2)(A) conduct. I mean a serious sentence is findings reconcilable with the made, hopefully going from con- Irey’s to deter others I would not vacate sentence on (a)(2) findings to determine whether the ments this circuit’s answer to a question so, is reasonable. To we do that continues to vex the nation’s courts step Booker, have to out of our role would appeals: after what does appellate *91 court and assume the role of reviewing review of sentences for substantive “rea- I explain, resentencer. As now this is sonableness” under an abuse of discretion today. error the precisely the court makes answer, standard mean?84 The correct as IV, I in parts demonstrate III supra, Approach The IV. Court’s is to apply classic abuse of discretion re- Today, needlessly the court assumes the view. The court’s answer is a shocking: role of resentencer. doing, simple objection so ce- that a sentence is “unrea- affairs, ducting although similar when abused its considerable discretion if it has this, dealing weighed we’re with an illness like I’m the factors in a manner that demon But, strably yields rationally not sure that that follows. unreasonable sentence. We nevertheless, required are therefore still appropriate to make the calcu deterrence is an ....”) consideration, lus ourselves and United States v. a Tom stiff sentence is in ko, 558, (3d (Fish Cir.2009) 562 F.3d 585-86 keeping with the seriousness of this offense. er, J., ("As dissenting) the remainder 60.) of our {Id. reveals, analysis the District Court's over-reli general The court’s statement deter- 3553(a)(1) § justification ance on for the "essentially subjective rence is in nature” in- significant qualitative quantitative vari dicates that the court did not understand the granted pales comparison ance it 3553(a)(2)(B) inquiry. inquiry § The includes 3553(a) § numerous suggest factors which community the incidence of the crime imprisonment that a term of is warranted.... community and the view of the offense. The 3553(a) § [W]e conclude that the relevant fac court should have taken into account its earli- strongest possible tors advocate in the terms finding pornography "epi- er that child anis including a imprison a term of demic,” ready availability driven its on the ment.”) Tomko, (majori 562 F.3d at 574 Regardless, Internet. it is unclear what the ty opinion) (“Accordingly, the substantive day regarding court found at the end reasonableness of each sentence must be general the need for deterrence —whether it terms, evaluated on its own based on the general reasoned that the need for deterrence provided, reasons that the district court should be discounted because of the illness of light particular of the facts and circumstances pedophilia general or whether the need for case.”) added) (emphasis of that and United great deterrence was and counseled a harsh Smart, 800, (10th States v. 518 F.3d Cir. latter, sentence. If it were the the sentence 2008) ("We may weight not examine the imposed may satisfy not be sufficient 3553(a) assigns district court to various fac general need for deterrence as found tors, and its ultimate assessment of the bal judge. district them, legal ance between as a conclusion to novo.”). be reviewed de appeals, including 84. The federal courts of court, approach this substantive reasonable- Moreover, appellate courts and circuit inconsistently. ness review This is not sur- judges country openly across the have ex- since, prising Supreme as the Court itself has pressed appropriate confusion about the role Booker, Rita, Gall, recognized, “Apprendi, See, appellate e.g., courts. United States v. Kimbrough given the lower courts a Feemster, (8th Cir.2009) 572 F.3d good digest relatively deal to over short (Colloton, J., (“[Ojne concurring) searches in - States, period.” Spears v. United U.S. principled vain for a basis on which to con- -, 840, 845, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 appellate duct a consistent and coherent re- (2009) curiam) omitted). (per (quotation reasonableness.”); view for United v. States Specifically, judges the courts and their differ Funk, (6th Cir.2008) 534 F.3d they purport in the amount of deference C.J., ("This (Boggs, dissenting) repre- case weighing afford the district court’s essentially judgment sents call under the 3553(a) Compare factors. United States v. unclear standard rather of ‘reasonableness’ (11th Cir.2008) Pugh, 515 F.3d given by Supreme that we have been (”[W]e Rita, may find Kimbrough, that a district court has Court the wake of it.”) making (quoting court took in party the grants disappointed sonable” Pugh, United States of a new equivalent functional Cir.2008)). (11th “reasonable,” the By appeals. the court of hearing before range that it court means the arguments evidence and court considers objectively satisfy correct to thinks court, makes offered to the district never 3553(a). sentencing purposes of reweighs the fac- findings, new tors, as a matter of law and concludes declare, goes so far as to even Irey must be sentenced to 30 William incorrectly any support, and without process, In the years’ imprisonment. *92 3553(a) § pres- of facts under weight the and immeasurable in- court does immense (“[T]he question ents a of law. Id. at 1190 damage. Part A sets out the stitutional importance light facts the explains Part B approach; court’s 3553(a) § a question factors is itself harm that it causes. law.”) (em- fact but instead is an issue added); n.

phasis (justifying id. at 3491 Resentencing Appellate A. finding the court’s new need specific deterrence in sex crime cases be- court, question pre- to the According ... cause member of this Court has “[n]o Irey’s whether sentence is “rea- sented is suggested determining before that in ever determining Ante at 1180 In sonable.” ought law we to confine ourselves to “reasonable,” the sentence is whether that in the the decisions were cited district unabashedly explains job court that its court”) added).85 (emphasis to take the facts found the district court record, any others it finds in the conclusion, reaching this the court findings then make its own for each disregards Supreme analysis Court’s 3553(a) § factor. Id. at 1189-90. After See, Gall, 56-57, e.g., at Gall. U.S. making findings, its own the court re- 600-02, at (reversing Eighth 3553(a) § weighs the factors and deter- “[although correctly because [it] Circuit range mines for itself what of sentences is that the appropriate state[ed] standard of (“In discretion, reasonable. Id. at 1189 order to de- it engaged review was abuse of occurred, termine whether that has we are analysis closely that more resembled ‘required [sentencing] presented” by, to make the calculus novo review of the facts de step example, concluding ourselves’ and to review each that the district Likewise, Gall.”). pellate reviewing commentators have noted courts in sentences. Sever- Supreme seemingly contradictory seemingly conflicting imperatives Court’s al often Bowman, III, Booker....”). imperatives. E.g.,Frank play after O. De Supreme Mangled bacle: How the Court has claiming 85. The court does not seem to be Sentencing Might American Law It and How relevant, Mended, a that whether fact is in the eviden- YetBe 77 U. Chi. L.Rev. 459-60 sense, (2010) tiary presents question of law. Rath- (claiming Supreme Court’s er, says given "impor- the court that a fact’s sentencing entire line of Sixth Amendment tance,” is, weight, deciding presents "tangle excep cases of rules and nor, 3553(a) presents question obviously simple issue of law. tions” that "is neither above, length logical”); (explaining that the district as illustrated at See ante Lind Harrison, say Appellate C. Discretion and Sen court cannot write facts out of record them, Booker, tencing ignoring even if it reflects the court’s 62 U. Miami L.Rev. after (2008) ("What important” judgment are not 1115-16 has resulted is that “those facts 3553(a) ap- inquiry). primarily confusion about the role of the 3553(a) weight too much “gave plays Gall’swith a critical in appellate role sentences, the conspiracy”) (quotations just drawal from review of as it does in the omitted); Smart, United States v. 518 initial decision” and the court of Cir.2008) (10th (reversing appeals “apply F.3d must those same factors in precedent determining as inconsistent with Gall that whether a sentence is reason- able.”) added). weight assigned “de novo (emphasis had reviewed 3553(a) to various factors be purports The court to apply abuse of weighing process cause we considered this give discretion it will because some defer- law”). a question ignores to be It also ence to a district court’s Spe- conclusion. precedent repeated this circuit’s —we cifically, the court *93 definite and firm conviction that the dis- Amedeo, 823, (11th Cir.2007); 487 F.3d 832 trict court committed a clear error of judg- Gardner, v. Fed.Appx. United States 363 3553(a) § ment in weighing the factors.” (11th Cir.2010) 688, 690 (unpublished); 1190, omitted). Id. at (quotation 1191 But Pertil, 569, States v. Fed.Appx. United 344 the line between “unreasonable” and “most (11th Cir.2009) (unpublished).86 573 appropriate” blurs. And it quickly blurs case, because questions Whatever of when the court conceives of its role as to 3553(a) § law are reviewed de novo even under the conduct the inquiry for itself and standard,87 of identify abuse discretion the court range of sentences the district give (as does not even think it owes— court reasonably imposed could have —or 3553(a) deference to the district court’s opposed to reviewing the district court’s (“Section analysis. 3553(a) ante at reasoning See 1183-84 from its factfindings Though disputed, question court is convinced that it is not weigh is how to them committing Eighth sentencing purposes.... the same mistake as the We would find unreasonable, however, conducting inquiry grossly Circuit in an any sugges- Gall — 3553(a) Irey factors akin to de novo review— may tion that the credit due for his striking there family’s feelings are similarities between the remotely two for him could even Gall, analyses. Compare approach heavy United States v. 446 weight against stacked 884, (8th Cir.2006) ("First, committed.”), F.3d 889 him dis- for the criminal acts he (“With gave weight trict court too much to Gall’s ante at 1217 child sexual abuse of Irey conspiracy capable withdrawal from the the kind that we know because the of and committed____ acknowledge significant failed to has [E]ven with an assumed being subject following benefit low risk of recidivism Gall received from to the release in 15 months, Guidelines.”), 38, imprisonment 3 rev’d 552 U.S. for that 586, 445, length adequate pro- of time does afford S.Ct. 169 L.Ed.2d and id. not at 891 ("[T]he him.”). tection from further crimes properly weigh district court did not the seriousness of Gall’s offense. While the States, 81, district court observed that Gall's offense lev- 87. See Koon v. United 518 U.S. 100, adequately 2035, 2047, el did not reflect the con- offense 116 S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) ("[Wjhether 'solely drug duct because it was based permissible a factor is a quantity,’ ignored departure the district court seri- basis for under circumstances law, ecstasy poses.”), question ous health risks appeals with ante at is a and the court of husband, ("The 1204-05 facts about as a need not defer to the district court's resolu-

