Tinа C. WALLACE, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 11-5500, 11-5577.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: May 7, 2014. Decided and Filed: Aug. 22, 2014.
764 F.3d 571
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; DRAIN, District Judge.*
v.
FEDEX CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 11-5500, 11-5577.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued: May 7, 2014.
Decided and Filed: Aug. 22, 2014.
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; DRAIN, District Judge.*
OPINION
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Tina Wallace worked for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant FedEx Corporation (“FedEx”) for twenty-one years in a variety of positions. By 2007, she was a senior paralegal. By the summer of 2007, Wallace also had a variety of health problems that required her to take leave from her position. FedEx offered Wallace leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and its representatives verbally asked her to complete a medical-certification form. FedEx, however, never explained the consequences of not returning a completed form. Wallace failed to provide FedEx with the medical certification, and once she was absent for two consecutive days after the form was due, FedEx terminated her employment. Wallace filed suit under the FMLA, alleging that FedEx interfered with her rights under the statute. A magistrate judge dismissed Wallace’s request for liquidated damages and front pay, but after a trial, the jury sided with Wallace on the issues of liability and back pay, awarding damages in the amount of $173,000. Both parties filed postjudgment motions, and the magistrate judge denied all of them, except to reduce Wallace’s damages award to $90,788.
Wallace appealed the magistrate judge’s decisions on liquidated damages, front pay, and remittitur. FedEx cross-appealed, challenging the magistrate judge’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on liability, making several different arguments. On December 14, 2011, a motions panel of this court dismissed Wallace’s appeal of the liquidated-damages and front-pay decisions as untimely under
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Wallace started working for FedEx in 1986 as a part-time package handler. She stayed with the company, moving eventually into the legal department in 1993 as an associate paralegal. On June 1, 2007, Wallace transferred as a senior paralegal into the Legal Sales and Alliance Group, which was supervised by Rusty Phillips. Wallace shifted into this group, in part, because of a variety of health problems. Knowing this information, Phillips had a conversation with Wallace prior to her joining his*
During the summer of 2007 as this transfer took place, Wallace was also suffering from temporomandibular joint disorder, known as “TMJ,” which resulted in severe headaches, facial pain, chest pains, “significant weight loss,” and sleeping problems. R. 53 at 130:16-19, 132:17-24 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Pаge ID # 1587, 1589). Dr. Christine Kasser, Wallace’s physician, had prescribed “Synthroid, Adderall, Prozac, Wellbutrin, Lortab, Subutex, Klonopin, and Ambien” to treat this condition. Id. at 133:22-23 (Page ID # 1590). The prescriptions helped some, but Wallace continued to have sleep issues and stomach problems. In late July 2007, Wallace started arriving at work late, which prompted Phillips to email Wallace, stressing the importance of arriving to work on time. See id. at 168:5-24 (Page ID # 1625); Ex. App’x at 56. Wallace apologized for “slacking” and “promise[d] to everyday, try to strive with 100% dedication and determination to get [to work] at or before 9:00.” Ex. App’x at 57.
Wallace’s health and attendance problems worsened after Dr. Kasser adjusted Wallace’s Lortab prescription on Friday, August 3. R. 53 at 167:15-17 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1624). Lortab is a narcotic, and Wallace and her doctor decided to discontinue its use. Id. at 134:5-14 (Page ID # 1591). This process had rather drastic side effects. Wallace experienced “ringing in [her] ears,” “night sweats,” and “headaches”; she “felt like [she] was in a fog,” and “[her] skin was all crawly feeling.” Id. at 134:10-14 (Page ID # 1591). She could not sleep and had diarrhea. Id. As a result, “getting up” in the morning and “getting to work” were difficult. Id. at 134:17-21 (Page ID # 1591). At times, when she arrived at work, she “would sit in the parking lot and cry” or “go in to the building and ... cry.” Id. at 134:20-23 (Page ID # 1591).
On Monday, August 6, Wallace emailed Phillips with the subject line “not sure what to do”:
Rusty, because of my “past/baggage/history, etc.” I have struggled with whether I should or shouldn’t let you know something; but because of the same reasons I really feel and think I should, but also shouldn’t because of how it will or will not be taken/understood.
