Tyler Halva, Appellant, vs. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, Respondent.
A19-0481
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
January 20, 2021
Anderson, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: January 20, 2021 Office of Appellate Courts
Jared M. Goerlitz, Goerlitz Law, PLLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Cicely R. Miltich, Kristine K. Nogosek, Alec R. Sloan, Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Daniel J. Cragg, Vince C. Reuter, Eckland & Blando LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.
Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.
Philip J. Kaplan, Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Public Record Media.
Scott M. Flaherty, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Tony Webster.
- The pleading standard for civil actions in Minnesota permits the use of broad general allegations in complaints, and a complaint that contains information sufficient to fairly notify the opposing party of the claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
- The Minnesota Official Records Act,
Minn. Stat. § 15.17 (2020), does not explicitly or impliedly authorize a private cause of action.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
This dispute arises from respondent Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (MnSCU) failing to maintain and produce certain government data. Appellant Tyler Halva sued MnSCU, alleging that its actions violated both the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (Data Practices Act) and the Minnesota Official Records Act (Official Records Act). The district court dismissed both claims, concluding that Halva could not pursue judicial remedies under the Data Practices Act after obtaining an administrative remedy under that act and that the Official Records Act does not authorize a private cause of action. The court of appeals affirmed on both claims, though decided the Data Practices Act issue on the alternate ground that Halva‘s complaint was insufficiently pleaded. We reverse the court of appeals’ determination that Halva‘s complaint was insufficiently pleaded, but affirm that court‘s decision that the Official Records Act does not authorize a private cause of action.
In March 2015, MnSCU posted a request for proposals for a professional services contract. MnSCU sought bids to develop an online registration system for continuing education and customized training. Proposals, which had to meet a number of specific criteria, were due by September 30, 2015.
Four vendors, including Halva, timely responded. MnSCU reviewed Halva‘s proposal during a WebEx video meeting and electronically highlighted portions of Halva‘s submission using Adobe Acrobat Reader‘s highlight function. MnSCU did not save the highlights it made on Halva‘s bid document. Halva‘s proposal was eventually disqualified because he failed to provide certain required information.
On December 23, 2015, Halva made the first of five data requests related to the bidding procedure by specifically asking MnSCU for the names of other vendors who submitted proposals. MnSCU responded to Halva‘s request with a brief e-mail on February 19, 2016. The e-mail listed the competing vendors and named one of Halva‘s competitors as the bid winner.
Over the course of the next five months, Halva made four more data requests, via electronic and paper mail, regarding the bidding process. He sought information concerning his competitors’ bids and the highlights made on his own bid document. MnSCU finally responded to these requests on August 5, 2016. In that response, MnSCU simply provided Halva with copies of the competing bids, but none of the other data requested by Halva.
Following commencement of the administrative proceedings, MnSCU sent Halva more information, including its evaluation of the proposals, the final contraсt with the winning vendor, and other communications related to the RFP. Once again, however, MnSCU did not provide Halva with the highlighted version of his bid document.
After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that MnSCU did not comply with the Data Practices Act. The ALJ ordered MnSCU to provide additional documents requested by Halva and awarded Halva a $950 refund of his initial filing fee and attorney fees. See
MnSCU then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Official Records Act claim, asserting that no private cause of action exists under that act. The district court granted the motion, and Halva appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, based in part on different reasoning than the district court. Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 937 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2019). First, the court of appeals held that the district court erred by concluding that Halva could not pursue both administrative and judicial remedies under the Data Prаctices Act. Id. at 474. But the court found that Halva had not sufficiently pleaded his damages and thus the district court correctly dismissed his complaint. Id. at 476. With respect to Halva‘s Official
ANALYSIS
Two issues are presented by this appeal: First, did the court of appeals apply the proper notice-pleading standard in evaluating Halva‘s damage allegations for his Data Practices claim and, second, does the Official Records Act аuthorize a private cause of action.
I.
We turn first to the pleading issue. In agreeing that the district court correctly dismissed Halva‘s claim under the Data Practices Act, the court of appeals reasoned that
[a]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff cannot allege mere “labels and conclusions.” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). He also is not entitled to recovery of damages that are “remote and speculative.” Jackson v. Reiling, 249 N.W.2d 896, 897 (1977). In his complaint, Halva claimed only that he “has been injured by [MnSCU]‘s failure to provide an opportunity to participate in a competitive bidding prоcess,” and alleged that he “has been aggrieved by these violations of the [Data Practices Act] and has suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney‘s fees.” These alleged damages are conjectural.
Id. at 474-75 (first alteration in original).
A.