father, community point.”). and member of the are tion of the equities or conclusion). “reweigh not to ap- courts is the court of Once to its make sure that what the facts but to independently identified reassess has peals sen- range permissible from [the is the derived believes the conclusions appellate (explicitly implicitly), ju- tences and assessments weighings court’s] inquiry into whether review becomes rec- supported by the dicially sound and falls within the court’s sentence the district ord”).88 it, appeals, the court of range of sentences worse, con- the court does not isWhat imposed. approach This

would fac- analysis of the fine its new guise novo review the to de amounts evidence, objec- arguments, tors Curtiss-Wright See of discretion. abuse In so to the district court.89 tions offered 10, Co., 1, Electric U.S. Corp. v. Gen. ignores the court well-established doing, (1980) L.Ed.2d 1 100 S.Ct. implicitly appellate procedure rules conducting abuse of that when (instructing Jones, v. review, overrules United States appellate the role of discretion my Taylor, The court contends that "much” on United States 88. The court relies "faulty 101 L.Ed.2d from the 487 U.S. criticisms on this score stem (1988), proposition that courts of for the only government made premise that decision appeals must scrutinize objection’ Irey’s is 'un- 'simple ” closely is arrived at because a sentence more 44. With this reasonable.' Ante at 1223 n. statutory by considering factors. a number hand, position my mischaracterization of though— Taylor, & n. 15. In Ante at 1189-90 by citing purports defeat it the court of whether a addressed the issue which *94 reaching the uncontr- number of our cases discretion dismiss- district court abused its party re- conclusion that a need not oversial ing charges prejudice with when the Govern- arguments peat colloquy it had in the Jones Speedy Act viola- committed a Trial ment See, e.g., already to the district court. made Supreme specifically Court limited tion—the Weir, United States factfindings sup- analysis the its to whether (11th Cir.1995) (declining apply to the waiver charges ported the decision to dismiss the “clearly under- rule when the district court with the prejudice. The Court started with [party’s] position specifically dismissing charges the the stood district court's order— prejudice it”). to see then looked rejected —and supported that conclu- whether the record My It true that a criticism is different. Ultimately, because the district court sion. specific general objection preserve more will reasoning, fully explain the Court did not its actually arguments litigant made to the dis- Court failed to con- "[t]he held that District court, id., general objection but a does trict of a sider all the relevant to the choice factors arguments litigant preserve specific that a remedy Act. What factors it did under the findings Here, rely unsupported by on were factual example, Govern- never made. the Taylor, 487 U.S. or evidence in the record.” argue general did terms that ment Finding at 2423. insuffi- due 30-year would be reasonable to support for the district cient in the record Irey’s the Gov- crimes. But seriousness refusing conjure to its court's decision the court does ernment did not contend—as explanations, the Court held own today good credit would behavior —that Tellingly, discretion. district court abused its sentence, Irey’s that such a sen- reduce or Speedy Act Trial the court did not conduct " amount less than four tence would its remedy inquiry for itself: It did not reach [Irey’s] 50 victims.” Ante months for each way Speedy each own conclusions on the made these Had the Government 1208-09. cut and it did not decide Trial Act factor the court considers arguments and the others or the case should be dismissed with whether here, may court first time the district for the Rather, prejudice. because the deci- without Since the imposed a different sentence. discretion, left to the district court's sion is not, may not consider did we Government simply question to it returned appeal. the first time on them for for reconsideration. (11th Cir.1990), citing overruled on new evidence. respect With 3553(a)(1), Morrill, grounds by example, other United States v. the court creates (11th Cir.1993) (en banc).90 argument for the first time an 984 F.2d 1136 district court’s view of as a victim Jones, explicitly In this court ruled out “permeated” and “tainted” the court’s considering arguments new and evidence 3553(a) weighing factors, of the although Thus, in sentencing appeals. without ex- prosecutor objected never to the char planation apology, court works a acterization of Irey as a victim. Ante at revolution in governing scope the rules 1199-200.92 The court also argues, for the of review. court’s willingness to do so time, first clearly district court conception underscores that its of substan- erred when it Irey’s found that misconduct tive reasonableness review no bears re- purely volitional,” was “not and that even semblance to traditional abuse of discre- accepting the district court’s finding on tion review.91 volition, the case would still fall in the Instead, the court conducts a free-wheel- heartland because almost all pedophiles ing inquiry conjuring arguments new and are child molesters.93 Id. at 1201-02. To — Any objecting conclusion that sen- sentencing. same should be true with trig- tence’s "substantive Sentencing defy unreasonableness” precise decisions calibration gers equivalent the functional of a new applied sen- unique must facts of tencing hearing appeal is tantamount specific cases. District uniquely courts are overruling required Jones. Jones that the dis- judgment suited to make the demanded opportunity trict court have the first to cor- parsimony principle, errors; objection rect its that a sentence is reopening appeal certainly record on di- "substantively explain- unreasonable” without importance minishes the ing why give opportu- does not the court that hearing. nity. time,” say 92. When I "for the first I mean Brown, United States v. 415 F.3d 1257 arguments that these were not made to the (11th Cir.2005), this court discussed abuse of district court. fact-heavy, discretion review in another indi *95 There, vidualistic context. the issue was course, recognize, 93. I that after the court expert testimony whether could be admitted explains why finding clearly the was errone- under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti ous, accepts finding states that it the be- cals, Inc., 579, 2786, 509 U.S. 125 challenge cause the Government did not it on (1993). explained L.Ed.2d 469 This court appeal. But see at ante 1201. If the court some detail the reasons for abuse of discre however, truly accepting finding, the I do not review, notably tion most that the "rules re why understand the court takes the time to lating precisely to Daubert issues are not cali conjure arguments. new evidence and applied brated and case-specific must be though It could be that ostensibly the court evidentiaiy defy gen circumstances that often accepts finding, the district court’s volitional eralization” and that “we don't want to deni Brown, explanation clearly its that it is grate importance erroneous is of the trial.” very important analysis. appeal, its The court ulti- 415 F.3d at 1266. On this court did mately finding reweigh concludes that the Daubert "cannot factors to determine because, reasonably carry weight” much whether the district court abused its at discre Instead, part, clearly explained tion. least it is this court that even erroneous. Id. If though expert really accepted Irey's only evidence met court that one of miscon- factors, part” the four Daubert duct say we could not was "due in substantial to dimin- "particular capacity, that in this situation” the district ished id. at it could not con- discretion, especially "given ultimately court abused its clude—as it does—that the district heavy really finger a thumb and a court would have abused its discretion as a thumb— put imposed or two—that is on the district court's side matter of law if it had a sentence of of the scale.” Id. at day statutory 1268. even one less than the maxi-