Ex. App’x at 15. Phillips responded that he thought “keeping an open, honest line of communication open [was] critical to a successful transition [to Wallace’s new position]” and offered to find someone with whom Wallace would feel comfortable speaking, if not him. Id.
By Tuesday, August 7, Wallace’s Lortab withdrawal symptoms had worsened, and she called in sick. The next day, Wallace emailed Phillips again: “In addition to yesterday, I unfortunately am unable to come in today and the rest of the week.” Ex. App’x at 14. Phillips replied: “You already know you are going to be sick through Friday? No hope of feeling better? Not sure I understand.” Ex. App’x at 58. Three hours later, Phillips sent another email:
Could you please be here at 9:00 a.m. sharp on Monday—we need to spend some time talking about your schedule—I think we are slipping from the 9:00 a.m. start time.... On the work schedule, in my mind, 9:00 meаns 9:00—not 9:12, 9:17 or 9:25. I believe there is a pattern of missing the start time we agreed upon. While I understand the occasional few minutes—it is a problem when it becomes a pattern.... Please let me know that you have received this
e-mail. Thank you and I hope you are feeling better.
Ex. App’x at 14.
Monday came, and Wallace arrived at work ninety minutes late. Phillips emailed: “After setting expectations when you started and after having a couple of discussions regarding your schedule, I am very disturbed that you arrived today at 10:30. We must find time to talk today.” Ex. App’x at 60. Wallace replied several hours later, apologizing. Phillips agreed “to start fresh,” but again stressed the importance of Wallace arriving on time to work. Id.
The next day, August 14, Wallace came to work at 9:30. When she arrived, Wallace tried to give Phillips an explanation, but he told her that they would meet later in the day. Phillips prepared a “written counseling,” a sort of reprimand, and issued it to Wallace. R. 54 at 174:8-9, 174:18-19 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2183); see also Ex. App’x at 61. This written counseling partially documented Wallace’s tardiness and the multiple discussions between Phillips and Wallace regarding Wallace’s attendance. Ex. App’x at 61. It also acknowledged that continued tardiness would result in “the escalation of the disciplinаry process.” Id.
On August 15, Wallace, Phillips, and Cathy Bowsher, a FedEx Human Resources Manager, met to discuss the written counseling. See Ex. App’x at 50. According to Phillips, Wallace apologized again for her tardiness and explained that she had had trouble “getting her child off to school.” R. 54 at 177:23 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2186). She also alerted Phillips and Bowsher to the fact that she was having difficulty, in part, because her doctor had adjusted her medication. At trial, Wallace stated that she did not mention the precise medication being adjusted because she “was not comfortable getting into that much detail.” R. 53 at 136:13-14 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1593). In response, Phillips gave Wallace three options:
First, comply with the attendance policy and complete work assignments in a timely fashion. Second, consider taking a period of time for medical leave until such time as she feels capable of adhering to the attendance policy and completing her work tasks. Lastly, [Wallace could] elect to not comply with the work requirements and suffer the consequences of the progressive discipline process.
Ex. App’x at 50. Wallace did not choose an option at the meeting. R. 53 at 137:6 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1594).
Immediately following the meeting’s conclusion, Wallace went to a pre-scheduled appointment with Dr. Kasser. During this visit, Dr. Kasser recognized that Wallace’s “condition appeared to be markedly changed” since the last time the doctor saw her and that Wallace “was anxious, shaking, [and] tremulous.” Id. at 214:10-20 (Page ID # 1671). Dr. Kasser “recommend[ed] that [Wallace] be off work for two weeks due to her medical conditions.” Ex. App’x at 3. The doctor placed this recommendation in writing and then wrote, “[s]he will then be reassessed.” Id. Dr. Kasser also presented Wallace with a letter indicating that Wallace’s absences from August 7 to August 10 should be excused for medical reasons. Ex. App’x at 62.
