UNITED STATES v. JUAN RAMON MATTA-LOPEZ
Case No. 2:85-CR-00606-1; 2:88-CR-00129-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 27, 2025
JOHN A. KRONSTADT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
| Daniel Torrez | Not Reported |
| Deputy Clerk | Court Reporter / Recorder |
| Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: | Attorneys Present for Defendants: |
| Not Present | Not Present |
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PURSUANT TO
I. Introduction
Juan Ramon Matta-Lopez (“Defendant“), who is 79 years old, has been in federal custody for 36 years while serving various sentences, including a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The conduct underlying his convictions occurred between 1981 and 1985. On November 15, 2024, he filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence for Compassionate Release pursuant to
On December 31, 2024, the Government filed an opposition to the Motion (“Opposition“). 85 Dkt. 295; 88 Dkt. 541. On January 16, 2025, Defendant filed a reply (“Reply“). 85 Dkt. 298; 88 Dkt. 546.1 A hearing on the Motion was held on January 23, 2025, and it was taken under submission. 85 Dkt. 303. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED.
II. Background
A. Defendant‘s Convictions
Defendant is serving life sentences imposed in two cases: (1) Central District of California Case No. 85-CR-00606-PAR: Judgment and Commitment dated January 16, 1990 (the “85 Action“); and (2) Central
In the 85 Action, Defendant‘s conduct occurred in or around 1981, and Defendant was convicted of seven counts: (count 1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of
In the 88 Action, Defendant‘s conduct occurred between 1983 and 1985, and Defendant was convicted of 11 counts: (count 1) conspiracy to import a controlled substance in violation of
B. Defendant‘s Imprisonment and Medical Conditions
Defendant has been in custody since 1988. 85 Dkt. 291 at 11–14. He has spent at least 25 years in almost continuous solitary confinement. Id. at 12–13. Defendant‘s health is deteriorating. Id. at 14. Defendant is currently being hospitalized at MFCP Springfield where he is bed-ridden and confined at the highest level of security. Id. at 13.
Defendant has a sacral ulcer that appears to have turned into osteomyelitis, a bone infection. 85 Dkt. 291 at 14. He is only comfortable when he is lying flat on his back, and this immobility allegedly led to the infected ulcer, which could progress to bacteremia, sepsis and shock. Id. The Springfield medical staff has identified the most effective treatment of this condition as the removal of the lower half of Defendant‘s body, but they have also determined that he would not survive such an operation. Id. The medical staff opined in July 2024 that Defendant “could die within weeks.” Id. (citing Dkt. 303 at 24 (under seal)). Defendant also suffers from dementia, which the Springfield staff has determined is likely “Alzheimer‘s type.” Id.
On August 11 or 12, 2024, Defendant underwent emergency surgery that removed the lower part of his colon, and a colostomy bag was installed. 85 Dkt. 291 at 14. This appears to have been in response to the development of two perforations in Defendant‘s colon apparently caused by extreme constipation that may have been the result of the pain medications Defendant had been taking. Id.
Other health issues identified in Defendant‘s medical records include congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD“), hypertension, enlarged prostate, a benign brain tumor, and macular degeneration, which appears to have left him blind in his left eye, and for which there is no
C. Legal Framework
1. Applicable Law and Bureau of Prison Policy as to Defendant
For defendants who are convicted of crimes where the underlying conduct occurred prior to November 1, 1987 (“old law” defendants), compassionate release is governed by
At any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons, the court may reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served. The court shall have jurisdiction to act upon the application at any time and no hearing shall be required.
Under
In 1994, a regulation issued that provided that the Bureau of Prisons would not file a motion pursuant to
The Bureau of Prisons cannot initiate [a request under
18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) ] on behalf of federal offenders who committed their offenses prior to November 1, 1987, and received non-parolable sentences.
The result of the application of
2. New Law
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA“) repealed
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. – The court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case--
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant‘s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant‘s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that- (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . .and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
In 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release based on the argument that the provisions in the First Step Act that authorized prisoners to file compassionate release motions applied to “old law” prisoners. 85 Dkt. 248. This motion was denied. 85 Dkt. 264. In 2021, Defendant appealed that Order to the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 843 Fed. App‘x 892 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant‘s position on the basis that the language of
That inmates in Matta‘s position—serving non-parolable sentences for pre-1987 offenses—are not eligible for compassionate release because the BOP declines to initiate compassionate release for them may be “harsh,” but it is not the product of an absurd statutory scheme, and therefore does not empower us to “rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359, (2005).