1264 Regard- court. cites never heard the district points, both of these the court prove punishment, the Govern- ing need expert evidence never offered (cit does, argued, as the court at ment never court.94 See id. Winick, good behavior credit would reduce Law in ing Bruce J. Sex Offender Irey’s years, to 15.5 which Jurisprudence sentence Therapeutic 1990s: A than four for each L. amounts to “less months Psychol. Pol’y Pub. & Analysis, at Nor did (1998), Hall Richard 50 victims.” Id. Ryan [his] C.W. & Irey’s Hall, argue the Government Pedophilia: A C.W. Defi Profile nition, not reflect the seriousness of the Offenders, Recid does Characteristics of ivism, Outcomes, years he received 2.5 and Forensic offense because Treatment Issues, longer than the 15 he would have Mayo Proc. Clinic (2007)). picture had he taken one lewd of a served 17-year-old girl. Id. at 1209. argue, did the ever

Nor Government does, deterrence, respect general court the court the district With analysis would new to the clearly finding Irey good erred in had court’s entire court. The Government never ar- positively character and had contributed to district community. gued general that the deterrence family his See id. need that, especially compelling por- child (contending categorically, 1203-05 anyone nography the crime com- context. But see id. at 1210-12. who commits family pointed his to lose The Government never to Su- mitted and causes its good family preme underscoring and home cannot be a Court cases that im- business character). good portance, appellate reversing man and have Nor did or to cases argue questioning logic to the district court district courts for Government Irey’s general pedophilia that it should not have considered deterrence when age old in his favor because to do so would involved. But see id. evading

reward him “for detection and it is completely ignored The Government unreasonable to that.” do Id. specific deterrence at the hear- Similarly, reweighing ing.95 questioned, each Government never 3553(a)(2) conjured today, purposes, the court as the does the district court’s arguments 65-year-old that a finding new and cited new evidence male would be ("Nothing apt mum. id. at entered into the A See less than the record. more term *96 advisory guidelines years, might Vining be "extra-record sentence of 30 information.” Corr., available, Sec’y, Dep’t 571 which is the maximum serve will of Nevertheless, (11th Cir.2010). per because it purposes set out 3553(a).”). forms function of evidence in the court’s analysis, I it event, refer to as such. any my point In is that when review- sentences, ing this should not consider fact, conjure arguments stipulated evidence and that have 95. the Government that I, Irey history category never been offered to the district court. That fell criminal into principles ap- stip- is inconsistent with classic of which in essence means the Government prison beyond pellate review and will dam- ulated that no time that called cause immense specific age for his offense level was needed for relationship we have institutional Accordingly, deterrence. the Government with the district courts of this circuit. argued, example, Irey's never that crimi- "evidence,” Though expert history category under-represented po- 94. I label this it is nal his technically not evidence because it was not tential for recidivism. Revocation, Probation, activity “physio for sexual from a ence Fed. too old June 2006; Langan al., Patrick A. et Bureau of at standpoint.” But see id. logical Statistics, Justice Recidivism Sex then, Obviously did the Government of Of Released Prison in 1991 fenders from published involving sex opinions cite to (2003); Report 2009 Annual the Di of age point. over 60 to make this offenders rector: Judicial Business the United of id. at Nor did the But see 1213-14. Gov 2010); (forthcoming States Courts spring expert ernment enter evidence about the Protecting Our Nation’s Children from high rates of comparatively recidivism old Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: see at 1214 er sex offenders. But id. Done?, What Needs to Be Hearing Before Tracey Kyckel Mark (citing Motivans & Crime, Terrorism, the Subcomm. on hahn, Federal Prosecution Child Sex Comm, of Security Homeland the H. 2006, Bureau Exploitation Just. (2005) (state Judiciary, Cong. 109th Offenders Bull., proposition Berlin, M.D., Dec. for the Stat. ment of Fred S . Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University)). that 7.3% of all sex are over offenders Hall, Ryan Hall Richard C.W. & C.W. Finally, 3553(a)(6), respect Definition, Pedophilia: A Char argued Irey’s Government never that sen- Profile of Recidivism, produce tence would Offenders, acteristics Treat dispari- unwarranted ty. then, it Obviously, never Outcomes, cited twelve Issues, ment and Forensics cases for the proposition that the defen- (2002), Mayo Clinic Proc. prop dants those cases committed a less seri- up pedophiles osition 44% of were ous crime than received more (age in the older adult 40 to 70 range at serious sentence. Id. 1219-21. years) and that pedophiles “offend their If the analysis court’s leaves doubt years at greater later rate than other the court has assumed the role of offenders”). sexual resentencer, its conclusion removes it. Af- deterrence, on specific Still the Govern conducting ter equivalent the functional never a new argued sentencing hearing, ment lifetime of su court con- cludes less than “[n]othing the adviso- pervised release would be insufficient to ry guidelines years, which is protect public by pointing Bureau of available, the maximum will serve the sen- statistics, evidence, expert Justice other 3553(a).” tencing §in purposes set out Id. demonstrating possible and cases that it is at it vacates Accordingly Irey’s sen- supervision. to recidivate when under But tence and remands the case with the in- (citing see id. 1214-16 Bureau of Justice struction that the district court impose a Statistics, Dep’t Justice, Federal Crimi years’ sentence of 30 confinement. Id. Trends, 2003, (2006); nal Justice Loretta unprecedented 1224-25. With this step, Stalans, J. Adult Sex on Com Offenders indisputable that the court has resen- munity Supervision: A Review Recent tenced Mr. Irey.96 Treatment, Strategies Assessment (2004); Crim. Just. & Behav. 564 James L.