Following this appointment, Wallace returned to her workplace and met with Phillips. Wallace presented him with both letters from Dr. Kasser. Two conversations took place. One, Wallace, Phillips, and Lynn Diebold—an attorney in FedEx’s Labor and Employment Group—discussed her medical leave. Phillips passed Wallace several FMLA forms, though they
Wallace took the FMLA forms to Dr. Kasser, and the doctor filled out the necessary certification on August 20. See Ex. App’x at 9. On August 23, after evaluating Wallace, Dr. Kasser wrote another letter, recommending that Wallace have an additional three weeks of sick leave. See Ex. App’x at 10. After this visit, Wallace took the form and the letter, but she never returned either to FedEx. At trial, Wallace explained that she “could not bring [herself] to contact them or see them or go to them to provide those [forms] to them because of ... the way that [she] was feeling because of ... stopping all the medication.” R. 53 at 144:19-23 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1601). In particular, she said that she “was just not [herself]” and that she “felt like a failure and a disappointment ... and could not bring [herself] to call anybody or see anybody.” Id. at 145:1-6 (Page ID # 1602). On cross-examination, Wallace admitted that her phone and bank records indicated that she placed several other phone calls and made purchases away from her home. Id. at 189:8-191:16 (Page ID # 1646-48). During this time, Phillips also sent Wallace an overnight envelope with her timesheets that she was to fill in and return in a prepaid envelope. FedEx never received completed timesheets.
On August 30, according to FedEx, Wallace’s original two weeks of leave ended. When Wallace failed to report to work, Phillips tried numerous times to reach her by phone, but he testified that he received a busy signal each time. R. 54 at 195:25—196:1 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2204-05). He also sent an email to Wallace’s personal account, alerting her to the fact that her leave had ended and that he had received no documentation from her. See Ex. App’x at 69. Phillips did not receive a “read receipt” indicating that Wallace had opened or seen this email. R. 54 at 200:24-201:10 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2209-10). This same sequence of events played out again on August 31, and once more, Phillips failed to reach Wallace. Id. at 198:4-200:21 (Page ID # 2207-09). In his August 31 email, Phillips wrote:
I have received nothing from you related to an extension of the sick time and I have not heard from you related to your failure to return to work on either August 30 or 31. Even if you had an extension of your time away from the office for sick leave by your doctor, it is your duty and responsibility to notify me of the situation, pursuant to company policy.... This is a very serious matter and I would suggest that you review our corporate policies and procedures related to failing to provide proper notice of your absence from work.
Ex. App’x at 70.
The weekend and Labor Day passed without communication between Wallace and anyone at FedEx. On Tuesday, September 4, Wallace called Bowsher at 5:30 a.m. and left a voice message, telling Bowsher that she was on her way to the hospital for surgery on her right ear. The same day, Phillips—with the assistance of Bowsher—drafted a termination letter, severing the company’s relationship with
When Wallace received the letter and the voiсe message on September 5, she called Phillips, Bowsher, and Jim Ferguson—a general counsel and vice president at FedEx. Wallace told them that she had a completed medical-certification form, but Ferguson told her that “it didn’t matter.” R. 53 at 153:12 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1610). At trial, Wallace testified that she would have called or turned in the medical-certification form if she had known the consequences of not doing so.
After her termination, Wallace continued to see Dr. Kasser. On December 13, Dr. Kasser executed a form for the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development on which she indicated that Wallace had been able to return to her usual duties on September 11, 2007. See Ex. App’x 11. Starting in mid-October, approximately one month after being terminated, Wallace began applying for other jobs. See Ex. App’x at 12-13. Between October 2007 and January 2010, Wallace applied (unsuccessfully) for approximately eighty jobs. See id.
While unemployed, Wallace also started seeing Dr. Jack Morgan, a psychiatrist, in January 2009. When Wallace first visited Dr. Morgan, he awarded her a GAF score of 45 in his notes because “she was not handling things well.” R. 54 at 32:9-11, 33:7 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2041, 2042). He also diagnosed hеr as potentially having bipolar disorder and a personality disorder, as well as suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder and ADHD. Dr. Morgan continued to see and treat Wallace, and by August 2009, she had improved enough that Dr. Morgan assigned a GAF score of 68, meaning that she was in the “higher level of moderate impairment.” Id. at 43:21 (Page ID # 2052). When asked if Wallace could perform her duties as a paralegal in February 2010, Dr. Morgan replied that he did not know the precise duties of a paralegal but that he “would be surprised to see her function well and be comfortable in a ... larger organization....” Id. at 45:3-5 (Page ID # 2054).