Matta-Ballesteros, 843 F. App‘x at 894.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that compassionate release for Defendant was governed by
In a subsequent, published opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
The appellants in Matta-Ballesteros and King did not raise an equal protection challenge based on the different statutes that applied to prisoners due to the dates of their convictions. Accordingly, that issue was not addressed in either decision.
Defendant seeks immediate release pursuant to
A. Defendant‘s Fifth Amendment Violation Claim
1. Legal Standards
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
The Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Therefore, assessing an equal protection challenge requires a court to “‘measure the basic validity of [a] legislative classification.‘” Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th at 1139 (quoting Pers. Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
The first step is to identify the classification of groups. Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Country Classic Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Bureau, 847 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1988)). Once a classified group has been identified, the court should look for a control group. Id. (citing Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995)). The control group should be composed of individuals who are similarly situated to those in the classified group in respects that are relevant to the government‘s challenged policy. Id. (citing Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2017)). If the two groups are similarly situated, the court then determines the appropriate level of scrutiny and then applies it. Id. (citing Ariz. Dream Act Coal, 855 F.3d at 969).
2. Application
Defendant raises an as-applied challenge to the disparity of treatment between “old law” defendants who are serving a life sentence without parole, and “new law” defendants who are serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 85 Dkt. 291 at 22.
Defendant contends that the First Step Act has adopted a classification that treats two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. 85 Dkt. 291 at 23. Thus, he argues that prisoners serving life sentences without parole based on conduct that occurred before November 1, 1987, are precluded from seeking compassionate release, while prisoners serving life sentences based on the same conduct occurring on or after November 1, 1987, have the opportunity to apply for compassionate release. Id. In the Opposition, the Government does not dispute that “old law” defendants serving a life sentence without possibility of parole and “new law” defendants who are serving life sentences for precisely the same criminal conduct are similarly situated.
Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied the first requirement of the equal protection analysis.
(b) Rational Basis Review
Defendant does not argue that
Rational basis is the correct level of review of Defendant‘s claim. See Olson v. California, 104 F.4th 66, 76 (9th Cir. 2024) (applying rational basis where the challenging party does not allege suspect classifications nor allege that the Equal Protection violation impinges on fundamental rights); see also McGinnis v. Ryster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (applying rational basis test to prisoners); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause).
(i) Legal Standards
Rational basis is “highly deferential.” United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 566 (9th Cir. 2000). “If the classification at issue does not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes, it must be upheld ‘if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.‘” Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)). “The constitutional inquiry is limited to assessing congressional action.” Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017).
Under rational basis review,
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification [citation omitted], the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker [citation omitted], and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. [citation omitted]
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
“In defending a statute on rational-basis review, the government ‘has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.‘” Kahawaiolaa, 386 F.3d at 1279–80 (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320). Rather, the person challenging the law “bears the burden ‘to negate every conceivable basis which might have supported the [legislative] distinction.‘” Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Angelotti Chiropractic, Inc. v. Baker, 791 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)).
(ii) Application
Defendant contends that there is no rational relationship between a legitimate government purpose and the disparity of treatment regarding compassionate release between “old law” prisoners who are serving life sentences without parole, and “new law” prisoners who are serving life sentences for the same crimes. 85 Dkt. 291 at 22–29. Specifically, Defendant contends that none of the legitimate government reasons underlying the SRA‘s cut-off date applies to him. Id. Defendant advances two principal arguments in support of this position.
First, Defendant contends that the purpose of the cut-off date, i.e., to avoid ex post facto concerns, does not provide a rational basis as to the different treatment of him and a “new law” defendant who committed the same offenses. 85 Dkt. 291 at 23–24, 28–29.2 The original draft of the SRA applied to “all federal sentencing” that occurred on or after its effective date, which was November 1, 1987. Id. at 23. As that date approached, Congress and the Department of Justice recognized that the SRA could be deemed an unconstitutional ex post facto law with respect to those sentenced, or as to crimes committed, prior to the effective date, in the event that the Sentencing Guidelines called for a harsher sentence. Id. Due to these concerns, the draft of the SRA was amended on October 28, 1987, to establish that the SRA applied only to conduct -- rather than sentences -- that occurred on or after November 1, 1987. Id. at 23–24 (citing 133 Cong. Rec. 29656–57 (1987)). Defendant notes that every subsequent discussion of this amendment justified it solely based on the need to avoid the ex post facto concerns. 85 Dkt. 291 at 24.