Johnson, Sex on Federal Com today’s After opinion, is the law of this Offenders munity Supervision: Factors that circuit that a party disappointed by who is Influ- Though we have ed Livesay, reversed sentences on States v. 587 F.3d 1278-79 before, (11th Cir.2009) grounds (vacating substantive reasonableness a sentence and in structing we have never ordered imprisonment required the district court to See, particular impose e.g., leaving a length sentence. Unit the of the term to the district by- ments; handed down if the sentence imposed has district court the

the sentence of that outside court falls the district resentencing.97 court for to this may apply Sometimes, reverse. range, we will testimony, disappointed the Except for live Here, the single point. a range could be never offered evidence party can brief than any other sentence court holds to the district articulated never arguments would constitute imprisonment years’ point, this vantage new From its court. the district court an abuse of discretion —if the district second-guess then court will months, years, to 29 the had sentenced will determine We court’s sentence. abused its days, it would have correct sentences objectively range of law.98 The court as a matter of discretion argu- new new facts and on the based disregard the could discretion); though district courts at 1204 Pugh, 515 F.3d court’s circumstances, extraordinary stating what the sentence Guidelines (remanding without law, Martin, cases, be); 455 F.3d as a matter because in "most United States should (11th Cir.2006) (same); Crisp, adequately taken will have 1241-42 the Commission account, (same). and no de- at 1291-92 factors into all relevant permissible.” United legally will be parture 220, 234, Booker, case, disap- 543 U.S. the Government is the States v. In this (2005). 738, 750, suppose defendant This was pointed party. But the 160 L.Ed.2d 621 claiming the disappointed party, though court had were the even the district also true imposed was so court virtually sentence the district to sentence unfettered discretion defen- "unreasonable.” If the range by severe as to be identified within the defendant by sandbagged the district dant had mandatory Guidelines. withholding mitigated the need evidence that Transforming from manda- the Guidelines by failing cite the sort punishment and tory advisory the Sixth Amendment cured court’s published cited in the authorities doubt- the Court had "never violation because the withheld opinion, we would not consider judge authority to exercise broad ed the (because published authorities evidence and imposing within a a sentence discretion presented to matters not we do not consider Booker, 543 statutory range.” United States v. court) plain we invoked the the district unless Thus, a defen- 125 S.Ct. at 740. U.S. error doctrine. along statutory any dant risked sentence long court did not range, so as the district only approach inconsis- is the court's 98. Not Because the district its discretion. abuse review, it also tent with abuse of discretion authority “broad discre- to exercise court’s reintroducing infirmi- the constitutional risks statutory along offenders tion” to sentence short, ty by the court’s cured Booker. remedy to range what allows the Booker appellate court into the approach turns the man- Amendment violation of cure the Sixth Sentencing post-Booker Commission: rather Guidelines, appellate datory and because re- Guidelines, the court than the Commission's authority, properly the check on that view is of a appeals will determine bounds defining scope appellate review is es- identifying district court’s discretion sential. given range for a of "reasonable sentences” appellate review is Giving proper content to set of facts. assuring advisory-Guide- key that the rights remedy actually the Sixth Amend- line Pre-Booker, mandatory Guidelines set appellate wrong by Booker. If identified ment because, statutory Apprendi maximum up stringent, it will carve statu- review is too jury only reflected based facts exactly sentencing ranges in the same tory verdict, sentenced to no a defendant could be mandatory way Sentencing Commission's sentencing range greater identified than the suppose example, did. For Guidelines history level and criminal for his base offense statutory range particular crime is 5 to for a category A defendant could receive score. imprisonment. Suppose that in one years' higher if—but if—the district case, appellate court decides that support specific offense facts to court found X the crime under defendant who commits adjustments by preponder- characteristics or facts, necessarily would the district court true even of the evidence. This was ance

1267 taking magnify, not the abuse of discretion stan- times punish- is the crime and the ” seriously. Gall, dard ment to ensue.’ 552 U.S. at 128 (quoting

S.Ct. Koon v. United Harm B. Institutional States, 81, 113, 518 U.S. (1996)). 135 L.Ed.2d 392 The dis- court’s willingness The resentence trict court unquestionably judi- is the best immense immeasurable does and institu- “ cial actor to this “unique conduct study” damage. ‘It been uniform

tional has open-ended and to undertake the and fact- judicial in the tradition constant federal for 3553(a) heavy See, Gall, inquiry. e.g., sentencing consider judge every the 51-52, 552 U.S. at S.Ct. individual 597-98 person convicted as an and ev- study (explaining a the district court ery unique case as the human is in a failings that mitigate, “superior position sometimes some- to find facts judge facts, will, imposed particular time, its abuse discretion unless a sen- we set of over imprisonment. years’ tence of at least 10 up statutory sentencing carve ranges to the case, Suppose that a another defendant point possible that it identify will be the crime, facts, again the same under X commits maximum imposed sentence can be appellate the court decides that the dis- solely based jury on the facts embodied in the necessarily court would abuse trict its discre- fact, today, verdict. In I after fail to see how imposed years' if it tion a sentence above 20 impose a district court could a sentence of decisions, imprisonment. two After those less than a materially similar sentencing range court has created a that is occurs, defendant. Once that this court will respects in all to a identical relevant manda- have reintroduced Sixth Amendment vio- tory-Guidelines range: as a matter supposedly by lation cured Booker. law, a violates of defendant who the crime part standard of review I set out in X set of a under facts must receive sentence of II.E, supra, gives meaning appellate review years' impris- between somewhere 10 and avoiding sentences while this result as If the defendant did not admit all onment. possible. my much approach, as Under this facts, then the court district would base court is reweighing not in the business of all judge-found by pre- that sentence on facts a record, of the conducting facts in the a ponderance of the evidence. district 3553(a) novo, inquiry declaring de judge would then have unfettered discretion range of objectively sentences that is correct to sentence a who defendant commits the Rather, my ap- "reasonable.” under crime under X facts between 10 and from proach, when we reverse sentence on sub- years, but would have no discretion to sen- grounds, simply holding stantive arewe beyond range (just tence as the district non-clearly under the erroneous facts found

judge had unfettered discretion to sentence by light judge the district of the district range within of sentences identified judge's explanation, judge rational no could Guidelines). mandatory imposed that sentence. We would not Today, step court takes in this di- given hold as a that on a matter law set of rection. The court of its conceives role as to facts, only a of at so-many least range determine what of sentences is "reason- years' imprisonment is reasonable. Nor words, deciding able.” other import particular would we decide the a matter of law of the the bounds district time; 3553(a) inquiry facts to the for all statutory range court's discretion within hold, example, we would as the court particular set of facts contained in this does, that pedophilia-as-diminished-capacity record. The court concludes that under the can never form basis for a case, downward of this facts must sentenced to departure in a sex crimes case. Such a stan- years’ imprisonment less than no or the gives judges dard district maximum discre- necessarily court would abuse its dis- anywhere tion to along sentence a defendant approach cretion. If we follow court's statutory range and thus range objec- and declare what sentences is tively remedy more "reasonable” on our own consistent with the fashioned based assess- Supreme light ment factors Court in Booker. *99 3553(a) diminishes tryout a on the road. This § in the indi- under import their institutional role the the district courts’ looks the defendant case” because it vidual legal profession eyes public of the and the insights not eye, gains in the and witnesses courts record, strips it the district has ex- because conveyed by the cold defacto authority.99 Congressionally given (quotation of their sentencing experience) tensive merely procedure is a omitted). If the district court court’s effective use The district may in however, tryout, busy a district court be turns on the expertise, of its to its pay lip to mere service lawyers clined of the participation active —the 3553(a) duty simply impose Guide counsel —in the and defense prosecutors sentence;100 all, by Rita after its sentence lines adversary proceeding envisioned tentative, only subject to second- by my opinion would and Gall and fleshed out And even if the dis guessing appeal. is vital to on today. professionalism Their Indeed, duty, pros if wanted to do its the sen- trict court sentencing process. the may present government’s ecutor the inspire are to the confidence tences to sentencing best case to the district court —better public, defendant and the the court im must be the wait and see what sentence hearing in the district court event,” expending government’s “tryout poses than a on the before “main rather that will deter- resources.101 road” for the real forum Wainwright Sykes, the sentence. mine willingness ignore The court’s to time- 2497, 2508, 433 U.S. contemporaneous objection and honored (1977). L.Ed.2d 594 default rules diminishes procedural Today’s decision sends the unmistakable status of the district courts for another message nothing designed court is reason.102 These rales are to the district case, participated unique In this the Government will not be tailored to the facts before court, through parsimony princi- prosecutor’s will not serve the in the diminishment sentencing argu- ple, injustice present a robust and will work an on one of the failure parties. ment to the district court and failure to ade- quately call attention to the mistakes she be- lieved the district court made. Defense tendency impose sen- 101. District courts’ required by counsel are the Sixth Amend- range tences within the Guidelines worsens perform highest professional ment to at the already perverse incentive. this This circuit’s hearing level and to treat the be- imposed district courts Guidelines sentences If fore the district court as main event. of the cases from October 65.6% performance wanting, is defense counsel’s through September 2009. See United may it Commission, counsel have to answer for in collat- Sentencing States Sourcebook of proceeding alleging Statistics, de- (2009). eral a violation of the Sentencing Federal tbl. 26 right to the effec- fendant's Sixth Amendment gives approach government The court’s prosecutor, tive assistance of counsel. every incentive to rest on the Guidelines and however, having 3553(a) does not run the risk of put §no evidence before the dis- judge pro- (as government answer to a in collateral frequently trict court does). ceeding charge inept performance. infrequent on a In the event that the dis- imposes a trict court below-Guidelines sen- tence, government nothing would lose be- Congres- 100. This would not flout cause it could make its case for the 3553(a), sional embodied in command appeals. first time before the court of deny justice would also for either the United States or the defendant. If the facts and Jones, all, simply application