B. Procedural History
On March 3, 2008, Wallace filed suit in federal court, alleging that FedEx violated the FMLA by terminating her employment on September 5, 2007. Wallace requested payment for her lost wages and healthcare benefits, reinstatement (and front pay until she is reinstated), and “liquidated damages in an amount equal to [her] lost wages, salary, and employment benefits” provided for in
The case went to trial approximately two years later.2 At the end of Wallace’s case-in-chief, FedEx moved for judgment as a matter of law under
After another day of testimony, FedEx moved again for judgment as a matter of law. FedEx argued that Wallace failed to put the company on notice that she was taking FMLA leave. Again, the court denied the motion, finding sufficient evidence in the record to support a reasonable juror’s finding in favor of Wallace. FedEx also moved under
The court submitted the remainder of the case to the jury, which found that Wallace proved the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “that she suffered from a ‘serious health condition’ that made her unable to perform the functions of her position”; (2) that she gave FedEx “adequate ‘notice’ of her intent to take leave under the FMLA”; (3) that FedEx “failed to give her written notice of her obligation to timely provide sufficient medical certification and the consequences if she failed to do so”; and (4) “but for [FedEx’s] not providing written notice ..., [Wallace] would have timely provided [the information].” R. 56 at 1-2 (Verdict Form) (Page ID # 836-37). The jury awarded Wallace $173,000. Id. at 2 (Page ID # 837). The judgment issued on April 2, 2010.
Since then, the parties have filed numerous motions. On April 23, 2010, FedEx filed a motion—unopposed by Wallace—requesting that the district court extend the deadline until May 7, 2010 for FedEx to file a motion under
On May 7, 2010, FedEx filed a
On December 20, 2010, the magistrate judge denied Wallace’s
The next action in this saga took place on March 24, 2011 when the magistrate judge denied FedEx’s motion under
On April 25, 2011, Wallace filed her notice of appeal pro se, seeking review of the magistrate judge’s grant of FedEx’s
On May 17, 2011, the clerk’s office for this circuit issued an order to show cause to Wallace, having observed that her notice to appeal appeared to have been filed late as it related to the magistrate judge’s decisions of March 31, 2010, April 27, 2010, and December 20, 2010. See Wallace v. FedEx Corp., No. 11-5500, at *1 (6th Cir. May 17, 2011) (unpublished order). The show-cause order reasoned that FedEx’s May 7, 2010 motion was not timely filed because it was filed more than 28 days from when the lower court issued its judgment, and
On December 14, 2011, a motions panel issued an order, dismissing Wallace’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s rulings of March 31, 2010, April 27, 2010, and De-
In her current appeal, Wallace raises several claims: (1) her notice of appeal related to the March 31, 2010 and December 20, 2010 rulings was timely filed; (2) the magistrate judge erred in granting FedEx’s
II. JURISDICTION
Before evaluating any of the parties’ arguments on the merits of the magistrate judge’s various rulings, we must first determine which issues are properly in front of us. See, e.g., First Nat‘l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2002). The main question presented is whether we can entertain Wallace’s claims regarding the magistrate judge’s December 20, 2010 ruling given that a motions panel has already dismissed this appeal as untimely. Ultimately, we conclude that we can decide only the appeal and cross-appeal related to the magistrate judge’s March 24, 2011 order.
A. Applicable Rules
Answering this question requires us to decipher how several rules of civil and appellate procedure interact. By way of introduction and for ease of reference, we briefly describe these rules at the outset. Under
With this framework in mind, we turn to the jurisdictional questions.