The congressional record supports the position that the cut-off date amendment was motivated by ex post facto concerns. On November 16, 1987, a letter written by then-Assistant Attorney General John Bolton was read on the House floor. It explained that the SRA‘s original draft, which applied to sentencing that occurred after November 1, 1987, raised a “constitutional problem.” 133 Cong. Rec. 31946 (1987). Bolton stated that application of the Sentencing Guidelines to sentences occurring on November 1, 1987 “would violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution where the guidelines result in harsher punishment than prior law.” Id. He added that a case-by-case determination of “when the guidelines would violate the ex post facto clause would lead to much litigation that can and should be avoided.” Id. Therefore, the SRA was amended to “establish[] a bright-line rule” that the SRA only applied to offenses for which the charged conduct occurred on or after November 1, 1987. Id. Congressman Hamilton Fish stated that the amendment “would solve one of the major constitutional questions raised in connection with the guidelines—the ex post facto problem—by amending the 1984 law, so as to make it clear that the new guidelines will apply only to criminal conduct occurring after the guidelines are in effect.” 133 Cong. Rec. 31950 (1987). In the Senate, Senators Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch issued a joint explanation, which stated, “As the Senate‘s section-by-section analysis of [the amendment] indicates, the purpose of Section 2 [the date amendment] is to avoid possible ex post facto problems with current law.” 133 Cong. Rec. 33109 (1987).
Defendant‘s argument is persuasive because as applied to him,
Second, Defendant contends that another justification for the cut-off date was the availability of parole to “old law” defendants. He argues that this rationale also does not apply to him. 85 Dkt. 291 at 29. This argument is persuasive. King concluded that the cut-off date was rational due to the availability of early release via parole for “old law” defendants:
There is a rational reason for this cut-off date. Unlike new law inmates, old law prisoners can still secure early release through the parole system. While the SRA replaced parole with supervised release, this regime change is not retroactive and parole remains available to inmates who committed crimes on or before October 31, 1987. See Jackson, 991 F.3d at 852–53. That old law inmates have early release avenues beyond compassionate release substantially undercuts [the defendant]‘s position that application of
§ 4205(g) to pre-November 1, 1987, offenders is absurd such that the plain language of the statutory scheme that prescribes compassionate release procedures should not control. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005); Schroeder, 793 F.3d 1083.
24 F.4th at 1231.
As noted, Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Consequently, he does not benefit from the rational basis reason for the cut-off date recognized in King. Accordingly, Defendant‘s arguments are persuasive that there is no rational basis for the “old law” and “new law” distinction as applied to him because he may not seek parole.
The Government next argues that the Ninth Circuit has already held that
Concluding that a statutory scheme is not “absurd” in connection with statutory interpretation, is not necessarily a determination that the statute satisfies the standards for a rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.
Further, the Government argues that Defendant‘s citations to Congressional intent are not substantively different from the positions that he advanced in his past unsuccessful appeal. 85 Dkt. 295 at 13. Although not found persuasive in the prior appeal, congressional intent is appropriately considered as part of the Equal Protection inquiry. See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Angelotti Chiropractic, 791 F.3d at 1086) (The one challenging the law bears the burden “to negate every conceivable basis which might have supported the [legislative] distinction.“) (emphasis in original).
* * *
A defendant who was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a crime that occurred before November 1, 1987, is precluded from filing a motion for compassionate release pursuant to
1. Legal Standards
The First Step Act (“FSA“), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, was enacted in 2018. This statute amended the procedures through which a defendant may seek a reduction of a sentence based on a request for “compassionate release.” The procedures that apply to such requests are addressed at
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that . . . the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [“BOP“], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant‘s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant‘s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or (the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);. and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
A request for compassionate release or reduction in sentence requires a three-step process.
First, the defendant must either “exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant‘s behalf” or wait until “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant‘s facility.” Id. The “administrative exhaustion requirement imposes a mandatory claim-processing rule that must be enforced when properly invoked” by the government. United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 2021).
Second, if the administrative remedies have been exhausted, a district court evaluates whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that such a reduction “is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
Third, a district court “consider[s] the [sentencing] factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”
The defendant bears the burden of “establish[ing] his eligibility for compassionate release.” United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2022).