circumstances of the case call for a sentence after sentencing range contemporaneous objection rule to the outside Guidelines 3553(a)(2) Sentencing unique satisfy purposes context. be- federal by the often will—the sentence cause the district court is not bound sentence—and

1269 (2001) give the court 149 L.Ed.2d 197 parties (explaining the to district that if force question presented “grows of, it to make deci- the everything needs sound out any by, to fix errors. is case-specific and the first chance bounded detailed factu- sions This, turn, circumstances,” quality to an al the leads enhanced then “value of ap- limited). judicial making, preserves pellate precedent” the court of decision Last- may prevent ly, away unnec- we fritter our finality, and resources sentence’s on essary appeals. message litigants The court’s to appeals, other in the prosecutors appellate queue in this don’t the circuit is: will suffer.

bother, try there need to put is no to This court is not well-suited to sentence position court in best make district to offenders another and even more im decisions. portant Supreme reason. The Court has

Sadly, today our approach abundantly diminishes made clear the crucial role that good process plays sentencing. Gall, district role for no reason. court’s See 552 49-50, sentencing authority dis- at It transfers from U.S. at 128 596-97. S.Ct. judges appeals, public’s which and the trict to the courts defendant’s confidence in judges’ experience justice the district and the of a turn lack sentence on how the expertise imposing criminal sentences. sentencer arrived at Given it. the stric review, today’s shows, length opinion appellate tures of it is impossible As attempting duplicate the for us to accord a process even to defendant the huge See, in- judge’s requires e.g., task is due. Fed. R. Crim P. 32(i). De- vestment of this court’s resources. When this court resentences de investment, fendant, real it spite huge deprives there is no him a meaningful lack of experience hearing right return: due to our which he has to ad job judge him expertise, poorly eye we are suited to the dress a who can look in the wrong will not reach infrequently deciding before his fate. See Fed. 32(i)(4)(A)(2)(ii). Moreover, our result. fact-intensive re- R.Crim.P. Because the incapable decisions will be of defendant’s first notice of the reasons for ability hinder our factual generalization and will resentence and its bases is provided by opinion guidance imposing establish clear the district this court’s sentence,103 of our deprived courts circuit. See Koon v. he right United States, 98-99, object 116 to U.S. S.Ct. to the reasons and factual base 2046-47; States, And, deprives see v. crucially, also United s.104 him of a Buford 59, 65-66, 1276, 1281, U.S. right appeal. S.Ct. to treatment Such of a liti- evidence, findings parties' proposed presented rule matters not to the trial conclusions, parties’ arguments considered, and the at the Depree court will not be v. Thom hearing. close of the If the as, district court (11th Cir.1991), would findings arguments bases to argu refuse entertain the evidence and sentencing hearing, articulated not at the ments, precious and thus would not waste object parties opportunity must have an space briefing respond. findings the court's and conclusions and ob- tain correction error the district right 104. The defendant would have the may court have made. rehearing, petition the court for but a rehear- ing petition perform does not the same ser- That the Government's brief cites evi- post-sentence objection provide vice a would arguments presented dence advances in the district court. to the district in the first instance is of moment. Defense counsel would assume no court, adhering that this to its time-honored main court, forum for the appropriate disrespect for the

gant not breeds event. due law, raises serious but also rule Florida, concerns. See Gardner

process 1197, 1207, 430 U.S. *101 V. (con- (1977) opinion) (plurality L.Ed.2d 393 reasons, I va- foregoing clause was would process that the due For the cluding and remand to the Irey’s sentence was im- cate “the death sentence violated when resentencing. court for district the basis of part, on at least posed, opportunity no which he had information explain”). deny EDMONDSON, Judge, Circuit BIRCH, BARKETT dissenting, which sheet, sum, a balance placed In when on MARTIN, join: Judges, Circuit by the harm caused grave institutional outweighs significantly approach

court’s places the law on the The limit might yield.105 any approach benefit power court to inter- right appellate use of appeal on dimin- Resentencing defendants decisions of Unit- fere with court in the ishes the role of the district (who, course, Judges District ed States profession, and it dimin- eyes legal powers of their have —under the law — in the district public’s ishes the confidence own) is, me, appeal what this is about. administering an courts as institution specific case before us involves seri- The gob- justice. criminal It misallocates ghastly ous crime and conduct —“horrific” None of this up judicial Judge’s part bles resources.106 in the District words —on And, necessary.107 If a sentence constitutes no has contend- party is of Defendant. discretion, imposing simply Judge, we should ed that the District abuse of sentence, significant procedural made a er- say return the case to the district so and decision, only tenced. The court’s could affect benefit that comes to mind is The defendant, many sentencing appeals resentencing we of the hundreds of finality. In bring we see in the to come. make his final and his case to will sentence a close. Irey's if 107. The court claims that reasonable, any acknowledges we have re- then sentence is reasonable

106. The court days pre-SRA rea- and that would return us to the viewed hundreds of cases for substantive decided, judge a "law him- where a district unto sonableness since Booker was (quotation by point- impact self or herself.” See ante minimizes the of its decision omitted). justify only arguments do not ing Circuit has These out that the Eleventh First, resentencing approach Irey. court’s reversed sentences in four of these cases. See decision, say Irey’s unreason- today’s we can sentence is ante at 1191. After howev- er, may appeals it aside under classic abuse we see more sentence be- able set review, party we need not resentence can ask this court discretion cause dissatisfied the reasonableness concern. the defendant based on infor- to solve to resentence Second, worry we need not about a return to position that the dis- mation favorable to its days given post-Boo/cer neglecting pre-SRA re- presumably ignored by trict court quirements judges exercise their stating that district to mention the information in its rea- only conducting a prece- sentencing discretion after And with the sons for the sentence. factors, statutory applying process, dent that we can consider evidence not in the formal is then arguments explaining their rationale —which new for or record and make appellate of dis- may subject to review for abuse against party appeal, we see more defendants resen- cretion. sentences vacated—or (who government prosecutors

ror.1 standard of review. Gall United States, showing bear the burden of reversible er- U.S.