Halva and two amici argue that the court of appeals erred by applying a new, heightened pleading standard. Halva contends that the court of appeals failed to apply the longstanding notice-pleading standard provided by Minnesota pleading rules. MnSCU
We review the allegations of a complaint subject to dismissal under Rule 12.02 de novo. DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019). We must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. We also interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014).
“Minnesota is a notice-pleading state.” Id. at 604-05. Plaintiffs may plead their case “by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under code pleading, by a statement of facts suffiсient to constitute a cause of action.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963); see also
“[A] claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss if it is possible, on any evidence that might be produced, to grant the relief demanded.” Id. at 604. Thus, “a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.”
Here, the court of appeals relied on our decisions in Bahr v. Capella University, 788 N.W.2d 76, (Minn. 2010), and Jackson v. Reiling, 249 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1977), to conclude that the allegations of Halva‘s complaint did not meet our notice-pleading standard. We take this opportunity to clarify both precedents and reaffirm our notice-pleading standard.
In Bahr, we stated that
“a pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963). But a legal conclusion in the complaint is not binding on us. Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235. A plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions. See id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
788 N.W.2d at 80. The court of appeals relied on the “labels and conclusions” phrase from Bahr to conclude that the allegations of Halva‘s complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This was error because the “labels and conclusions” language in Bahr references legal conclusions, not factual conclusions. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 603;2
In Jackson, the other case the court of appeals cited, a plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and sued the defendant under a negligence theory. 249 N.W.2d at 896. Before his injury, the plaintiff had worked for a railroad company for 9½ years. Id. An employee became eligible for pension benefits “after 10 years of employment,” so the plaintiff‘s pension failed to vest. Id. at 897. The case went to trial, and the jury found the
As part of his claim for damages, the plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to damages from his loss of pension. Id. at 897. We rejected this argument, stating that “[d]amages which are remote and speculative cannot be recovered.” Id. We explained:
The jury, in order to find a causal relationship, would have had to conclude that the accident caused the loss of plaintiff‘s job; that but for the accident he would have retained his job for the requisite time period; and that he would have survived to retirement age. Determining the amount of the loss is even more difficult. It would depend on whether plaintiff would have retained his job with the railroad until retirement, the amount of his social security benefits from other employment, any pensions or substitute compensation earned in other employment, and the length of time he would have lived past retirement. It is not clear that plaintiff would suffer any loss at all. There was ample justification for the trial court‘s ruling that these damages were remote and speculative.
Id. (emphasis added).
We did not discuss pleading standards in Jackson. See id. Instead, we discussed what a party must prove at trial to recover damages. Id. Thus, the court of appeals erred by relying on Jackson to conclude that Halva‘s complaint was proрerly dismissed because the damages allegations were conjectural. Even though a claimant‘s damages may be difficult to prove, it is improper to deny the claimant a chance to prove those damages by dismissing the claim based on the allegations of the complaint. When damages for a claim “are purely speculative or unmanageably complex, they will be barred at the summary judgment stage.” Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 635 (Minn. 2007). To the extent that the court of appeals applied a heightened standard to a motion to dismiss, we reject that standard and reaffirm the notice-pleading standard that we articulated in Walsh.
Applying the notice-pleading standard to Halva‘s complaint, we conclude that the allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In the complaint, Halva asserts that he is “entitled to an award of any actual damages plus exemplary damages for each [of MnSCU‘s] violation[s] of the [Data Practices Act].” He also alleges that he “suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney‘s fees.” MnSCU argues that this complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to put it on notice of how Halva‘s delays in receiving data caused him injury. Halva counters by asserting that the allegations of his complaint are sufficient because they gave MnSCU notice as to his theory of damages.
A pleading is sufficiently detailed when it gives “fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader‘s theory upon which his claim for relief is based.” Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. “Under our law, the pleading of broad general statements that may be conclusory is permitted.” Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997). “No longer is a pleader required tо allege facts and every element of a cause of action.” Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
Halva‘s complaint sufficiently identified the facts that gave rise to his claim. His complaint lists a number of facts that could support a finding of a Data Practices Act violation. In fact, we have something here not often seen in a pleading dispute: earlier litigation on the same issue and an order from an ALJ concluding that MnSCU violated the Data Practices Act. Halva‘s complaint, admittedly, is sparse with details and does not contain a direct causal statement explaining how those violations caused him harm.
This conclusion is not only supported by Walsh, but also by our decision in Hardin County Savings Bank v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of City of Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 2012). In Hardin County, the plaintiff asserted a negligent misrepresentation claim that was dismissed after a Rule 12.02 motion. Id. at 189. One element at issue was that another “person was financially harmed by relying” on the misrepresentation. Id. at 192. To support this element of the claim, the plaintiff simply stated that the defendants misrepresented the plaintiff‘s position, causing the plaintiff to default on some bond obligations that resulted in damages “in an amount greater than $50,000.” Id. at 195. We held that this statement was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss even under the heightened pleading standard applicable to allegations of fraud under Rule 9.02. Id.