2. Application
Through the Motion, Defendant contends that he qualifies for compassionate release pursuant to
(a) Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
(i) Legal Standard
A court may modify a term of imprisonment upon a motion of the defendant after the defendant has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal of the Bureau of Prisons” or 30 days have elapsed since the “warden of the defendant‘s facility” received the request for a compassionate release, “whichever is earlier.”
(ii) Application
On September 24, 2024, Defendant filed a request for compassionate release with the warden at MFCP Springfield. 85 Dkt. 291 at 15 (citing 85 Dkt. 301) (sealed). Defendant has not yet received a response from the warden. Id. Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.
(b) 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) Requirements
(i) Legal Standards
The FSA does not expressly define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Instead, that issue was left to the Sentencing Commission through the promulgation of policy statements as to “what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting
On November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to include motions by a defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a) (“Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the defendant pursuant to
Because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 has been amended to include motions brought by a defendant, it is determined that the policy statements in § 1B1.13 are binding in connection with the consideration of the Motion. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the following issues are to be considered in determining whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant the reduction of a sentence: (i) “Medical Circumstances of the Defendant,” (ii) “Age of the Defendant,” (iii) “Family Circumstances of the Defendant,” (iv) “Victim of Abuse,” (v) “Other Reasons,” and (vi) “Unusually Long Sentence.”
(ii) Application
Defendant contends that there are extraordinary and compelling circumstances that warrant compassionate release. 85 Dkt. 291 at 29–32.
Defendant argues that his terminal illness qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a reduction in sentence under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). 85 Dkt. 291 at 30. Defendant‘s terminal illness is a bone infection that could “at any point . . . progress to bacteremia, sepsis, and shock.” 85 Dkt. 291 at 30 (quoting Dkt. 301 at 24 (sealed)). The only treatment for this condition is to amputation the lower half of Defendant‘s body, which doctors have stated “he would not survive.” 85 Dkt. 301 at 24 (sealed).
Defendant contends that his other medical conditions, which are significantly debilitating, also qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction in sentence under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(B). 85 Dkt. 291 at 30. Defendant spends most of his time in bed and has a 20-year history of lower back pain. Id. (citing Dkt. 301 at 24 (sealed)). Defendant contends that it is difficult for him to sit up; he is only comfortable lying flat on his back and he cannot even change positions in bed. Id. at 31. Defendant has a sacral ulcer, whose infection developed into a life-threatening bone condition for which there is no cure. Id. In addition, recent medical records show that on August 11 or 12, 2024, Defendant underwent emergency surgery that removed the lower part of his colon and installed a colostomy bag. Id. This was required due to the development of two perforations in Defendant‘s colon brought on by extreme constipation likely due to the need for Defendant to take pain medications continuously. Id. This condition will now reduce Defendant‘s ability to perform self-care. Id.
There are other health issues identified in Defendant‘s medical records. They include: congestive heart
In addition to his terminal illness and deteriorated health condition, Defendant is 79 years old, and has served over 36 years in federal custody.
Based on a review of Defendant‘s age, time already spent incarcerated, and debilitating and terminal health condition, there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant compassionate release. A sentence reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, as articulated in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
(c) § 3553 Factors
(i) Legal Standards
Having determined that Defendant has satisfied Section 3582(c)‘s exhaustion requirement and that there are “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction, “the Court must next consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable[.]” United States v. Parker, 461 F. Supp. 3d 966, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quotation omitted). These factors include: “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed; the kinds of sentences available; the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established in the Guidelines; any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide restitution to any victims.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing
(ii) Application
Defendant contends that the application of the
(1) Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and History and Characteristics of the Defendant
The first of the
(2) Need for the Sentence Imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to product the public from further rimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Defendant has already served approximately 36 years in custody, which “has consumed a large part of his life and by any measure represents a very substantial punishment that reflects the seriousness of his offenses and the need for general or specific deterrence” and “is also a period of time that promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment for his offenses.” Parker, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (quotation omitted). This constitutes just punishment. It also provided general deterrence to the public. As to the need to protect the public, the original sentence did so, and at this time, given Defendant‘s rapidly declining health and terminal illness, he does not present a risk to the public. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of release.
(3) Remaining Factors
The remaining pertinent
The matters previously discussed, including the 36-year term of confinement and Defendant‘s health issues, show that these remaining factors also weigh in favor of release.
* * *
Considered collectively, the
For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant is resentenced to time served as to all counts, and that Defendant shall be released forthwith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Preparer DT