ror) (2007), L.Ed.2d 445 imposed Supreme contend that the sentence Court— in the course of reversing court too an appellate lenient and that no judgment that had overturned a except sentence would be lawful the maxi- dis trict court’s sentence as light3 too imprisonment mum sentence of —set standard of review: we look to see if pertinent criminal statute will allow: 30 the sentence is reasonable in light of a years.2 “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” appel- issue is not whether federal 40, 128 Id. at S.Ct. judges ought late duty. They do their *102 This standard promotes review must. And the appel- issue is not whether (among other things) finality in criminal late courts can review sentences and some- cases. But the deferential abuse-of-discre- aside, correctly times set them even when tion standard was mainly selected to rec- the imposed proce- sentence was without ognize that the Sentencing Guidelines are They Appellate judges dural errors. can. advisory only and a Judge District must legitimate power do have some to review presume not that the sentence indicated is, the substance of sentences: to by the Sentencing Guidelines is a reason- determine whether a Judge District has able sentence for the convicted person imposed a sentence that is either too le- standing before the District Judge: the nient or too harsh as a matter of law. The District Judge must make for each convict- general question presented here is what is person ed “an individualized assessment limit, law, power the under the on the Gall, based on the presented.” facts appellate judges deciding such reviews. 50, Thus, U.S. at 128 S.Ct. at 597. sen- legal power limit on the of appellate tencing is a fact-bound determination. judges to interfere with sentences imposed Supreme When the Court laid down the by Judges law, District staked out pointed the Court out that a District Only procedur- case without a substantial reversing Judge's In the District far-below- my sentence, al error inis mind as I write this dissent. Eighth the-Guidelines Circuit in Gall had opined studied the record and interplay 2. Because of the of the Guidelines Judge sentencing the District given had statute, pertinent and the criminal the Guide- X, weight” properly "too much to "did not (which Judge recognized lines the District as Y, weigh” Z, given emphasis” "too much factor) called, case, sentencing in this for 30 said, Supreme and so on. The Court "Al- years' imprisonment. But the Guidelines are though Appeals correctly the Court of stated See, mandatory everyone e.g., not knows. appropriate that the standard of review was - States, -, v. Nelson United U.S. discretion, engaged analysis abuse of in an 890, (2009) S.Ct. (reversing 172 L.Ed.2d 719 closely that more resembled de novo review of stressing Fourth Circuit and that "Guidelines that, presented the facts and determined in its mandatory are not not on view, degree of variance [from adviso- courts; they presumed are also not to be rea- Gall, ry guideline] was not warranted.” courts.); by sentencing Spears sonable" U.S. at 128 S.Ct. at 600. — States, -, United U.S. 129 S.Ct. (2009) Although Eighth Circuit vacated the (reversing Eighth 172 L.Ed.2d 596 Cir- imposed by upholding cuit and the district court below-Guidelines sen- entirely resentencing, Eighth tence in crack remanded for cocaine case based Circuit Judge’s policy disagree- precise District did imposed not set a sentence to be Guidelines). ment with on Mr. Gall on remand. 857-58, 2182, 2190, in a 102 S.Ct. Judge superior position [relative “is U.S. (1982). it, judge grasp L.Ed.2d 606 As I appellate court] find facts indi- under in the import their deferential abuse-of-discretion standard (while judge certainly no “any and hears evidence” rule or vidual case. sees rule) determinations, evidence, credibility nothing makes calls for more than scintilla knowledge gains in the record for full the facts some reasonable basis has conveyed Judge’s Id. insights not the record.” District decision. Because the (internal quotation prohibits judges from appellate standard added). emphasis their own making omitted and determination where lies, weight evidence law sentencing, Judge is to In District greatly maneuvering restrains the room of “impose sufficient, a sentence courts. flows appellate The restraint di- greater necessary, comply with the than rectly from the deferential abuse-of-discre- forth in” purposes set 18 U.S.C. for us by tion standard review chosen 3553(a)(2). added).4 (emphasis I Supreme Court. submit that an appellate reweighing court’s of the evi- law, my Judge’s view of the a District *103 giving or dence the facts different con- is impose decision on what sentence to grant in something struction —to the rec- a fact as here essentially finding, especially ord more or less value than the District witnesses at the where testified Judge did and that so to conclude the oral raises hearing: particularly evidence weighs heavily record overall more for a credibility. issues of Cooter & Consider higher of a kind of sentence —smacks de Corp., Gell v. Hartmarx 401- U.S. novo review á la Eighth ap- Circuit’s 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) proach appellate Gall: the over- (discussing standard of deferential steps authority. its review for sanctions under Fed. imposed 11 as one to a fact-inten R.Civ.P. review Appellate courts can set aside a sen- question). And appellate sive “[w]hen too tence as lenient to be reasonable aas court reviews a factual find district court’s of law. appellate matter But courts first ings, clearly abuse-of-discretion only question: need to ask one could an indistinguishable: erroneous standards are objectively Judge reasonable District look- 401, 110 ...” Id. at at 2458. S.Ct. ing at the record “on the whole” the ultimate imposed found sentence to clearly The abuse- erroneous/deferential one, (includ- a “sufficient” when the record deprive appel- of-discretion standards ing all the evidence and reasonable authority reweigh late court of to con- infer- evaluations) flicting credibility ences and is evidence to reconsider facts viewed already weighed light a dis- in the most considered favorable sentence. Gell, “Yes,” trict court. appellate See Cooter & 496 U.S. If the answer is courts 400-04, 2458-60; correctly nothing S.Ct. see also can do but affirm the Labs., Labs., Inc., Inwood Inc. v. Ives This sentence. deferential standard limits (C) imposed protect 4. The sentence public needs from further defendant; (A) offense, crimes of the to reflect the seriousness of (D) law, provide the defendant with promote respect provide needed for the and to offense; training, educational or just punishment for the vocational medical care, (B) adequate other treatment to afford to crimi- correctional deterrence conduct; nal most effective manner. severely authority appellate judges Judge enced District did not abuse his sentences, in deciding years to interfere with even when the discretion that 17.5 imprisonment appellate judges giving plus more or less lifetime of supervised — release was a sufficient weight given to one circumstance or another— all sentence, case, the circumstances. That think the in an immediate this serious crime deserves substantial term “just” “just.” is not or not the most of im- prisonment beyond (and, debate in reali- hand, On the other this standard of re debated). ty, has never been I trust that objective, view-—because demands some (I them) judges hope most American all of guards reasonable basis the record — accept would years imprison- 17.5 against stops true arbitrariness and short ment is a substantial imprison- term of allowing Judges District the freedom to years ment.5 And it beyond the statuto- sentence simply please. The def ry minimum sentence for the crime erential abuse-of-discretion standard of re with which Defendant was charged.6 acknowledges view sentencing is government says nothing about marshaling applying the facts and imprisonment would be a law fact-dependent legal criteria set out ful sentence in the circumstances of this 3553(a). pertinent 18 U.S.C. stan case. I agree cannot legal con places dard the main responsibility and First, I clusion. think argument belit legal power for sentencing squarely on tles punishment involved a lifetime United States Judges District whose busi of supervised release that follows a sub ness is fact finding; very this standard stantial term of imprisonment. The Su greatly authority appellate restricts the Court, Gall, preme it plain made to me interfere, judges although appellate *104 supervised-release punishments judges definitely would have imposed some count—under the law—as real punish other sentence. is not for the Court “[I]t ments and must not by appel be treated Appeals to decide de novo whether ... or, least, late courts as nothing nothing Gall, the sentence reasonable.” [is] significant when sentences are being re 59, 128 U.S. at at 602. S.Ct. “The fact that 48-49, viewed. See id. at 128 S.Ct. at 595- appellate might reasonably have Second, in particular record this concluded that a different sentence was that, many things case contains I accept, appropriate is justify insufficient to rever (that is, would allow an provide adequate sal of the district court.” Id. at for) evidentiary/factual basis an objectively at 597. S.Ct. judge reasonable to back off the absolute Turning to the facts of the particular thirty-years-imprisonment maximum sen us, case before I experi- conclude that the tence. might case, actually something Defendant serve years district plus court —in this 17.5 a less than 17.5 because the Executive supervised lifetime of a release —as fixed sen- Branch, years, “may” over the award him approach tence. I believe this has been our some limited credit toward service of his sen- custom. prison tence if the administrators determine "displayed exemplary Defendant has compli- government only charged 6. The Defendant ance with disciplinary regula- institutional production pornog- with one count of of child 3624(b)(1). tions.” See 18 U.S.C. How 2251(c). raphy per 18 U.S.C. Other cases actually much credit Defendant will be involving longer pornogra- sentences in child awarded highly in the uncertain future is phy prior cases involved either criminal con- speculative. purposes, For review it seems victions or more counts or both. imposed best to me to by treat a sentence in disgrace and trouble. being who was that Defendant surren- undisputed