B. Wallace’s Appeal of Liquidated-Damages and Front-Pay Rulings
On December 14, 2011, the motions panel dismissed Wallace’s appeal relating to the issues of liquidated damages and front pay, holding that Wallace had failed to comply with
In the regular course of events, one panel of this court cannot overrule another panel’s published decision. See Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2001). While the decisions of motions panels are generally interlocutory in nature (and, thus, not strictly binding upon subsequent panels), they do receive some measure of deference. See, e.g., Kraus v. Taylor, 715 F.3d 589, 594 (6th Cir. 2013); R.E. Dailey & Co. v. John Madden Co., 983 F.2d 1068, 1992 WL 405282, at *1 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1992) (table decision). Later panels cannot simply choose to disregard motions-panel decisions, and if a litigant wishes to challenge a motions panel’s decision on a dispositive motion, the proper course of action is to request panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. See 6 Cir. R. 35, 40; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2018, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (noting our use of this procedure); Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2005) (same), aff’d, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).
In this case, Wallace did not explicitly petition for rehearing. Instead, she filed her first opening brief pro se on April 13, 2012, and in this brief, she renewed her argument that the magistrate judge erred in granting FedEx’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issues of liquidated damages and front pay. Given the motions panel’s dismissal of Wallace’s appeal of this issue, it makes little sense for her to include this argument in her appellate brief unless she sought review of the motions panel’s decision. Reading Wallace’s pro se filings liberally, as we must, we construe this language as a request for rehearing. See, e.g., United States v. Ninety-Three (93) Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2003); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1990).
Under the
Wallace implicitly contends that these reasons exist because the motions panel’s decision directly conflicts with a prior published decision of this court—National Ecological Foundation v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2007). On the narrow point that the motions panel’s
National Ecological is directly on point, and it is the law of the circuit, meaning that it binds all subsequent panels “‘unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.’” Darrah, 255 F.3d at 309 (quoting Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478.2 (2d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between law of the case and law of the circuit). The Supreme Court has not decided a case that would allow the motions panel to cast aside National Ecological,8 and we have not overturned the case en banc. Therefore, on December 14, 2011, it was binding precedent. By not following that decision, the motions panel clearly erred in holding that Wallace’s notice of appeal was untimely.
Unfortunately for Wallace, however, the motions panel’s clear error is not—in and of itself—enough to warrant us reopening her appeal three years later. We recognize that this ruling appears harsh, but we do not believe that it results in a manifest injustice for several reasons. One, Wallace “agree[d] with the [motions panel]
III. ANALYSIS
A. FMLA Liability
Having decided that we review only the parties’ appeals and cross-appeals related to the March 24, 2011 order, we turn first to FedEx’s contention that the magistrate judge erred by not awarding it judgment as a matter of law on the issue of FMLA liability. Under the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].”
We review de novo the denial of a motion (or renewed motion) for judgment as a matter of law. Arban, 345 F.3d at 400; Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.’” Tisdale, 415 F.3d at 527 (quoting Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004)). For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s denial of FedEx’s motions.
1. Notice
“[T]o invoke the protection of the FMLA, an employee must provide notice and a qualifying reason for requesting the leave.” Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1995)). Under the regulations in place at the time of these events, this notice must have been given “as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
In its cross-appeal, FedEx argues that “Wallace failed to present any evidence showing that she provided FedEx notice of an intention to take FMLA leave beyond the non-FMLA leave she received for August 15th through 29th.” Second Br. at 38; see also Fourth Br. at 13. Specifically, FedEx focuses upon Wallace’s failure to return the medical-certification form or to indicate that she desired leave beyond August 29.
By focusing on whether Wallace provided enough documentation for continued leave, FedEx largely misses the point of this notice element. The relevant question is whether Wallace provided FedEx with notice that she needed FMLA leave, not whether she provided notice that she needed a certain amount of FMLA leave. See Cavin, 346 F.3d at 725 (finding a plaintiff’s notice to the defendant “sufficient to
Even if we were to adopt FedEx’s line of thinking, the jury was not unreasonable in concluding that Wallace requested leave that extended to her absences on September 3 and 4. Dr. Kasser’s note stated that she “recommend[ed] that [Wallace] be off for two weeks due to her medical conditions. She will then be reassessed.” Ex. App’x at 3. In an ideal world, Wallace would have updated this note to clarify that Dr. Kasser explicitly found another three weeks of leave were necessary, but Dr. Kasser’s note is open to interpretation. A reasonable jury could conclude that the use of “two weeks” was an approximate span of time, a reading that gains more traction when combined with the sentence “[s]he will then be reassessed.” Moreover, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Kasser’s note not only provides a rough estimate of time needed but also indicates that the medical professionals would need to clear Wallace to return to work before her leave would end.10 From our vantage point, it is not clear that the jury refused to make these implicit findings, and if it did make them, those findings would not be unreasonable. Thus, if we draw all inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, we cannot hold that the magistrate judge erred in refusing to grant judgment as a matter of law on this point.