In the same way, because Halva‘s complaint provides the factual nexus for his alleged damages, it is sufficient under our normal pleading standard. Indeed, in certain cases, Halva‘s style of pleading is required under our Rules of Civil Procedure. See
II.
We turn next to Halva‘s Official Records Act claim. The Official Records Act requires the State and its agencies to “make and preserve all records necessary to a full and accurate knowledge of their official activities.”
Halva makes two arguments in support of his position that the Official Records Act allows a private cause of action. First, he argues that the silence within the Official Records Act is ambiguous because the act is subject to more than one interpretation; that ambiguity, he contends, supports an interpretation that recognizes an implied private cause of action. Second, and alternatively, Halva аrgues that we should recognize a common law remedy for violations of the Official Records Act. MnSCU counters by asserting the absence of ambiguity and urges us to reject an adoption of any new common law remedy.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850 853 (Minn. 2020); see Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 2010) (judgments on
We are generally “reluctant to recognize causes of action” when the language of the statute does not expressly provide one. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d at 689. “In determining whether a private cause of action is clearly implied, we look to the language of the statute in question and its related sections.” Id. at 691. We cannot “add words to the statute that the Lеgislature did not supply.” Id. In fact, we have declined to recognize implied private causes of action in four of our decisions from the past 30 years. Id. at 692 (declining to find a cause of action within Minnesota‘s Pharmacy Practice and Wholesale Distribution Act because it was not expressly or impliedly provided by the plain language of the statute); Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 864-65 (Minn. 2010) (declining to find a private cause of action for third parties within a specific subdivision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act because the language of the statute was unambiguous and there was no implied cause of aсtion); Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 207-08 (declining to find an implied cause of action within Minnesota‘s Child Abuse Reporting Act because the Legislature “expressly creates civil liability when it intends to do so“); Bruegger v.
We decline to recognize an implied private cause of action for violations of the Official Records Act for several reasons. First, subdivision 4 of the Official Records Act reads: “Access to records containing government data is governed by sections 13.03 and 138.17.”
Second, we have customarily concluded that statutory silence on the topic of a private remedy does not make a statute ambiguous. “We have recognized that silenсe does
Third, although other provisions of Minnesota Statutes ch. 15 (2020), specifically set forth causes of action, notably, the Official Records Act does not. MnSCU accurately identifies criminal causes of action in chapter 15, civil remedies in section 15.057, and an action to compel compliance in section 15.60, paragraph c. See
Even if we were to equate silence with ambiguity, the amendment history of the Official Records Act cuts against finding an implied cause of action. Before 1979, we considered whether plaintiffs could enforce requests for disclosure of records under the Official Records Act through judicial relief. See Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. State, 163 N.W.2d 46, 48-49 (Minn. 1968); see also Kottschade v. Lundberg, 160 N.W.2d 135, 138-39 (Minn. 1968). In 1979, the Legislature amended the Official Reсords Act and folded any potential Official Records Act remedy into the Data Practices Act. Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 328, § 23, 1979 Minn. Laws 910, 922-23. Indeed, “[the Data Practices Act] has replaced the repealed foia provision of the Official Records Act.” Donald A. Gemberling & Gary A Weissman, Data Privacy: Everything You Wanted to Know About the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act -- From “A” to “Z”, 8 William Mitchell L. Rev. 573, 625-26 (1982) (referring to the Official Records Act as “the outdated predecessor of the [Data Practices Act]“). Instead of finding that the Legislature implied a cause of action within the Official Records Act, a more reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended to foreclose the possibility of a separate cause of action.
“Under the principle of judicial restraint, we are generally reluctant to recognize a new common-law right or remedy.” Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 408 (Minn. 2019). This reluctance is because “determining public policy” is a job “better performed by the legislature.” Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 151 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But we have recognized or extended rights or remedies when there is a compelling reason to do so.” Olson, 929 N.W.2d at 408.
Halva argues that governmental transparency is a compelling reason to recognize a common law cause of action. Although we agree that governmental transparency is an important interest, the Legislature has already addressed this interest through the Data Practices Act. The Data Practices Act provides that “[t]he responsible authority in every government entity shall keep records containing government data in such an arrangement and condition as to make them easily accessible for convenient use.”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals holding that Halva‘s complaint under thе Data Practices Act was insufficiently pleaded, and we affirm the court of appeals holding that the Official Records Act does not authorize a private cause of action.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.