It is humanizing indicted, appreciate I this kind plead guilty, being dered after testimony raises a familiar debate about re- accepted He expressed and remorse. character to be possible it is whether and relieved the Government sponsibility person so that a who is compartmentalized a trial.7 expense and of the trouble wicked) (or way really can bond, in one he weak surrendering posting and After (or ways other or strong good) cen- some treatment entered into residential holisti- character must be viewed It is whether step toward rehabilitation. ter: person’s that a weak or wicked pri- cally has no so that Defendant undisputed also Furthermore, a reli- produces character in one context De- criminal convictions. fa- and, every context. This justice able conclusion not obstruct fendant did up by taken Aris- miliar debate has been contrary, government with the cooperated Kant other Greats. And I the nature of totle and information about providing (time, power Appeals of a Court of identity of others doubt places, offense his forth). I it as a matter of law. Whatever These resolve with whom he dealt and so family- might think about this traditionally personally com- things kinds of evidence, Judge in of a and-friend the District monly lessening in a been reflected legal right had the to determine it would have other- this case sentence from what credibility of the before him In of the full rec- witnesses wise been. the context ord, testimony weight give ba- and to things provide these reasonable record, this evi- to be less he did.8 Given the entire sis for the sentence this case support dence was reasonable evidence to than the maximum allowed the statute. than the maximum sen- a sentence less Moreover, sentencing hearing at the pertinent tence allowed statute. court, Defendant stood before addition, sentencing hearing, at the spoke judge impose who would him; presented expert Defendant Defendant witness: upon the sentence not; government this Dr. Shaw. The did presented witnesses his behalf: object did not to the ex- govern- government an oral-evidence case. The case is *105 expert of the witness. presented pertise ment no witnesses. Several Defendant’s (nor expert suggested any- to The never has family friends and members testified else) guilty not generally and one that Defendant was Defendant’s characteristics But history employer, as an account of some mental disorder. good works testify did that this parent, loyalty expert and so on and to their own mental health Defendant, recognized human was afflicted with a support as a Defendant likely be Kapordelis, found the defendant would not 7. Contrast United States (11th Cir.2009), given F.3d 1291 where defendant— "his attitude and lack of rehabilitated charged, among a medical doctor other remorse.” images things, producing pornographic underage boy underage boys (including one I think it was Frost who said that Robert who relative and another under- was his near than "there are tones of voice that mean more patient: age boy had the doctor's who been Judge words.” A District hears those tones. boys seemingly drugged defendant had Furthermore, Judge wit- a District sees the first) (despite powerful photograph- —insisted well hears the testimo- ness’s demeanor as him) against by jury ic evidence on a trial big ny. opportunities are ad- I submit these and, respon- sentencing, accepted at his never vantages finding. when it comes to fact sibility, prosecutors called "liars” and Hitler; compared them to and the district record, pedophilia. conflicting) heterosexual are I think what mental disorder: I legally enough that this disorder was have summarized is expert The testified justify say compel objective- had chosen do not something that Defendant —I —an have, something ly judge that was reasonable to find that a but was “with- (something biologi- years imprisonment “natural of less than the 30 in” Defendant cal”) Defendant to have a ten- would be sufficient. and caused to sexual dency being toward attracted I might judged However prepubescent behavior with children. weight my of the evidence and facts in own (This submit, evidence, supports I the Dis- sentence, reckoning of the I accept best to Defendant as a Judge’s trict reference that the record as a whole was sufficient to a victim “victim”: the sense of allow—as a matter of law—the imposition biology.) circumstance of Defendant’s own something than less the maximum sen- expert also testified that the disorder involved, tence. Imponderables and a treatable, was this Defendant was Judge District unique has access to and treatment, amenable for Defendant’s familiarity with the individual defendant. naturally in aging9 reduction testoster- —a Here, District Judge naturally one and a reduction in sex thought out a and selected sentence for likely helpful drive—would to his treat- this case that period involved substantial ment, likely and that Defendant was not imprisonment, including a period of Judge be a recidivist. District who (not hours, months, weeks or expert and heard this witness could saw years of imprisonment) above the statuto- the evidence. Given the entire rec- credit Then, ry minimum. to follow the term of ord, this evidence is reasonable evidence to imprisonment, judge im- than maxi- support a sentence of less posed supervised lifetime of release with mum the statute. allowed many special conditions10: a “substantial course, Supreme Of a number of elements make restriction of freedom” as the Still, Gall, up accept total record. while I it in put Court Gall. 552 U.S. at (some that other facts and evidence of it 128 S.Ct. at 595. consider, right although Defendant was 50 the time of sentenc seems all never Bureau, ing. According to the Census persons aged would I contend that 50 typically are, white male of 50 would have a life law, exempt older as a matter of from expectancy years. of less than 30 See U.S. 30-year imprisonment term of under Abstract, Dep’t., Census 2010 Statistical Ta statute.) pertinent Judge The District (available http://www.census.gov/ ble 103 thought age pertinent that Defendant's compendia/statab/2010/tables/1 .pdf). 0s0 103 *106 sentencing, especially to Defendant’s ad- 30-year maximum sentence had a A then age upon imprison- vanced his release from fact, being, realistic of in life im likelihood accept ment. I that the circumstance of De- prisonment Congress, for this Defendant. in age permissible, fendant's was a reasonable 2251(c) 18 U.S.C. statute of Defen —the basis, else, conjunction everything in with dant’s conviction—does not call for life im sentencing impose for court to a sentence prisonment statutory punishment. as a of less than the maximum on this Defen- (Taking uncertainty, into account life’s I un dant. imprisonment derstand that term of might actually imprison turn out to life supervised 10. The list of conditions of release ment; but, reality, some sentences of long was and tailored someone like for Defen- are, defendants, years likely for some more dant. to be than other for life sentences sentences reality age other defendants. This of human I the deferen- Judges. believe the one of District range under sentencing set out standard only 15 tial abuse-of-discretion very wide: involved is

statute (15 to was intended but- applied Gall minimum sentence from the years (30 sentencing powers the district courts’ tress maximum sentence years) 2422(b) (a to appellate powers limit the courts’ and to Cf., e.g., 18 U.S.C. years). essentially a factual issue what is recast allowing imprisonment for sexual offense princi- of these life); question into a law. Given 21 U.S.C. years ten jurisprudentially impor- it (a I believe 841(b)(1)(A) ples, allowing for drug offense review, clear of de novo or life). tant to steer So, the of ten imprisonment it, appeal in an something resembling sentencing discre for the exercise room of a the substantive-reasonableness about from the start markedly controlled tion is all, this record and Considering sentence. by Congress; statutory range set by the deci- Judge’s I defer to the District would therefore, that it harder it seems to me today’s and affirm the sentence sion far off the sentencing judge go case. seems even clearer rails. This observation here, where, Judge the District