2. Interference
FedEx also argues that no reasonable jury could find that FedEx’s termination of Wallace’s employment was an interference with her rights under the FMLA because Wallace’s failure to return the medical-certification form meant that she was not eligible for leave under the statute. This broad argument triggers a number of questions: (a) whether FedEx provided Wallace with sufficient notice regarding the consequences of failing to return a medical-certification form; (b) if not, whether
a. FedEx’s Noncompliance with 29 C.F.R. § 825.305
Under the Department of Labor’s regulations, an employer has the option of re-
If all inferences are drawn in the jury’s favor, the record supports the jury’s findings. The parties agree that Phillips and Diebold told Wallace that she needed to return a medical-certification form within fifteen days. R. 53 at 139:18-19 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1596). But
b. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305 Is Not Arbitrary or Capricious
FedEx also argues that the magistrate judge erred by applying
First, interpreting “a timely manner” to be at least fifteen days is within the agency’s discretion. The FMLA grants the Secretary of Labor power to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out” the statute.
Second, requiring employers to provide employees individualized notice of the consequences of not returning a medical-certification form does not turn
Third, requiring an employer to provide an employee with individualized notice regarding the consequences of not completing the certification process does not conflict with
c. Independent, Legitimate Reason
Next, FedEx argues that it terminated Wallace for a legitimate reason—failing to comply with the company’s attendance policy—which was independent of her FMLA leave. Again, FedEx correctly states the law. We have said that “[a]n employee lawfully may be dismissed, preventing him from exercising his statutory rights to FMLA leave or reinstatement, but only if the dismissal would have occurred regardless of the employee’s request for or taking of FMLA leave.” Arban, 345 F.3d at 401 (citing Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Despite stating the law correctly, FedEx errs when it argues that failing to report for work on August 30 and 31 is somehow independent from the FMLA leave at issue in this case. Wallace’s failure to report for work—and her subsequent termination—is a direct result of failing to perfect her FMLA leave, which is a consequence of FedEx failing to meet its responsibilities under
d. Prejudice
Finally, FedEx challenges the jury’s finding that “but for [FedEx] not providing written notice regarding [Wallace’s] obligations to provide medical certification and the consequences for not doing so, [Wallace] would have timely provided sufficient medical certification[.]” R. 56 at 2 (Jury Verdict) (Page ID # 837). FedEx contends that no reasonable juror could make this decision based on the evidence at trial for two reasons: (1) there is no evidence that FedEx fired Wallace for failing to return her medical-certification form; and (2) Wallace admitted her emotional state—not lack of notice—caused her not to turn in the form. Neither argument is meritorious.
FedEx’s first argument fails because it asks us to ignore the full chain of causation that led to Wallace failing to report to work on August 30 and 31. FedEx claims that it terminated Wallace’s employment because she was absent—without a valid excuse—for two consecutive days, but the reason her absences were unexcused was because Wallace fаiled to perfect her FMLA leave. The
FedEx’s second argument is also fruitless. The corporation contends that Wallace admitted that she failed to return the form, not because FedEx failed to give her notice, but because she was “emotionally and mentally ... not [her]self.” R. 53 at 145:2 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1602). In the Fourth Brief, FedEx writes, “[h]er failure to comply with the certification requirement resulted from her diminished emotional state and not FedEx’s alleged actions, therefore, Wallace could not show as a matter of law that she was harmed by FedEx’s alleged technical violation of the FMLA.” Fourth Br. at 12. In making this argument, FedEx disregards
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we reject FedEx’s cross-appeal in full and AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s denial of FedEx’s motions for judgment as a matter of law.