to me respect I and not without dissent imprison impose lengthy did regret. maximum, but neither did ment: not the (or the minimum sentence impose he BIRCH, Judge, dissenting: Circuit hours, weeks, merely something was months, year beyond the mini one adage jurisprudence time-worn mum). often lead to law is that hard facts bad I have certainly applicable this case. a vari support I think the record would sentencing that had I been the little doubt sentences, including some ety of lawful might I well have fashioned a differ- judge actually heavier than the one sentences ent and harsher sentence for this defen- Nevertheless, imposed. government’s play But the here is the dant. decision have failed to demonstrate to prosecutors respective appellate roles of the court and legitimate that there is no basis for the me appellate court. Our role is actual sentencing district court’s decision. properly constrained the standard applying All considered and the def things required to which we are to adhere. review standard, I erential abuse-of-discretion persuasively de- Judge As Edmondson imposed cannot conclude that the sentence application scribes the standard to beyond the borders of reason outside record, compels an affirmance of the background, For more see United able. judgment court’s in this case. (11th Irey, 563 F.3d 1223 Cir. States join I Accordingly, respectfully dissent and 2009) (vacated banc). rehearing en dissenting opinions Judge judicial system, I In the federal believe Judge Edmondson and Barkett. courts have duties and the district powers mainly finding about fact — BARKETT, Judge, dissenting, in Circuit *107 in the balance some facts weighing about MARTIN, Circuit which BIRCH not against others —that are theirs and join: Judges, important ours. I believe that one of the just everything judges agree is to allow Dis- I about appellate duties of If Judge Edmondson’s dissent. there is Judges carry trict room to out the duties departure, it is the addition vant any point of factors on the record. These would (or 3553(a) clarification, view), my particular § that the dis- include a factor defendant, by a judge trict must articulate the reasons for raised or one clearly implicated by specific imposed the sentence based on the evi- facts of that case.... in the record. the record dence Because

may a number of support reasonable sen- Moreover, judge tences, necessary this articulation is so should be able to articulate the ratio- appellate court can be satisfied justifies nale that the actual number of judge actually that the district considered years months or up make a defen- § how all of the relate to the factors sentence, dant’s whether that number is individual case. defendant’s within Sentencing or outside the Guide- A lines. reasonable sentence is one for

I previously explained why impor- it is which explanation there is an of how judge’s give tant for district reasons in particular length of the imposed my Docampo, dissent United States v. corresponds to the individual (11th Cir.2009). sentencing needs of particular de- First, Congress explicitly mandated the fendant. example, For how does sen- articulation of reasons: years, tence of fifteen opposed as ato years, sentence of five or ten twenty- or Congress requires the district court to years matter, two for that serve the open “state in court the reasons for its general needs of individual and deter- sentence,” imposition particular of the rence addressing while also the nature 3553(c), so, doing and before the court of the crime and the individual charac- must consider each of the factors delin- teristics of given the defendant in a 3553(a) §in ap- eated to arrive at the case? The number of cannot be propriate sentence. simply by determined an individual Second, Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1106. judge’s gut feeling. society As a every requires explana- case elaborate process, values due we must have some tion: every step ju- rationalization for of our system. dicial There should be a trans- “enough” “adequate” or What de- parent, logical, justifica- and reasonable pends upon the circumstances of the tion to support jail the amount of time particular case at hand[ ].... [L]ess prescribed particular for a defendant may required “simple” if a case is based on the 3553 factors. “typical.” logical corollary of this conclusion, however, is that more is re- 1106-08, Id. at n. 7. quired judge when a is faced with an Here, judge meticulously the district atypical argues case or the defendant conscientiously followed the dictates of departure that a from the Guidelines is Indeed, Congress. I do not see what more warranted. judge reasonably the district could done to assure us that he considered and Thus, ... while a mechanical discus- all weighed factors sion of each may factor not be judge to this case. The district applied case, necessary every every district court piece considered evidence him, a responsibility analyze has the rele- extensive record before which is *108 current substantial sen- Irey’s in lieu of meaningful ap- permit to clearly sufficient majority is not “re- Because the tence.1 if there is problem, pellate review. judge’s judgment but viewing” the district itself, that, one, beyond the offense its own and is assum- substituting rather is to evidence present failed government failed to prosecutor that ing the role challenge any of to rebut or whatsoever that could presenting evidence perform sentencing, witnesses the defendant’s sentence, I longer dis- arguably support And, judge’s job, nor it was not the district sent.2 ours, rely on evidence supply is it presented. not

that was majority— line is that

The bottom credi- finding own of facts and

based on its disagrees simply

bility determinations — judge’s conclusion

with the district years followed a lifetime

seventeen appropriate is an sen-

supervised release Irey. Notably, majority real-

tence for man- any explanation not offer

ly does judge impose the district

dating imprisonment thirty years

sentence ever, extremely fact-intensive majority published even if this 1. The cites to numerous involving analysis can be based on the information con- unpublished cases various dif alone, appellate opinions consider- against in which the tained in ferent offenses minors any potential unwarranted sentenc- in ex ation of defendants therein received sentences disparity appellate ing is not a task for the thirty years suggest Irey’s cess of sen complete as the court to first instance tence of seventeen and one-half creates majority does in this case. disparity” that renders it un a “substantial Majority Op. at 1219-21. Look reasonable. Moreover, majority’s several of the cited length ing sentences various just legiti contain facts that could cases cases, Irey’s arguably in the cited sentence finding mately support a that those defen However, Congress presents disparity. did Irey similarly dants were not situated to avoid not command courts to support the that the thus do not conclusion "disparities” or even "substantial dis mere imposed unwar created an parities.” require What it did sentenc disparity. example, ranted For several ing the need to avoid unwar courts consider who, Irey, cases concern defendants unlike among similarly disparities situated ranted proceeded previously to trial. We have held 3553(a)(6). defendants. See 18 U.S.C. plead guilty and assist that defendants who Whether one defendant's sentence creates an ai;e similarly government not situated disparity unwarranted from other defendants e.g., proceed to trial. See Docam those who necessarily requires a court to un (holding po, F.3d at 1101 that a defen inquiry dertake a fact-intensive in the first similarly proceeded to trial was dant who place to determine whether the defendants plead co-conspirators situated to his who similarly See United States v. are situated. government guilty and and thus assisted (11th Docampo, 573 F.3d Cir. disparity between there was no unwarranted 2009) ("A disparity, well-founded claim of lengthy the defendant’s 270 month sentence however, apples being assumes that com substantially co-conspirator's shorter and his (citation omitted). pared apples.”) I be sentences). truly a court cannot assert that one lieve defendant’s sentence creates an unwarranted my Docampo: I also noted in dissent in As disparity from another or several defendants’ difficulty Appellate had no find- entirety the sen courts have without the benefit of asking ing [wheth- when tencing of all the defendants. How- unreasonableness records

1279 Plaintiff-Appellant, SCOTT, L. Richard ROBERTS, In Her Ca

Dawn K. Official Secretary

pacity as Interim of State of Florida, Defendant-Ap State

pellee, McCollum, Jr., Intervenor-

Ira William

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-13211. Appeals, States Court of

United

Eleventh Circuit.

July See, reasonable, enough punishment]. sentence automatically er a is lines are we e.g., Pugh, F.3d [United v.] States apply too—as a circuit that does not a rea- Cir.2008)] [(11th (finding probation presumption obligated sonableness —are possessor pornography of some child ask whether within-Guidelines insufficient). willing We be should likewise without scale. reasonable thumb on the that, it, in a to find case that warrants "a Thus, reiterating previously we what ‘greater within-Guidelines sentence than noted, "many there instances where the necessary’ objectives to serve of sen- range yield Guidelines will not a reasonable States], tencing,” Kimbrough [v. [552 United may ap- sentence.... some cases it 85, 91], [558], (quoting U.S. Guidelines; to defer propriate 3553(a)). appellate sentencing Our re- others, Hunt, United not.” States v. develop one-way view should not into (11th Cir.2006). F.3d upwards. rachet Just as the district court Docampo, F.3d at 1110-11. obligation the Guide- has an not to assume notes “[a] ly weight given held “[t]he court’s sentence need not ap- be the most factor is within the sound discre one, propriate only it need be a reasonable tion of the district court and we will not one” and because “we are to vacate the our judgment weighing substitute if, if, we are left with the relevant factors.” E.g., United States v.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Irey
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jul 29, 2010
Citation: 612 F.3d 1160
Docket Number: 19-10254
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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