B. Damages
Wallace appeals the magistrate judge’s reduction of the jury’s damages award. Under the
In her briefing, Wallace assigns two errors: (1) the magistrate judge remitted her backpay damages award without giving her the option of a new trial; and (2) the magistrate judge impermissibly reweighed the evidence in deciding to reduce the jury’s award of damages. FedEx re-
1. The Magistrate Judge Granted Remittitur
On May 7, 2010, FedEx filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under
First, the March 24, 2011 order is styled as a denial of FedEx’s motion for judgment as a law and a grant of remittitur. See R. 87 at 1 (Mag. J. Mar. 24, 2011 Order) (Page ID # 2629). Second, the magistrate judge recites only the standard for granting remittitur, not the legal requirements for granting judgment as a
2. Magistrate Judge Impermissibly Re-Weighed Evidence
Despite the above-mentioned procedural error, there remains the question of whether this panel should remand and order the magistrate judge to give Wallace the option of a new trial or remand and order the magistrate judge to enter judgment in Wallace’s favor for the full $173,000. To answer this question, it is necessary to review the magistrate judge’s prior decision on remittitur on the merits. In doing so, we conclude that the magistrate judge abused her discretion by re-weighing the evidence, and thus, we order the magistrate judge to enter judgment in Wallace’s favor for $173,000.
A jury’s damages “award must stand unless it is (1) beyond the range supportable by рroof; or (2) so excessive as to shock the conscience; or (3) the result of a mistake.” Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir. 2000). Specifically, we have “held that ‘a jury verdict will not be set aside or reduced as excessive unless it is beyond the maximum damages that the jury reasonably could find to be compensatory for a party’s loss.’” Farber, 917 F.2d at 1395 (quoting Green v. Francis, 705 F.2d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1983)). “A trial court is within its discretion in remitting a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that the verdict is clearly excessive; resulted from passion, bias, or prejudice; or is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience of the court.” Id. Moreover, a “trial court may not substitute its judgment or credibility determinations for those of the jury.” Id. And “[the district court] abuses its discretion in ordering either a remittitur or new trial when the amount of the verdict turns upon conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, the magistrate judge concluded that a reasonable jury could not find that Wallace was able to work as a paralegal between January 2009 and March 2010. R. 87 at 13-14 (Mag. J. Mar. 24, 2011 Order) (Page ID # 2641-42). For support, the magistrate judge relied upon the testimony of Dr. Morgan and Wallace’s own statements.
Dr. Morgan did testify that he “didn’t think that [Wallace] would have been able to work effectively” as of January 2009, that he initially assigned her a GAF score of 45, and that he did not believe Wallace could work effectively at her job at FedEx in February 2010. R. 54 at 32:7-8 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2041); see also id.
If this were all the testimony that the jury heard, we would be inclined to agree with the magistrate judge’s remittance of the back-pay award. But it is not. The jury also heard Wallace explain her inability to answer FedEx’s questions regarding her ability to work on various dates. See id. at 206:8-207:16 (Page ID # 1663-64). Wallace stated: “I mean, you don’t know if you’re going to be sick or have a cold or something of that nature.” Id. at 206:17-18 (Page ID # 1663). The jury heard Dr. Morgan state that the GAF score was an arbitrary number, that Wallace might have been able to work as a paralegal in April 2009, and that he was unfamiliar with the duties of a paralegal. R. 54 at 32:13-19 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2041); id. at 37:21-23 (Page ID # 2046); id. at 45:1-9 (Page ID # 2054).
Viewing this information in the light most favorable to Wallace, we conclude that it is not clear that the jury could not have credited this additional information and believed that Wallаce was capable of working between January 2009 and March 2010. The magistrate judge’s failure to credit this information constitutes a re-weighing of the evidence, and thus, she abused her discretion. As a result, we order the magistrate judge to enter judgment for Wallace in the amount of $173,000.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the magistrate judge’s remittitur decision and ORDER the magistrate judge to enter judgment in favor of Wallace in the amount of $173,000. With regard to FedEx’s cross-appeals, we AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on all issues.